bpf: Use bpf_capable() instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN for blinding decision

The full CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for blinding looks too strict nowadays.
These days given unprivileged BPF is disabled by default, the main users
for constant blinding coming from unprivileged in particular via cBPF -> eBPF
migration (e.g. old-style socket filters).

Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

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