Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "The main theme of this pull request is security covering variants 2
  and 3 for arm64. I expect to send additional patches next week
  covering an improved firmware interface (requires firmware changes)
  for variant 2 and way for KPTI to be disabled on unaffected CPUs
  (Cavium's ThunderX doesn't work properly with KPTI enabled because of
  a hardware erratum).

  Summary:

   - Security mitigations:
      - variant 2: invalidate the branch predictor with a call to
        secure firmware
      - variant 3: implement KPTI for arm64

   - 52-bit physical address support for arm64 (ARMv8.2)

   - arm64 support for RAS (firmware first only) and SDEI (software
     delegated exception interface; allows firmware to inject a RAS
     error into the OS)

   - perf support for the ARM DynamIQ Shared Unit PMU

   - CPUID and HWCAP bits updated for new floating point multiplication
     instructions in ARMv8.4

   - remove some virtual memory layout printks during boot

   - fix initial page table creation to cope with larger than 32M kernel
     images when 16K pages are enabled"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (104 commits)
  arm64: Fix TTBR + PAN + 52-bit PA logic in cpu_do_switch_mm
  arm64: Turn on KPTI only on CPUs that need it
  arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2
  arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs
  arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context
  arm64: mm: ignore memory above supported physical address size
  arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN
  KVM: arm64: Emulate RAS error registers and set HCR_EL2's TERR & TEA
  KVM: arm64: Handle RAS SErrors from EL2 on guest exit
  KVM: arm64: Handle RAS SErrors from EL1 on guest exit
  KVM: arm64: Save ESR_EL2 on guest SError
  KVM: arm64: Save/Restore guest DISR_EL1
  KVM: arm64: Set an impdef ESR for Virtual-SError using VSESR_EL2.
  KVM: arm/arm64: mask/unmask daif around VHE guests
  arm64: kernel: Prepare for a DISR user
  arm64: Unconditionally enable IESB on exception entry/return for firmware-first
  arm64: kernel: Survive corrected RAS errors notified by SError
  arm64: cpufeature: Detect CPU RAS Extentions
  arm64: sysreg: Move to use definitions for all the SCTLR bits
  arm64: cpufeature: __this_cpu_has_cap() shouldn't stop early
  ...

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 267d2b79d52d..b44992ec9643 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #define NO_CONT_MAPPINGS	BIT(1)
 
 u64 idmap_t0sz = TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS);
+u64 idmap_ptrs_per_pgd = PTRS_PER_PGD;
 
 u64 kimage_voffset __ro_after_init;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kimage_voffset);
@@ -525,6 +526,35 @@ static int __init parse_rodata(char *arg)
 }
 early_param("rodata", parse_rodata);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void)
+{
+	pgprot_t prot = rodata_enabled ? PAGE_KERNEL_ROX : PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
+	phys_addr_t pa_start = __pa_symbol(__entry_tramp_text_start);
+
+	/* The trampoline is always mapped and can therefore be global */
+	pgprot_val(prot) &= ~PTE_NG;
+
+	/* Map only the text into the trampoline page table */
+	memset(tramp_pg_dir, 0, PGD_SIZE);
+	__create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE,
+			     prot, pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0);
+
+	/* Map both the text and data into the kernel page table */
+	__set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, pa_start, prot);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
+		extern char __entry_tramp_data_start[];
+
+		__set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA,
+			     __pa_symbol(__entry_tramp_data_start),
+			     PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(map_entry_trampoline);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Create fine-grained mappings for the kernel.
  */
@@ -570,8 +600,8 @@ static void __init map_kernel(pgd_t *pgd)
 		 * entry instead.
 		 */
 		BUG_ON(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_16K_PAGES));
-		set_pud(pud_set_fixmap_offset(pgd, FIXADDR_START),
-			__pud(__pa_symbol(bm_pmd) | PUD_TYPE_TABLE));
+		pud_populate(&init_mm, pud_set_fixmap_offset(pgd, FIXADDR_START),
+			     lm_alias(bm_pmd));
 		pud_clear_fixmap();
 	} else {
 		BUG();
@@ -612,7 +642,8 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
 	 * allocated with it.
 	 */
 	memblock_free(__pa_symbol(swapper_pg_dir) + PAGE_SIZE,
-		      SWAPPER_DIR_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
+		      __pa_symbol(swapper_pg_end) - __pa_symbol(swapper_pg_dir)
+		      - PAGE_SIZE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -686,7 +717,7 @@ int __meminit vmemmap_populate(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int node)
 			if (!p)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 
-			set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(p) | PROT_SECT_NORMAL));
+			pmd_set_huge(pmd, __pa(p), __pgprot(PROT_SECT_NORMAL));
 		} else
 			vmemmap_verify((pte_t *)pmd, node, addr, next);
 	} while (addr = next, addr != end);
@@ -879,15 +910,19 @@ int __init arch_ioremap_pmd_supported(void)
 
 int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
 {
+	pgprot_t sect_prot = __pgprot(PUD_TYPE_SECT |
+					pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot)));
 	BUG_ON(phys & ~PUD_MASK);
-	set_pud(pud, __pud(phys | PUD_TYPE_SECT | pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot))));
+	set_pud(pud, pfn_pud(__phys_to_pfn(phys), sect_prot));
 	return 1;
 }
 
 int pmd_set_huge(pmd_t *pmd, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
 {
+	pgprot_t sect_prot = __pgprot(PMD_TYPE_SECT |
+					pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot)));
 	BUG_ON(phys & ~PMD_MASK);
-	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(phys | PMD_TYPE_SECT | pgprot_val(mk_sect_prot(prot))));
+	set_pmd(pmd, pfn_pmd(__phys_to_pfn(phys), sect_prot));
 	return 1;
 }