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This is a partial revert of commit
8117961d98f ("x86/efi: Disregard setup header of loaded image")
which triggers boot issues on older Dell laptops. As it turns out,
switching back to a heap allocation for the struct boot_params
constructed by the EFI stub works around this, even though it is unclear
why.
Cc: Christian Heusel <[email protected]>
Reported-by: <mavrix#[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The "early" part of the helper's name isn't accurate[1]. Drop it in
preparation for adding a new (not early) usage.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMj1kXEyDjH0uu3Z4eBesV3PEnKGi5ArXXMp7R-hn8HdRytiPg@mail.gmail.com [1]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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As it turns out, clearing the BSS was not the right fix for the issue
that was ultimately fixed by commit decd347c2a75 ("x86/efistub:
Reinstate soft limit for initrd loading"), and given that the Windows
EFI loader becomes very unhappy when entered with garbage in BSS, this
is one thing that x86 PC EFI implementations can be expected to get
right.
So drop it from the pure PE entrypoint. The handover protocol entrypoint
still needs this - it is used by the flaky distro bootloaders that
barely implement PE/COFF at all.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The fail label is only used in a situation where the previous EFI API
call succeeded, and so status will be set to EFI_SUCCESS. Fix this, by
dropping the goto entirely, and call efi_exit() with the correct error
code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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0c18184de990 ("platform/x86: apple-gmux: support MMIO gmux on T2 Macs")
brought support for T2 Macs in apple-gmux. But in order to use dual GPU,
the integrated GPU has to be enabled. On such dual GPU EFI Macs, the EFI
stub needs to report that it is booting macOS in order to prevent the
firmware from disabling the iGPU.
This patch is also applicable for some non T2 Intel Macs.
Based on this patch for GRUB by Andreas Heider <[email protected]>:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2013-12/msg00442.html
Credits also goto Kerem Karabay <[email protected]> for helping porting
the patch to the Linux kernel.
Cc: Orlando Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
[ardb: limit scope using list of DMI matches provided by Lukas and Orlando]
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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Between kexec and confidential VM support, handling the EFI memory maps
correctly on x86 is already proving to be rather difficult (as opposed
to other EFI architectures which manage to never modify the EFI memory
map to begin with)
EFI fake memory map support is essentially a development hack (for
testing new support for the 'special purpose' and 'more reliable' EFI
memory attributes) that leaked into production code. The regions marked
in this manner are not actually recognized as such by the firmware
itself or the EFI stub (and never have), and marking memory as 'more
reliable' seems rather futile if the underlying memory is just ordinary
RAM.
Marking memory as 'special purpose' in this way is also dubious, but may
be in use in production code nonetheless. However, the same should be
achievable by using the memmap= command line option with the ! operator.
EFI fake memmap support is not enabled by any of the major distros
(Debian, Fedora, SUSE, Ubuntu) and does not exist on other
architectures, so let's drop support for it.
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI fix from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Followup fix for the EFI boot sequence refactor, which may result in
physical KASLR putting the kernel in a region which is being used for
a special purpose via a command line argument.
* tag 'efi-fixes-for-v6.10-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
x86/efistub: Omit physical KASLR when memory reservations exist
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The legacy decompressor has elaborate logic to ensure that the
randomized physical placement of the decompressed kernel image does not
conflict with any memory reservations, including ones specified on the
command line using mem=, memmap=, efi_fake_mem= or hugepages=, which are
taken into account by the kernel proper at a later stage.
When booting in EFI mode, it is the firmware's job to ensure that the
chosen range does not conflict with any memory reservations that it
knows about, and this is trivially achieved by using the firmware's
memory allocation APIs.
That leaves reservations specified on the command line, though, which
the firmware knows nothing about, as these regions have no other special
significance to the platform. Since commit
a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
these reservations are not taken into account when randomizing the
physical placement, which may result in conflicts where the memory
cannot be reserved by the kernel proper because its own executable image
resides there.
To avoid having to duplicate or reuse the existing complicated logic,
disable physical KASLR entirely when such overrides are specified. These
are mostly diagnostic tools or niche features, and physical KASLR (as
opposed to virtual KASLR, which is much more important as it affects the
memory addresses observed by code executing in the kernel) is something
we can live without.
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/FA5F6719-8824-4B04-803E-82990E65E627%40akamai.com
Reported-by: Ben Chaney <[email protected]>
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.1+
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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Commit
8117961d98fb2 ("x86/efi: Disregard setup header of loaded image")
dropped the memcopy of the image's setup header into the boot_params
struct provided to the core kernel, on the basis that EFI boot does not
need it and should rely only on a single protocol to interface with the
boot chain. It is also a prerequisite for being able to increase the
section alignment to 4k, which is needed to enable memory protections
when running in the boot services.
So only the setup_header fields that matter to the core kernel are
populated explicitly, and everything else is ignored. One thing was
overlooked, though: the initrd_addr_max field in the setup_header is not
used by the core kernel, but it is used by the EFI stub itself when it
loads the initrd, where its default value of INT_MAX is used as the soft
limit for memory allocation.
This means that, in the old situation, the initrd was virtually always
loaded in the lower 2G of memory, but now, due to initrd_addr_max being
0x0, the initrd may end up anywhere in memory. This should not be an
issue principle, as most systems can deal with this fine. However, it
does appear to tickle some problems in older UEFI implementations, where
the memory ends up being corrupted, resulting in errors when unpacking
the initramfs.
So set the initrd_addr_max field to INT_MAX like it was before.
Fixes: 8117961d98fb2 ("x86/efi: Disregard setup header of loaded image")
Reported-by: Radek Podgorny <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI fixes from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Fix logic that is supposed to prevent placement of the kernel image
below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR
- Use the firmware stack in the EFI stub when running in mixed mode
- Clear BSS only once when using mixed mode
- Check efi.get_variable() function pointer for NULL before trying to
call it
* tag 'efi-fixes-for-v6.9-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi: fix panic in kdump kernel
x86/efistub: Don't clear BSS twice in mixed mode
x86/efistub: Call mixed mode boot services on the firmware's stack
efi/libstub: fix efi_random_alloc() to allocate memory at alloc_min or higher address
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Clearing BSS should only be done once, at the very beginning.
efi_pe_entry() is the entrypoint from the firmware, which may not clear
BSS and so it is done explicitly. However, efi_pe_entry() is also used
as an entrypoint by the mixed mode startup code, in which case BSS will
already have been cleared, and doing it again at this point will corrupt
global variables holding the firmware's GDT/IDT and segment selectors.
So make the memset() conditional on whether the EFI stub is running in
native mode.
Fixes: b3810c5a2cc4a666 ("x86/efistub: Clear decompressor BSS in native EFI entrypoint")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI fix from Ard Biesheuvel:
"This fixes an oversight on my part in the recent EFI stub rework for
x86, which is needed to get Linux/x86 distro builds signed again for
secure boot by Microsoft. For this reason, most of this work is being
backported to v6.1, which is therefore also affected by this
regression.
- Explicitly wipe BSS in the native EFI entrypoint, so that globals
shared with the legacy decompressor are zero-initialized correctly"
* tag 'efi-fixes-for-v6.9-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
x86/efistub: Clear decompressor BSS in native EFI entrypoint
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The EFI stub on x86 no longer invokes the decompressor as a subsequent
boot stage, but calls into the decompression code directly while running
in the context of the EFI boot services.
This means that when using the native EFI entrypoint (as opposed to the
EFI handover protocol, which clears BSS explicitly), the firmware PE
image loader is being relied upon to ensure that BSS is zeroed before
the EFI stub is entered from the firmware.
As Radek's report proves, this is a bad idea. Not all loaders do this
correctly, which means some global variables that should be statically
initialized to 0x0 may have junk in them.
So clear BSS explicitly when entering via efi_pe_entry(). Note that
zeroing BSS from C code is not generally safe, but in this case, the
following assignment and dereference of a global pointer variable
ensures that the memset() cannot be deferred or reordered.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.1+
Reported-by: Radek Podgorny <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
- Measure initrd and command line using the CC protocol if the ordinary
TCG2 protocol is not implemented, typically on TDX confidential VMs
- Avoid creating mappings that are both writable and executable while
running in the EFI boot services. This is a prerequisite for getting
the x86 shim loader signed by MicroSoft again, which allows the
distros to install on x86 PCs that ship with EFI secure boot enabled.
- API update for struct platform_driver::remove()
* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
virt: efi_secret: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
x86/efistub: Remap kernel text read-only before dropping NX attribute
efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms
efi/libstub: Measure into CC protocol if TCG2 protocol is absent
efi/libstub: Add Confidential Computing (CC) measurement typedefs
efi/tpm: Use symbolic GUID name from spec for final events table
efi/libstub: Use TPM event typedefs from the TCG PC Client spec
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Currently, the EFI stub invokes the EFI memory attributes protocol to
strip any NX restrictions from the entire loaded kernel, resulting in
all code and data being mapped read-write-execute.
The point of the EFI memory attributes protocol is to remove the need
for all memory allocations to be mapped with both write and execute
permissions by default, and make it the OS loader's responsibility to
transition data mappings to code mappings where appropriate.
Even though the UEFI specification does not appear to leave room for
denying memory attribute changes based on security policy, let's be
cautious and avoid relying on the ability to create read-write-execute
mappings. This is trivially achievable, given that the amount of kernel
code executing via the firmware's 1:1 mapping is rather small and
limited to the .head.text region. So let's drop the NX restrictions only
on that subregion, but not before remapping it as read-only first.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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To allow event log info access after boot, EFI boot stub extracts
the event log information and installs it in an EFI configuration
table. Currently, EFI boot stub only supports installation of event
log only for TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 protocols. Extend the same support
for CC protocol. Since CC platform also uses TCG2 format, reuse TPM2
support code as much as possible.
Link: https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#efi-cc-measurement-protocol [1]
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0229a87e-fb19-4dad-99fc-4afd7ed4099a%40collabora.com
[ardb: Split out final events table handling to avoid version confusion]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The early SME/SEV code parses the command line very early, in order to
decide whether or not memory encryption should be enabled, which needs
to occur even before the initial page tables are created.
This is problematic for a number of reasons:
- this early code runs from the 1:1 mapping provided by the decompressor
or firmware, which uses a different translation than the one assumed by
the linker, and so the code needs to be built in a special way;
- parsing external input while the entire kernel image is still mapped
writable is a bad idea in general, and really does not belong in
security minded code;
- the current code ignores the built-in command line entirely (although
this appears to be the case for the entire decompressor)
Given that the decompressor/EFI stub is an intrinsic part of the x86
bootable kernel image, move the command line parsing there and out of
the core kernel. This removes the need to build lib/cmdline.o in a
special way, or to use RIP-relative LEA instructions in inline asm
blocks.
This involves a new xloadflag in the setup header to indicate
that mem_encrypt=on appeared on the kernel command line.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The EFI stub's kernel placement logic randomizes the physical placement
of the kernel by taking all available memory into account, and picking a
region at random, based on a random seed.
When KASLR is disabled, this seed is set to 0x0, and this results in the
lowest available region of memory to be selected for loading the kernel,
even if this is below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. Some of this memory is
typically reserved for the GFP_DMA region, to accommodate masters that
can only access the first 16 MiB of system memory.
Even if such devices are rare these days, we may still end up with a
warning in the kernel log, as reported by Tom:
swapper/0: page allocation failure: order:10, mode:0xcc1(GFP_KERNEL|GFP_DMA), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
Fix this by tweaking the random allocation logic to accept a low bound
on the placement, and set it to LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Reported-by: Tom Englund <[email protected]>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218404
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The recently introduced EFI memory attributes protocol should be used
if it exists to ensure that the memory allocation created for the kernel
permits execution. This is needed for compatibility with tightened
requirements related to Windows logo certification for x86 PCs.
Currently, we simply strip the execute protect (XP) attribute from the
entire range, but this might be rejected under some firmware security
policies, and so in a subsequent patch, this will be changed to only
strip XP from the executable region that runs early, and make it
read-only (RO) as well.
In order to catch any issues early, ensure that the memory attribute
protocol works as intended, and give up if it produces spurious errors.
Note that the DXE services based fallback was always based on best
effort, so don't propagate any errors returned by that API.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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When KASLR is enabled, the KASLR_FLAG bit in boot_params->hdr.loadflags
should be set to 1 to propagate KASLR status from compressed kernel to
kernel, just as the choose_random_location() function does.
Currently, when the kernel is booted via the EFI stub, the KASLR_FLAG
bit in boot_params->hdr.loadflags is not set, even though it should be.
This causes some functions, such as kernel_randomize_memory(), not to
execute as expected. Fix it.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <[email protected]>
[ardb: drop 'else' branch clearing KASLR_FLAG]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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River reports boot hangs with v6.6 and v6.7, and the bisect points to
commit
a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
which moves the memory allocation and kernel decompression from the
legacy decompressor (which executes *after* ExitBootServices()) to the
EFI stub, using boot services for allocating the memory. The memory
allocation succeeds but the subsequent call to decompress_kernel() never
returns, resulting in a failed boot and a hanging system.
As it turns out, this issue only occurs when physical address
randomization (KASLR) is enabled, and given that this is a feature we
can live without (virtual KASLR is much more important), let's disable
the physical part of KASLR when booting on AMI UEFI firmware claiming to
implement revision v2.0 of the specification (which was released in
2006), as this is the version these systems advertise.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218173
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Rework PE header generation, primarily to generate a modern, 4k
aligned kernel image view with narrower W^X permissions.
- Further refine init-lifetime annotations
- Misc cleanups & fixes
* tag 'x86-boot-2023-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/boot: efistub: Assign global boot_params variable
x86/boot: Rename conflicting 'boot_params' pointer to 'boot_params_ptr'
x86/head/64: Move the __head definition to <asm/init.h>
x86/head/64: Add missing __head annotation to startup_64_load_idt()
x86/head/64: Mark 'startup_gdt[]' and 'startup_gdt_descr' as __initdata
x86/boot: Harmonize the style of array-type parameter for fixup_pointer() calls
x86/boot: Fix incorrect startup_gdt_descr.size
x86/boot: Compile boot code with -std=gnu11 too
x86/boot: Increase section and file alignment to 4k/512
x86/boot: Split off PE/COFF .data section
x86/boot: Drop PE/COFF .reloc section
x86/boot: Construct PE/COFF .text section from assembler
x86/boot: Derive file size from _edata symbol
x86/boot: Define setup size in linker script
x86/boot: Set EFI handover offset directly in header asm
x86/boot: Grab kernel_info offset from zoffset header directly
x86/boot: Drop references to startup_64
x86/boot: Drop redundant code setting the root device
x86/boot: Omit compression buffer from PE/COFF image memory footprint
x86/boot: Remove the 'bugger off' message
...
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Now that the x86 EFI stub calls into some APIs exposed by the
decompressor (e.g., kaslr_get_random_long()), it is necessary to ensure
that the global boot_params variable is set correctly before doing so.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
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Now that the x86 EFI stub calls into some APIs exposed by the
decompressor (e.g., kaslr_get_random_long()), it is necessary to ensure
that the global boot_params variable is set correctly before doing so.
Note that the decompressor and the kernel proper carry conflicting
declarations for the global variable 'boot_params' so refer to it via an
alias to work around this.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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setup_e820() is executed after UEFI's ExitBootService has been called.
This causes the firmware to throw an exception because the Console IO
protocol is supposed to work only during boot service environment. As
per UEFI 2.9, section 12.1:
"This protocol is used to handle input and output of text-based
information intended for the system user during the operation of code
in the boot services environment."
So drop the diagnostic warning from this function. We might add back a
warning that is issued later when initializing the kernel itself.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The native EFI entrypoint does not take a struct boot_params from the
loader, but instead, it constructs one from scratch, using the setup
header data placed at the start of the image.
This setup header is placed in a way that permits legacy loaders to
manipulate the contents (i.e., to pass the kernel command line or the
address and size of an initial ramdisk), but EFI boot does not use it in
that way - it only copies the contents that were placed there at build
time, but EFI loaders will not (and should not) manipulate the setup
header to configure the boot. (Commit 63bf28ceb3ebbe76 "efi: x86: Wipe
setup_data on pure EFI boot" deals with some of the fallout of using
setup_data in a way that breaks EFI boot.)
Given that none of the non-zero values that are copied from the setup
header into the EFI stub's struct boot_params are relevant to the boot
now that the EFI stub no longer enters via the legacy decompressor, the
copy can be omitted altogether.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
"This primarily covers some cleanup work on the EFI runtime wrappers,
which are shared between all EFI architectures except Itanium, and
which provide some level of isolation to prevent faults occurring in
the firmware code (which runs at the same privilege level as the
kernel) from bringing down the system.
Beyond that, there is a fix that did not make it into v6.5, and some
doc fixes and dead code cleanup.
- one bugfix for x86 mixed mode that did not make it into v6.5
- first pass of cleanup for the EFI runtime wrappers
- some cosmetic touchups"
* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
x86/efistub: Fix PCI ROM preservation in mixed mode
efi/runtime-wrappers: Clean up white space and add __init annotation
acpi/prmt: Use EFI runtime sandbox to invoke PRM handlers
efi/runtime-wrappers: Don't duplicate setup/teardown code
efi/runtime-wrappers: Remove duplicated macro for service returning void
efi/runtime-wrapper: Move workqueue manipulation out of line
efi/runtime-wrappers: Use type safe encapsulation of call arguments
efi/riscv: Move EFI runtime call setup/teardown helpers out of line
efi/arm64: Move EFI runtime call setup/teardown helpers out of line
efi/riscv: libstub: Fix comment about absolute relocation
efi: memmap: Remove kernel-doc warnings
efi: Remove unused extern declaration efi_lookup_mapped_addr()
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preserve_pci_rom_image() was accessing the romsize field in
efi_pci_io_protocol_t directly instead of using the efi_table_attr()
helper. This prevents the ROM image from being saved correctly during a
mixed mode boot.
Fixes: 2c3625cb9fa2 ("efi/x86: Fold __setup_efi_pci32() and __setup_efi_pci64() into one function")
Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The bare metal decompressor code was never really intended to run in a
hosted environment such as the EFI boot services, and does a few things
that are becoming problematic in the context of EFI boot now that the
logo requirements are getting tighter: EFI executables will no longer be
allowed to consist of a single executable section that is mapped with
read, write and execute permissions if they are intended for use in a
context where Secure Boot is enabled (and where Microsoft's set of
certificates is used, i.e., every x86 PC built to run Windows).
To avoid stepping on reserved memory before having inspected the E820
tables, and to ensure the correct placement when running a kernel build
that is non-relocatable, the bare metal decompressor moves its own
executable image to the end of the allocation that was reserved for it,
in order to perform the decompression in place. This means the region in
question requires both write and execute permissions, which either need
to be given upfront (which EFI will no longer permit), or need to be
applied on demand using the existing page fault handling framework.
However, the physical placement of the kernel is usually randomized
anyway, and even if it isn't, a dedicated decompression output buffer
can be allocated anywhere in memory using EFI APIs when still running in
the boot services, given that EFI support already implies a relocatable
kernel. This means that decompression in place is never necessary, nor
is moving the compressed image from one end to the other.
Since EFI already maps all of memory 1:1, it is also unnecessary to
create new page tables or handle page faults when decompressing the
kernel. That means there is also no need to replace the special
exception handlers for SEV. Generally, there is little need to do
any of the things that the decompressor does beyond
- initialize SEV encryption, if needed,
- perform the 4/5 level paging switch, if needed,
- decompress the kernel
- relocate the kernel
So do all of this from the EFI stub code, and avoid the bare metal
decompressor altogether.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal
decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before
handing over to the kernel proper.
The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot
services, which means it can force the boot to fail gracefully and
return an error to the bootloader if the loaded kernel does not
implement support for all the features that the hypervisor enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Currently, the EFI stub relies on DXE services in some cases to clear
non-execute restrictions from page allocations that need to be
executable. This is dodgy, because DXE services are not specified by
UEFI but by PI, and they are not intended for consumption by OS loaders.
However, no alternative existed at the time.
Now, there is a new UEFI protocol that should be used instead, so if it
exists, prefer it over the DXE services calls.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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In preparation for updating the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the bare
metal decompressor code altogether, implement the support code for
switching between 4 and 5 levels of paging before jumping to the kernel
proper.
Reuse the newly refactored trampoline that the bare metal decompressor
uses, but relies on EFI APIs to allocate 32-bit addressable memory and
remap it with the appropriate permissions. Given that the bare metal
decompressor will no longer call into the trampoline if the number of
paging levels is already set correctly, it is no longer needed to remove
NX restrictions from the memory range where this trampoline may end up.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The so-called EFI handover protocol is value-add from the distros that
permits a loader to simply copy a PE kernel image into memory and call
an alternative entrypoint that is described by an embedded boot_params
structure.
Most implementations of this protocol do not bother to check the PE
header for minimum alignment, section placement, etc, and therefore also
don't clear the image's BSS, or even allocate enough memory for it.
Allocating more memory on the fly is rather difficult, but at least
clear the BSS region explicitly when entering in this manner, so that
the EFI stub code does not get confused by global variables that were
not zero-initialized correctly.
When booting in mixed mode, this BSS clearing must occur before any
global state is created, so clear it in the 32-bit asm entry point.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Now that the EFI entry code in assembler is only used by the optional
and deprecated EFI handover protocol, and given that the EFI stub C code
no longer returns to it, most of it can simply be dropped.
While at it, clarify the symbol naming, by merging efi_main() and
efi_stub_entry(), making the latter the shared entry point for all
different boot modes that enter via the EFI stub.
The efi32_stub_entry() and efi64_stub_entry() names are referenced
explicitly by the tooling that populates the setup header, so these must
be retained, but can be emitted as aliases of efi_stub_entry() where
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Instead of returning to the calling code in assembler that does nothing
more than perform an indirect call with the boot_params pointer in
register ESI/RSI, perform the jump directly from the EFI stub C code.
This will allow the asm entrypoint code to be dropped entirely in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The UEFI v2.9 specification includes a new memory type to be used in
environments where the OS must accept memory that is provided from its
host. Before the introduction of this memory type, all memory was
accepted eagerly in the firmware. In order for the firmware to safely
stop accepting memory on the OS's behalf, the OS must affirmatively
indicate support to the firmware. This is only a problem for AMD
SEV-SNP, since Linux has had support for it since 5.19. The other
technology that can make use of unaccepted memory, Intel TDX, does not
yet have Linux support, so it can strictly require unaccepted memory
support as a dependency of CONFIG_TDX and not require communication with
the firmware.
Enabling unaccepted memory requires calling a 0-argument enablement
protocol before ExitBootServices. This call is only made if the kernel
is compiled with UNACCEPTED_MEMORY=y
This protocol will be removed after the end of life of the first LTS
that includes it, in order to give firmware implementations an
expiration date for it. When the protocol is removed, firmware will
strictly infer that a SEV-SNP VM is running an OS that supports the
unaccepted memory type. At the earliest convenience, when unaccepted
memory support is added to Linux, SEV-SNP may take strict dependence in
it. After the firmware removes support for the protocol, this should be
reverted.
[tl: address some checkscript warnings]
Signed-off-by: Dionna Glaze <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0d5f3d9a20b5cf361945b7ab1263c36586a78a42.1686063086.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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UEFI Specification version 2.9 introduces the concept of memory
acceptance: Some Virtual Machine platforms, such as Intel TDX or AMD
SEV-SNP, requiring memory to be accepted before it can be used by the
guest. Accepting happens via a protocol specific for the Virtual
Machine platform.
Accepting memory is costly and it makes VMM allocate memory for the
accepted guest physical address range. It's better to postpone memory
acceptance until memory is needed. It lowers boot time and reduces
memory overhead.
The kernel needs to know what memory has been accepted. Firmware
communicates this information via memory map: a new memory type --
EFI_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY -- indicates such memory.
Range-based tracking works fine for firmware, but it gets bulky for
the kernel: e820 (or whatever the arch uses) has to be modified on every
page acceptance. It leads to table fragmentation and there's a limited
number of entries in the e820 table.
Another option is to mark such memory as usable in e820 and track if the
range has been accepted in a bitmap. One bit in the bitmap represents a
naturally aligned power-2-sized region of address space -- unit.
For x86, unit size is 2MiB: 4k of the bitmap is enough to track 64GiB or
physical address space.
In the worst-case scenario -- a huge hole in the middle of the
address space -- It needs 256MiB to handle 4PiB of the address
space.
Any unaccepted memory that is not aligned to unit_size gets accepted
upfront.
The bitmap is allocated and constructed in the EFI stub and passed down
to the kernel via EFI configuration table. allocate_e820() allocates the
bitmap if unaccepted memory is present, according to the size of
unaccepted region.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Currently allocate_e820() is only interested in the size of map and size
of memory descriptor to determine how many e820 entries the kernel
needs.
UEFI Specification version 2.9 introduces a new memory type --
unaccepted memory. To track unaccepted memory, the kernel needs to
allocate a bitmap. The size of the bitmap is dependent on the maximum
physical address present in the system. A full memory map is required to
find the maximum address.
Modify allocate_e820() to get a full memory map.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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There is no need for head_32.S and head_64.S both declaring a copy of
the global 'image_offset' variable, so drop those and make the extern C
declaration the definition.
When image_offset is moved to the .c file, it needs to be placed
particularly in the .data section because it lands by default in the
.bss section which is cleared too late, in .Lrelocated, before the first
access to it and thus garbage gets read, leading to SEV guests exploding
in early boot.
This happens only when the SEV guest kernel is loaded through grub. If
supplied with qemu's -kernel command line option, that memory is always
cleared upfront by qemu and all is fine there.
[ bp: Expand commit message with SEV aspect. ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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To stop the bots from sending sparse warnings to me and the list about
efi_main() not having a prototype, decorate it with asmlinkage so that
it is clear that it is called from assembly, and therefore needs to
remain external, even if it is never declared in a header file.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI updates from Ard Biesheuvel:
"A bit more going on than usual in the EFI subsystem. The main driver
for this has been the introduction of the LoonArch architecture last
cycle, which inspired some cleanup and refactoring of the EFI code.
Another driver for EFI changes this cycle and in the future is
confidential compute.
The LoongArch architecture does not use either struct bootparams or DT
natively [yet], and so passing information between the EFI stub and
the core kernel using either of those is undesirable. And in general,
overloading DT has been a source of issues on arm64, so using DT for
this on new architectures is a to avoid for the time being (even if we
might converge on something DT based for non-x86 architectures in the
future). For this reason, in addition to the patch that enables EFI
boot for LoongArch, there are a number of refactoring patches applied
on top of which separate the DT bits from the generic EFI stub bits.
These changes are on a separate topich branch that has been shared
with the LoongArch maintainers, who will include it in their pull
request as well. This is not ideal, but the best way to manage the
conflicts without stalling LoongArch for another cycle.
Another development inspired by LoongArch is the newly added support
for EFI based decompressors. Instead of adding yet another
arch-specific incarnation of this pattern for LoongArch, we are
introducing an EFI app based on the existing EFI libstub
infrastructure that encapulates the decompression code we use on other
architectures, but in a way that is fully generic. This has been
developed and tested in collaboration with distro and systemd folks,
who are eager to start using this for systemd-boot and also for arm64
secure boot on Fedora. Note that the EFI zimage files this introduces
can also be decompressed by non-EFI bootloaders if needed, as the
image header describes the location of the payload inside the image,
and the type of compression that was used. (Note that Fedora's arm64
GRUB is buggy [0] so you'll need a recent version or switch to
systemd-boot in order to use this.)
Finally, we are adding TPM measurement of the kernel command line
provided by EFI. There is an oversight in the TCG spec which results
in a blind spot for command line arguments passed to loaded images,
which means that either the loader or the stub needs to take the
measurement. Given the combinatorial explosion I am anticipating when
it comes to firmware/bootloader stacks and firmware based attestation
protocols (SEV-SNP, TDX, DICE, DRTM), it is good to set a baseline now
when it comes to EFI measured boot, which is that the kernel measures
the initrd and command line. Intermediate loaders can measure
additional assets if needed, but with the baseline in place, we can
deploy measured boot in a meaningful way even if you boot into Linux
straight from the EFI firmware.
Summary:
- implement EFI boot support for LoongArch
- implement generic EFI compressed boot support for arm64, RISC-V and
LoongArch, none of which implement a decompressor today
- measure the kernel command line into the TPM if measured boot is in
effect
- refactor the EFI stub code in order to isolate DT dependencies for
architectures other than x86
- avoid calling SetVirtualAddressMap() on arm64 if the configured
size of the VA space guarantees that doing so is unnecessary
- move some ARM specific code out of the generic EFI source files
- unmap kernel code from the x86 mixed mode 1:1 page tables"
* tag 'efi-next-for-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi: (24 commits)
efi/arm64: libstub: avoid SetVirtualAddressMap() when possible
efi: zboot: create MemoryMapped() device path for the parent if needed
efi: libstub: fix up the last remaining open coded boot service call
efi/arm: libstub: move ARM specific code out of generic routines
efi/libstub: measure EFI LoadOptions
efi/libstub: refactor the initrd measuring functions
efi/loongarch: libstub: remove dependency on flattened DT
efi: libstub: install boot-time memory map as config table
efi: libstub: remove DT dependency from generic stub
efi: libstub: unify initrd loading between architectures
efi: libstub: remove pointless goto kludge
efi: libstub: simplify efi_get_memory_map() and struct efi_boot_memmap
efi: libstub: avoid efi_get_memory_map() for allocating the virt map
efi: libstub: drop pointless get_memory_map() call
efi: libstub: fix type confusion for load_options_size
arm64: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
loongarch: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
riscv: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
efi/libstub: implement generic EFI zboot
efi/libstub: move efi_system_table global var into separate object
...
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Use a EFI configuration table to pass the initrd to the core kernel,
instead of per-arch methods. This cleans up the code considerably, and
should make it easier for architectures to get rid of their reliance on
DT for doing EFI boot in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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Currently, struct efi_boot_memmap is a struct that is passed around
between callers of efi_get_memory_map() and the users of the resulting
data, and which carries pointers to various variables whose values are
provided by the EFI GetMemoryMap() boot service.
This is overly complex, and it is much easier to carry these values in
the struct itself. So turn the struct into one that carries these data
items directly, including a flex array for the variable number of EFI
memory descriptors that the boot service may return.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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When booting the x86 kernel via EFI using the LoadImage/StartImage boot
services [as opposed to the deprecated EFI handover protocol], the setup
header is taken from the image directly, and given that EFI's LoadImage
has no Linux/x86 specific knowledge regarding struct bootparams or
struct setup_header, any absolute addresses in the setup header must
originate from the file and not from a prior loading stage.
Since we cannot generally predict where LoadImage() decides to load an
image (*), such absolute addresses must be treated as suspect: even if a
prior boot stage intended to make them point somewhere inside the
[signed] image, there is no way to validate that, and if they point at
an arbitrary location in memory, the setup_data nodes will not be
covered by any signatures or TPM measurements either, and could be made
to contain an arbitrary sequence of SETUP_xxx nodes, which could
interfere quite badly with the early x86 boot sequence.
(*) Note that, while LoadImage() does take a buffer/size tuple in
addition to a device path, which can be used to provide the image
contents directly, it will re-allocate such images, as the memory
footprint of an image is generally larger than the PE/COFF file
representation.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.10+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
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The variable "has_system_memory" is unused in function
‘adjust_memory_range_protection’, remove it.
Signed-off-by: chen zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The newly added DXE calls use 64-bit quantities, which means we need to
marshall them explicitly when running in mixed mode. Currently, we get
away without it because we just bail when GetMemorySpaceDescriptor()
fails, which is guaranteed to happen due to the function argument mixup.
Let's fix this properly, though, by defining the macros that describe
how to marshall the arguments. While at it, drop an incorrect cast on a
status variable.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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There are UEFI versions that restrict execution of memory regions,
preventing the kernel from booting. Parts that needs to be executable
are:
* Area used for trampoline placement.
* All memory regions that the kernel may be relocated before
and during extraction.
Use DXE services to ensure aforementioned address ranges
to be executable. Only modify attributes that does not
have appropriate attributes.
Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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UEFI DXE services are not yet used in kernel code
but are required to manipulate page table memory
protection flags.
Add required declarations to use DXE services functions.
Signed-off-by: Baskov Evgeniy <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[ardb: ignore absent DXE table but warn if the signature check fails]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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Before adding TPM measurement of the initrd contents, refactor the
initrd handling slightly to be more self-contained and consistent.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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The image_size argument to efi_relocate_kernel() is currently specified
as init_size, but this is unnecessarily large. The compressed kernel is
much smaller, in fact, its image only extends up to the start of _bss,
since at this point, the .bss section is still uninitialized.
Depending on compression level, this can reduce the amount of data
copied by 4-5x.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
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