diff options
| author | Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> | 2017-10-11 20:57:08 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <[email protected]> | 2017-10-20 15:22:44 +1100 |
| commit | 9304b46c912d65a103a68f093b456ba3c02dca3b (patch) | |
| tree | 7ff1e1cf15cee3bf54b31956977c4133fb3ca751 | |
| parent | fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c (diff) | |
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 13661d34f842..9b8a6e79d858 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -695,6 +695,8 @@ out: return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + /* * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -713,7 +715,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) + if (!root_privileged()) return; /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs @@ -838,7 +840,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; |