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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-17 13:03:37 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-17 13:03:37 -0800
commit09d1c6a80f2cf94c6e70be919203473d4ab8e26c (patch)
tree144604e6cf9f513c45c4d035548ac1760e7dac11 /arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c
parent1b1934dbbdcf9aa2d507932ff488cec47999cf3f (diff)
parent1c6d984f523f67ecfad1083bb04c55d91977bb15 (diff)
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "Generic: - Use memdup_array_user() to harden against overflow. - Unconditionally advertise KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL for all architectures. - Clean up Kconfigs that all KVM architectures were selecting - New functionality around "guest_memfd", a new userspace API that creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it. guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine, cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized. guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to switch a memory area between guest_memfd and regular anonymous memory. - New ioctl KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES allowing userspace to specify per-page attributes for a given page of guest memory; right now the only attribute is whether the guest expects to access memory via guest_memfd or not, which in Confidential SVMs backed by SEV-SNP, TDX or ARM64 pKVM is checked by firmware or hypervisor that guarantees confidentiality (AMD PSP, Intel TDX module, or EL2 in the case of pKVM). x86: - Support for "software-protected VMs" that can use the new guest_memfd and page attributes infrastructure. This is mostly useful for testing, since there is no pKVM-like infrastructure to provide a meaningfully reduced TCB. - Fix a relatively benign off-by-one error when splitting huge pages during CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG. - Fix a bug where KVM could incorrectly test-and-clear dirty bits in non-leaf TDP MMU SPTEs if a racing thread replaces a huge SPTE with a non-huge SPTE. - Use more generic lockdep assertions in paths that don't actually care about whether the caller is a reader or a writer. - let Xen guests opt out of having PV clock reported as "based on a stable TSC", because some of them don't expect the "TSC stable" bit (added to the pvclock ABI by KVM, but never set by Xen) to be set. - Revert a bogus, made-up nested SVM consistency check for TLB_CONTROL. - Advertise flush-by-ASID support for nSVM unconditionally, as KVM always flushes on nested transitions, i.e. always satisfies flush requests. This allows running bleeding edge versions of VMware Workstation on top of KVM. - Sanity check that the CPU supports flush-by-ASID when enabling SEV support. - On AMD machines with vNMI, always rely on hardware instead of intercepting IRET in some cases to detect unmasking of NMIs - Support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM) - Fix a variety of vPMU bugs where KVM fail to stop/reset counters and other state prior to refreshing the vPMU model. - Fix a double-overflow PMU bug by tracking emulated counter events using a dedicated field instead of snapshotting the "previous" counter. If the hardware PMC count triggers overflow that is recognized in the same VM-Exit that KVM manually bumps an event count, KVM would pend PMIs for both the hardware-triggered overflow and for KVM-triggered overflow. - Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configs so that it's not inadvertantly enabled by non-KVM developers, which can be problematic for subsystems that require no regressions for W=1 builds. - Advertise all of the host-supported CPUID bits that enumerate IA32_SPEC_CTRL "features". - Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the current TSC generation, as updating the masterclock can cause kvmclock's time to "jump" unexpectedly, e.g. when userspace hotplugs a pre-created vCPU. - Use RIP-relative address to read kvm_rebooting in the VM-Enter fault paths, partly as a super minor optimization, but mostly to make KVM play nice with position independent executable builds. - Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code. - Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation" at build time. ARM64: - LPA2 support, adding 52bit IPA/PA capability for 4kB and 16kB base granule sizes. Branch shared with the arm64 tree. - Large Fine-Grained Trap rework, bringing some sanity to the feature, although there is more to come. This comes with a prefix branch shared with the arm64 tree. - Some additional Nested Virtualization groundwork, mostly introducing the NV2 VNCR support and retargetting the NV support to that version of the architecture. - A small set of vgic fixes and associated cleanups. Loongarch: - Optimization for memslot hugepage checking - Cleanup and fix some HW/SW timer issues - Add LSX/LASX (128bit/256bit SIMD) support RISC-V: - KVM_GET_REG_LIST improvement for vector registers - Generate ISA extension reg_list using macros in get-reg-list selftest - Support for reporting steal time along with selftest s390: - Bugfixes Selftests: - Fix an annoying goof where the NX hugepage test prints out garbage instead of the magic token needed to run the test. - Fix build errors when a header is delete/moved due to a missing flag in the Makefile. - Detect if KVM bugged/killed a selftest's VM and print out a helpful message instead of complaining that a random ioctl() failed. - Annotate the guest printf/assert helpers with __printf(), and fix the various bugs that were lurking due to lack of said annotation" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (185 commits) x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled KVM: x86: add missing "depends on KVM" KVM: fix direction of dependency on MMU notifiers KVM: introduce CONFIG_KVM_COMMON KVM: arm64: Add missing memory barriers when switching to pKVM's hyp pgd KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Avoid potential UAF in LPI translation cache RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add get-reg-list test for STA registers RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add steal_time test support RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add guest_sbi_probe_extension RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Move sbi_ecall to processor.c RISC-V: KVM: Implement SBI STA extension RISC-V: KVM: Add support for SBI STA registers RISC-V: KVM: Add support for SBI extension registers RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI STA info to vcpu_arch RISC-V: KVM: Add steal-update vcpu request RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI STA extension skeleton RISC-V: paravirt: Implement steal-time support RISC-V: Add SBI STA extension definitions RISC-V: paravirt: Add skeleton for pv-time support RISC-V: KVM: Fix indentation in kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_csr() ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c142
1 files changed, 110 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c
index a04ff98085d9..72a2ffb8dcd1 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ static const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry sbi_ext[] = {
.ext_ptr = &vcpu_sbi_ext_dbcn,
},
{
+ .ext_idx = KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STA,
+ .ext_ptr = &vcpu_sbi_ext_sta,
+ },
+ {
.ext_idx = KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_EXPERIMENTAL,
.ext_ptr = &vcpu_sbi_ext_experimental,
},
@@ -80,6 +84,34 @@ static const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry sbi_ext[] = {
},
};
+static const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *
+riscv_vcpu_get_sbi_ext(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long idx)
+{
+ const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext = NULL;
+
+ if (idx >= KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sbi_ext); i++) {
+ if (sbi_ext[i].ext_idx == idx) {
+ sext = &sbi_ext[i];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return sext;
+}
+
+bool riscv_vcpu_supports_sbi_ext(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int idx)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu_sbi_context *scontext = &vcpu->arch.sbi_context;
+ const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext;
+
+ sext = riscv_vcpu_get_sbi_ext(vcpu, idx);
+
+ return sext && scontext->ext_status[sext->ext_idx] != KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_forward(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
{
struct kvm_cpu_context *cp = &vcpu->arch.guest_context;
@@ -140,28 +172,19 @@ static int riscv_vcpu_set_sbi_ext_single(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long reg_num,
unsigned long reg_val)
{
- unsigned long i;
- const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu_sbi_context *scontext = &vcpu->arch.sbi_context;
-
- if (reg_num >= KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_MAX)
- return -ENOENT;
+ const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext;
if (reg_val != 1 && reg_val != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sbi_ext); i++) {
- if (sbi_ext[i].ext_idx == reg_num) {
- sext = &sbi_ext[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!sext)
+ sext = riscv_vcpu_get_sbi_ext(vcpu, reg_num);
+ if (!sext || scontext->ext_status[sext->ext_idx] == KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
return -ENOENT;
scontext->ext_status[sext->ext_idx] = (reg_val) ?
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_AVAILABLE :
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_UNAVAILABLE;
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_ENABLED :
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_DISABLED;
return 0;
}
@@ -170,24 +193,16 @@ static int riscv_vcpu_get_sbi_ext_single(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long reg_num,
unsigned long *reg_val)
{
- unsigned long i;
- const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext = NULL;
struct kvm_vcpu_sbi_context *scontext = &vcpu->arch.sbi_context;
+ const struct kvm_riscv_sbi_extension_entry *sext;
- if (reg_num >= KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_MAX)
- return -ENOENT;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sbi_ext); i++) {
- if (sbi_ext[i].ext_idx == reg_num) {
- sext = &sbi_ext[i];
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!sext)
+ sext = riscv_vcpu_get_sbi_ext(vcpu, reg_num);
+ if (!sext || scontext->ext_status[sext->ext_idx] == KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
return -ENOENT;
*reg_val = scontext->ext_status[sext->ext_idx] ==
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_AVAILABLE;
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_ENABLED;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -310,6 +325,69 @@ int kvm_riscv_vcpu_get_reg_sbi_ext(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
+int kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_sbi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
+{
+ unsigned long __user *uaddr =
+ (unsigned long __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
+ unsigned long reg_num = reg->id & ~(KVM_REG_ARCH_MASK |
+ KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK |
+ KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_STATE);
+ unsigned long reg_subtype, reg_val;
+
+ if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) != sizeof(unsigned long))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&reg_val, uaddr, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ reg_subtype = reg_num & KVM_REG_RISCV_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+ reg_num &= ~KVM_REG_RISCV_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+
+ switch (reg_subtype) {
+ case KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_STA:
+ return kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_sbi_sta(vcpu, reg_num, reg_val);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int kvm_riscv_vcpu_get_reg_sbi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
+{
+ unsigned long __user *uaddr =
+ (unsigned long __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
+ unsigned long reg_num = reg->id & ~(KVM_REG_ARCH_MASK |
+ KVM_REG_SIZE_MASK |
+ KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_STATE);
+ unsigned long reg_subtype, reg_val;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) != sizeof(unsigned long))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ reg_subtype = reg_num & KVM_REG_RISCV_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+ reg_num &= ~KVM_REG_RISCV_SUBTYPE_MASK;
+
+ switch (reg_subtype) {
+ case KVM_REG_RISCV_SBI_STA:
+ ret = kvm_riscv_vcpu_get_reg_sbi_sta(vcpu, reg_num, &reg_val);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(uaddr, &reg_val, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
const struct kvm_vcpu_sbi_extension *kvm_vcpu_sbi_find_ext(
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long extid)
{
@@ -325,7 +403,7 @@ const struct kvm_vcpu_sbi_extension *kvm_vcpu_sbi_find_ext(
if (ext->extid_start <= extid && ext->extid_end >= extid) {
if (entry->ext_idx >= KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_MAX ||
scontext->ext_status[entry->ext_idx] ==
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_AVAILABLE)
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_ENABLED)
return ext;
return NULL;
@@ -413,12 +491,12 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (ext->probe && !ext->probe(vcpu)) {
scontext->ext_status[entry->ext_idx] =
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_UNAVAILABLE;
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE;
continue;
}
- scontext->ext_status[entry->ext_idx] = ext->default_unavail ?
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_UNAVAILABLE :
- KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_AVAILABLE;
+ scontext->ext_status[entry->ext_idx] = ext->default_disabled ?
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_DISABLED :
+ KVM_RISCV_SBI_EXT_STATUS_ENABLED;
}
}