x86/perf: Clarify why x86_pmu_event_mapped() isn't racy

Naively, it looks racy, but ->mmap_sem saves it.  Add a comment and a
lockdep assertion.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03a1e629063899168dfc4707f3bb6e581e21f5c6.1489694270.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index e07b36c5588a..183a972f9210 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2109,6 +2109,18 @@ static void x86_pmu_event_mapped(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (!(event->hw.flags & PERF_X86_EVENT_RDPMC_ALLOWED))
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * This function relies on not being called concurrently in two
+	 * tasks in the same mm.  Otherwise one task could observe
+	 * perf_rdpmc_allowed > 1 and return all the way back to
+	 * userspace with CR4.PCE clear while another task is still
+	 * doing on_each_cpu_mask() to propagate CR4.PCE.
+	 *
+	 * For now, this can't happen because all callers hold mmap_sem
+	 * for write.  If this changes, we'll need a different solution.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+
 	if (atomic_inc_return(&current->mm->context.perf_rdpmc_allowed) == 1)
 		on_each_cpu_mask(mm_cpumask(current->mm), refresh_pce, NULL, 1);
 }