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author | Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> | 2021-08-31 09:10:00 +0100 |
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committer | Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> | 2021-08-31 09:10:00 +0100 |
commit | 65266a7c6abfa1ad915a362c41bf38576607f1f9 (patch) | |
tree | 046d86fc88c50fcdeaddb9ab4c709ae0878b1e3f /net/unix/af_unix.c | |
parent | 1a7f67e618d42e9870dcd9fb0c7b2682d71fd631 (diff) | |
parent | 702f43872665e3b1cc6fdb77d238533274fc9d18 (diff) |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'tip/sched/arm64' into for-next/core
* tip/sched/arm64: (785 commits)
Documentation: arm64: describe asymmetric 32-bit support
arm64: Remove logic to kill 32-bit tasks on 64-bit-only cores
arm64: Hook up cmdline parameter to allow mismatched 32-bit EL0
arm64: Advertise CPUs capable of running 32-bit applications in sysfs
arm64: Prevent offlining first CPU with 32-bit EL0 on mismatched system
arm64: exec: Adjust affinity for compat tasks with mismatched 32-bit EL0
arm64: Implement task_cpu_possible_mask()
sched: Introduce dl_task_check_affinity() to check proposed affinity
sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems
sched: Split the guts of sched_setaffinity() into a helper function
sched: Introduce task_struct::user_cpus_ptr to track requested affinity
sched: Reject CPU affinity changes based on task_cpu_possible_mask()
cpuset: Cleanup cpuset_cpus_allowed_fallback() use in select_fallback_rq()
cpuset: Honour task_cpu_possible_mask() in guarantee_online_cpus()
cpuset: Don't use the cpu_possible_mask as a last resort for cgroup v1
sched: Introduce task_cpu_possible_mask() to limit fallback rq selection
sched: Cgroup SCHED_IDLE support
sched/topology: Skip updating masks for non-online nodes
Linux 5.14-rc6
lib: use PFN_PHYS() in devmem_is_allowed()
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/unix/af_unix.c | 51 |
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 23c92ad15c61..ba7ced947e51 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -1526,6 +1526,53 @@ out: return err; } +static void unix_peek_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + + /* + * Garbage collection of unix sockets starts by selecting a set of + * candidate sockets which have reference only from being in flight + * (total_refs == inflight_refs). This condition is checked once during + * the candidate collection phase, and candidates are marked as such, so + * that non-candidates can later be ignored. While inflight_refs is + * protected by unix_gc_lock, total_refs (file count) is not, hence this + * is an instantaneous decision. + * + * Once a candidate, however, the socket must not be reinstalled into a + * file descriptor while the garbage collection is in progress. + * + * If the above conditions are met, then the directed graph of + * candidates (*) does not change while unix_gc_lock is held. + * + * Any operations that changes the file count through file descriptors + * (dup, close, sendmsg) does not change the graph since candidates are + * not installed in fds. + * + * Dequeing a candidate via recvmsg would install it into an fd, but + * that takes unix_gc_lock to decrement the inflight count, so it's + * serialized with garbage collection. + * + * MSG_PEEK is special in that it does not change the inflight count, + * yet does install the socket into an fd. The following lock/unlock + * pair is to ensure serialization with garbage collection. It must be + * done between incrementing the file count and installing the file into + * an fd. + * + * If garbage collection starts after the barrier provided by the + * lock/unlock, then it will see the elevated refcount and not mark this + * as a candidate. If a garbage collection is already in progress + * before the file count was incremented, then the lock/unlock pair will + * ensure that garbage collection is finished before progressing to + * installing the fd. + * + * (*) A -> B where B is on the queue of A or B is on the queue of C + * which is on the queue of listening socket A. + */ + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); + spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock); +} + static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds) { int err = 0; @@ -2175,7 +2222,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size); if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb); } err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size; @@ -2418,7 +2465,7 @@ unlock: /* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg. */ if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) - scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp); + unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb); sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk); |