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authorRick Edgecombe <[email protected]>2023-06-12 17:10:32 -0700
committerRick Edgecombe <[email protected]>2023-07-11 14:12:18 -0700
commit18e66b695e787374ca762ecdeaa1ab5e3772af94 (patch)
treefe0c977a5b99541f1cb81dc32f97758d2b5ce799 /lib/test_fortify/write_overflow-strncpy-src.c
parentfb47a799cc5ccc469c63e9174f2ad555a21ba2a1 (diff)
x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection. Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify that at least one CET feature is configured. Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]> Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-7-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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