docs: security: Confidential computing intro and threat model for x86 virtualization

Kernel developers working on confidential computing for virtualized
environments in x86 operate under a set of assumptions regarding the Linux
kernel threat model that differs from the traditional view. Historically,
the Linux threat model acknowledges attackers residing in userspace, as
well as a limited set of external attackers that are able to interact with
the kernel through networking or limited HW-specific exposed interfaces
(e.g. USB, thunderbolt). The goal of this document is to explain additional
attack vectors that arise in the virtualized confidential computing space.

Reviewed-by: Larry Dewey <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <[email protected]>

Message-ID: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>

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