set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds

in copy_process(): non root users but with capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
or CAP_SYS_ADMIN will clean PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag even
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds. Add the same capability check logic here.

Align the permission checks in copy_process() and set_user(). In
copy_process() CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable users will be
able to circumvent and clear the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag whereas they
aren't able to the same in set_user(). There's no obvious logic to this
and trying to unearth the reason in the thread didn't go anywhere.

The gist seems to be that this code wants to make sure that a program
can't successfully exec if it has gone through a set*id() transition
while exceeding its RLIMIT_NPROC.
A capable but non-INIT_USER caller getting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED set during
a set*id() transition wouldn't be able to exec right away if they still
exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC at the time of exec. So their exec would fail
in fs/exec.c:

        if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
            is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
                retval = -EAGAIN;
                goto out_ret;
        }

However, if the caller were to fork() right after the set*id()
transition but before the exec while still exceeding their RLIMIT_NPROC
then they would get PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED cleared (while the child would
inherit it):

        retval = -EAGAIN;
        if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
                if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER &&
                    !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        goto bad_fork_free;
        }
        current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;

which means a subsequent exec by the capable caller would now succeed
even though they could still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC limit. This seems
inconsistent. Allow a CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable user to
avoid PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED as they already can in copy_process().

Cc: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]>, , ,

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Neil Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index ef1a78f5d71c..72c7639e3c98 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -480,7 +480,8 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
 	 * failure to the execve() stage.
 	 */
 	if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
-			new_user != INIT_USER)
+			new_user != INIT_USER &&
+			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 	else
 		current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;