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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity/enable.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/verity/enable.c46
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index e13db6507b38..fc4c50e5219d 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct block_buffer {
u32 filled;
+ bool is_root_hash;
u8 *data;
};
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ static int hash_one_block(struct inode *inode,
struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1;
int err;
+ /*
+ * Safety check to prevent a buffer overflow in case of a filesystem bug
+ * that allows the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a
+ * bug in the Merkle tree logic itself
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next->is_root_hash && next->filled != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */
memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled);
@@ -98,6 +106,7 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
}
}
buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash;
+ buffers[num_levels].is_root_hash = true;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start));
memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset));
@@ -166,7 +175,7 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
}
}
/* The root hash was filled by the last call to hash_one_block(). */
- if (WARN_ON(buffers[num_levels].filled != params->digest_size)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(buffers[num_levels].filled != params->digest_size)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
vops->end_enable_verity, err);
fsverity_free_info(vi);
- } else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
+ } else if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
err = -EINVAL;
fsverity_free_info(vi);
} else {
@@ -348,6 +357,13 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
err = file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE);
if (err)
return err;
+ /*
+ * __kernel_read() is used while building the Merkle tree. So, we can't
+ * allow file descriptors that were opened for ioctl access only, using
+ * the special nonstandard access mode 3. O_RDONLY only, please!
+ */
+ if (!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
+ return -EBADF;
if (IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
@@ -367,25 +383,27 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
goto out_drop_write;
err = enable_verity(filp, &arg);
- if (err)
- goto out_allow_write_access;
/*
- * Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
- * being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
- * again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
- * these pages didn't undergo verification against the file digest which
- * fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the pagecache
- * to ensure that all future reads are verified.
+ * We no longer drop the inode's pagecache after enabling verity. This
+ * used to be done to try to avoid a race condition where pages could be
+ * evicted after being used in the Merkle tree construction, then
+ * re-instantiated by a concurrent read. Such pages are unverified, and
+ * the backing storage could have filled them with different content, so
+ * they shouldn't be used to fulfill reads once verity is enabled.
+ *
+ * But, dropping the pagecache has a big performance impact, and it
+ * doesn't fully solve the race condition anyway. So for those reasons,
+ * and also because this race condition isn't very important relatively
+ * speaking (especially for small-ish files, where the chance of a page
+ * being used, evicted, *and* re-instantiated all while enabling verity
+ * is quite small), we no longer drop the inode's pagecache.
*/
- filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
/*
* allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access().
* Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files.
*/
-out_allow_write_access:
allow_write_access(filp);
out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);