diff options
author | Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> | 2023-07-28 17:47:22 -0700 |
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committer | Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | 2023-08-31 13:48:50 -0400 |
commit | 52e322eda3d475614210efbc0f2793a1da9d367a (patch) | |
tree | 210f3242d4fe9dcdb7ba5131bb32e8a4f3c6d7af /net/lapb/lapb_iface.c | |
parent | 069f30c619792d5202d72fecd842cacbee260561 (diff) |
KVM: x86/mmu: BUG() in rmap helpers iff CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y
Introduce KVM_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION() and use it in the low-level rmap
helpers to convert the existing BUG()s to WARN_ON_ONCE() when the kernel
is built with CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=n, i.e. does NOT want to BUG()
on corruption of host kernel data structures. Environments that don't
have infrastructure to automatically capture crash dumps, i.e. aren't
likely to enable CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y, are typically better
served overall by WARN-and-continue behavior (for the kernel, the VM is
dead regardless), as a BUG() while holding mmu_lock all but guarantees
the _best_ case scenario is a panic().
Make the BUG()s conditional instead of removing/replacing them entirely as
there's a non-zero chance (though by no means a guarantee) that the damage
isn't contained to the target VM, e.g. if no rmap is found for a SPTE then
KVM may be double-zapping the SPTE, i.e. has already freed the memory the
SPTE pointed at and thus KVM is reading/writing memory that KVM no longer
owns.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: David Matlack <[email protected]>
Cc: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/lapb/lapb_iface.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions