diff options
author | Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> | 2022-09-15 17:03:52 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Andrew Morton <[email protected]> | 2022-10-03 14:03:21 -0700 |
commit | 75cf0290271bf6dae9dee982aef15242dadf97e4 (patch) | |
tree | c7d283be1e8d80ac10ec8932cf10edd15fa9ef06 | |
parent | 3c206509826094e85ead0b056f484db96829248d (diff) |
instrumented.h: add KMSAN support
To avoid false positives, KMSAN needs to unpoison the data copied from the
userspace. To detect infoleaks - check the memory buffer passed to
copy_to_user().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/instrumented.h | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/kmsan-checks.h | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 38 |
3 files changed, 70 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/instrumented.h b/include/linux/instrumented.h index 9f1dba8f717b..501fa8486749 100644 --- a/include/linux/instrumented.h +++ b/include/linux/instrumented.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /* * This header provides generic wrappers for memory access instrumentation that - * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN. + * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN, KMSAN. */ #ifndef _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H #define _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/kasan-checks.h> #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> +#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h> #include <linux/types.h> /** @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ instrument_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { kasan_check_read(from, n); kcsan_check_read(from, n); + kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, n, 0); } /** @@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ static __always_inline void instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n, unsigned long left) { + kmsan_unpoison_memory(to, n - left); } /** @@ -162,10 +165,14 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, * * @to destination variable, may not be address-taken */ -#define instrument_get_user(to) \ -({ \ +#define instrument_get_user(to) \ +({ \ + u64 __tmp = (u64)(to); \ + kmsan_unpoison_memory(&__tmp, sizeof(__tmp)); \ + to = __tmp; \ }) + /** * instrument_put_user() - add instrumentation to put_user()-like macros * @@ -177,8 +184,9 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from, * @ptr userspace pointer to copy to * @size number of bytes to copy */ -#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \ -({ \ +#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \ +({ \ + kmsan_copy_to_user(ptr, &from, sizeof(from), 0); \ }) #endif /* _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h index a6522a0c28df..c4cae333deec 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h +++ b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size); */ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size); +/** + * kmsan_copy_to_user() - Notify KMSAN about a data transfer to userspace. + * @to: destination address in the userspace. + * @from: source address in the kernel. + * @to_copy: number of bytes to copy. + * @left: number of bytes not copied. + * + * If this is a real userspace data transfer, KMSAN checks the bytes that were + * actually copied to ensure there was no information leak. If @to belongs to + * the kernel space (which is possible for compat syscalls), KMSAN just copies + * the metadata. + */ +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left); + #else static inline void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, @@ -58,6 +73,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) static inline void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size) { } +static inline void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, + size_t to_copy, size_t left) +{ +} #endif diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c index 6f3e64b0b61f..5c0eb25d984d 100644 --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c +++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c @@ -205,6 +205,44 @@ void kmsan_iounmap_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) kmsan_leave_runtime(); } +void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy, + size_t left) +{ + unsigned long ua_flags; + + if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime()) + return; + /* + * At this point we've copied the memory already. It's hard to check it + * before copying, as the size of actually copied buffer is unknown. + */ + + /* copy_to_user() may copy zero bytes. No need to check. */ + if (!to_copy) + return; + /* Or maybe copy_to_user() failed to copy anything. */ + if (to_copy <= left) + return; + + ua_flags = user_access_save(); + if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) { + /* This is a user memory access, check it. */ + kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to, + REASON_COPY_TO_USER); + } else { + /* Otherwise this is a kernel memory access. This happens when a + * compat syscall passes an argument allocated on the kernel + * stack to a real syscall. + * Don't check anything, just copy the shadow of the copied + * bytes. + */ + kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata((void *)to, (void *)from, + to_copy - left); + } + user_access_restore(ua_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_copy_to_user); + /* Functions from kmsan-checks.h follow. */ void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { |