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authorJeff Xu <[email protected]>2024-06-07 20:35:41 +0000
committerAndrew Morton <[email protected]>2024-06-15 10:43:07 -0700
commit653c5c75115c1e23b8393c1cb1ad2d6f6712742f (patch)
tree019b5e0a8f256986a35c668b6015822fc5aedf54 /lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strncpy-src.c
parent3afb76a66b5559a7b595155803ce23801558a7a9 (diff)
mm/memfd: add documentation for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was introduced, there was one big mistake: it didn't have proper documentation. This led to a lot of confusion, especially about whether or not memfd created with the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is sealable. Before MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, memfd had to explicitly set MFD_ALLOW_SEALING to be sealable, so it's a fair question. As one might have noticed, unlike other flags in memfd_create, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is actually a combination of multiple flags. The idea is to make it easier to use memfd in the most common way, which is NOEXEC + F_SEAL_EXEC + MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. This works with sysctl vm.noexec to help existing applications move to a more secure way of using memfd. Proposals have been made to put MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL non-sealable, unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is set, to be consistent with other flags [1], Those are based on the viewpoint that each flag is an atomic unit, which is a reasonable assumption. However, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was designed with the intent of promoting the most secure method of using memfd, therefore a combination of multiple functionalities into one bit. Furthermore, the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL has been added for more than one year, and multiple applications and distributions have backported and utilized it. Altering ABI now presents a degree of risk and may lead to disruption. MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is a new flag, and applications must change their code to use it. There is no backward compatibility problem. When sysctl vm.noexec == 1 or 2, applications that don't set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL or MFD_EXEC will get MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL memfd. And old-application might break, that is by-design, in such a system vm.noexec = 0 shall be used. Also no backward compatibility problem. I propose to include this documentation patch to assist in clarifying the semantics of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, thereby preventing any potential future confusion. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to David Rheinsberg and Barnabás Pőcze for initiating the discussion on the topic of sealability. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ [[email protected]: updates per Randy] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [[email protected]: v3] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]> Cc: Barnabás Pőcze <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <[email protected]> Cc: David Rheinsberg <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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