diff options
| author | Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> | 2014-06-17 14:36:41 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> | 2014-06-17 14:37:31 +0200 |
| commit | f0b1f6442b5090fed3529cb39f3acf8c91693d3d (patch) | |
| tree | bc5f62b017a82161c9a7f892f464813f6efd5bf3 /security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | |
| parent | 4632a93f015caf6d7db4352f37aab74a39e60d7a (diff) | |
| parent | 7171511eaec5bf23fb06078f59784a3a0626b38f (diff) | |
Merge tag 'v3.16-rc1' into i2c/for-next
Merge a stable base (Linux 3.16-rc1)
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 6e0bd933b6a9..3bcb80df4d01 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { }; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; -int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION; +int evm_hmac_attrs; char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX @@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK XATTR_NAME_SMACK, +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS + XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, + XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, +#endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -57,6 +62,14 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +static void __init evm_init_config(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID + evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; +#endif + pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; @@ -287,12 +300,20 @@ out: * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * - * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that - * the current value is valid. + * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, + * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have + * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent + * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires + * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; + + if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) + && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC)) + return -EPERM; return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -432,6 +453,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; + evm_init_config(); + error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); |