From 040d9e2bce0a5b321c402b79ee43a8e8d2fd3b06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 01:47:42 -0800
Subject: apparmor: fix display of .ns_name for containers

The .ns_name should not be virtualized by the current ns view. It
needs to report the ns base name as that is being used during startup
as part of determining apparmor policy namespace support.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1746463
Fixes: d9f02d9c237aa ("apparmor: fix display of ns name")
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d4fa04d91439..a23b0ca19fd0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1189,9 +1189,7 @@ static int seq_ns_level_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 static int seq_ns_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-
-	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", aa_ns_name(labels_ns(label),
-					   labels_ns(label), true));
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", labels_ns(label)->base.name);
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 
 	return 0;
-- 
cgit 


From b5beb07ad32ab533027aa988d96a44965ec116f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 04:57:39 -0800
Subject: apparmor: fix resource audit messages when auditing peer

Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available
when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element
of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could
cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel.

Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field
so they can be used together.

CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 4ac095118717..2ebc00a579fd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					const char *target;
 					kuid_t ouid;
 				} fs;
+				struct {
+					int rlim;
+					unsigned long max;
+				} rlim;
 				int signal;
 			};
 		};
@@ -134,10 +138,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			const char *ns;
 			long pos;
 		} iface;
-		struct {
-			int rlim;
-			unsigned long max;
-		} rlim;
 		struct {
 			const char *src_name;
 			const char *type;
-- 
cgit 


From 98cf5bbff413eadf1b9cb195a7b80cc61c72a50e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 11:24:10 +0100
Subject: apparmor: fix logging of the existence test for signals

The existence test is not being properly logged as the signal mapping
maps it to the last entry in the named signal table. This is done
to help catch bugs by making the 0 mapped signal value invalid so
that we can catch the signal value not being filled in.

When fixing the off-by-one comparision logic the reporting of the
existence test was broken, because the logic behind the mapped named
table was hidden. Fix this by adding a define for the name lookup
and using it.

Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f7dc4c9a855a1 ("apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h | 4 +++-
 security/apparmor/ipc.c               | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
index 92e62fe95292..5ca47c50dfa7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 
 #define SIGUNKNOWN 0
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+
 /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
  * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
  * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = {
 };
 
 /* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */
-static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = {
+static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME] = {
 	"unknown",
 	"hup",
 	"int",
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index b40678f3c1d5..586facd35f7c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 			audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
 		}
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
+	if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
-- 
cgit 


From a6a52579e52b55448326db88bd9a5740e7c1a037 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 20:08:28 +0100
Subject: apparmor: split load data into management struct and data blob

Splitting the management struct from the actual data blob will allow
us in the future to do some sharing and other data reduction
techniques like replacing the the raw data with compressed data.

Prepare for this by separating the management struct from the data
blob.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c         | 13 ++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
index be6cd69ac319..8db4ab759e80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata {
 	int abi;
 	unsigned char *hash;
 
-	char data[];
+	char *data;
 };
 
 int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 59a1a25b7d43..ece0c246cfe6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -164,8 +164,9 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work)
 	}
 
 	kzfree(d->hash);
-	kfree(d->name);
-	kvfree(d);
+	kzfree(d->name);
+	kvfree(d->data);
+	kzfree(d);
 }
 
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
@@ -180,10 +181,16 @@ void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref)
 
 struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size)
 {
-	struct aa_loaddata *d = kvzalloc(sizeof(*d) + size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct aa_loaddata *d;
 
+	d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (d == NULL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	d->data = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!d->data) {
+		kfree(d);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
 	kref_init(&d->count);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->list);
 
-- 
cgit 


From cf65fabc2a2c8c12031678d86a2bd4a660865011 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 02:53:15 -0700
Subject: apparmor: add first substr match to dfa

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/match.h |   4 ++
 security/apparmor/match.c         | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index add4c6726558..72b9b89670e6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *str);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 			 const char c);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos);
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 72c604350e80..6c6dc1a22f9a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -457,3 +457,123 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 
 	return state;
 }
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_until - traverse @dfa until accept state or end of input
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR end of string
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*retpos = str;
+	return state;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_matchn_until - traverse @dfa until accept or @n bytes consumed
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of the string of bytes to match
+ * @retpos: first character in str after match OR str + n
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @n input is consumed.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *accept = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	*retpos = NULL;
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; n; n--) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; n; n--) {
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (accept[state])
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*retpos = str;
+	return state;
+}
-- 
cgit 


From 6e0654d20ed9679cbf75a0ff7cd786e364f7f09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 14:57:59 -0700
Subject: apparmor: use the dfa to do label parse string splitting

The current split scheme is actually wrong in that it splits
  ///&

where that is invalid and should fail. Use the dfa to do a proper
bounded split without having to worry about getting the string
processing right in code.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/label.h  |  25 ++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/match.h  |   1 +
 security/apparmor/label.c          |  12 ++--
 security/apparmor/match.c          |  29 ++++++++--
 security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
index af22dcbbcb8a..80e9ba9d172c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -330,6 +330,31 @@ void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
 
+static inline const char *aa_label_strn_split(const char *str, int n)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_matchn_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, n, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+
 
 struct aa_perms;
 int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index 72b9b89670e6..cd8aeab6ac57 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ struct aa_dfa {
 };
 
 extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
+extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
 
 #define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 324fe5c60f87..31e2f701d971 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1815,7 +1815,9 @@ static int label_count_str_entries(const char *str)
 
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
-	for (split = strstr(str, "//&"); split; split = strstr(str, "//&")) {
+	for (split = aa_label_str_split(str);
+	     split;
+	     split = aa_label_str_split(str)) {
 		count++;
 		str = split + 3;
 	}
@@ -1859,7 +1861,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	DEFINE_VEC(profile, vec);
 	struct aa_label *label, *currbase = base;
 	int i, len, stack = 0, error;
-	char *split;
+	const char *split;
 
 	AA_BUG(!base);
 	AA_BUG(!str);
@@ -1883,7 +1885,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	for (i = 0; i < stack; i++)
 		vec[i] = aa_get_profile(base->vec[i]);
 
-	for (split = strstr(str, "//&"), i = stack; split && i < len; i++) {
+	for (split = aa_label_str_split(str), i = stack;
+	     split && i < len; i++) {
 		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, split - str);
 		if (!vec[i])
 			goto fail;
@@ -1894,7 +1897,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 		if (vec[i]->ns != labels_ns(currbase))
 			currbase = &vec[i]->label;
 		str = split + 3;
-		split = strstr(str, "//&");
+		split = aa_label_str_split(str);
 	}
 	/* last element doesn't have a split */
 	if (i < len) {
@@ -1930,7 +1933,6 @@ fail:
 	goto out;
 }
 
-
 /**
  * aa_labelset_destroy - remove all labels from the label set
  * @ls: label set to cleanup (NOT NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 6c6dc1a22f9a..5d95caeddebc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ static char nulldfa_src[] = {
 };
 struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
 
+static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = {
+	#include "stacksplitdfa.in"
+};
+struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
+
 int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -37,19 +42,31 @@ int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
 	nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
 				TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
 				TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
-	if (!IS_ERR(nulldfa))
-		return 0;
+	if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
+		nulldfa = NULL;
+		return error;
+	}
 
-	error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
-	nulldfa = NULL;
+	stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
+				      sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
+				      TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+				      TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
+	if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
+		aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
+		nulldfa = NULL;
+		error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
+		stacksplitdfa = NULL;
+		return error;
+	}
 
-	return error;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
 {
+	aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
 	aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
-	nulldfa = NULL;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4bddd10b62a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/stacksplitdfa.in
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* 0x1 [^\000]*[^/\000]//& */ 0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74,
+0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00,
+0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00,
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+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00
-- 
cgit 


From 95652cac83605d96cf3849e80e3e3f4dce74f5da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 16:33:56 -0700
Subject: apparmor: provide a bounded version of label_parse

some label/context sources might not be guaranteed to be null terminiated
provide a size bounded version of label parse to deal with these.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/label.h |  3 +++
 security/apparmor/label.c         | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
index 80e9ba9d172c..d871e7ff0952 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -327,6 +327,9 @@ void aa_label_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_seq_print(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack);
 struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 31e2f701d971..4721338ad551 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1808,16 +1808,17 @@ void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
 	aa_put_ns(ns);
 }
 
-static int label_count_str_entries(const char *str)
+static int label_count_strn_entries(const char *str, size_t n)
 {
+	const char *end = str + n;
 	const char *split;
 	int count = 1;
 
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
-	for (split = aa_label_str_split(str);
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
 	     split;
-	     split = aa_label_str_split(str)) {
+	     split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str)) {
 		count++;
 		str = split + 3;
 	}
@@ -1845,9 +1846,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_label_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label
+ * aa_label_strn_parse - parse, validate and convert a text string to a label
  * @base: base label to use for lookups (NOT NULL)
  * @str: null terminated text string (NOT NULL)
+ * @n: length of str to parse, will stop at \0 if encountered before n
  * @gfp: allocation type
  * @create: true if should create compound labels if they don't exist
  * @force_stack: true if should stack even if no leading &
@@ -1855,19 +1857,23 @@ static struct aa_profile *fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base,
  * Returns: the matching refcounted label if present
  *     else ERRPTR
  */
-struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
-				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack)
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack)
 {
 	DEFINE_VEC(profile, vec);
 	struct aa_label *label, *currbase = base;
 	int i, len, stack = 0, error;
+	const char *end = str + n;
 	const char *split;
 
 	AA_BUG(!base);
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
-	str = skip_spaces(str);
-	len = label_count_str_entries(str);
+	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
+	if (str == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);
 	if (*str == '&' || force_stack) {
 		/* stack on top of base */
 		stack = base->size;
@@ -1885,7 +1891,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	for (i = 0; i < stack; i++)
 		vec[i] = aa_get_profile(base->vec[i]);
 
-	for (split = aa_label_str_split(str), i = stack;
+	for (split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str), i = stack;
 	     split && i < len; i++) {
 		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, split - str);
 		if (!vec[i])
@@ -1897,11 +1903,11 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 		if (vec[i]->ns != labels_ns(currbase))
 			currbase = &vec[i]->label;
 		str = split + 3;
-		split = aa_label_str_split(str);
+		split = aa_label_strn_split(str, end - str);
 	}
 	/* last element doesn't have a split */
 	if (i < len) {
-		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, strlen(str));
+		vec[i] = fqlookupn_profile(base, currbase, str, end - str);
 		if (!vec[i])
 			goto fail;
 	}
@@ -1933,6 +1939,13 @@ fail:
 	goto out;
 }
 
+struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack)
+{
+	return aa_label_strn_parse(base, str, strlen(str), gfp, create,
+				   force_stack);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_labelset_destroy - remove all labels from the label set
  * @ls: label set to cleanup (NOT NULL)
-- 
cgit 


From 71fa373b784e13eb8d68f41b68b9482241e5288c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2017 12:57:39 -0700
Subject: apparmor: cleanup add proper line wrapping to nulldfa.in

nulldfa.in makes for a very long unwrapped line, which certain tools
do not like. So add line breaks.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/nulldfa.in | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
index 3cb38022902e..095f42a24cbc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
+++ b/security/apparmor/nulldfa.in
@@ -1 +1,107 @@
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+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x00
-- 
cgit 


From 475bdda1f00074783e18403f3f38a36dd3488430 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 01:13:41 -0700
Subject: apparmor: root view labels should not be under user control

The root view of the label parse should not be exposed to user
control.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/label.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 4721338ad551..69c7451becef 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1871,8 +1871,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
 	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
-	if (str == NULL)
+	if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);
 	if (*str == '&' || force_stack) {
 		/* stack on top of base */
@@ -1881,8 +1882,6 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 		if (*str == '&')
 			str++;
 	}
-	if (*str == '=')
-		base = &root_ns->unconfined->label;
 
 	error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp);
 	if (error)
-- 
cgit 


From 1d6583d9c6723d78e446dd203ffd974f6b85ab76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2017 23:05:59 +0530
Subject: security: apparmor: remove duplicate includes

These duplicate includes have been found with scripts/checkincludes.pl but
they have been removed manually to avoid removing false positives.

Signed-off-by: Pravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index a23b0ca19fd0..00fc4f9f7f14 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/crypto.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
-#include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
-- 
cgit 


From 3dc6b1ce6861ebf40b68ab4b752a05584a1f99bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 01:02:13 -0800
Subject: apparmor: make signal label match work when matching stacked labels

Given a label with a profile stack of
    A//&B or A//&C ...

A ptrace rule should be able to specify a generic trace pattern with
a rule like

    signal send A//&**,

however this is failing because while the correct label match routine
is called, it is being done post label decomposition so it is always
being done against a profile instead of the stacked label.

To fix this refactor the cross check to pass the full peer label in to
the label_match.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/ipc.c | 40 ++++++++++++----------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 586facd35f7c..754f2ff8d355 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -184,50 +184,34 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
-/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */
-static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label,
-				 int signal, struct aa_perms *perms)
-{
-	unsigned int state;
-
-	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
-	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
-			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
-			    signal);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label);
-	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms);
-}
-
 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
 	struct aa_perms perms;
+	unsigned int state;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
 	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
 		return 0;
 
-	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
-	profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal,
-			     &perms);
+	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
+	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
+			    aad(sa)->signal);
+	aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
 }
 
-static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender,
-				struct aa_profile *target,
-				struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-	return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa),
-		      profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa));
-}
-
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
 
 	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
-	return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm,
-				      &sa);
+	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
+			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
+			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 3acfd5f54ca16c15c36ac2f218357f2707b7edb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:32:02 +0100
Subject: apparmor: audit unknown signal numbers

Allow apparmor to audit the number of a signal that it does not
provide a mapping for and is currently being reported only as
unknown.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h     |  5 ++++-
 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h |  1 +
 security/apparmor/ipc.c               | 10 +++++++---
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 2ebc00a579fd..41ad2c947bf4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -130,7 +130,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					int rlim;
 					unsigned long max;
 				} rlim;
-				int signal;
+				struct {
+					int signal;
+					int unmappedsig;
+				};
 			};
 		};
 		struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
index 5ca47c50dfa7..cbf7a997ed84 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #define SIGUNKNOWN 0
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+#define SIGRT_BASE 128
 
 /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
  * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index 754f2ff8d355..d7b137d4eb74 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
 	if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
 		return SIGUNKNOWN;
 	else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
-		return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128;	/* rt sigs mapped to 128 */
+		return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
 	else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
 		return sig_map[sig];
 	return SIGUNKNOWN;
@@ -174,11 +174,14 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 			audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
 		}
 	}
-	if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
+	if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+		audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
+				 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
+	else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
-				 aad(sa)->signal - 128);
+				 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
 	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -211,6 +214,7 @@ int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
 
 	aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
+	aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
 	return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
 			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
 			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
-- 
cgit 


From 4d2f8ba3e3b76e34f84ae1de456934713e9e59af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 14:08:36 -0800
Subject: apparmor: rename task_ctx to the more accurate cred_ctx

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/context.c         | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 security/apparmor/domain.c          |  6 +++---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 19 +++++++++----------
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             | 26 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/apparmor/policy.c          |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
index c95f1ac6190b..89c03053303e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
  * License.
  *
  *
- * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_ctx and
- * the aa_task_ctx.label, both of which are required and are not allowed
- * to be NULL.  The aa_task_ctx is not reference counted and is unique
+ * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_cred_ctx and
+ * the aa_cred_ctx.label, both of which are required and are not allowed
+ * to be NULL.  The aa_cred_ctx is not reference counted and is unique
  * to each cred (which is reference count).  The label pointed to by
- * the task_ctx is reference counted.
+ * the cred_ctx is reference counted.
  *
  * TODO
  * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
@@ -30,21 +30,21 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
 /**
- * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_ctx
+ * aa_alloc_cred_ctx - allocate a new cred_ctx
  * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
  *
  * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
  */
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
+struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_cred_ctx), flags);
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_free_task_context - free a task_ctx
- * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ * aa_free_cred_ctx - free a cred_ctx
+ * @ctx: cred_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
  */
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx) {
 		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
@@ -56,11 +56,11 @@ void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * aa_dup_cred_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
  * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
  * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
  */
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old)
 {
 	*new = *old;
 	aa_get_label(new->label);
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_ctx();
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = current_cred_ctx();
 	struct cred *new;
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 		/* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+		aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	/*
 	 * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it
@@ -136,14 +136,14 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
  */
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
 	ctx->onexec = label;
 	ctx->token = stack;
 
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
  */
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
  */
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 	AA_BUG(!ctx->label);
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6a54d2ffa840..90967de96be0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 done:
 	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	aa_put_label(label);
 	put_buffers(buffer);
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ build:
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 6ae07e9aaa17..0622fcf2a695 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 #include "policy_ns.h"
 
 #define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
+#define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
 
 /**
- * struct aa_task_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
+ * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
  * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
  * @exec: label to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
  * @previous: label the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -37,17 +37,16 @@
  *
  * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
  */
-struct aa_task_ctx {
+struct aa_cred_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
 };
 
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
-			 const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
+struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
+void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
@@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
  */
 static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 
 	AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label);
 	return ctx->label;
@@ -214,10 +213,10 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
  * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
  */
-static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+static inline void aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 9a65eeaf7dfa..0624eb2081f3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -51,11 +51,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
  */
 
 /*
- * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels
+ * free the associated aa_cred_ctx and put its labels
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
+	aa_free_cred_ctx(cred_ctx(cred));
 	cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp);
 
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -75,18 +75,18 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 }
 
 /*
- * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
+ * prepare new aa_cred_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
  */
 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				 gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp);
 
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
+	aa_dup_cred_ctx(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
 	cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
+	const struct aa_cred_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 
-	aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
+	aa_dup_cred_ctx(new_ctx, old_ctx);
 }
 
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	int error = -ENOENT;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ fail:
 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-	struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
 
 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
 	if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
@@ -1024,9 +1024,9 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 
-	ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index b0b58848c248..c505d517fa3c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *update_to_newest_parent(struct aa_profile *new)
  * @udata: serialized data stream  (NOT NULL)
  *
  * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
- * by any aa_task_ctx.  If the profile does not exist on the profile list
+ * by any aa_cred_ctx.  If the profile does not exist on the profile list
  * it is added.
  *
  * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure.
-- 
cgit 


From 3b529a7600d834f450ac244f43a7c082687284b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 01:59:25 -0800
Subject: apparmor: move task domain change info to task security

The task domain change info is task specific and its and abuse of
the cred to store the information in there. Now that a task->security
field exists store it in the proper place.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/context.c         | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/apparmor/domain.c          | 14 +++---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 31 +++++++++----
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             | 48 ++++++++++++++++---
 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
index 89c03053303e..432672b18945 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx) {
 		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 
 		kzfree(ctx);
 	}
@@ -64,8 +62,6 @@ void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old)
 {
 	*new = *old;
 	aa_get_label(new->label);
-	aa_get_label(new->previous);
-	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -85,6 +81,43 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
 	return p;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+
+		kzfree(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->previous);
+	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label
  * @label: new label  (NOT NULL)
@@ -112,7 +145,7 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 		/* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
+		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(current_task_ctx());
 
 	/*
 	 * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it
@@ -136,18 +169,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
  */
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
 {
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 	ctx->onexec = label;
 	ctx->token = stack;
 
-	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -163,28 +191,31 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
  */
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 {
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
 	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-	if (!ctx->previous) {
+	if (!tctx->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
-		ctx->previous = ctx->label;
-		ctx->token = token;
-	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
+		tctx->previous = ctx->label;
+		tctx->token = token;
+	} else if (tctx->token == token) {
 		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 	} else {
 		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
+
 	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
 	/* clear exec on switching context */
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(tctx->onexec);
+	tctx->onexec = NULL;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -201,28 +232,28 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
  */
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 {
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct cred *new;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-	if (ctx->token != token) {
-		abort_creds(new);
+	if (tctx->token != token)
 		return -EACCES;
-	}
 	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
-	if (!ctx->previous) {
-		abort_creds(new);
+	if (!tctx->previous)
 		return 0;
-	}
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 
 	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
 	AA_BUG(!ctx->label);
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(tctx);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
+
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 90967de96be0..b90759a765b5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -780,6 +780,7 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
@@ -795,15 +796,17 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return 0;
 
 	ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+	tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+	AA_BUG(!tctx);
 
 	label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
 
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
 	get_buffers(buffer);
 	/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
-	if (ctx->onexec)
-		new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
+	if (tctx->onexec)
+		new = handle_onexec(label, tctx->onexec, tctx->token,
 				    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
 	else
 		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
@@ -858,9 +861,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ctx->label = new;
 
 done:
-	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(ctx);
-
 	aa_put_label(label);
 	put_buffers(buffer);
 
@@ -1050,6 +1050,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
@@ -1070,8 +1071,9 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
 	ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
-	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+	previous = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
 
 	if (unconfined(label)) {
 		info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 0622fcf2a695..c3b51d88275b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -25,20 +25,24 @@
 #define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
 #define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
 
+#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+#define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
+
 /**
  * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
  * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
- * @exec: label to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
- * @previous: label the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
- * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous
- *
- * Contains the task's current label (which could change due to
- * change_hat).  Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
- *
- * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
  */
 struct aa_cred_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
@@ -47,6 +51,11 @@ struct aa_cred_ctx {
 struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
 void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
 void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
+
+struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
+void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
+
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
@@ -213,11 +222,13 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
  * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
  */
-static inline void aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 {
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
 	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 	ctx->previous = NULL;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 0624eb2081f3..a1d63d93b862 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -102,6 +102,27 @@ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	aa_dup_cred_ctx(new_ctx, old_ctx);
 }
 
+static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+
+	aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
+	task_ctx(task) = NULL;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+			       unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_dup_task_ctx(new, current_task_ctx());
+	task_ctx(task) = new;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					unsigned int mode)
 {
@@ -577,15 +598,16 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	int error = -ENOENT;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
 		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
-	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
-	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && tctx->previous)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && tctx->onexec)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->onexec);
 	else
 		error = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -699,7 +721,9 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	/* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(current_task_ctx());
+
 	return;
 }
 
@@ -779,6 +803,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 };
@@ -1025,15 +1051,25 @@ static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 
 	ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail_cred;
+	tctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tctx)
+		goto fail_task;
 
 	ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
 	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+	task_ctx(current) = tctx;
 
 	return 0;
+
+fail_task:
+	aa_free_cred_ctx(ctx);
+fail_cred:
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static void destroy_buffers(void)
-- 
cgit 


From d9087c49d4388e3f35f09a5cf7ed6e09c9106604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 03:53:53 -0800
Subject: apparmor: drop cred_ctx and reference the label directly

With the task domain change information now stored in the task->security
context, the cred->security context only stores the label. We can get
rid of the cred_ctx and directly reference the label, removing a layer
of indirection, and unneeded extra allocations.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/context.c         | 83 ++++++++++---------------------------
 security/apparmor/domain.c          | 14 +++----
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 24 +++--------
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             | 55 +++++++-----------------
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
index 432672b18945..70e4a094add8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -13,11 +13,9 @@
  * License.
  *
  *
- * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_cred_ctx and
- * the aa_cred_ctx.label, both of which are required and are not allowed
- * to be NULL.  The aa_cred_ctx is not reference counted and is unique
- * to each cred (which is reference count).  The label pointed to by
- * the cred_ctx is reference counted.
+ * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the cred_label() which
+ * is required and are not allowed to be NULL.  The cred_label is
+ * reference counted.
  *
  * TODO
  * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
@@ -29,40 +27,6 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
-/**
- * aa_alloc_cred_ctx - allocate a new cred_ctx
- * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags)
-{
-	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_cred_ctx), flags);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_free_cred_ctx - free a cred_ctx
- * @ctx: cred_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	if (ctx) {
-		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-
-		kzfree(ctx);
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_dup_cred_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
- * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
- * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
- */
-void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old)
-{
-	*new = *old;
-	aa_get_label(new->label);
-}
 
 /**
  * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
@@ -126,11 +90,12 @@ void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 {
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = current_cred_ctx();
+	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
 	struct cred *new;
+
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	if (ctx->label == label)
+	if (old == label)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
@@ -140,22 +105,22 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(ctx->label) != labels_ns(label)))
-		/* if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
+	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
+		/*
+		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
 		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(current_task_ctx());
 
 	/*
-	 * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it
-	 * is possible that ctx->profile->proxy->profile is the reference
-	 * keeping @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before
-	 * dropping the reference on ctx->profile
+	 * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
+	 * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
+	 * dropping the reference on the cred's label
 	 */
 	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	ctx->label = label;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = label;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -193,26 +158,26 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 {
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
-	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+	struct cred *new;
 
+	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	if (!tctx->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
-		tctx->previous = ctx->label;
+		tctx->previous = cred_label(new);
 		tctx->token = token;
 	} else if (tctx->token == token) {
-		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
 	} else {
 		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
 	/* clear exec on switching context */
 	aa_put_label(tctx->onexec);
 	tctx->onexec = NULL;
@@ -233,7 +198,6 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 {
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new;
 
 	if (tctx->token != token)
@@ -245,11 +209,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	ctx->label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
-	AA_BUG(!ctx->label);
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
 	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(tctx);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index b90759a765b5..5285938680e0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -779,7 +779,6 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -795,12 +794,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
 		return 0;
 
-	ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
 	tctx = current_task_ctx();
-	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	AA_BUG(!tctx);
 
-	label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
+	label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
 
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
 	get_buffers(buffer);
@@ -856,9 +854,9 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		}
 		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 	}
-	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
-	/* transfer reference, released when ctx is freed */
-	ctx->label = new;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
+	/* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */
+	cred_label(bprm->cred) = new;
 
 done:
 	aa_put_label(label);
@@ -1049,7 +1047,6 @@ build:
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -1070,7 +1067,6 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 	tctx = current_task_ctx();
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 	previous = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index c3b51d88275b..8d36c14bc76d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -22,21 +22,11 @@
 #include "label.h"
 #include "policy_ns.h"
 
-#define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
-
 #define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
 #define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
+#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
 
-/**
- * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
- * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
- */
-struct aa_cred_ctx {
-	struct aa_label *label;
-};
-
-/**
+/*
  * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
  * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
  * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
@@ -48,10 +38,6 @@ struct aa_task_ctx {
 	u64 token;
 };
 
-struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
-
 struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
 void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
 void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
@@ -73,10 +59,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
  */
 static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
 
-	AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label);
-	return ctx->label;
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	return label;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index a1d63d93b862..628c6a07df64 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
  */
 
 /*
- * free the associated aa_cred_ctx and put its labels
+ * put the associated labels
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	aa_free_cred_ctx(cred_ctx(cred));
-	cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
+	cred_label(cred) = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -64,30 +64,17 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
  */
 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+	cred_label(cred) = NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * prepare new aa_cred_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
+ * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
  */
 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				 gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp);
-
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	aa_dup_cred_ctx(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
-	cred_ctx(new) = ctx;
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -96,10 +83,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	const struct aa_cred_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
-
-	aa_dup_cred_ctx(new_ctx, old_ctx);
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old));
 }
 
 static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -599,11 +583,10 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
 	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && tctx->previous)
 		label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
 	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && tctx->onexec)
@@ -700,11 +683,11 @@ fail:
 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
+	struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
 
 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
-	if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
-	    (unconfined(new_ctx->label)))
+	if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
+	    (unconfined(new_label)))
 		return;
 
 	aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
@@ -712,7 +695,7 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 
 	/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
-	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label);
+	__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1050,26 +1033,16 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
 
-	ctx = aa_alloc_cred_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx)
-		goto fail_cred;
 	tctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tctx)
-		goto fail_task;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
-	cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
+	cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
 	task_ctx(current) = tctx;
 
 	return 0;
-
-fail_task:
-	aa_free_cred_ctx(ctx);
-fail_cred:
-	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static void destroy_buffers(void)
-- 
cgit 


From f175221af35bedf99b201d861a0fe54e19ef36c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 04:09:40 -0800
Subject: apparmor: rename tctx to ctx

now that cred_ctx has been removed we can rename task_ctxs from tctx
without causing confusion.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/context.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/apparmor/domain.c  | 16 ++++++++--------
 security/apparmor/lsm.c     | 18 +++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
index 70e4a094add8..d95a3d47cb92 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -156,8 +156,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
  */
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct cred *new;
 
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -165,11 +164,11 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	if (!tctx->previous) {
+	if (!ctx->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
-		tctx->previous = cred_label(new);
-		tctx->token = token;
-	} else if (tctx->token == token) {
+		ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
+		ctx->token = token;
+	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
 		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
 	} else {
 		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
@@ -179,8 +178,8 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
 
 	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
 	/* clear exec on switching context */
-	aa_put_label(tctx->onexec);
-	tctx->onexec = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -197,13 +196,13 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
  */
 int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct cred *new;
 
-	if (tctx->token != token)
+	if (ctx->token != token)
 		return -EACCES;
 	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
-	if (!tctx->previous)
+	if (!ctx->previous)
 		return 0;
 
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -211,10 +210,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
-	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(tctx);
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 5285938680e0..b180e10f2b86 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	char *buffer = NULL;
@@ -794,17 +794,17 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
 		return 0;
 
-	tctx = current_task_ctx();
+	ctx = current_task_ctx();
 	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
-	AA_BUG(!tctx);
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
 
 	label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
 
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
 	get_buffers(buffer);
 	/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
-	if (tctx->onexec)
-		new = handle_onexec(label, tctx->onexec, tctx->token,
+	if (ctx->onexec)
+		new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
 				    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
 	else
 		new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC,
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ build:
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
@@ -1067,9 +1067,9 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	tctx = current_task_ctx();
+	ctx = current_task_ctx();
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
-	previous = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
+	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 
 	if (unconfined(label)) {
 		info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 628c6a07df64..fda36f3e3820 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -582,15 +582,15 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	int error = -ENOENT;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx = current_task_ctx();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
 		label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
-	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && tctx->previous)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->previous);
-	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && tctx->onexec)
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(tctx->onexec);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
 	else
 		error = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1033,14 +1033,14 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *tctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 
-	tctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!tctx)
+	ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
-	task_ctx(current) = tctx;
+	task_ctx(current) = ctx;
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From e1a03f627b5254fa1ee83bd0761490f31ea2e382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 04:36:47 -0800
Subject: apparmor: cleanup fixup description of aa_replace_profiles

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/policy.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index c505d517fa3c..a158af1f1b38 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -845,8 +845,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *update_to_newest_parent(struct aa_profile *new)
  * @udata: serialized data stream  (NOT NULL)
  *
  * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
- * by any aa_cred_ctx.  If the profile does not exist on the profile list
- * it is added.
+ * by any task creds via invalidating the old version of the profile, which
+ * tasks will notice to update their own cred.  If the profile does not exist
+ * on the profile list it is added.
  *
  * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure.
  */
-- 
cgit 


From d065f2f56522b9240acb8c5ea35e9ee25f1b33e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 00:25:27 -0700
Subject: apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 8d36c14bc76d..b2aeb1da7e77 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -89,17 +89,6 @@ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
 	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
 }
 
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	return !unconfined(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
-}
-
 /**
  * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
  *
-- 
cgit 


From de62de59c27881c59c7df2e535cb9e1275cd52cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 00:43:02 -0700
Subject: apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/Makefile          |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/context.c         | 221 ------------------------------------
 security/apparmor/domain.c          |   4 +-
 security/apparmor/include/context.h |  40 +------
 security/apparmor/include/task.h    |  90 +++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             |   6 +-
 security/apparmor/task.c            | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 273 insertions(+), 266 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 security/apparmor/context.c
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/task.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/task.c

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 9a6b4033d52b..380c8e08174a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
-apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d95a3d47cb92..000000000000
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
- * contexts.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- *
- *
- * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the cred_label() which
- * is required and are not allowed to be NULL.  The cred_label is
- * reference counted.
- *
- * TODO
- * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
- * cred or task context but instead creates a new one.  Ideally the task
- * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
- *
- */
-
-#include "include/context.h"
-#include "include/policy.h"
-
-
-/**
- * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
- * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: counted reference to @task's label
- */
-struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	struct aa_label *p;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	p = aa_get_newest_label(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return p;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
- * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
- *
- * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
-{
-	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
- * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	if (ctx) {
-		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-
-		kzfree(ctx);
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
- * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
- * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
- */
-void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
-{
-	*new = *old;
-	aa_get_label(new->previous);
-	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label
- * @label: new label  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: 0 or error on failure
- */
-int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
-{
-	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
-	struct cred *new;
-
-	AA_BUG(!label);
-
-	if (old == label)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
-		return -EBUSY;
-
-	new  = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
-		/*
-		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
-		 * clear out context state
-		 */
-		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(current_task_ctx());
-
-	/*
-	 * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
-	 * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
-	 * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
-	 * dropping the reference on the cred's label
-	 */
-	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
-	cred_label(new) = label;
-
-	commit_creds(new);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
- * @label: system label to set at exec  (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
- * @stack: whether stacking should be done
- * Returns: 0 or error on failure
- */
-int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
-{
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
-
-	aa_get_label(label);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->onexec = label;
-	ctx->token = stack;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
- * @label: label to set as the current hat  (NOT NULL)
- * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
- *
- * Do switch of tasks hat.  If the task is currently in a hat
- * validate the token to match.
- *
- * Returns: 0 or error on failure
- */
-int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
-{
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
-	struct cred *new;
-
-	new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	AA_BUG(!label);
-
-	if (!ctx->previous) {
-		/* transfer refcount */
-		ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
-		ctx->token = token;
-	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
-		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
-	} else {
-		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
-		abort_creds(new);
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
-
-	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
-	/* clear exec on switching context */
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->onexec = NULL;
-
-	commit_creds(new);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_restore_previous_label - exit from hat context restoring previous label
- * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
- *
- * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous label.  The token
- * must match the stored token value.
- *
- * Returns: 0 or error of failure
- */
-int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
-{
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
-	struct cred *new;
-
-	if (ctx->token != token)
-		return -EACCES;
-	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
-	if (!ctx->previous)
-		return 0;
-
-	new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
-	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
-	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
-	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
-
-	commit_creds(new);
-
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index b180e10f2b86..56d080a6d774 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
 		return 0;
 
-	ctx = current_task_ctx();
+	ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	AA_BUG(!ctx);
 
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	ctx = current_task_ctx();
+	ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index b2aeb1da7e77..e287b7d0d4be 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -21,33 +21,10 @@
 
 #include "label.h"
 #include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
-#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
 #define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
 
-/*
- * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
- * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
- * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
- * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
- */
-struct aa_task_ctx {
-	struct aa_label *onexec;
-	struct aa_label *previous;
-	u64 token;
-};
-
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
-
-int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
-int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
-int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
-int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
-struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
-
 
 /**
  * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
@@ -196,19 +173,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 	return ns;
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
- * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
- */
-static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	AA_BUG(!ctx);
-
-	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->previous = NULL;
-	ctx->onexec = NULL;
-	ctx->token = 0;
-}
-
 #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d222197db299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
+#define __AA_TASK_H
+
+#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+
+/*
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *onexec;
+	struct aa_label *previous;
+	u64 token;
+};
+
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+
+		kzfree(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
+				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->previous);
+	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
+	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->previous = NULL;
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+	ctx->token = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index fda36f3e3820..7577cd982230 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	aa_dup_task_ctx(new, current_task_ctx());
+	aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
 	task_ctx(task) = new;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 	int error = -ENOENT;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_task_ctx();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(current_task_ctx());
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
 
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..36eb8707ad89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * TODO
+ * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
+ * cred or task context but instead creates a new one.  Ideally the task
+ * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
+ */
+
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's label
+ */
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_label *p;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	p = aa_get_newest_label(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label
+ * @label: new label  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (old == label)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	new  = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
+		/*
+		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
+		 * clear out context state
+		 */
+		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
+
+	/*
+	 * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference
+	 * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before
+	 * dropping the reference on the cred's label
+	 */
+	aa_get_label(label);
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = label;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
+ * @label: system label to set at exec  (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
+ * @stack: whether stacking should be done
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+
+	aa_get_label(label);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = label;
+	ctx->token = stack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
+ * @label: label to set as the current hat  (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
+ *
+ * Do switch of tasks hat.  If the task is currently in a hat
+ * validate the token to match.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+
+	if (!ctx->previous) {
+		/* transfer refcount */
+		ctx->previous = cred_label(new);
+		ctx->token = token;
+	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
+		aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	} else {
+		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+	/* clear exec on switching context */
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_restore_previous_label - exit from hat context restoring previous label
+ * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
+ *
+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous label.  The token
+ * must match the stored token value.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error of failure
+ */
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	struct cred *new;
+
+	if (ctx->token != token)
+		return -EACCES;
+	/* ignore restores when there is no saved label */
+	if (!ctx->previous)
+		return 0;
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
+	cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+	AA_BUG(!cred_label(new));
+	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
cgit 


From d8889d49e414b371eb235c08c3a759ab3e0cfa51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 01:04:48 -0700
Subject: apparmor: move context.h to cred.h

Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context
fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context
remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it
deals with.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c      |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/capability.c      |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/domain.c          |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/file.c            |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 176 ------------------------------------
 security/apparmor/include/cred.h    | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/ipc.c             |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/label.c           |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/mount.c           |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy.c          |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c       |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c   |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/procattr.c        |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/resource.c        |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/task.c            |   2 +-
 16 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/context.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/cred.h

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 00fc4f9f7f14..874c1bf6b84a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/crypto.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 67e347192a55..253ef6e9d445 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 56d080a6d774..cd58eef4eb8d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index e79bf44396a3..9a67a33904b3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e287b7d0d4be..000000000000
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- */
-
-#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
-#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
-
-#include <linux/cred.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-
-#include "label.h"
-#include "policy_ns.h"
-#include "task.h"
-
-#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
-
-
-/**
- * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
- * @cred: cred to obtain label from  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: confining label
- *
- * does NOT increment reference count
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
-
-	AA_BUG(!label);
-	return label;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_get_newest_cred_label - obtain the newest label on a cred
- * @cred: cred to obtain label from (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: newest version of confining label
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-	return aa_get_newest_label(aa_cred_raw_label(cred));
-}
-
-/**
- * __aa_task_raw_label - retrieve another task's label
- * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: @task's label without incrementing its ref count
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
- * of the label so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_current_raw_label(void)
-{
-	return aa_cred_raw_label(current_cred());
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_get_current_label - get the newest version of the current tasks label
- *
- * Returns: newest version of confining label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * This fn will not update the tasks cred, so it is safe inside of locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with aa_put_label()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *l = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(l))
-		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
-	return aa_get_label(l);
-}
-
-#define __end_current_label_crit_section(X) end_current_label_crit_section(X)
-
-/**
- * end_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label..
- * @label: label reference to put
- *
- * Should only be used with a reference obtained with
- * begin_current_label_crit_section and never used in situations where the
- * task cred may be updated
- */
-static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label)
-{
-	if (label != aa_current_raw_label())
-		aa_put_label(label);
-}
-
-/**
- * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * safe to call inside locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with __end_current_label_crit_section()
- * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
- * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
- * __end_current_label_crit_section()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(label))
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
-
-	return label;
-}
-
-/**
- * begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label and update it
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Not safe to call inside locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with end_current_label_crit_section()
- * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
- * critical section between begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
- * end_current_label_crit_section()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
-		if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
-			/* task cred will keep the reference */
-			aa_put_label(label);
-	}
-
-	return label;
-}
-
-static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label;
-	struct aa_ns *ns;
-
-	label  = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label));
-	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
-	return ns;
-}
-
-#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e287b7d0d4be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+#include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
+
+#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
+ * @cred: cred to obtain label from  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: confining label
+ *
+ * does NOT increment reference count
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_cred_label - obtain the newest label on a cred
+ * @cred: cred to obtain label from (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return aa_get_newest_label(aa_cred_raw_label(cred));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_raw_label - retrieve another task's label
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's label without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the label so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_current_raw_label(void)
+{
+	return aa_cred_raw_label(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_current_label - get the newest version of the current tasks label
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred, so it is safe inside of locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with aa_put_label()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(l))
+		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
+	return aa_get_label(l);
+}
+
+#define __end_current_label_crit_section(X) end_current_label_crit_section(X)
+
+/**
+ * end_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label..
+ * @label: label reference to put
+ *
+ * Should only be used with a reference obtained with
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section and never used in situations where the
+ * task cred may be updated
+ */
+static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	if (label != aa_current_raw_label())
+		aa_put_label(label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label))
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label and update it
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Not safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+		if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
+			/* task cred will keep the reference */
+			aa_put_label(label);
+	}
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+
+	label  = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index d7b137d4eb74..527ea1557120 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/sig_names.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 69c7451becef..523250e34837 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/secid.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 7577cd982230..ef6334e11597 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
index 8c558cbce930..6e8c7ac0b33d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index a158af1f1b38..a8e096a88e62 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
index b1e629cba70b..b0f9dc3f765a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index ece0c246cfe6..40c8dc617b13 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/crypto.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index d81617379d63..80c34ed373c3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/domain.h"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index cf4d234febe9..d022137143b9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index 36eb8707ad89..44b9b938e06d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
  */
 
-#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
-- 
cgit 


From 9fcf78cca198600b27c44b4e50f00f8af3927f17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 18:26:19 -0700
Subject: apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement
 at nnp

Domain transition so far have been largely blocked by no new privs,
unless the transition has been provably a subset of the previous
confinement. There was a couple problems with the previous
implementations,

- transitions that weren't explicitly a stack but resulted in a subset
  of confinement were disallowed

- confinement subsets were only calculated from the previous
  confinement instead of the confinement being enforced at the time of
  no new privs, so transitions would have to get progressively
  tighter.

Fix this by detecting and storing a reference to the task's
confinement at the "time" no new privs is set. This reference is then
used to determine whether a transition is a subsystem of the
confinement at the time no new privs was set.

Unfortunately the implementation is less than ideal in that we have to
detect no new privs after the fact when a task attempts a domain
transition. This is adequate for the currently but will not work in a
stacking situation where no new privs could be conceivably be set in
both the "host" and in the container.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c   |   1 +
 security/apparmor/domain.c       | 163 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 security/apparmor/include/task.h |   4 +
 security/apparmor/task.c         |   7 ++
 4 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 874c1bf6b84a..07623fb41e32 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2156,6 +2156,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack",		1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
 	{ }
 };
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index cd58eef4eb8d..9d1936519cfd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -592,22 +592,6 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (!new)
 		goto audit;
 
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(new, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		nonewprivs = true;
-		perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
@@ -684,21 +668,6 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
 		goto audit;
 	}
-	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and
-	 * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail.
-	 *
-	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked
-	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(onexec, &profile->label)) {
-		error = -EPERM;
-		info = "no new privs";
-		perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
-		goto audit;
-	}
 
 	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
 		if (DEBUG_ON) {
@@ -800,6 +769,17 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(bprm->cred));
 
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) &&
+	    !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
 	get_buffers(buffer);
 	/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
@@ -820,7 +800,20 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	/* TODO: Add ns level no_new_privs subset test */
+	/* Policy has specified a domain transitions. If no_new_privs and
+	 * confined ensure the transition is to confinement that is subset
+	 * of the confinement when the task entered no new privs.
+	 *
+	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
+	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
+	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 */
+	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
+	    !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		info = "no new privs";
+		goto audit;
+	}
 
 	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
 		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
@@ -1047,30 +1040,28 @@ build:
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
-	 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
-	 * available.
-	 */
-	if (task_no_new_privs(current)) {
-		/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
-		AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 	previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
 	if (unconfined(label)) {
 		info = "unconfined can not change_hat";
 		error = -EPERM;
@@ -1091,6 +1082,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 		if (error)
 			goto fail;
 
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1100,6 +1103,18 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 			/* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
 			goto kill;
 	} else if (previous && !(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) {
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		/* Return to saved label.  Kill task if restore fails
 		 * to avoid brute force attacks
 		 */
@@ -1142,21 +1157,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions when no_new_privs
-	 * and not unconfined OR the transition results in a stack on
-	 * the current label.
-	 * Stacking domain transitions and transitions from unconfined are
-	 * allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
-	 * in a reduction of permissions.
-	 */
-	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !stack &&
-	    !profile_unconfined(profile) &&
-	    !aa_label_is_subset(target, &profile->label)) {
-		info = "no new privs";
-		error = -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	if (!error)
 		error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request,
 					     profile->file.start, perms);
@@ -1190,10 +1190,23 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 	const char *info = NULL;
 	const char *auditname = fqname;		/* retain leading & if stack */
 	bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	int error = 0;
 	char *op;
 	u32 request;
 
+	label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	/*
+	 * Detect no new privs being set, and store the label it
+	 * occurred under. Ideally this would happen when nnp
+	 * is set but there isn't a good way to do that yet.
+	 *
+	 * Testing for unconfined must be done before the subset test
+	 */
+	if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp)
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
+
 	if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
 		AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1281,14 +1294,28 @@ check:
 	if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* stacking is always a subset, so only check the nonstack case */
+	if (!stack) {
+		new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
+					   aa_get_label(target),
+					   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
+		/*
+		 * no new privs prevents domain transitions that would
+		 * reduce restrictions.
+		 */
+		if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) &&
+		    !aa_label_is_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) {
+			/* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */
+			AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied");
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) {
 		/* only transition profiles in the current ns */
 		if (stack)
 			new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL);
-		else
-			new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-					aa_get_label(target),
-					aa_get_label(&profile->label));
 		if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) {
 			info = "failed to build target label";
 			error = PTR_ERR(new);
@@ -1297,9 +1324,15 @@ check:
 			goto audit;
 		}
 		error = aa_replace_current_label(new);
-	} else
+	} else {
+		if (new) {
+			aa_put_label(new);
+			new = NULL;
+		}
+
 		/* full transition will be built in exec path */
 		error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack);
+	}
 
 audit:
 	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index d222197db299..55edaa1d83f8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -18,11 +18,13 @@
 
 /*
  * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @nnp: snapshot of label at time of no_new_privs
  * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
  * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
  * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
  */
 struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *nnp;
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
 static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
 		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 
@@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
 				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
 {
 	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->nnp);
 	aa_get_label(new->previous);
 	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index 44b9b938e06d..c6b78a14da91 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task)
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 {
 	struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	struct cred *new;
 
 	AA_BUG(!label);
@@ -59,6 +60,12 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) {
+		struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp;
+
+		ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp);
+		aa_put_label(tmp);
+	}
 	if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label)))
 		/*
 		 * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace
-- 
cgit 


From 074c1cd798cb0b481d7eaa749b64aa416563c053 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 11:58:33 -0700
Subject: apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/match.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 5d95caeddebc..aeac68c58689 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -329,6 +329,18 @@ fail:
 	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
 
+#define match_char(state, def, base, next, check, C)	\
+do {							\
+	u32 b = (base)[(state)];			\
+	unsigned int pos = base_idx(b) + (C);		\
+	if ((check)[pos] != (state)) {			\
+		(state) = (def)[(state)];		\
+		break;					\
+	}						\
+	(state) = (next)[pos];				\
+	break;						\
+} while (1)
+
 /**
  * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
@@ -352,7 +364,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+	unsigned int state = start;
 
 	if (state == 0)
 		return 0;
@@ -361,23 +373,13 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
-		/* default is direct to next state */
-		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
-			if (check[pos] == state)
-				state = next[pos];
-			else
-				state = def[state];
-		}
+		for (; len; len--)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check,
+				   equiv[(u8) *str++]);
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
-			if (check[pos] == state)
-				state = next[pos];
-			else
-				state = def[state];
-		}
+		for (; len; len--)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++);
 	}
 
 	return state;
@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+	unsigned int state = start;
 
 	if (state == 0)
 		return 0;
@@ -412,22 +414,13 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		while (*str) {
-			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
-			if (check[pos] == state)
-				state = next[pos];
-			else
-				state = def[state];
-		}
+		while (*str)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check,
+				   equiv[(u8) *str++]);
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		while (*str) {
-			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
-			if (check[pos] == state)
-				state = next[pos];
-			else
-				state = def[state];
-		}
+		while (*str)
+			match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++);
 	}
 
 	return state;
@@ -450,27 +443,14 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
 	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-	unsigned int pos;
 
 	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
 	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
 		/* Equivalence class table defined */
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
-		/* default is direct to next state */
-
-		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
-		if (check[pos] == state)
-			state = next[pos];
-		else
-			state = def[state];
-	} else {
-		/* default is direct to next state */
-		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
-		if (check[pos] == state)
-			state = next[pos];
-		else
-			state = def[state];
-	}
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, equiv[(u8) c]);
+	} else
+		match_char(state, def, base, next, check, (u8) c);
 
 	return state;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 031dcc8f4e84fea37dc6f78fdc7288aa7f8386c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 12:10:50 -0700
Subject: apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding

State differential encoding can provide better compression for
apparmor policy, without having significant impact on match time.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/match.h |  4 ++++
 security/apparmor/match.c         | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index cd8aeab6ac57..e0de00bd16a8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
+#define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE	1
 
 struct table_set_header {
 	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
@@ -164,4 +165,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
 		kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
 }
 
+#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000
+#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000
+
 #endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index aeac68c58689..70cdcb3c3b25 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
 
 	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
 		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+			    (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count))
 				goto out;
 			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
@@ -202,6 +203,24 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* Now that all the other tables are verified, verify diffencoding */
+	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		size_t j, k;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+			for (j = i;
+			     (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+			      !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE);
+			     j = k) {
+				k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
+				if (j == k)
+					goto out;
+				if (k < j)
+					break;		/* already verified */
+				BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	error = 0;
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -274,6 +293,9 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
 		goto fail;
 
 	dfa->flags = ntohs(*(__be16 *) (data + 12));
+	if (dfa->flags != 0 && dfa->flags != YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)
+		goto fail;
+
 	data += hsize;
 	size -= hsize;
 
@@ -335,6 +357,8 @@ do {							\
 	unsigned int pos = base_idx(b) + (C);		\
 	if ((check)[pos] != (state)) {			\
 		(state) = (def)[(state)];		\
+		if (b & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE)		\
+			continue;			\
 		break;					\
 	}						\
 	(state) = (next)[pos];				\
-- 
cgit 


From d901d6a298dc6e9105b9dc091d65b043e9f8c9a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 13:01:01 -0700
Subject: apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers

separate the different types of verification so they are logically
separate and can be reused separate of each other.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/match.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 70cdcb3c3b25..7ae6ed9d69dd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ fail:
 }
 
 /**
- * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
- * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ * verify_table_headers - verify that the tables headers are as expected
+ * @tables - array of dfa tables to check (NOT NULL)
  * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable
  *
  * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
@@ -145,83 +145,98 @@ fail:
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
  */
-static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+static int verify_table_headers(struct table_header **tables, int flags)
 {
-	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	size_t state_count, trans_count;
 	int error = -EPROTO;
 
 	/* check that required tables exist */
-	if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] &&
-	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
-	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
+	if (!(tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
+	      tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
-	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	state_count = tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
 	if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) {
-		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
 			goto out;
-		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
 			goto out;
 	}
 	if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) {
-		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
+		if (!tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
 			goto out;
-		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
+		if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
 			goto out;
 	}
-	if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
+	if (state_count != tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* next.size == chk.size */
-	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
-	if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
+	trans_count = tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	if (trans_count != tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
-	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] &&
-	    dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
+	if (tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
-		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-			if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
-			    (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count))
-				goto out;
-			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
-				       "bounds error\n");
-				goto out;
-			}
-		}
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
 
-		for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
-			if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-				goto out;
-			if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-				goto out;
+/**
+ * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
+ * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	int error = EPROTO;
+
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+		if (!(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+		    (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count))
+			goto out;
+		if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
+			pr_err("AppArmor DFA next/check upper bounds error\n");
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
+		if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+		if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* Now that all the other tables are verified, verify diffencoding */
-	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+	for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
 		size_t j, k;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-			for (j = i;
-			     (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
-			      !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE);
-			     j = k) {
-				k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
-				if (j == k)
-					goto out;
-				if (k < j)
-					break;		/* already verified */
-				BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
-			}
+		for (j = i;
+		     (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE) &&
+		     !(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] & MARK_DIFF_ENCODE);
+		     j = k) {
+			k = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[j];
+			if (j == k)
+				goto out;
+			if (k < j)
+				break;		/* already verified */
+			BASE_TABLE(dfa)[j] |= MARK_DIFF_ENCODE;
 		}
 	}
 	error = 0;
+
 out:
 	return error;
 }
@@ -338,11 +353,16 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
 		size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
 		table = NULL;
 	}
-
-	error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags);
+	error = verify_table_headers(dfa->tables, flags);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		error = verify_dfa(dfa);
+		if (error)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
 	return dfa;
 
 fail:
-- 
cgit 


From cf91600071a973c28cebf314e618610a20ec4d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 09:58:29 +0100
Subject: apparmor: cleanup create_aafs() error path

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 32 ++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 07623fb41e32..8cdab3c5bc63 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2458,34 +2458,26 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".load", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_load);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subload(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".replace", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subreplace(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file(".remove", 0666, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subremove(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	dent = securityfs_create_file("revision", 0444, aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 				      NULL, &aa_fs_ns_revision_fops);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 	ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent;
 
 	/* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */
@@ -2499,10 +2491,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 	/* magic symlink similar to nsfs redirects based on task policy */
 	dent = securityfs_create_symlink("policy", aa_sfs_entry.dentry,
 					 NULL, &policy_link_iops);
-	if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(dent);
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(dent))
+		goto dent_error;
 
 	error = aa_mk_null_file(aa_sfs_entry.dentry);
 	if (error)
@@ -2514,6 +2504,8 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 	aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
 	return 0;
 
+dent_error:
+	error = PTR_ERR(dent);
 error:
 	aa_destroy_aafs();
 	AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
-- 
cgit 


From a0781209cb894e5115bb00c269b1d94c4b632d6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 18:26:46 +0100
Subject: apparmor: cleanup: simplify code to get ns symlink name

ns_get_name() is called in only one place and can be folded in.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 25 ++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 8cdab3c5bc63..1e63ff2e5b85 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -119,9 +119,7 @@ static int aafs_count;
 
 static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
-
-	seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino);
+	seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2392,29 +2390,18 @@ static const char *policy_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns,
-		       struct inode *inode)
-{
-	int res = snprintf(buf, size, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, inode->i_ino);
-
-	if (res < 0 || res >= size)
-		res = -ENOENT;
-
-	return res;
-}
-
 static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer,
 			   int buflen)
 {
-	struct aa_ns *ns;
 	char name[32];
 	int res;
 
-	ns = aa_get_current_ns();
-	res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), ns, d_inode(dentry));
-	if (res >= 0)
+	res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME,
+		       d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
+	if (res > 0 && res < sizeof(name))
 		res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name);
-	aa_put_ns(ns);
+	else
+		res = -ENOENT;
 
 	return res;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 8e51f9087f4024d20f70f4d9831e1f45d8088331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 12:37:19 -0800
Subject: apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and
 value

Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more
extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for
this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile
if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised
by the IMA subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c         | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |   6 ++
 security/apparmor/policy.c         |   8 ++
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |  85 ++++++++++++++++++---
 4 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 9d1936519cfd..6bcafe8d226d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
@@ -301,8 +302,57 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile
+ * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate
+ * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
+ */
+static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			   struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t size;
+	struct dentry *d;
+	char *value = NULL;
+	int value_size = 0, ret = profile->xattr_count;
+
+	if (!bprm || !profile->xattr_count)
+		return 0;
+
+	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value,
+					  value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (size < 0) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Check the xattr value, not just presence */
+		if (profile->xattr_lens[i]) {
+			if (profile->xattr_lens[i] != size) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if (memcmp(value, profile->xattr_values[i], size)) {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(value);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
+ * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @name - to match against  (NOT NULL)
  * @head - profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
  * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL)
@@ -316,11 +366,12 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
  */
-static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
+static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+					 const char *name,
 					 struct list_head *head,
 					 const char **info)
 {
-	int len = 0;
+	int len = 0, xattrs = 0;
 	bool conflict = false;
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
 
@@ -329,26 +380,56 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
 		    &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
 			continue;
 
+		/* Find the "best" matching profile. Profiles must
+		 * match the path and extended attributes (if any)
+		 * associated with the file. A more specific path
+		 * match will be preferred over a less specific one,
+		 * and a match with more matching extended attributes
+		 * will be preferred over one with fewer. If the best
+		 * match has both the same level of path specificity
+		 * and the same number of matching extended attributes
+		 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
+		 * match.
+		 */
 		if (profile->xmatch) {
-			if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
-				unsigned int state;
-				u32 perm;
-
-				state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
-						     DFA_START, name);
-				perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
-				/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
-				if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
-					if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
+			unsigned int state;
+			u32 perm;
+
+			if (profile->xmatch_len < len)
+				continue;
+
+			state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
+					     DFA_START, name);
+			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+				int ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile);
+
+				/* Fail matching if the xattrs don't match */
+				if (ret < 0)
+					continue;
+
+				/* The new match isn't more specific
+				 * than the current best match
+				 */
+				if (profile->xmatch_len == len &&
+				    ret <= xattrs) {
+					/* Match is equivalent, so conflict */
+					if (ret == xattrs)
 						conflict = true;
-						continue;
-					}
-					candidate = profile;
-					len = profile->xmatch_len;
-					conflict = false;
+					continue;
 				}
+
+				/* Either the same length with more matching
+				 * xattrs, or a longer match
+				 */
+				candidate = profile;
+				len = profile->xmatch_len;
+				xattrs = ret;
+				conflict = false;
 			}
-		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
+		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name) &&
+			   aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile) >= 0)
 			/* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
 			return profile;
 	}
@@ -363,6 +444,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
 
 /**
  * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @ns: the current namespace  (NOT NULL)
  * @list: list to search  (NOT NULL)
  * @name: the executable name to match against  (NOT NULL)
@@ -370,13 +452,14 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
  *
  * Returns: label or NULL if no match found
  */
-static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list,
+static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+				    struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list,
 				    const char *name, const char **info)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list, info));
+	profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(bprm, name, list, info));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return profile ? &profile->label : NULL;
@@ -432,6 +515,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 /**
  * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex
  * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task
  * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
  * @xindex: index into x transition table
  * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL)
@@ -441,6 +525,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
  * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available
  */
 static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				   const char *name, u32 xindex,
 				   const char **lookupname,
 				   const char **info)
@@ -468,11 +553,11 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	case AA_X_NAME:
 		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
 			/* released by caller */
-			new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &profile->base.profiles,
 					  name, info);
 		else
 			/* released by caller */
-			new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+			new = find_attach(bprm, ns, &ns->base.profiles,
 					  name, info);
 		*lookupname = name;
 		break;
@@ -512,6 +597,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					   bool *secure_exec)
 {
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *component;
+	struct label_it i;
 	const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
 	unsigned int state = profile->file.start;
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
@@ -536,8 +623,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
-		new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles,
-				  name, &info);
+		new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns,
+				  &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info);
 		if (new) {
 			AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label");
 			return new;
@@ -550,7 +637,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms);
 	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
 		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
-		new = x_to_label(profile, name, perms.xindex, &target, &info);
+		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
+				 &info);
 		if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
 			/* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
 			goto audit;
@@ -559,6 +647,20 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			info = "profile transition not found";
 			/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
 			perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+		} else {
+			/* verify that each component's xattr requirements are
+			 * met, and fail execution otherwise
+			 */
+			label_for_each(i, new, component) {
+				if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component) < 0) {
+					error = -EACCES;
+					info = "required xattrs not present";
+					perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+					aa_put_label(new);
+					new = NULL;
+					goto audit;
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
 		/* no exec permission - learning mode */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 17fe41a9cac3..02bde92ebb5c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
+
+	int xattr_count;
+	char **xattrs;
+	size_t *xattr_lens;
+	char **xattr_values;
+
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index a8e096a88e62..7fee546ba10d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
 void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	struct rhashtable *rht;
+	int i;
 
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 
@@ -227,6 +228,13 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
+		kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
+		kzfree(profile->xattr_values[i]);
+	}
+	kzfree(profile->xattrs);
+	kzfree(profile->xattr_lens);
+	kzfree(profile->xattr_values);
 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 40c8dc617b13..98d019185e57 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -203,6 +203,15 @@ static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
 	return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
 }
 
+static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (p)
+		memcpy(p, src, len);
+	return p;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
  * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
@@ -522,6 +531,68 @@ fail:
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattrs")) {
+		int i, size;
+
+		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+		profile->xattr_count = size;
+		profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *),
+						GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->xattrs)
+			goto fail;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->xattrs[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattr_values")) {
+		int i, size;
+
+		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+
+		/* Must be the same number of xattr values as xattrs */
+		if (size != profile->xattr_count)
+			goto fail;
+
+		profile->xattr_lens = kcalloc(size, sizeof(size_t),
+						    GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->xattr_lens)
+			goto fail;
+
+		profile->xattr_values = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *),
+						      GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->xattr_values)
+			goto fail;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			profile->xattr_lens[i] = unpack_blob(e,
+					      &profile->xattr_values[i], NULL);
+			profile->xattr_values[i] =
+				kvmemdup(profile->xattr_values[i],
+					 profile->xattr_lens[i]);
+		}
+
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return 1;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	void *pos = e->pos;
@@ -556,15 +627,6 @@ fail:
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void *kvmemdup(const void *src, size_t len)
-{
-	void *p = kvmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (p)
-		memcpy(p, src, len);
-	return p;
-}
-
 static u32 strhash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
 {
 	const char * const *key = data;
@@ -719,6 +781,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (!unpack_xattrs(e, profile)) {
+		info = "failed to unpack profile xattrs";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) {
 		info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits";
 		goto fail;
-- 
cgit 


From 73f488cd903938e78979d50e081a0314ad142351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 15:28:05 -0800
Subject: apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching

This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended
conditional using dfa matching.

This has a couple of advantages
- pattern matching can be used for the xattr match

- xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required

- the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with
  other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional
  work lands.

The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch
conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch
will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on
the executable name.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |  5 ++++
 security/apparmor/domain.c         | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |  2 --
 security/apparmor/policy.c         |  6 +----
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  | 35 +------------------------
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 1e63ff2e5b85..35e6b240fb14 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2147,6 +2147,10 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 
+static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_attach[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("xattr", 1),
+	{ }
+};
 static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",	1),
@@ -2155,6 +2159,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack",		1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions",		aa_sfs_entry_attach),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
 	{ }
 };
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6bcafe8d226d..6a1279f11fcc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -306,11 +306,12 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
  * aa_xattrs_match - check whether a file matches the xattrs defined in profile
  * @bprm: binprm struct for the process to validate
  * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state to start match in
  *
  * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
  */
 static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			   struct aa_profile *profile)
+			   struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state)
 {
 	int i;
 	size_t size;
@@ -321,27 +322,40 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	if (!bprm || !profile->xattr_count)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* transition from exec match to xattr set */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+
 	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
 		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(d, profile->xattrs[i], &value,
 					  value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (size < 0) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (size >= 0) {
+			u32 perm;
 
-		/* Check the xattr value, not just presence */
-		if (profile->xattr_lens[i]) {
-			if (profile->xattr_lens[i] != size) {
+			/* Check the xattr value, not just presence */
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->xmatch, state, value,
+						 size);
+			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) {
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}
-
-			if (memcmp(value, profile->xattr_values[i], size)) {
+		}
+		/* transition to next element */
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+		if (size < 0) {
+			/*
+			 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
+			 * next element was valid. IFF so the xattr
+			 * was optional.
+			 */
+			if (!state) {
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}
+			/* don't count missing optional xattr as matched */
+			ret--;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -403,13 +417,16 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
 			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
 			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
-				int ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile);
+				int ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile, state);
 
 				/* Fail matching if the xattrs don't match */
 				if (ret < 0)
 					continue;
 
-				/* The new match isn't more specific
+				/*
+				 * TODO: allow for more flexible best match
+				 *
+				 * The new match isn't more specific
 				 * than the current best match
 				 */
 				if (profile->xmatch_len == len &&
@@ -428,9 +445,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				xattrs = ret;
 				conflict = false;
 			}
-		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name) &&
-			   aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile) >= 0)
-			/* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
+		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
+			/*
+			 * old exact non-re match, without conditionals such
+			 * as xattrs. no more searching required
+			 */
 			return profile;
 	}
 
@@ -652,7 +671,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			 * met, and fail execution otherwise
 			 */
 			label_for_each(i, new, component) {
-				if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component) < 0) {
+				if (aa_xattrs_match(bprm, component, state) <
+				    0) {
 					error = -EACCES;
 					info = "required xattrs not present";
 					perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 02bde92ebb5c..c93b9ed55490 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -151,8 +151,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	int xattr_count;
 	char **xattrs;
-	size_t *xattr_lens;
-	char **xattr_values;
 
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 7fee546ba10d..c07493ce2376 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -228,13 +228,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
 		kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
-		kzfree(profile->xattr_values[i]);
-	}
 	kzfree(profile->xattrs);
-	kzfree(profile->xattr_lens);
-	kzfree(profile->xattr_values);
 	kzfree(profile->dirname);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 98d019185e57..8a31ddd474d7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -540,8 +540,7 @@ static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 
 		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
 		profile->xattr_count = size;
-		profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *),
-						GFP_KERNEL);
+		profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!profile->xattrs)
 			goto fail;
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
@@ -554,38 +553,6 @@ static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 
-	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xattr_values")) {
-		int i, size;
-
-		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
-
-		/* Must be the same number of xattr values as xattrs */
-		if (size != profile->xattr_count)
-			goto fail;
-
-		profile->xattr_lens = kcalloc(size, sizeof(size_t),
-						    GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!profile->xattr_lens)
-			goto fail;
-
-		profile->xattr_values = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *),
-						      GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!profile->xattr_values)
-			goto fail;
-
-		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			profile->xattr_lens[i] = unpack_blob(e,
-					      &profile->xattr_values[i], NULL);
-			profile->xattr_values[i] =
-				kvmemdup(profile->xattr_values[i],
-					 profile->xattr_lens[i]);
-		}
-
-		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-			goto fail;
-		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-			goto fail;
-	}
 	return 1;
 
 fail:
-- 
cgit 


From 21f606610502ef56f9180b1529fc7e02957564c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 19:43:13 -0800
Subject: apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution

Overlapping domain attachments using the current longest left exact
match fail in some simple cases, and with the fix to ensure consistent
behavior by failing unresolvable attachments it becomes important to
do a better job.

eg. under the current match the following are unresolvable where
the alternation is clearly a better match under the most specific
left match rule.
  /**
  /{bin/,}usr/

Use a counting match that detects when a loop in the state machine is
enter, and return the match count to provide a better specific left
match resolution.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c    |   1 +
 security/apparmor/domain.c        |  30 ++++++----
 security/apparmor/include/match.h |  19 ++++++
 security/apparmor/match.c         | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 35e6b240fb14..3dcc122234c8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2159,6 +2159,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack",		1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("fix_binfmt_elf_mmap",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left",	1),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions",		aa_sfs_entry_attach),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"),
 	{ }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6a1279f11fcc..57cc892e05a2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -385,10 +385,13 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 					 struct list_head *head,
 					 const char **info)
 {
-	int len = 0, xattrs = 0;
+	int candidate_len = 0, candidate_xattrs = 0;
 	bool conflict = false;
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
 
+	AA_BUG(!name);
+	AA_BUG(!head);
+
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
 		if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL &&
 		    &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
@@ -406,19 +409,20 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 		 * match.
 		 */
 		if (profile->xmatch) {
-			unsigned int state;
+			unsigned int state, count;
 			u32 perm;
 
-			if (profile->xmatch_len < len)
-				continue;
-
-			state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
-					     DFA_START, name);
+			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(profile->xmatch, DFA_START,
+						 name, &count);
 			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
 			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
 			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
-				int ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile, state);
+				int ret;
+
+				if (count < candidate_len)
+					continue;
 
+				ret = aa_xattrs_match(bprm, profile, state);
 				/* Fail matching if the xattrs don't match */
 				if (ret < 0)
 					continue;
@@ -429,10 +433,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				 * The new match isn't more specific
 				 * than the current best match
 				 */
-				if (profile->xmatch_len == len &&
-				    ret <= xattrs) {
+				if (count == candidate_len &&
+				    ret <= candidate_xattrs) {
 					/* Match is equivalent, so conflict */
-					if (ret == xattrs)
+					if (ret == candidate_xattrs)
 						conflict = true;
 					continue;
 				}
@@ -441,8 +445,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 				 * xattrs, or a longer match
 				 */
 				candidate = profile;
-				len = profile->xmatch_len;
-				xattrs = ret;
+				candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len;
+				candidate_xattrs = ret;
 				conflict = false;
 			}
 		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index e0de00bd16a8..958d2b52a7b7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -138,6 +138,25 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
+#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 8
+struct match_workbuf {
+	unsigned int count;
+	unsigned int pos;
+	unsigned int len;
+	unsigned int size;	/* power of 2, same as history size */
+	unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE];
+};
+#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N)		\
+struct match_workbuf N = {		\
+	.count = 0,			\
+	.pos = 0,			\
+	.len = 0,			\
+	.size = WB_HISTORY_SIZE,			\
+}
+
+unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, unsigned int *count);
+
 /**
  * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p
  * @dfa: dfa  (MAYBE NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 7ae6ed9d69dd..dd4c995c5e25 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -556,7 +556,6 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	return state;
 }
 
-
 /**
  * aa_dfa_matchn_until - traverse @dfa until accept or @n bytes consumed
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
@@ -618,3 +617,124 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	*retpos = str;
 	return state;
 }
+
+#define inc_wb_pos(wb)						\
+do {								\
+	wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (wb->size - 1);		\
+	wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (wb->size - 1);		\
+} while (0)
+
+/* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */
+static bool is_loop(struct match_workbuf *wb, unsigned int state,
+		    unsigned int *adjust)
+{
+	unsigned int pos = wb->pos;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (wb->history[pos] < state)
+		return false;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= wb->len; i++) {
+		if (wb->history[pos] == state) {
+			*adjust = i;
+			return true;
+		}
+		if (pos == 0)
+			pos = wb->size;
+		pos--;
+	}
+
+	*adjust = i;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static unsigned int leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, struct match_workbuf *wb,
+				 unsigned int *count)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	AA_BUG(!dfa);
+	AA_BUG(!str);
+	AA_BUG(!wb);
+	AA_BUG(!count);
+
+	*count = 0;
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
+
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			unsigned int adjust;
+
+			wb->history[wb->pos] = state;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+			if (is_loop(wb, state, &adjust)) {
+				state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, str);
+				*count -= adjust;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			inc_wb_pos(wb);
+			(*count)++;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (!state)
+		*count = 0;
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_leftmatch - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: current count of longest left.
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, unsigned int *count)
+{
+	DEFINE_MATCH_WB(wb);
+
+	/* TODO: match for extended state dfas */
+
+	return leftmatch_fb(dfa, start, str, &wb, count);
+}
-- 
cgit 


From 304ec482f562885b178b370cd50340447585d1c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:28:50 -0500
Subject: get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c                           | 1 -
 drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-curproc.c | 1 -
 drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-prim.c    | 1 -
 fs/ceph/dir.c                                            | 1 -
 fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c                                         | 1 -
 fs/orangefs/acl.c                                        | 1 -
 kernel/exec_domain.c                                     | 1 -
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c                               | 1 -
 8 files changed, 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c b/arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c
index 6e9a0a9a6a04..783b20354f8b 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/kdev_t.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-curproc.c b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-curproc.c
index 1d8949f1a4fa..91e48c42533c 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-curproc.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-curproc.c
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-prim.c b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-prim.c
index 6f92ea272186..4eb9ba455e98 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-prim.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/libcfs/linux/linux-prim.c
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 #define DEBUG_SUBSYSTEM S_LNET
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 
 #include <linux/libcfs/libcfs.h>
diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c
index 0c4346806e17..364a91fb3599 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 #include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
 
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
index 65c9c4175145..b993ad282de2 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
 #include <linux/nfs.h>
 #include <linux/nfs4.h>
 #include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 #include "nfs4_fs.h"
 #include "internal.h"
diff --git a/fs/orangefs/acl.c b/fs/orangefs/acl.c
index 480ea059a680..10587413b20e 100644
--- a/fs/orangefs/acl.c
+++ b/fs/orangefs/acl.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #include "orangefs-kernel.h"
 #include "orangefs-bufmap.h"
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/exec_domain.c b/kernel/exec_domain.c
index 0975b0268545..a5697119290e 100644
--- a/kernel/exec_domain.c
+++ b/kernel/exec_domain.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 static int execdomains_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index dbe6efde77a0..5fa191252c8f 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
-- 
cgit 


From 72e89f50084c6dbc58a00aeedf92c450dc1a8b1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 20:53:21 +0000
Subject: security: Add support for SCTP security hooks

The SCTP security hooks are explained in:
Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst | 175 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  36 ++++++++
 include/linux/security.h            |  25 ++++++
 security/security.c                 |  22 +++++
 4 files changed, 258 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6e5a3925a860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+SCTP LSM Support
+================
+
+For security module support, three SCTP specific hooks have been implemented::
+
+    security_sctp_assoc_request()
+    security_sctp_bind_connect()
+    security_sctp_sk_clone()
+
+Also the following security hook has been utilised::
+
+    security_inet_conn_established()
+
+The usage of these hooks are described below with the SELinux implementation
+described in ``Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst``
+
+
+security_sctp_assoc_request()
+-----------------------------
+Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
+security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
+
+
+security_sctp_bind_connect()
+-----------------------------
+Passes one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses to the security module for validation
+based on the ``@optname`` that will result in either a bind or connect
+service as shown in the permission check tables below.
+Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+::
+
+    @sk      - Pointer to sock structure.
+    @optname - Name of the option to validate.
+    @address - One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses.
+    @addrlen - The total length of address(s). This is calculated on each
+               ipv4 or ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or
+               sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6).
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                     BIND Type Checks                           |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                   CONNECT Type Checks                          |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+A summary of the ``@optname`` entries is as follows::
+
+    SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD - Allows additional bind addresses to be
+                             associated after (optionally) calling
+                             bind(3).
+                             sctp_bindx(3) adds a set of bind
+                             addresses on a socket.
+
+    SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX - Allows the allocation of multiple
+                            addresses for reaching a peer
+                            (multi-homed).
+                            sctp_connectx(3) initiates a connection
+                            on an SCTP socket using multiple
+                            destination addresses.
+
+    SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT  - Initiate a connection that is generated by a
+                            sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3) on a new asociation.
+
+    SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR     - Set local primary address.
+
+    SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR - Request peer sets address as
+                                 association primary.
+
+    SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          - These are used when Dynamic Address
+    SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     - Reconfiguration is enabled as explained below.
+
+
+To support Dynamic Address Reconfiguration the following parameters must be
+enabled on both endpoints (or use the appropriate **setsockopt**\(2))::
+
+    /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable
+    /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_noauth_enable
+
+then the following *_PARAM_*'s are sent to the peer in an
+ASCONF chunk when the corresponding ``@optname``'s are present::
+
+          @optname                      ASCONF Parameter
+         ----------                    ------------------
+    SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     ->   SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP
+    SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR ->   SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY
+
+
+security_sctp_sk_clone()
+-------------------------
+Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2)
+(i.e. a TCP style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace
+calls **sctp_peeloff**\(3).
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
+    @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
+    @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
+
+
+security_inet_conn_established()
+---------------------------------
+Called when a COOKIE ACK is received::
+
+    @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
+
+
+Security Hooks used for Association Establishment
+=================================================
+The following diagram shows the use of ``security_sctp_bind_connect()``,
+``security_sctp_assoc_request()``, ``security_inet_conn_established()`` when
+establishing an association.
+::
+
+      SCTP endpoint "A"                                SCTP endpoint "Z"
+      =================                                =================
+    sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc()
+ Association setup can be initiated
+ by a connect(2), sctp_connectx(3),
+ sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3).
+ These will result in a call to
+ security_sctp_bind_connect() to
+ initiate an association to
+ SCTP peer endpoint "Z".
+         INIT --------------------------------------------->
+                                                   sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init()
+                                                 Respond to an INIT chunk.
+                                             SCTP peer endpoint "A" is
+                                             asking for an association. Call
+                                             security_sctp_assoc_request()
+                                             to set the peer label if first
+                                             association.
+                                             If not first association, check
+                                             whether allowed, IF so send:
+          <----------------------------------------------- INIT ACK
+          |                                  ELSE audit event and silently
+          |                                       discard the packet.
+          |
+    COOKIE ECHO ------------------------------------------>
+                                                          |
+                                                          |
+                                                          |
+          <------------------------------------------- COOKIE ACK
+          |                                               |
+    sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca                                    |
+ Call security_inet_conn_established()                    |
+ to set the peer label.                                   |
+          |                                               |
+          |                               If SCTP_SOCKET_TCP or peeled off
+          |                               socket security_sctp_sk_clone() is
+          |                               called to clone the new socket.
+          |                                               |
+      ESTABLISHED                                    ESTABLISHED
+          |                                               |
+    ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    |                     Association Established                    |
+    ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7161d8e7ee79..84c0b927ea85 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -906,6 +906,33 @@
  *	associated with the TUN device's security structure.
  *	@security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
  *
+ * Security hooks for SCTP
+ *
+ * @sctp_assoc_request:
+ *	Passes the @ep and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to
+ *	the security module.
+ *	@ep pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
+ *	@skb pointer to skbuff of association packet.
+ *	Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ * @sctp_bind_connect:
+ *	Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock
+ *	@sk. Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either
+ *	for a connect or bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each
+ *	ipv4 and ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or
+ *	sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6).
+ *	@sk pointer to sock structure.
+ *	@optname name of the option to validate.
+ *	@address list containing one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses.
+ *	@addrlen total length of address(s).
+ *	Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ * @sctp_sk_clone:
+ *	Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP
+ *	style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace
+ *	calls sctp_peeloff(3).
+ *	@ep pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
+ *	@sk pointer to current sock structure.
+ *	@sk pointer to new sock structure.
+ *
  * Security hooks for Infiniband
  *
  * @ib_pkey_access:
@@ -1665,6 +1692,12 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security);
 	int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security);
 	int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security);
+	int (*sctp_assoc_request)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				  struct sk_buff *skb);
+	int (*sctp_bind_connect)(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
+	void (*sctp_sk_clone)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+			      struct sock *newsk);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
@@ -1914,6 +1947,9 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
 	struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
 	struct list_head tun_dev_open;
+	struct list_head sctp_assoc_request;
+	struct list_head sctp_bind_connect;
+	struct list_head sctp_sk_clone;
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 	struct list_head ib_pkey_access;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 73f1ef625d40..2ff5f5777a53 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy;
 struct xfrm_state;
 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
 struct seq_file;
+struct sctp_endpoint;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
@@ -1229,6 +1230,11 @@ int security_tun_dev_create(void);
 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security);
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security);
 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security);
+int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
+void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+			    struct sock *newsk);
 
 #else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
@@ -1421,6 +1427,25 @@ static inline int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+					      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+					     struct sockaddr *address,
+					     int addrlen)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+					  struct sock *sk,
+					  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1cd8526cb0b7..133bc9915f18 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
 
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
@@ -1528,6 +1529,27 @@ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
+int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
+
+int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
+			     address, addrlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
+
+void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+			    struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
-- 
cgit 


From d452930fd3b9031e59abfeddb2fa383f1403d61a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 20:57:18 +0000
Subject: selinux: Add SCTP support

The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in:
Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst | 157 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c                | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |   2 +-
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h     |  21 ++-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h       |   4 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c             | 133 +++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 565 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f66bf30658a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+SCTP SELinux Support
+=====================
+
+Security Hooks
+===============
+
+``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` describes the following SCTP security
+hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below::
+
+    security_sctp_assoc_request()
+    security_sctp_bind_connect()
+    security_sctp_sk_clone()
+    security_inet_conn_established()
+
+
+security_sctp_assoc_request()
+-----------------------------
+Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
+security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
+
+The security module performs the following operations:
+     IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer
+     sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid
+     assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations.
+
+     ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid``
+     to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied.
+
+     Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with
+     MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP
+     TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket
+     to be generated.
+
+     If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip
+     options are set on the socket.
+
+
+security_sctp_bind_connect()
+-----------------------------
+Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname``
+as follows::
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                   BIND Permission Checks                       |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+  |                 CONNECT Permission Checks                      |
+  |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
+  |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+  | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
+  | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
+  ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` gives a summary of the ``@optname``
+entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address
+Reconfiguration is enabled.
+
+
+security_sctp_sk_clone()
+-------------------------
+Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style
+socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
+**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new
+sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and
+``@ep peer sid`` respectively.
+::
+
+    @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
+    @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
+    @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
+
+
+security_inet_conn_established()
+---------------------------------
+Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid
+to that in ``@skb``::
+
+    @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
+    @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
+
+
+Policy Statements
+==================
+The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
+kernel::
+
+    class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
+
+whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
+
+    policycap extended_socket_class;
+
+SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
+to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
+in the section below.
+
+If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
+statement as shown in the following example::
+
+    portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
+
+
+SCTP Peer Labeling
+===================
+An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
+assigned during the establishment of the first association. Once the peer
+label has been assigned, any new associations will have the ``association``
+permission validated by checking the socket peer sid against the received
+packets peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed or
+denied.
+
+NOTES:
+   1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
+      ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
+
+   2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
+      (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
+      and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
+      socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
+      address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
+
+   3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
+      context.
+
+   4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
+      is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
+      then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
+      the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
+      label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
+
+   5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
+      set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
+
+   6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
+      CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
+
+      Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
+         a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
+            delivered because of an invalid label.
+         b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
+
+   7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
+      implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
+      although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8644d864e3c1..28a5c4ee0705 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 #include <linux/quota.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
 #include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
@@ -4134,6 +4136,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -4207,6 +4226,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	/* includes fragments */
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -4396,6 +4428,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sclass = sclass;
 		sksec->sid = sid;
+		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
 		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
 	}
 
@@ -4416,11 +4452,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	/*
-	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
-	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
-	 * check the first address now.
-	 */
+	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
 	family = sk->sk_family;
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
@@ -4432,7 +4464,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET) {
+		/*
+		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
@@ -4486,6 +4524,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
 
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
@@ -4500,7 +4542,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = family;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET)
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
 			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		else
 			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
@@ -4514,7 +4556,11 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -4525,10 +4571,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		return err;
 
 	/*
-	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+	 * for the port.
 	 */
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
@@ -4536,7 +4584,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, perm;
 
-		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 				return -EINVAL;
@@ -4550,10 +4603,19 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 
 		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 
-		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
-		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		}
 
 		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -4561,13 +4623,24 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-out:
-	return err;
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
@@ -4830,7 +4903,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
 		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
@@ -4943,6 +5017,171 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 }
 
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
+ * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
+ * already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	u32 conn_sid;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return 0;
+
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+		 */
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
+					      &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+
+	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+		 */
+		sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
+	} else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
+		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+		 */
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+	 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+	 * plug this into the new socket.
+	 */
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ep->secid = conn_sid;
+	ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
+
+	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				     struct sockaddr *address,
+				     int addrlen)
+{
+	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+	void *addr_buf;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	addr_buf = address;
+
+	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+		addr = addr_buf;
+		switch (addr->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (optname) {
+		/* Bind checks */
+		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+			err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+			break;
+		/* Connect checks */
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
+			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
+			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+			 * primary address is selected.
+			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+			 * selinux_socket_connect().
+			 */
+			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr_buf += len;
+		walk_size += len;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+				  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+	 * the non-sctp clone version.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
@@ -6563,6 +6802,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index acdee7795297..7f0372426494 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sctp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
 	{ "icmp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "node_bind", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index e77a5e307955..6ef4953431dc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -52,9 +53,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 sid);
-
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
 void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
 				     int optname);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr);
 
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
@@ -113,6 +118,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+						    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
 						   u16 family)
 {
@@ -122,6 +132,10 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	return;
 }
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 						    u16 family)
 {
@@ -145,6 +159,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+						       struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3d54468ce334..dabf02888a95 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
+	enum {				/* SCTP association state */
+		SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+		SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+	} sctp_assoc_state;
 };
 
 struct tun_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2c297b995b16..8730be427390 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
 	if (sk != NULL) {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
 		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
 			return 0;
 		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
@@ -269,6 +270,61 @@ skbuff_setsid_return:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto assoc_request_return;
+
+	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+	 */
+	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	} else {
+		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
  * @req: incoming connection request socket
@@ -318,6 +374,22 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
  * @sock: the socket to label
@@ -469,7 +541,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
  * @sk: the socket to label
  * @addr: the destination address
  *
@@ -478,18 +551,13 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
  * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
-	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
-		return 0;
-
-	lock_sock(sk);
-
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
 	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
 	 * the socket */
@@ -497,18 +565,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
 		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
 		rc = 0;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
 
-socket_connect_return:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
 	release_sock(sk);
+
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 2572f5b4245abf2b4e5a86cabf65a50efda09aac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 22:12:09 +0100
Subject: selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration

A missing 'struct' keyword caused a build error when CONFIG_NETLABEL
is disabled:

In file included from security/selinux/hooks.c:99:
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h:135:66: error: unknown type name 'sock'
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
                                                                  ^~~~
security/selinux/hooks.c: In function 'selinux_sctp_sk_clone':
security/selinux/hooks.c:5188:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone'; did you mean 'selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

Fixes: db97c9f9d312 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 6ef4953431dc..8671de09c363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, sock *newsk)
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sock *newsk)
 {
 	return;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 58c442f34c77ad80941e3da85cc0738e8e21d4f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 17:06:21 +0100
Subject: Smack: Handle CGROUP2 in the same way that CGROUP
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The new file system CGROUP2 isn't actually handled
by smack. This changes makes Smack treat equally
CGROUP and CGROUP2 items.

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 03fdecba93bb..5d77ed04422c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3431,6 +3431,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
 		switch (sbp->s_magic) {
 		case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
 			/*
 			 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
 			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
@@ -3474,6 +3475,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
 	case SMACK_MAGIC:
 	case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
 		/*
 		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
 		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
-- 
cgit 


From aa8e712cee93d520e96a2ca8e3a20f807c937e3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 18:48:02 -0500
Subject: selinux: wrap global selinux state

Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions.  The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM).  It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c                 |   16 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c               |  214 ++++---
 security/selinux/ibpkey.c              |    3 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc.h         |    6 -
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h      |    6 -
 security/selinux/include/conditional.h |   11 +-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h      |    2 -
 security/selinux/include/security.h    |  228 +++++--
 security/selinux/netif.c               |    2 +-
 security/selinux/netlabel.c            |   14 +-
 security/selinux/netnode.c             |    4 +-
 security/selinux/netport.c             |    2 +-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c           |  145 +++--
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c            |    9 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h            |    3 -
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c          |    7 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h          |    3 -
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c          |    8 +-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h          |    4 -
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c              |   72 ++-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.h              |   38 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c         | 1078 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 security/selinux/ss/services.h         |   24 +-
 security/selinux/ss/status.c           |   47 +-
 security/selinux/xfrm.c                |    6 +-
 25 files changed, 1155 insertions(+), 797 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 2380b8d72cec..36124f48a5ff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ssid,
+				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
 	else {
@@ -157,7 +158,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, tsid,
+				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
 	else {
@@ -969,7 +971,8 @@ static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 {
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
-	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	security_compute_av(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+			    avd, &xp_node->xp);
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
@@ -982,7 +985,8 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+	if (is_enforcing(&selinux_state) &&
+	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
@@ -1043,8 +1047,8 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			goto decision;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
-						&local_xpd);
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
+						 tclass, driver, &local_xpd);
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
 				ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 28a5c4ee0705..d78f9e2f6df0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -100,20 +100,24 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
 /* SECMARK reference count */
 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-int selinux_enforcing;
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
 
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enforcing;
 	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
-		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+		selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
@@ -131,6 +135,19 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
+static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
+	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+		selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
 
@@ -147,7 +164,8 @@ static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -162,7 +180,8 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
  */
 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 }
 
 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
@@ -266,7 +285,8 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 
 	might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 
-	if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+	if (selinux_state.initialized &&
+	    isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 		if (!may_sleep)
 			return -ECHILD;
 
@@ -488,7 +508,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
-		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
+		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 }
@@ -588,7 +608,7 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
@@ -619,21 +639,25 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 
 	i = 0;
 	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
+					     sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
@@ -643,7 +667,8 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 		struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
 
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
@@ -706,7 +731,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
 		if (!num_opts) {
 			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -752,7 +777,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -828,7 +855,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 		 * filesystem type.
 		 */
-		rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
 				"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
@@ -853,7 +880,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		}
 		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
-			rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
+			rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
+						     current_sid(),
+						     current_sid(),
 						     SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 						     &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 			if (rc)
@@ -989,7 +1018,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 	 */
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -1016,7 +1045,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 
 	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
 		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
-		rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -1299,7 +1328,7 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 
 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 {
-	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
+	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
@@ -1473,7 +1502,8 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				path++;
 			}
 		}
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
+					path, tclass, sid);
 	}
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
@@ -1591,7 +1621,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 			rc = 0;
 		} else {
-			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
+							     context, rc, &sid,
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
@@ -1624,7 +1655,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
+					     sclass, NULL, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
@@ -1885,7 +1917,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
 	} else {
 		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
-		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+		return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+					       dsec->sid, tclass,
 					       name, _new_isid);
 	}
 
@@ -2108,7 +2141,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
 		av |= FILE__OPEN;
 
 	return av;
@@ -2353,7 +2387,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
 	 * the old and new contexts.
 	 */
-	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
 		av = 0;
 		if (nnp)
 			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
@@ -2370,7 +2404,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
 	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
 	 */
-	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					 new_tsec->sid);
 	if (!rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2422,8 +2457,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
 					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -2781,7 +2816,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2906,7 +2943,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
+				       ctxlen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
@@ -2960,14 +2998,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 	}
 
-	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name)
 		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
 
 	if (value && len) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+						   &context, &clen);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		*value = context;
@@ -3128,7 +3167,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm &&
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
 	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
 	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
 	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
@@ -3190,7 +3229,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
 		if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 			struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3215,7 +3255,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 			return rc;
 		}
-		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
+						   size, &newsid);
 	}
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3225,8 +3266,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
-					  isec->sclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
+					  sid, isec->sclass);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3251,7 +3292,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
+					   &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
 		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
@@ -3326,10 +3368,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
 	 */
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
-		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
+						      isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
 	else
-		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
+		error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+						&context, &size);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	error = size;
@@ -3355,7 +3399,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (!value || !size)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3617,7 +3662,7 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
@@ -3631,7 +3676,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	if (default_noexec &&
@@ -4319,7 +4364,8 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
+					   nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
@@ -4347,7 +4393,8 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
-		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
+					    conn_sid);
 	else
 		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
 
@@ -4364,8 +4411,8 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
-				       socksid);
+	return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				       secclass, NULL, socksid);
 }
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
@@ -4741,8 +4788,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 
 	/* server child socket */
 	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
-				    &sksec_new->sid);
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
+				    sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4847,7 +4894,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4909,7 +4956,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 
-	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
+				      &scontext_len);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -5032,7 +5080,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	u32 conn_sid;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return 0;
 
 	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
@@ -5101,7 +5149,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
 	struct sockaddr *addr;
 	struct socket *sock;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
@@ -5173,7 +5221,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
 	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
 	 * the non-sctp clone version.
 	 */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
 		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
@@ -5359,7 +5407,8 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
 			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
 			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
+			if (!is_enforcing(&selinux_state) ||
+			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
 				err = 0;
 		}
 
@@ -5389,7 +5438,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -5558,7 +5607,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -5864,8 +5913,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
 		 * message queue this message will be stored in
 		 */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
-					     NULL, &msec->sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -6174,7 +6223,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+	error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	return len;
@@ -6221,7 +6270,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 			str[size-1] = 0;
 			size--;
 		}
-		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
+						&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 			if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 				struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -6240,8 +6290,9 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 
 				return error;
 			}
-			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
-							      &sid);
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(
+						      &selinux_state,
+						      value, size, &sid);
 		}
 		if (error)
 			return error;
@@ -6278,7 +6329,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
 		error = -EPERM;
 		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
-			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+			error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
+							    tsec->sid, sid);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
 		}
@@ -6320,12 +6372,14 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+				       secdata, seclen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
@@ -6427,7 +6481,8 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	unsigned len;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
+				     &context, &len);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = len;
 	*_buffer = context;
@@ -6466,7 +6521,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
 	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
 	struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
 
-	err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid);
+	err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
+				      &sid);
 
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -6880,6 +6936,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
+	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+	set_enforcing(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
+	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+
 	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
 	cred_init_security();
 
@@ -6893,6 +6954,12 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
+	avtab_cache_init();
+
+	ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+	hashtab_cache_init();
+
 	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
 
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
@@ -6901,7 +6968,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
 	else
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
@@ -7022,23 +7089,22 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
-static int selinux_disabled;
-
-int selinux_disable(void)
+int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	if (ss_initialized) {
+	if (state->initialized) {
 		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_disabled) {
+	if (state->disabled) {
 		/* Only do this once. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	state->disabled = 1;
+
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
-	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
 	security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
index e3614ee5f1c0..0a4b89d48297 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(&selinux_state, subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+				   sid);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 57d61cf36500..de33dc9034b8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@
 #include "av_permissions.h"
 #include "security.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-extern int selinux_enforcing;
-#else
-#define selinux_enforcing 1
-#endif
-
 /*
  * An entry in the AVC.
  */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index 3bcc72769b87..4e2a44d0ae66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -19,11 +19,5 @@ struct security_class_mapping {
 
 extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
 
-/*
- * The security server must be initialized before
- * any labeling or access decisions can be provided.
- */
-extern int ss_initialized;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
index ff4fddca9050..0e30eca02c48 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -13,10 +13,15 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 #define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+#include "security.h"
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values);
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index);
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index dabf02888a95..cc5e26b0161b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -158,6 +158,4 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
 };
 
-extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 02f0412d42f2..c3a1ef10e710 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 
 #define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
@@ -81,13 +83,6 @@ enum {
 
 extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
 
-extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-extern int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
-
 /*
  * type_datum properties
  * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
@@ -98,13 +93,95 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
 /* limitation of boundary depth  */
 #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void);
+struct selinux_ss;
+
+struct selinux_state {
+	bool disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool enforcing;
+#endif
+	bool checkreqprot;
+	bool initialized;
+	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+	struct selinux_ss *ss;
+};
+
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->enforcing;
+}
+
+static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+	state->enforcing = value;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM];
+}
 
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
-size_t security_policydb_len(void);
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS];
+}
 
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION];
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap);
 
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
@@ -141,76 +218,100 @@ struct extended_perms {
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-			 u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
-	u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+			    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid);
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 callsid, char *username,
 			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
 
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 tclass);
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				      u16 tclass);
 
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
 
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid);
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
@@ -221,27 +322,31 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE		7 /* use native label support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX		7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
 
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb);
 
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
-	u32 *sid);
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid);
 
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid,
 				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(
+static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 					    struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 					    u32 *sid)
 {
 	return -EIDRM;
 }
 
-static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
-					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+					 u32 sid,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
@@ -252,7 +357,7 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
 /*
  * status notifier using mmap interface
  */
-extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION	1
 struct selinux_kernel_status {
@@ -266,10 +371,12 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
 	 */
 } __packed;
 
-extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
-extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
-extern int selinux_disable(void);
+extern int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state);
 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -277,5 +384,8 @@ extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 
-#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
 
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index e607b4473ef6..ac65f7417413 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
+	ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 	new->nsec.ns = ns;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 8730be427390..28010f741cfe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid);
 	if (rc == 0 &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
 	secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid,
+					    secattr);
 	if (rc != 0) {
 		netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
 		return NULL;
@@ -257,7 +258,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		secattr = &secattr_storage;
 		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
-		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid,
+						    secattr);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			goto skbuff_setsid_return;
 	}
@@ -297,7 +299,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state,
+					    ep->secid, &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto assoc_request_return;
 
@@ -345,7 +348,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid,
+					    &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto inet_conn_request_return;
 	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index da923f89d2a9..6dd89b89bc1f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 		goto out;
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_INET:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
 		break;
 	case PF_INET6:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
 		break;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index 3311cc393cb4..9ed4c5064a5e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (new == NULL)
 		goto out;
-	ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid);
+	ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 00eed842c491..98492755adbf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -41,17 +41,6 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
-unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-
-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
-{
-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
-		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
 
 /* global data for booleans */
@@ -108,7 +97,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   is_enforcing(&selinux_state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -119,7 +109,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
-	int new_value;
+	int old_value, new_value;
 
 	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
-	if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
+	old_value = is_enforcing(&selinux_state);
+
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
 		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
 				      NULL);
@@ -146,15 +138,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-			new_value, selinux_enforcing,
+			new_value, old_value,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
-		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
-		if (selinux_enforcing)
+		set_enforcing(&selinux_state, new_value);
+		if (new_value)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
-		selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(&selinux_state,
+						 new_value);
+		if (!new_value)
 			call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 	}
 	length = count;
@@ -179,7 +172,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
 	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
-		security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		security_get_reject_unknown(&selinux_state) :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state);
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -192,7 +186,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
 
 static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(&selinux_state);
 
 	if (!status)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -268,7 +262,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (new_value) {
-		length = selinux_disable();
+		length = selinux_disable(&selinux_state);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
@@ -322,7 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   security_mls_enabled());
+			   security_mls_enabled(&selinux_state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -359,13 +353,13 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	if (!plm)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(&selinux_state)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
-		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(&selinux_state));
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+	rc = security_read_policy(&selinux_state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -500,7 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_load_policy(data, count);
+	length = security_load_policy(&selinux_state, data, count);
 	if (length) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
 		goto out;
@@ -553,11 +547,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, buf, size,
+					 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &canon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -581,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_state.checkreqprot);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -613,7 +608,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	kfree(page);
@@ -673,19 +668,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, oldcon, &osid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, newcon, &nsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, taskcon, &tsid,
+					 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(&selinux_state, osid, nsid,
+					       tsid, tclass);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = count;
 out:
@@ -780,15 +779,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+	security_compute_av_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
@@ -868,20 +869,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-					      objname, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
+					      tclass, objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -931,19 +935,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_change_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				     &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -989,18 +997,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, con, &sid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+	length = security_get_user_sids(&selinux_state, sid, user, &sids,
+					&nsids);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
 	ptr = buf + length;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sids[i],
+					     &newcon, &len);
 		if (rc) {
 			length = rc;
 			goto out;
@@ -1051,19 +1062,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_member_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				     &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
+					 &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1115,7 +1130,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(&selinux_state, index);
 	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
 		ret = cur_enforcing;
 		goto out;
@@ -1226,7 +1241,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 
 	length = 0;
 	if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
-		length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+		length = security_set_bools(&selinux_state, bool_num,
+					    bool_pending_values);
 
 	if (!length)
 		length = count;
@@ -1279,7 +1295,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
+	ret = security_get_bools(&selinux_state, &num, &names, &values);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1300,7 +1316,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 			goto out;
 
 		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
-		ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+		ret = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, "selinuxfs", page,
+					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
 					   page);
@@ -1524,7 +1541,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
-	ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &con, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1617,7 +1634,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 
-	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	value = security_policycap_supported(&selinux_state,
+					     i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -1634,7 +1652,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
 	int i, rc, nperms;
 	char **perms;
 
-	rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	rc = security_get_permissions(&selinux_state, objclass, &perms,
+				      &nperms);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1701,7 +1720,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
 	/* delete any existing entries */
 	sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
 
-	rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+	rc = security_get_classes(&selinux_state, &classes, &nclasses);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 2c3c7d010d8a..a2c9148b0662 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -655,7 +655,8 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 
 	return rc;
 }
-void avtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
 					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
@@ -664,9 +665,3 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
 						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
 						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 725853cadc42..0d652fad5319 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -114,9 +114,6 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key);
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
 
-void avtab_cache_init(void);
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index b6a78b09235c..5ae8c61b75bf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -523,14 +523,9 @@ int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
 {
 	ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
 							sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
 							0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(ebitmap_node_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index edf4fa39c60a..6aa7cf6a2197 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
 int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index fe25b3fb2154..ebfdaa31ee32 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -169,14 +169,10 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 	info->slots_used = slots_used;
 	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
 }
-void hashtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 		hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
 			sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
 			0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-		kmem_cache_destroy(hashtab_node_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 6183ee2a2e7a..3e3e42bfd150 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -85,8 +85,4 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
 /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
 
-/* Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node */
-void hashtab_cache_init(void);
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index ad982ce8bfa4..39475fb455bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -33,20 +33,20 @@
  * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
  * security context string representation of `context'.
  */
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
 {
 	int i, l, len, head, prev;
 	char *nm;
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
 		int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
-		len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
 
 		/* categories */
 		head = -2;
@@ -56,17 +56,17 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
 			if (i - prev > 1) {
 				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
 				if (head != prev) {
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				}
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				head = i;
 			}
 			prev = i;
 		}
 		if (prev != head) {
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 		}
 		if (l == 0) {
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
  * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
  * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
  */
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+			struct context *context,
 			char **scontext)
 {
 	char *scontextp, *nm;
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	scontextp = *scontext;
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 	scontextp++;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS,
+		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
 					   context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
 		scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
 
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 						*scontextp++ = '.';
 					else
 						*scontextp++ = ',';
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 					scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				}
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 					*scontextp++ = ':';
 				else
 					*scontextp++ = ',';
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 				scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				head = i;
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 				*scontextp++ = '.';
 			else
 				*scontextp++ = ',';
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 			scontextp += strlen(nm);
 		}
@@ -375,12 +376,13 @@ out:
  * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
  * given constraints of gfp_mask.
  */
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
@@ -389,7 +391,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	if (!tmpstr) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 	} else {
-		rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
 					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
 		kfree(freestr);
 	}
@@ -417,10 +419,11 @@ int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon)
 {
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
 		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
@@ -470,7 +473,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 	int l, i;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
@@ -503,7 +506,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
@@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	int default_range = 0;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (specified) {
@@ -524,12 +528,12 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
 		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
 		rtr.target_class = tclass;
-		r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
+		r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr);
 		if (r)
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 
-		if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
-			cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+		if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 			if (cladatum)
 				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
 		}
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
@@ -577,10 +581,11 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
  *
  */
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
@@ -597,10 +602,11 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
  *
  */
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
@@ -617,12 +623,13 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
  * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
@@ -645,12 +652,13 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
  * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 131d76266ea5..9a3ff7af70ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@
 #include "context.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext);
 int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
 		       struct sidtab *s,
 		       u32 def_sid);
 
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
 int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
 
@@ -46,42 +48,52 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			struct policydb *newp,
 			struct context *context);
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
 		    struct context *newcontext,
 		    bool sock);
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
-static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8900ea5cbabf..3698352213d7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -80,53 +80,32 @@ char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition"
 };
 
-int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
+static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
 
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-
-static struct sidtab sidtab;
-struct policydb policydb;
-int ss_initialized;
-
-/*
- * The largest sequence number that has been used when
- * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
- * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
- * occurs.
- */
-static u32 latest_granting;
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
+{
+	rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
+	mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
+	*ss = &selinux_ss;
+}
 
 /* Forward declaration. */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext,
 				    u32 *scontext_len);
 
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms);
-
-struct selinux_mapping {
-	u16 value; /* policy value */
-	unsigned num_perms;
-	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
-};
-
-static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
-static u16 current_mapping_size;
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
-			       struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
-			       u16 *out_map_size)
+			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
 {
-	struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
-	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
 	u16 i, j;
 	unsigned k;
 	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
@@ -139,15 +118,15 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 		i++;
 
 	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
-	out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!out_map)
+	out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map->mapping)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
 	j = 0;
 	while (map[j].name) {
 		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
-		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
 
 		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
 		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
@@ -194,11 +173,11 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
 		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
 
-	*out_map_p = out_map;
-	*out_map_size = i;
+	out_map->size = i;
 	return 0;
 err:
-	kfree(out_map);
+	kfree(out_map->mapping);
+	out_map->mapping = NULL;
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -206,10 +185,10 @@ err:
  * Get real, policy values from mapped values
  */
 
-static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
-		return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+	if (tclass < map->size)
+		return map->mapping[tclass].value;
 
 	return tclass;
 }
@@ -217,42 +196,44 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
 /*
  * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
  */
-static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
-		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+	for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+		if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
 			return i;
 	}
 
 	return SECCLASS_NULL;
 }
 
-static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 int allow_unknown)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
-		unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+	if (tclass < map->size) {
+		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
 		u32 result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		avd->allowed = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
-			if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		avd->auditallow = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -266,9 +247,11 @@ static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 	}
 }
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void)
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.mls_enabled;
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	return p->mls_enabled;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -282,7 +265,8 @@ int security_mls_enabled(void)
  * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
  * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
  */
-static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+				struct context *scontext,
 				struct context *tcontext,
 				struct context *xcontext,
 				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
@@ -326,8 +310,8 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
 			case CEXPR_ROLE:
 				val1 = scontext->role;
 				val2 = tcontext->role;
-				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
-				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
 				switch (e->op) {
 				case CEXPR_DOM:
 					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
@@ -472,7 +456,8 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *scontext,
 				    struct context *tcontext,
 				    u16 tclass,
 				    u32 permissions,
@@ -492,8 +477,8 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
 	if (!permissions)
 		return;
 
-	tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
-	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
 
 	/* init permission_names */
@@ -507,11 +492,11 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
 				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
 				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -550,7 +535,8 @@ out:
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
-static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				     struct context *scontext,
 				     struct context *tcontext,
 				     u16 tclass,
 				     struct av_decision *avd)
@@ -562,14 +548,14 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	struct type_datum *target;
 	u32 masked = 0;
 
-	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!source);
 
 	if (!source->bounds)
 		return;
 
-	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!target);
 
@@ -584,7 +570,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
 				  tcontextp,
 				  tclass,
 				  &lo_avd,
@@ -599,7 +585,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
 	/* audit masked permissions */
-	security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				tclass, masked, "bounds");
 }
 
@@ -632,11 +618,12 @@ void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
  * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
  * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
  */
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms)
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *constraint;
 	struct role_allow *ra;
@@ -655,13 +642,13 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 		xperms->len = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		if (printk_ratelimit())
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/*
 	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
@@ -669,15 +656,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 */
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
 				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
@@ -691,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 			}
 
 			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
-			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
 					avd, xperms);
 
 		}
@@ -704,7 +694,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
 	while (constraint) {
 		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
-		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
 			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 		}
@@ -716,16 +706,16 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
 	 * pair.
 	 */
-	if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
-	    (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
+	if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
 	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
-		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
 			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
 			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -733,41 +723,46 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
 	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
 	 */
-	type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				 tclass, avd);
 }
 
-static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+					   struct context *ocontext,
 					   struct context *ncontext,
 					   struct context *tcontext,
 					   u16 tclass)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
 	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
 		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
-		  o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(o);
 	kfree(n);
 	kfree(t);
 
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!is_enforcing(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+					  u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *ocontext;
 	struct context *ncontext;
 	struct context *tcontext;
@@ -776,23 +771,27 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	if (!user)
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	else
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
 
-	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
-	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
 	if (!ocontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, oldsid);
@@ -800,7 +799,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
 	if (!ncontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, newsid);
@@ -808,7 +807,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, tasksid);
@@ -818,12 +817,13 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
 	while (constraint) {
-		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
-					  constraint->expr)) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext,
+					  tcontext, constraint->expr)) {
 			if (user)
 				rc = -EPERM;
 			else
-				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+								     ocontext,
 								     ncontext,
 								     tcontext,
 								     tclass);
@@ -833,22 +833,24 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
-					u16 tclass)
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						tclass, true);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      tclass, true);
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 orig_tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						orig_tclass, false);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      orig_tclass, false);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -860,20 +862,26 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
  * @oldsid : current security identifier
  * @newsid : destinated security identifier
  */
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *old_context, *new_context;
 	struct type_datum *type;
 	int index;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
+	old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
 	if (!old_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, old_sid);
@@ -881,7 +889,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
+	new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
 	if (!new_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, new_sid);
@@ -895,7 +903,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 
 	index = new_context->type;
 	while (true) {
-		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 					  index - 1);
 		BUG_ON(!type);
 
@@ -917,9 +925,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		char *new_name = NULL;
 		u32 length;
 
-		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context,
 					      &old_name, &length) &&
-		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+		    !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context,
 					      &new_name, &length)) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context,
 				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
@@ -932,17 +940,17 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		kfree(old_name);
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	avd->allowed = 0;
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
-	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 	avd->flags = 0;
 }
 
@@ -1000,12 +1008,15 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 	}
 }
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
-				u32 tsid,
-				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u8 driver,
-				struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid,
+				      u32 tsid,
+				      u16 orig_tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
@@ -1020,60 +1031,64 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
 	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
 	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
 				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
 
-			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
 						&avkey, xpermd);
 		}
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
@@ -1091,22 +1106,28 @@ allow:
  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
  */
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid,
 			 u32 tsid,
 			 u16 orig_tclass,
 			 struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
 	xperms->len = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
@@ -1114,45 +1135,53 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
-	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  xperms);
+	map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+		     policydb->allow_unknown);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
 	goto out;
 }
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid,
 			      u32 tsid,
 			      u16 tclass,
 			      struct av_decision *avd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
@@ -1160,10 +1189,10 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
@@ -1171,14 +1200,15 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  NULL);
  out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
@@ -1192,7 +1222,9 @@ allow:
  * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
  * the length of the string.
  */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
 	char *scontextp;
 
@@ -1211,10 +1243,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	}
 
 	/* Compute the size of the context. */
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
 
 	if (!scontext)
 		return 0;
@@ -1229,11 +1261,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
 	 */
 	scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+		sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
 
-	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+	mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
 
 	*scontextp = 0;
 
@@ -1249,9 +1281,12 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
 	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
 }
 
-static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					u32 sid, char **scontext,
 					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -1259,7 +1294,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 		*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len  = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
 			char *scontextp;
 
@@ -1280,20 +1315,23 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	if (force)
-		context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
 	else
-		context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
+				      scontext_len);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	return rc;
 
@@ -1309,14 +1347,18 @@ out:
  * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
  * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
  */
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 0);
 }
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1404,10 +1446,13 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
 					int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
 	struct context context;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -1421,7 +1466,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	if (!scontext2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		int i;
 
 		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
@@ -1442,9 +1487,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		if (!str)
 			goto out;
 	}
-
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
 				      scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
 		context.str = str;
@@ -1452,10 +1498,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		str = NULL;
 	} else if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
 	context_destroy(&context);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	kfree(scontext2);
 	kfree(str);
@@ -1474,16 +1520,19 @@ out:
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
 			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
 }
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
+	return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+				       sid, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1504,51 +1553,56 @@ int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
 }
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
 }
 
 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
 	struct context *scontext,
 	struct context *tcontext,
 	u16 tclass,
 	struct context *newcontext)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
 	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
 		  " scontext=%s"
 		  " tcontext=%s"
 		  " tclass=%s",
-		  n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(s);
 	kfree(t);
 	kfree(n);
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!is_enforcing(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct context *newcontext,
 				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
 				  const char *objname)
 {
@@ -1560,7 +1614,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
 	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
 	 */
-	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
 		return;
 
 	ft.stype = stype;
@@ -1568,12 +1622,13 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 	ft.tclass = tclass;
 	ft.name = objname;
 
-	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
 	if (otype)
 		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
@@ -1581,6 +1636,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
 	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
@@ -1591,7 +1648,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		switch (orig_tclass) {
 		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
 			*out_sid = ssid;
@@ -1605,24 +1662,28 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	context_init(&newcontext);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (kern) {
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
 	} else {
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
-		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map,
+							  tclass));
 	}
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
@@ -1630,8 +1691,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
-		cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/* Set the user identity. */
 	switch (specified) {
@@ -1657,7 +1718,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		else
 			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
@@ -1669,7 +1730,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) {
 			/* Use the type of process. */
 			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
 		} else {
@@ -1683,11 +1744,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
 	if (!avdatum) {
-		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
 				avdatum = &node->datum;
@@ -1703,13 +1764,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
 	if (objname)
-		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+		filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
 				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
 		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
-		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+		for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
+		     roletr = roletr->next) {
 			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
 			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
 			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
@@ -1722,14 +1784,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
 	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
-	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
 			     &newcontext, sock);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
-		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext,
 							tcontext,
 							tclass,
 							&newcontext);
@@ -1737,9 +1799,9 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcontext);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -1758,17 +1820,21 @@ out:
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    objname, out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1785,12 +1851,14 @@ int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1807,12 +1875,14 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state,
+				    ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1829,15 +1899,18 @@ static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
 		return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
+	struct context *context)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s;
 	u32 len;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (is_enforcing(state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
 		kfree(s);
 	}
@@ -1845,6 +1918,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context
 }
 
 struct convert_context_args {
+	struct selinux_state *state;
 	struct policydb *oldp;
 	struct policydb *newp;
 };
@@ -1971,7 +2045,8 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+							    &oldc);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
@@ -1983,7 +2058,7 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 bad:
 	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
@@ -1996,39 +2071,29 @@ bad:
 	goto out;
 }
 
-static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	unsigned int i;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
-	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
-	selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-					  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
-	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
-	selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
-	selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+		state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
 		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
 			selinux_policycap_names[i],
-			ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
 
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
 			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
 				i);
 	}
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *newpolicydb);
 
 /**
  * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
@@ -2040,14 +2105,16 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
  * This function will flush the access vector cache after
  * loading the new policy.
  */
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
 	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
-	struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
+	struct selinux_map newmap;
 	struct convert_context_args args;
 	u32 seqno;
-	u16 map_size;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
 
@@ -2058,53 +2125,42 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	}
 	newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
-		avtab_cache_init();
-		ebitmap_cache_init();
-		hashtab_cache_init();
-		rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
-		if (rc) {
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
+		if (rc)
 			goto out;
-		}
 
-		policydb.len = len;
-		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
-					 &current_mapping,
-					 &current_mapping_size);
+		policydb->len = len;
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &state->ss->map);
 		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
 		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		security_load_policycaps();
-		ss_initialized = 1;
-		seqno = ++latest_granting;
+		security_load_policycaps(state);
+		state->initialized = 1;
+		seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 		selinux_complete_init();
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 #if 0
-	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+	sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
 #endif
 
 	rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
@@ -2113,9 +2169,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	newpolicydb->len = len;
 	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
-	else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
 
 	rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
@@ -2125,20 +2181,20 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	/* Clone the SID table. */
-	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+	sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
 
-	rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -2146,7 +2202,8 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
 	 * in the new SID table.
 	 */
-	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.state = state;
+	args.oldp = policydb;
 	args.newp = newpolicydb;
 	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
 	if (rc) {
@@ -2157,28 +2214,28 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	}
 
 	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
-	memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+	memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
 
 	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
-	memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
-	security_load_policycaps();
-	oldmap = current_mapping;
-	current_mapping = map;
-	current_mapping_size = map_size;
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps(state);
+	oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.size = newmap.size;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
 	policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
 	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
-	kfree(oldmap);
+	kfree(oldmapping);
 
 	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 
@@ -2186,7 +2243,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	goto out;
 
 err:
-	kfree(map);
+	kfree(newmap.mapping);
 	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
 	policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
 
@@ -2195,13 +2252,14 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	size_t len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	len = policydb.len;
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	len = p->len;
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -2212,14 +2270,20 @@ size_t security_policydb_len(void)
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
 		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
@@ -2230,7 +2294,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2242,7 +2306,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2252,14 +2316,20 @@ out:
  * @pkey_num: pkey number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
 		    c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
@@ -2271,7 +2341,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2282,7 +2352,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2292,14 +2362,20 @@ out:
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
 		    !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
@@ -2312,7 +2388,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2323,7 +2399,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2332,14 +2408,20 @@ out:
  * @name: interface name
  * @if_sid: interface SID
  */
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
@@ -2348,12 +2430,12 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						  &c->context[0],
 						  &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[1],
 						   &c->sid[1]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2364,7 +2446,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2388,15 +2470,21 @@ static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
  * @addrlen: address length in bytes
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain,
 		      void *addrp,
 		      u32 addrlen,
 		      u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	switch (domain) {
 	case AF_INET: {
@@ -2408,7 +2496,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
 
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
 		while (c) {
 			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
 				break;
@@ -2421,7 +2509,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
 			goto out;
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
 		while (c) {
 			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
 						c->u.node6.mask))
@@ -2438,7 +2526,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2451,7 +2539,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2471,11 +2559,14 @@ out:
  * number of elements in the array.
  */
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 fromsid,
 			   char *username,
 			   u32 **sids,
 			   u32 *nel)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
 	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
 	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
@@ -2487,20 +2578,23 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	*sids = NULL;
 	*nel = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto out;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	context_init(&usercon);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
 	if (!fromcon)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username);
 	if (!user)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -2512,15 +2606,16 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
-		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
 		usercon.role = i + 1;
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
 			usercon.type = j + 1;
 
-			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+						 &usercon))
 				continue;
 
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
 			if (mynel < maxnel) {
@@ -2540,7 +2635,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (rc || !mynel) {
 		kfree(mysids);
 		goto out;
@@ -2583,11 +2678,14 @@ out:
  *
  * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
  */
-static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				       const char *fstype,
 				       char *path,
 				       u16 orig_sclass,
 				       u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
@@ -2597,10 +2695,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
 		path++;
 
-	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+	sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass);
 	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
-	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+	for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
 		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
 		if (cmp <= 0)
 			break;
@@ -2622,7 +2720,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!c->sid[0]) {
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2643,16 +2741,17 @@ out:
  * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
  * it afterward.
  */
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype,
 		       char *path,
 		       u16 orig_sclass,
 		       u32 *sid)
 {
 	int retval;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -2660,16 +2759,21 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
  * @sb: superblock in question
  */
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
@@ -2679,14 +2783,14 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
 	} else {
-		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
 					  &sbsec->sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
@@ -2697,20 +2801,25 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
 	*names = NULL;
 	*values = NULL;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	*len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (!*len)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2725,16 +2834,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 		goto err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
-		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		(*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
 
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				      GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!(*names)[i])
 			goto err;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 err:
 	if (*names) {
@@ -2746,90 +2856,98 @@ err:
 }
 
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 	int lenp, seqno = 0;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (len != lenp)
 		goto out;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
 				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-				sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
 				!!values[i],
-				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
 				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 				audit_get_sessionid(current));
 		}
 		if (values[i])
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		else
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 	}
 
-	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (!rc) {
 		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index)
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (index >= len)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+	rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *policydb)
 {
 	int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
 	char **bnames = NULL;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
-		booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+		booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
 		if (booldatum)
 			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
 	}
-	for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2848,8 +2966,11 @@ out:
  * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
  * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
  */
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	struct context *context1;
 	struct context *context2;
 	struct context newcon;
@@ -2858,17 +2979,17 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) {
 		*new_sid = sid;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	context_init(&newcon);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
@@ -2876,7 +2997,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
+	context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
 	if (!context2) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, mls_sid);
@@ -2891,10 +3012,11 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon);
 		if (rc) {
-			if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+						      &len)) {
 				audit_log(current->audit_context,
 					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
@@ -2905,9 +3027,9 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 		}
 	}
 
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcon);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -2933,10 +3055,13 @@ out:
  *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
  *
  */
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
 	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
@@ -2958,23 +3083,25 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
 	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
-	 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+	 */
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
 	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
 	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
@@ -2991,7 +3118,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 	 * expressive */
 	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3008,19 +3135,21 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+	*nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
 	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!*classes)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			*classes);
 	if (rc) {
 		int i;
@@ -3030,7 +3159,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3047,15 +3176,17 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc, i;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
 	if (!match) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
 			__func__, class);
@@ -3081,25 +3212,25 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 		goto err;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 
 err:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
 		kfree((*perms)[i]);
 	kfree(*perms);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.reject_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown;
 }
 
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.allow_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3112,13 +3243,15 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
  * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
  *
  */
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -3140,6 +3273,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 
 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
 	struct role_datum *roledatum;
 	struct type_datum *typedatum;
@@ -3149,7 +3284,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	*rule = NULL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	switch (field) {
@@ -3182,15 +3317,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+	tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 
 	switch (field) {
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr);
 		if (!userdatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
@@ -3198,7 +3333,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr);
 		if (!roledatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
@@ -3206,7 +3341,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr);
 		if (!typedatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
@@ -3215,14 +3350,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
-		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc) {
 		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
@@ -3262,6 +3398,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			     struct audit_context *actx)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct context *ctxt;
 	struct mls_level *level;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
@@ -3272,14 +3409,14 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+	if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) {
 		match = -ESTALE;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			  sid);
@@ -3363,7 +3500,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return match;
 }
 
@@ -3437,19 +3574,22 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
  * failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 	struct context ctx_new;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
@@ -3457,7 +3597,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -3465,17 +3605,17 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
 		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
 		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
-		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
-			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
 			goto out_free;
 
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
@@ -3485,12 +3625,12 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 	} else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return 0;
 out_free:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3504,33 +3644,35 @@ out:
  * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOENT;
-	ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
 				  GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
-	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
-	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
@@ -3541,15 +3683,17 @@ out:
  * @len: length of data in bytes
  *
  */
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct policy_file fp;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*len = security_policydb_len();
+	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
 
 	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
 	if (!*data)
@@ -3558,9 +3702,9 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
 	fp.data = *data;
 	fp.len = *len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 356bdd36cf6d..24c7bdcc8075 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -10,7 +10,28 @@
 #include "policydb.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
 
-extern struct policydb policydb;
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+	struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+	u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_ss {
+	struct sidtab sidtab;
+	struct policydb policydb;
+	rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
+	u32 latest_granting;
+	struct selinux_map map;
+	struct page *status_page;
+	struct mutex status_lock;
+};
 
 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
 				struct avtab_node *node);
@@ -19,4 +40,3 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 					struct avtab_node *node);
 
 #endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
index d982365f9d1a..043efc59f8e4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@
  * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
  * changed without any system call invocations.
  */
-static struct page *selinux_status_page;
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
 
 /*
  * selinux_kernel_status_page
@@ -44,21 +42,21 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
  * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
  * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
  */
-struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 	struct page		       *result = NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (!selinux_status_page) {
-		selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (!state->ss->status_page) {
+		state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
 
-		if (selinux_status_page) {
-			status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+		if (state->ss->status_page) {
+			status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
 			status->sequence = 0;
-			status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+			status->enforcing = is_enforcing(state);
 			/*
 			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
 			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
@@ -66,11 +64,12 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
 			 * So, application can know it was updated.
 			 */
 			status->policyload = 0;
-			status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+			status->deny_unknown =
+				!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 		}
 	}
-	result = selinux_status_page;
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	result = state->ss->status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 
 	return result;
 }
@@ -80,13 +79,14 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
  *
  * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int enforcing)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -105,22 +105,23 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
  * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
  * setting of deny_unknown.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int seqno)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
 
 		status->policyload = seqno;
-		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 928188902901..a5ac27de571f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
 	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+				     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	if (secid == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+				     &str_len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-- 
cgit 


From e5a5ca96a42ca7eee19cf8694377308771350950 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 17:38:30 -0500
Subject: selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions

Rename is_enforcing() to enforcing_enabled() and
enforcing_set() to set_enforcing().

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c              | 2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 4 ++--
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++----
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        | 6 +++---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 6 +++---
 security/selinux/ss/status.c        | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 36124f48a5ff..54b09cc03b55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	if (is_enforcing(&selinux_state) &&
+	if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
 	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d78f9e2f6df0..337fb325e5cc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5407,7 +5407,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
 			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
 			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-			if (!is_enforcing(&selinux_state) ||
+			if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
 			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
 				err = 0;
 		}
@@ -6937,7 +6937,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
 	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
-	set_enforcing(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
 	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
 	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index c3a1ef10e710..f1db09a5f521 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -111,22 +111,22 @@ void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
 extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	return state->enforcing;
 }
 
-static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
 {
 	state->enforcing = value;
 }
 #else
-static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state)
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	return true;
 }
 
-static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
 {
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 98492755adbf..0dbd5fd6a396 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   is_enforcing(&selinux_state));
+			   enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
-	old_value = is_enforcing(&selinux_state);
+	old_value = enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state);
 
 	if (new_value != old_value) {
 		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			new_value, old_value,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
-		set_enforcing(&selinux_state, new_value);
+		enforcing_set(&selinux_state, new_value);
 		if (new_value)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
 		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 3698352213d7..4785ca552d51 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ out:
 	kfree(n);
 	kfree(t);
 
-	if (!is_enforcing(state))
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
@@ -1596,7 +1596,7 @@ out:
 	kfree(s);
 	kfree(t);
 	kfree(n);
-	if (!is_enforcing(state))
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
 	char *s;
 	u32 len;
 
-	if (is_enforcing(state))
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
index 043efc59f8e4..a121de45ac0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
 
 			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
 			status->sequence = 0;
-			status->enforcing = is_enforcing(state);
+			status->enforcing = enforcing_enabled(state);
 			/*
 			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
 			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
-- 
cgit 


From 68741a8adab900fafb407532e6bae0887f14fbe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Mar 2018 19:54:34 +0000
Subject: selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure

Fix the following error when running regression tests using LTP as follows:
cd /opt/ltp/
cat runtest/syscalls |grep connect01>runtest/connect-syscall
./runltp -pq -f connect-syscall

Running tests.......
connect01    1  TPASS  :  bad file descriptor successful
connect01    2  TPASS  :  invalid socket buffer successful
connect01    3  TPASS  :  invalid salen successful
connect01    4  TPASS  :  invalid socket successful
connect01    5  TPASS  :  already connected successful
connect01    6  TPASS  :  connection refused successful
connect01    7  TFAIL  :  connect01.c:146: invalid address family ;
returned -1 (expected -1), errno 22 (expected 97)
INFO: ltp-pan reported some tests FAIL
LTP Version: 20180118

Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 337fb325e5cc..e7eaef2ea021 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4517,22 +4517,29 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
 		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
 		 */
-		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
-			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto out;
-			}
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
-		} else {
-			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) {
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto out;
-			}
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 		}
 
 		if (snum) {
@@ -4636,16 +4643,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
 		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
 		 */
-		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET) {
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
-		} else {
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 		}
 
 		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
-- 
cgit 


From 6b4f3d01052a479c7ebbe99d52a663558dc1be2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2017 12:40:01 -0400
Subject: usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to
 kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill

commit d178bc3a708f39cbfefc3fab37032d3f2511b4ec ("user namespace: usb:
 make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid
to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of
uids.  Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields
from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to
kill_pid_info_as_cred.  Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill
with the cred.  Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which
avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook.
Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of
this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability
checking based on the supplied cred.  The changes to Smack and AppArmor
have only been compile-tested.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
---
 drivers/usb/core/devio.c     | 10 ++--------
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h    |  5 +++--
 include/linux/sched/signal.h |  2 +-
 include/linux/security.h     |  4 ++--
 kernel/signal.c              |  6 +++---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c      | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 security/security.c          |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c     |  7 +++++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c   | 12 +++++-------
 9 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
index d526595bc959..76e16c5251b9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/devio.c
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ struct usb_dev_state {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	void __user *disccontext;
 	unsigned long ifclaimed;
-	u32 secid;
 	u32 disabled_bulk_eps;
 	bool privileges_dropped;
 	unsigned long interface_allowed_mask;
@@ -95,7 +94,6 @@ struct async {
 	struct usb_memory *usbm;
 	unsigned int mem_usage;
 	int status;
-	u32 secid;
 	u8 bulk_addr;
 	u8 bulk_status;
 };
@@ -586,7 +584,6 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
 	struct usb_dev_state *ps = as->ps;
 	struct siginfo sinfo;
 	struct pid *pid = NULL;
-	u32 secid = 0;
 	const struct cred *cred = NULL;
 	int signr;
 
@@ -602,7 +599,6 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
 		sinfo.si_addr = as->userurb;
 		pid = get_pid(as->pid);
 		cred = get_cred(as->cred);
-		secid = as->secid;
 	}
 	snoop(&urb->dev->dev, "urb complete\n");
 	snoop_urb(urb->dev, as->userurb, urb->pipe, urb->actual_length,
@@ -618,7 +614,7 @@ static void async_completed(struct urb *urb)
 	spin_unlock(&ps->lock);
 
 	if (signr) {
-		kill_pid_info_as_cred(sinfo.si_signo, &sinfo, pid, cred, secid);
+		kill_pid_info_as_cred(sinfo.si_signo, &sinfo, pid, cred);
 		put_pid(pid);
 		put_cred(cred);
 	}
@@ -1013,7 +1009,6 @@ static int usbdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	init_waitqueue_head(&ps->wait);
 	ps->disc_pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
 	ps->cred = get_current_cred();
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &ps->secid);
 	smp_wmb();
 	list_add_tail(&ps->list, &dev->filelist);
 	file->private_data = ps;
@@ -1727,7 +1722,6 @@ static int proc_do_submiturb(struct usb_dev_state *ps, struct usbdevfs_urb *uurb
 	as->ifnum = ifnum;
 	as->pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
 	as->cred = get_current_cred();
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &as->secid);
 	snoop_urb(ps->dev, as->userurb, as->urb->pipe,
 			as->urb->transfer_buffer_length, 0, SUBMIT,
 			NULL, 0);
@@ -2617,7 +2611,7 @@ static void usbdev_remove(struct usb_device *udev)
 			sinfo.si_code = SI_ASYNCIO;
 			sinfo.si_addr = ps->disccontext;
 			kill_pid_info_as_cred(ps->discsignr, &sinfo,
-					ps->disc_pid, ps->cred, ps->secid);
+					ps->disc_pid, ps->cred);
 		}
 	}
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7161d8e7ee79..e0ac011d07a5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -672,7 +672,8 @@
  *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
  *	@info contains the signal information.
  *	@sig contains the signal value.
- *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
+ *	@cred contains the cred of the process where the signal originated, or
+ *	NULL if the current task is the originator.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_prctl:
  *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
@@ -1564,7 +1565,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid);
+				int sig, const struct cred *cred);
 	int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 				unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 23b4f9cb82db..a7ce74c74e49 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ extern int force_sig_info(int, struct siginfo *, struct task_struct *);
 extern int __kill_pgrp_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pgrp);
 extern int kill_pid_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid);
 extern int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int, struct siginfo *, struct pid *,
-				const struct cred *, u32);
+				const struct cred *);
 extern int kill_pgrp(struct pid *pid, int sig, int priv);
 extern int kill_pid(struct pid *pid, int sig, int priv);
 extern __must_check bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *, int);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 73f1ef625d40..3f5fd988ee87 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-			int sig, u32 secid);
+			int sig, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ static inline int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 
 static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
 				     struct siginfo *info, int sig,
-				     u32 secid)
+				     const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index c6e4c83dc090..b033292f4beb 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 		}
 	}
 
-	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
+	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, NULL);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ static int kill_as_cred_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 /* like kill_pid_info(), but doesn't use uid/euid of "current" */
 int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
-			 const struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+			 const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 	struct task_struct *p;
@@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ int kill_pid_info_as_cred(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	ret = security_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	ret = security_task_kill(p, info, sig, cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 9a65eeaf7dfa..77bdfa7f8428 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -717,16 +717,23 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 }
 
 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
-			      int sig, u32 secid)
+			      int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
 	int error;
 
-	if (secid)
-		/* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
-		 *  Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
+	if (cred) {
+		/*
+		 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
 		 */
-		return 0;
+		cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+		tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
+		error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
+		aa_put_label(cl);
+		aa_put_label(tl);
+		return error;
+	}
+
 	cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 	tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
 	error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1cd8526cb0b7..14c291910d25 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1114,9 +1114,9 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-			int sig, u32 secid)
+			int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
 }
 
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8644d864e3c1..8abd542c6b7c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4036,16 +4036,19 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
+				int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
+	u32 secid;
 	u32 perm;
 
 	if (!sig)
 		perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
 	else
 		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
-	if (!secid)
+	if (!cred)
 		secid = current_sid();
+	else
+		secid = cred_sid(cred);
 	return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 03fdecba93bb..feada2665322 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2228,15 +2228,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
  * @p: the task object
  * @info: unused
  * @sig: unused
- * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
  *
  * Return 0 if write access is permitted
  *
- * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
- * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
  */
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-			   int sig, u32 secid)
+			   int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
@@ -2252,17 +2250,17 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
-	if (secid == 0) {
+	if (cred == NULL) {
 		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
 		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
 	/*
-	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
 	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
 	 */
-	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
 	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
 	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
 	return rc;
-- 
cgit 


From 56974a6fcfef69ee0825bd66ed13e92070ac5224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 23:18:33 -0700
Subject: apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation

version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be
            available in v8 abi complaint policy.

Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/.gitignore         |   1 +
 security/apparmor/Makefile           |  43 +++-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c       |   2 +
 security/apparmor/file.c             |  30 +++
 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   6 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h      | 106 ++++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/perms.h    |   5 +-
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h   |  11 +
 security/apparmor/lib.c              |   5 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c              | 392 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c              | 187 +++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c    |   3 +-
 13 files changed, 786 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Generated include files
 #
+net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 380c8e08174a..ff23fcfefe19 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -5,11 +5,44 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+#    #define AF_LOCAL		1	/* POSIX name for AF_UNIX	*/
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    [1] = "local",
+#    [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+#    #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+	printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+	 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+	 $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+#    SOCK_STREAM	= 1,
+# to
+#    [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+	-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -62,6 +95,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
 	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 			    $(src)/Makefile
@@ -69,3 +103,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
 		      $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+		     $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+		     $(src)/Makefile
+	$(call cmd,make-af)
+	$(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 3dcc122234c8..10d16e3abed9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2169,6 +2169,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6",	1),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v7",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v8",	1),
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -2204,6 +2205,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
 	AA_SFS_DIR("policy",			aa_sfs_entry_policy),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("domain",			aa_sfs_entry_domain),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("file",			aa_sfs_entry_file),
+	AA_SFS_DIR("network_v8",		aa_sfs_entry_network),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("mount",			aa_sfs_entry_mount),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces",		aa_sfs_entry_ns),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 9a67a33904b3..224b2fef93ca 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
@@ -560,6 +561,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+			    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
+			    u32 request, u32 denied)
+{
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+
+	/* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
+	if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
+	error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+	if (denied) {
+		/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
+		/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
+		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
  * @op: operation being checked
@@ -604,6 +631,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
 		error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
 					 denied);
 
+	else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
+		error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
+					 denied);
 done:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 829082c35faa..73d63b58d875 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -24,12 +24,13 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN	1
 #define AA_CLASS_FILE		2
 #define AA_CLASS_CAP		3
-#define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+#define AA_CLASS_DEPRECATED	4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
 #define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE		9
 #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL		10
+#define AA_CLASS_NET		14
 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
 
 #define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_LABEL
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 41ad2c947bf4..9c9be9c98c15 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					int signal;
 					int unmappedsig;
 				};
+				struct {
+					int type, protocol;
+					struct sock *peer_sk;
+					void *addr;
+					int addrlen;
+				} net;
 			};
 		};
 		struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec7228e857a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND		AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE		AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN		AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT		AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT		0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND		0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN		0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT		0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT		0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+			AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN |	  \
+			AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+			AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |	\
+		      AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+		      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD |	\
+		      AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
+		      AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT |	\
+		       AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+};
+
+#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
+	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
+						  .family = (F)};	  \
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
+			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+			  OP);						  \
+	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
+			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+
+#define af_select(FAMILY, FN, DEF_FN)		\
+({						\
+	int __e;				\
+	switch ((FAMILY)) {			\
+	default:				\
+		__e = DEF_FN;			\
+	}					\
+	__e;					\
+})
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					struct common_audit_data *sa,
+					u32 request,
+					struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+				  sk->sk_type);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock);
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index d7b7e7115160..38aa6247d00f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
 
 
 void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask);
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-			u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
 void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms);
 void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index c93b9ed55490..ffe12a2366e0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "lib.h"
 #include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "perms.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
@@ -224,6 +225,16 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					       u16 AF) {
+	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	__be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
  * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 4d5e98e49d5e..068a9f471f77 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
 	*str = '\0';
 }
 
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask)
 {
 	const char *fmt = "%s";
 	unsigned int i, perm = 1;
@@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
 }
 
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-			u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
 {
 	char str[33];
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ef6334e11597..956edebf83eb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include "include/cred.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/label.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
@@ -743,6 +744,373 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
 	return error;
 }
 
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
+ */
+static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
+	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
+ */
+static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
+				       struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+
+	new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
+	new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
+		error = af_select(family,
+				  create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
+				  aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+					     family, type, protocol));
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
+ *
+ * Note:
+ * -   kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
+ *     move to a special kernel label
+ * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
+ *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
+ *     sock_graft.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				       int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	if (kern) {
+		struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
+
+		label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
+		aa_put_ns(ns);
+	} else
+		label = aa_get_current_label();
+
+	if (sock->sk) {
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+
+		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
+		ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
+	}
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!address);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 listen_perm(sock, backlog),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
+ *
+ * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
+ *       has not been done.
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!newsock);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 accept_perm(sock, newsock),
+			 aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
+}
+
+static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(!msg);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
+static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 sock_perm(op, request, sock),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
+static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+			    int level, int optname)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
+			 opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
+			 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
+				level, optname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
+ *
+ * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
+ *
+ * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
+ * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	if (ctx->peer)
+		return ctx->peer;
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
+ *
+ * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					     char __user *optval,
+					     int __user *optlen,
+					     unsigned int len)
+{
+	char *name;
+	int slen, error = 0;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(peer);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
+				 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
+				 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
+	/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
+	if (slen < 0) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		if (slen > len) {
+			error = -ERANGE;
+		} else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (put_user(slen, optlen))
+			error = -EFAULT;
+out:
+		kfree(name);
+
+	}
+
+done:
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	/* TODO: requires secid support */
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
+ *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
+ *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
+ *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
+ *       socket is shared by different tasks.
+ */
+static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+	if (!ctx->label)
+		ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -777,6 +1145,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
+		      apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bb24cfa0a164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"send",
+	"receive",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"create",
+	"shutdown",
+	"connect",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setattr",
+	"getattr",
+	"setcred",
+	"getcred",
+
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"chgrp",
+	"lock",
+
+	"mmap",
+	"mprot",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"accept",
+	"bind",
+	"listen",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"setopt",
+	"getopt",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+};
+
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+	if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
+		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
+
+	if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
+				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+
+		if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
+					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
+		}
+	}
+	if (aad(sa)->peer) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+				FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Generic af perm */
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	unsigned int state;
+	__be16 buffer[2];
+
+	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+
+	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
+	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+				 4);
+	aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
+					   type));
+}
+
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+	if (unconfined(label))
+		return 0;
+
+	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+			aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+}
+
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
+
+	/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+
+	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 8a31ddd474d7..b9e6b2cafa69 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@
 
 #define v5	5	/* base version */
 #define v6	6	/* per entry policydb mediation check */
-#define v7	7	/* full network masking */
+#define v7	7
+#define v8	8	/* full network masking */
 
 /*
  * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
-- 
cgit 


From b9590ad4c4f2fedc364016613f2af74ea7758bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 01:59:02 -0800
Subject: apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE

The unpack code now makes sure every profile has a dfa so the safe
version of POLICY_MEDIATES is no longer needed.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c     |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 12 +-----------
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 10d16e3abed9..701cb3e5ec3b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 			tmp = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, &cond);
 		}
 	} else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
-		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(profile, *match_str))
+		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str))
 			return;	/* no change to current perms */
 		dfa = profile->policy.dfa;
 		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index ffe12a2366e0..ab64c6b5db5a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -214,17 +214,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 	return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label));
 }
 
-#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(T)])
-/* safe version of POLICY_MEDIATES for full range input */
-static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
-						 unsigned char class)
-{
-	if (profile->policy.dfa)
-		return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa,
-					profile->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
-	return 0;
-}
-
+#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(unsigned char) (T)])
 static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					       u16 AF) {
 	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
-- 
cgit 


From 274f62e1e5c74e7cbc5c965ec02b7c590da4b2fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 11:59:10 -0400
Subject: selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in
 get_bools/classes

If security_get_bools/classes are called before the selinux state is
initialized (i.e. before first policy load), then they should just
return immediately with no booleans/classes.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 4785ca552d51..ccfa65f6bc17 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2811,6 +2811,13 @@ int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
 	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*len = 0;
+		*names = NULL;
+		*values = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
@@ -3141,6 +3148,12 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
 	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*nclasses = 0;
+		*classes = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-- 
cgit 


From 0619f0f5e36f12e100ef294f5980cfe7c93ff23e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 11:59:11 -0400
Subject: selinux: wrap selinuxfs state

Move global selinuxfs state to a per-instance structure (selinux_fs_info),
and include a pointer to the selinux_state in this structure.
Pass this selinux_state to all security server operations, thereby
ensuring that each selinuxfs instance presents a view of and acts
as an interface to a particular selinux_state instance.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM).  It merely wraps the selinuxfs global state,
links it to a particular selinux_state (currently always the single
global selinux_state) and uses that state for all operations.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 438 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 261 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 0dbd5fd6a396..41099cc3d5e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
@@ -41,23 +42,6 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
-
-/* global data for booleans */
-static struct dentry *bool_dir;
-static int bool_num;
-static char **bool_pending_names;
-static int *bool_pending_values;
-
-/* global data for classes */
-static struct dentry *class_dir;
-static unsigned long last_class_ino;
-
-static char policy_opened;
-
-/* global data for policy capabilities */
-static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
-
 enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
 	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
@@ -82,7 +66,51 @@ enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
 };
 
-static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+struct selinux_fs_info {
+	struct dentry *bool_dir;
+	unsigned int bool_num;
+	char **bool_pending_names;
+	unsigned int *bool_pending_values;
+	struct dentry *class_dir;
+	unsigned long last_class_ino;
+	bool policy_opened;
+	struct dentry *policycap_dir;
+	struct mutex mutex;
+	unsigned long last_ino;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+
+	fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(*fsi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fsi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&fsi->mutex);
+	fsi->last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+	fsi->state = &selinux_state;
+	fsi->sb = sb;
+	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i;
+
+	if (fsi) {
+		for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+			kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	}
+	kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
+	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+}
 
 #define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET		0x01000000
 #define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET		0x02000000
@@ -94,11 +122,12 @@ static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
 static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state));
+			   enforcing_enabled(fsi->state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -107,6 +136,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int old_value, new_value;
@@ -128,8 +159,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
-	old_value = enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state);
-
+	old_value = enforcing_enabled(state);
 	if (new_value != old_value) {
 		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
@@ -141,12 +171,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			new_value, old_value,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
-		enforcing_set(&selinux_state, new_value);
+		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
 		if (new_value)
 			avc_ss_reset(0);
 		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
-		selinux_status_update_setenforce(&selinux_state,
-						 new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value);
 		if (!new_value)
 			call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 	}
@@ -168,12 +197,14 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
 	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
-		security_get_reject_unknown(&selinux_state) :
-		!security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state);
+		security_get_reject_unknown(state) :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -186,7 +217,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
 
 static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(&selinux_state);
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(fsi->state);
 
 	if (!status)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -242,6 +274,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
@@ -262,7 +295,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (new_value) {
-		length = selinux_disable(&selinux_state);
+		length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
@@ -301,9 +334,9 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
 };
 
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
-static int sel_make_bools(void);
-static int sel_make_classes(void);
-static int sel_make_policycap(void);
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
 
 /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
 static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
@@ -312,11 +345,12 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
 static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   security_mls_enabled(&selinux_state));
+			   security_mls_enabled(fsi->state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -332,12 +366,14 @@ struct policy_load_memory {
 
 static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
 	int rc;
 
 	BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
@@ -345,7 +381,7 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 		goto err;
 
 	rc = -EBUSY;
-	if (policy_opened)
+	if (fsi->policy_opened)
 		goto err;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -353,25 +389,25 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	if (!plm)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(&selinux_state)) {
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(state)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
-		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(&selinux_state));
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(state));
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_read_policy(&selinux_state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
+	rc = security_read_policy(state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	policy_opened = 1;
+	fsi->policy_opened = 1;
 
 	filp->private_data = plm;
 
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	return 0;
 err:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	if (plm)
 		vfree(plm->data);
@@ -381,11 +417,12 @@ err:
 
 static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
 
 	BUG_ON(!plm);
 
-	policy_opened = 0;
+	fsi->policy_opened = 0;
 
 	vfree(plm->data);
 	kfree(plm);
@@ -396,10 +433,11 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
 	int ret;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
@@ -408,7 +446,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -462,14 +500,40 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sel_make_bools(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	ssize_t length;
 	void *data = NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
@@ -494,29 +558,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_load_policy(&selinux_state, data, count);
+	length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count);
 	if (length) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	length = sel_make_bools();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
-		goto out1;
-	}
-
-	length = sel_make_classes();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
-		goto out1;
-	}
-
-	length = sel_make_policycap();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+	length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (length)
 		goto out1;
-	}
 
 	length = count;
 
@@ -526,7 +576,7 @@ out1:
 		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 		audit_get_sessionid(current));
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	vfree(data);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -538,6 +588,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *canon = NULL;
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t length;
@@ -547,12 +599,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, buf, size,
-					 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(state, buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &canon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, sid, &canon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -573,16 +624,18 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_state.checkreqprot);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", fsi->state->checkreqprot);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned int new_value;
@@ -608,7 +661,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	selinux_state.checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	kfree(page);
@@ -624,6 +677,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 					const char __user *buf,
 					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
 	char *req = NULL;
 	u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
@@ -668,23 +723,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, oldcon, &osid,
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, newcon, &nsid,
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, taskcon, &tsid,
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition_user(&selinux_state, osid, nsid,
-					       tsid, tclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(state, osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = count;
 out:
@@ -754,6 +805,8 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -779,17 +832,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	security_compute_av_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+	security_compute_av_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
@@ -804,6 +855,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
@@ -869,23 +922,20 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
-					      tclass, objname, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+					      objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
-					 &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -908,6 +958,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -935,23 +987,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_change_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
-				     &newsid);
+	length = security_change_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
-					 &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -970,6 +1018,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
 	u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
@@ -997,21 +1047,18 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, con, &sid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_get_user_sids(&selinux_state, sid, user, &sids,
-					&nsids);
+	length = security_get_user_sids(state, sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
 	ptr = buf + length;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sids[i],
-					     &newcon, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(state, sids[i], &newcon, &len);
 		if (rc) {
 			length = rc;
 			goto out;
@@ -1035,6 +1082,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -1062,23 +1111,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid,
-					     GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_member_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
-				     &newsid);
+	length = security_member_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon,
-					 &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1112,6 +1157,7 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
 static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	ssize_t ret;
@@ -1119,10 +1165,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1130,16 +1177,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(&selinux_state, index);
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index);
 	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
 		ret = cur_enforcing;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
-			  bool_pending_values[index]);
+			  fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
 	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1147,13 +1194,14 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
 	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
@@ -1162,7 +1210,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
 		goto out;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1188,11 +1237,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	if (new_value)
 		new_value = 1;
 
-	bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
 	length = count;
 
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	kfree(page);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -1207,11 +1256,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 				      const char __user *buf,
 				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
@@ -1240,15 +1290,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 		goto out;
 
 	length = 0;
-	if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
-		length = security_set_bools(&selinux_state, bool_num,
-					    bool_pending_values);
+	if (new_value && fsi->bool_pending_values)
+		length = security_set_bools(fsi->state, fsi->bool_num,
+					    fsi->bool_pending_values);
 
 	if (!length)
 		length = count;
 
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	kfree(page);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -1266,12 +1316,12 @@ static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
 
 #define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
 
-static int sel_make_bools(void)
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
 	int i, ret;
 	ssize_t len;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
-	struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
+	struct dentry *dir = fsi->bool_dir;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	char **names = NULL, *page;
@@ -1280,13 +1330,13 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	u32 sid;
 
 	/* remove any existing files */
-	for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
-		kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
-	kfree(bool_pending_names);
-	kfree(bool_pending_values);
-	bool_num = 0;
-	bool_pending_names = NULL;
-	bool_pending_values = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	fsi->bool_num = 0;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = NULL;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
 	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 
@@ -1295,7 +1345,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = security_get_bools(&selinux_state, &num, &names, &values);
+	ret = security_get_bools(fsi->state, &num, &names, &values);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1316,7 +1366,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 			goto out;
 
 		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
-		ret = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, "selinuxfs", page,
+		ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
 					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
@@ -1330,9 +1380,9 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
-	bool_num = num;
-	bool_pending_names = names;
-	bool_pending_values = values;
+	fsi->bool_num = num;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = names;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = values;
 
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
 	return 0;
@@ -1350,10 +1400,6 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
-
-struct path selinux_null;
-
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -1503,6 +1549,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
 
 static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int i;
 	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
 		{ "cache_threshold",
@@ -1526,7 +1574,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
-		inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
 
@@ -1536,12 +1584,13 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *con;
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
-	ret = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &con, &len);
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsi->state, sid, &con, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1629,13 +1678,13 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	int value;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 
-	value = security_policycap_supported(&selinux_state,
-					     i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	value = security_policycap_supported(fsi->state, i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -1649,11 +1698,11 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
 static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
 				struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = dir->d_sb->s_fs_info;
 	int i, rc, nperms;
 	char **perms;
 
-	rc = security_get_permissions(&selinux_state, objclass, &perms,
-				      &nperms);
+	rc = security_get_permissions(fsi->state, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1687,6 +1736,8 @@ out:
 static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 					struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	int rc;
@@ -1703,7 +1754,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 	inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &last_class_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &fsi->last_class_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
 		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
 
@@ -1712,26 +1763,27 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_classes(void)
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
+
 	int rc, nclasses, i;
 	char **classes;
 
 	/* delete any existing entries */
-	sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->class_dir);
 
-	rc = security_get_classes(&selinux_state, &classes, &nclasses);
+	rc = security_get_classes(fsi->state, &classes, &nclasses);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
-	last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+	fsi->last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
 		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
 
-		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
-				&last_class_ino);
+		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(fsi->class_dir, classes[i],
+					      &fsi->last_class_ino);
 		if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
 			rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
 			goto out;
@@ -1751,25 +1803,25 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_policycap(void)
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
 	unsigned int iter;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 
-	sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->policycap_dir);
 
 	for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
 		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
-			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir,
 					      selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
 		else
-			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, "unknown");
 
 		if (dentry == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
+		inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
 		if (inode == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1808,8 +1860,11 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
 	return dentry;
 }
 
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
 static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
 	int ret;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -1837,14 +1892,20 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 					S_IWUGO},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
+
+	ret = selinux_fs_info_create(sb);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(bool_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(bool_dir);
-		bool_dir = NULL;
+	fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->bool_dir);
+		fsi->bool_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -1858,7 +1919,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!inode)
 		goto err;
 
-	inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+	inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
 	isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
 	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
 	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
@@ -1866,9 +1927,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
-	selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		goto err;
@@ -1878,7 +1938,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &sel_last_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &fsi->last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		goto err;
@@ -1888,23 +1948,31 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(class_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(class_dir);
-		class_dir = NULL;
+	fsi->class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->class_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->class_dir);
+		fsi->class_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(policycap_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(policycap_dir);
-		policycap_dir = NULL;
+	fsi->policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities",
+					  &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir);
+		fsi->policycap_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
 	return 0;
 err:
 	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  failed while creating inodes\n",
 		__func__);
+
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1914,16 +1982,25 @@ static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
 	return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
 }
 
+static void sel_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+	kill_litter_super(sb);
+}
+
 static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
 	.name		= "selinuxfs",
 	.mount		= sel_mount,
-	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+	.kill_sb	= sel_kill_sb,
 };
 
 struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+struct path selinux_null;
 
 static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 {
+	struct qstr null_name = QSTR_INIT(NULL_FILE_NAME,
+					  sizeof(NULL_FILE_NAME)-1);
 	int err;
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
@@ -1945,6 +2022,13 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 		err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
 		selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
 	}
+	selinux_null.dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(selinux_null.mnt->mnt_root,
+						&null_name);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.dentry)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not lookup null!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.dentry);
+		selinux_null.dentry = NULL;
+	}
 
 	return err;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 6b6bc6205d98796361962ee282a063f18ba8dc57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 11:47:56 -0500
Subject: selinux: wrap AVC state

Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and
pass it explicitly to all AVC functions.  The AVC private state
is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced
from the selinux_state.

This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or
APIs (userspace or LSM).

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c              | 284 ++++++++++++++-----------
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 398 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 security/selinux/include/avc.h      |  32 ++-
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h   |   3 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   3 +
 security/selinux/netlabel.c         |   3 +-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |  60 ++++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   9 +-
 security/selinux/xfrm.c             |  17 +-
 9 files changed, 512 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 54b09cc03b55..f3aedf077509 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -82,14 +82,42 @@ struct avc_callback_node {
 	struct avc_callback_node *next;
 };
 
-/* Exported via selinufs */
-unsigned int avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
 #endif
 
-static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+struct selinux_avc {
+	unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+	struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+};
+
+static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+	}
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+	*avc = &selinux_avc;
+}
+
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	return avc->avc_cache_threshold;
+}
+
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold)
+{
+	avc->avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
+}
+
 static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
@@ -143,14 +171,14 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  */
-static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	int rc;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ssid,
-				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
 	else {
@@ -158,8 +186,7 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, tsid,
-				     &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
 	else {
@@ -178,15 +205,6 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
  */
 void __init avc_init(void)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
-		spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
-	}
-	atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
-	atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
-
 	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
 					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
@@ -201,7 +219,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
 					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
-int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page)
 {
 	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
 	struct avc_node *node;
@@ -212,7 +230,7 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 	slots_used = 0;
 	max_chain_len = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
 		if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
 			slots_used++;
 			chain_len = 0;
@@ -227,7 +245,7 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 
 	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
 			 "longest chain: %d\n",
-			 atomic_read(&avc_cache.active_nodes),
+			 atomic_read(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes),
 			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
 }
 
@@ -464,11 +482,12 @@ static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
 	return audited;
 }
 
-static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-				u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
-				struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
-				u8 perm, int result,
-				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+				   u8 perm, int result,
+				   struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	u32 audited, denied;
 
@@ -476,7 +495,7 @@ static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
-	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
 			audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -488,29 +507,30 @@ static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
+static void avc_node_delete(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
 {
 	hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
 	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
+static void avc_node_kill(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
 {
 	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
 	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+static void avc_node_replace(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
 {
 	hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
 	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	int hvalue, try, ecx;
@@ -519,16 +539,17 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
 	spinlock_t *lock;
 
 	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
-		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.lru_hint) &
+			(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
 			continue;
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
-			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
 			avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
 			ecx++;
 			if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
@@ -544,7 +565,7 @@ out:
 	return ecx;
 }
 
-static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
@@ -555,8 +576,9 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
 
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
-		avc_reclaim_node();
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes) >
+	    avc->avc_cache_threshold)
+		avc_reclaim_node(avc);
 
 out:
 	return node;
@@ -570,14 +592,15 @@ static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcl
 	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
 }
 
-static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+					       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
 		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
 		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
@@ -602,12 +625,13 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * then this function returns the avc_node.
  * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
-	node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_search_node(avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
 	if (node)
 		return node;
@@ -616,7 +640,8 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   int seqno, int is_insert)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
@@ -624,14 +649,14 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
 	if (is_insert) {
-		if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+		if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
-			       seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
+			       seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
 			ret = -EAGAIN;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
-			avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+		if (seqno > avc->avc_cache.latest_notif)
+			avc->avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
 
@@ -656,18 +681,19 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-				struct av_decision *avd,
-				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	unsigned long flag;
 
-	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
 		goto out;
 
-	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
 	if (node) {
 		struct hlist_head *head;
 		spinlock_t *lock;
@@ -680,15 +706,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 			return NULL;
 		}
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
 			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
 			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
 			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
-				avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+				avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
 				goto found;
 			}
 		}
@@ -726,9 +752,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->state,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
 	if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
 				 ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
@@ -736,10 +763,11 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
-		struct common_audit_data *a,
-		unsigned flags)
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a,
+			    unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
@@ -767,6 +795,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	sad.audited = audited;
 	sad.denied = denied;
 	sad.result = result;
+	sad.state = state;
 
 	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
@@ -815,10 +844,11 @@ out:
  * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
-			u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
-			struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
-			u32 flags)
+static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			   u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+			   u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+			   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+			   u32 flags)
 {
 	int hvalue, rc = 0;
 	unsigned long flag;
@@ -826,7 +856,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	spinlock_t *lock;
 
-	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
 	if (!node) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -835,8 +865,8 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 	/* Lock the target slot */
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
-	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-	lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 
@@ -852,7 +882,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 
 	if (!orig) {
 		rc = -ENOENT;
-		avc_node_kill(node);
+		avc_node_kill(avc, node);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -896,7 +926,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 		avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
 		break;
 	}
-	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
+	avc_node_replace(avc, node, orig);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 out:
@@ -906,7 +936,7 @@ out:
 /**
  * avc_flush - Flush the cache
  */
-static void avc_flush(void)
+static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	struct avc_node *node;
@@ -915,8 +945,8 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		/*
@@ -925,7 +955,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
-			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
@@ -935,12 +965,12 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
  * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
  * @seqno: policy sequence number
  */
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
 {
 	struct avc_callback_node *c;
 	int rc = 0, tmprc;
 
-	avc_flush();
+	avc_flush(avc);
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
@@ -952,7 +982,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 		}
 	}
 
-	avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
+	avc_latest_notif_update(avc, seqno, 0);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -965,32 +995,34 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just
  * results in a bigger stack frame.
  */
-static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
-			 struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+static noinline
+struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
-	security_compute_av(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
-			    avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	security_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
+	return avc_insert(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
 
-static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-				u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
-				struct av_decision *avd)
+static noinline int avc_denied(struct selinux_state *state,
+			       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned int flags,
+			       struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state) &&
 	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
-				tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
+	avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver,
+			xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1001,8 +1033,9 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
  * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
  */
-int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct av_decision avd;
@@ -1021,9 +1054,9 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (unlikely(!node)) {
-		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
 	} else {
 		memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
 		xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
@@ -1047,11 +1080,12 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			goto decision;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		security_compute_xperms_decision(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid,
-						 tclass, driver, &local_xpd);
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+						 driver, &local_xpd);
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
-				ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
+		avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested,
+				driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
+				&local_xpd, 0);
 	} else {
 		avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
 	}
@@ -1063,12 +1097,12 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 decision:
 	denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
-		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
-				AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+				driver, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
 			&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
@@ -1095,10 +1129,11 @@ decision:
  * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
  * should be released for the auditing.
  */
-inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			 unsigned flags,
-			 struct av_decision *avd)
+inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+				unsigned int flags,
+				struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
@@ -1109,15 +1144,16 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (unlikely(!node))
-		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
 	else
 		memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
 
 	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
-		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
+				flags, avd);
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return rc;
@@ -1139,39 +1175,43 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc, rc2;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, 0);
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata, 0);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		       u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
 		       int flags)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc, rc2;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
 			auditdata, flags);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
-u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return avc_cache.latest_notif;
+	return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
 
 void avc_disable(void)
@@ -1188,7 +1228,7 @@ void avc_disable(void)
 	 * the cache and get that memory back.
 	 */
 	if (avc_node_cachep) {
-		avc_flush();
+		avc_flush(selinux_state.avc);
 		/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
 	}
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e7eaef2ea021..21b377aef69a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -468,12 +468,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -484,12 +486,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 	int rc;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1774,9 +1778,11 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
 	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
-		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
 		if (rc2)
 			return rc2;
 	}
@@ -1802,7 +1808,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	isec = inode->i_security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1875,7 +1882,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	ad.u.file = file;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FD,
 				  FD__USE,
 				  &ad);
@@ -1945,7 +1953,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
 			  &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1956,11 +1965,13 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid, sbsec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
@@ -1989,7 +2000,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2009,7 +2021,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2033,16 +2046,19 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 
 	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_isec->sid,
 			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, old_isec->sid,
 				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -2052,13 +2068,15 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
 	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
 		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
 		new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
 		new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, new_isec->sid,
 				  new_isec->sclass,
 				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
 		if (rc)
@@ -2078,7 +2096,8 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
 	sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
 }
 
 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
@@ -2155,7 +2174,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
 	u32 mysid = current_sid();
 	u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
 			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2168,13 +2188,15 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
 	int rc;
 
 	if (mysid != fromsid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
 				  BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2184,7 +2206,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
 	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
 	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2203,7 +2226,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FD,
 				  FD__USE,
 				  &ad);
@@ -2221,7 +2245,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 		return 0;
 
 	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2232,21 +2257,25 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 	u32 csid = task_sid(child);
 
 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
-		return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2255,7 +2284,8 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2315,18 +2345,21 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 	switch (type) {
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
 	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
 				    NULL);
 	}
 	/* All other syslog types */
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2393,7 +2426,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
 		if (nosuid)
 			av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
 		if (!rc)
 			return 0;
@@ -2476,25 +2510,29 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ad.u.file = bprm->file;
 
 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
-		rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
 		/* Check for shared state */
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
 					  NULL);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2506,7 +2544,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
 			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
 			if (ptsid != 0) {
-				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+				rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						  ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
 						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 				if (rc)
@@ -2520,7 +2559,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
 		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
 		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
 				  NULL);
 		bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
@@ -2612,7 +2652,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
 	 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
 	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
 	if (rc) {
 		/* protect against do_prlimit() */
@@ -2652,7 +2693,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
 	 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
 	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
 	if (rc) {
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
 			memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
@@ -3081,7 +3123,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	if (IS_ERR(isec))
 		return PTR_ERR(isec);
 
-	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
 				  rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3097,7 +3140,8 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
 	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
-	rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+	rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
 			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3135,7 +3179,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (IS_ERR(isec))
 		return PTR_ERR(isec);
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
 	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
 				     from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
 				     &denied);
@@ -3224,7 +3269,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3261,7 +3307,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3271,7 +3318,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid,
 			    sbsec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
@@ -3489,7 +3537,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
-	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
 		/* No change since file_open check. */
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3529,7 +3577,8 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 	ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  ssid, fsec->sid,
 				SECCLASS_FD,
 				FD__USE,
 				&ad);
@@ -3541,8 +3590,9 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 		return 0;
 
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
-	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
-			requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
+				    ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+				    requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -3610,7 +3660,8 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
 		 * This has an additional check.
 		 */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				  PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
 		if (rc)
 			goto error;
@@ -3640,7 +3691,8 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 
 	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
 		u32 sid = current_sid();
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
 	}
 
@@ -3684,13 +3736,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		int rc = 0;
 		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
 		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
 			   ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
 			     vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
 			    vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
 		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
 			/*
@@ -3782,7 +3836,8 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	else
 		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fsec->fown_sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3808,7 +3863,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * struct as its SID.
 	 */
 	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
-	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
 	/*
 	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
 	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
@@ -3827,7 +3882,8 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
 {
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3901,7 +3957,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, secid,
 			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
 			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
 			   NULL);
@@ -3925,7 +3982,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, isec->sid,
 			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
 			   KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
 			   NULL);
@@ -3942,7 +4000,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
 	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -3956,7 +4015,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 
 	/* init_module */
 	if (file == NULL)
-		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 					SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
 
 	/* finit_module */
@@ -3966,13 +4026,15 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 
 	fsec = file->f_security;
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
 	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 				SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -3994,19 +4056,22 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
 
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4017,19 +4082,22 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4044,7 +4112,8 @@ static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcre
 		av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
 	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
 		av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
-	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4058,7 +4127,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
 	   upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
 	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), task_sid(p),
 				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -4066,19 +4136,22 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 
 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4093,7 +4166,8 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
 	if (!secid)
 		secid = current_sid();
-	return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4428,7 +4502,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -4448,7 +4523,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
@@ -4557,7 +4633,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				ad.u.net = &net;
 				ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net->family = family;
-				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+				err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						   sksec->sid, sid,
 						   sksec->sclass,
 						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
 				if (err)
@@ -4601,7 +4678,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		else
 			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid,
 				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
@@ -4686,7 +4764,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
@@ -4798,7 +4877,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
 			   sksec_other->sclass,
 			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
 	if (err)
@@ -4829,7 +4909,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -4844,7 +4925,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
 	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   peer_sid, if_sid,
 			   SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -4852,7 +4934,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
 	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    peer_sid, node_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
@@ -4875,7 +4958,8 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return err;
 
 	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -4940,7 +5024,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
 			return err;
 		}
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
 				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err) {
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
@@ -4949,7 +5034,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (secmark_active) {
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -5132,7 +5218,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
 				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -5306,7 +5393,9 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
 	__tsec = current_security();
 	tsid = __tsec->sid;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+			    NULL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
@@ -5354,7 +5443,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
 	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
 	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -5362,7 +5452,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
 	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			    TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -5390,11 +5481,13 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int err;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -5485,7 +5578,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	if (secmark_active)
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP;
 
@@ -5597,7 +5691,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
-		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
@@ -5720,7 +5815,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (secmark_active)
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
@@ -5730,13 +5826,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 		if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, if_sid,
 				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
 		if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, node_sid,
 				 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 	}
@@ -5824,7 +5922,8 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -5854,7 +5953,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			  MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
@@ -5879,7 +5979,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -5892,7 +5993,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case MSG_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case MSG_STAT:
@@ -5941,15 +6043,18 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
 		/* Can this process send the message */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
 				  MSG__SEND, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
 		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 				  MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -5971,10 +6076,12 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid,
 			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -5996,7 +6103,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
 			  SHM__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
@@ -6021,7 +6129,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
 			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -6035,7 +6144,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case SHM_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SHM_STAT:
@@ -6089,7 +6199,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
 			  SEM__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
@@ -6114,7 +6225,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
 			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -6128,7 +6240,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case SEM_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case GETPID:
 	case GETNCNT:
@@ -6214,7 +6327,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	__tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
 
 	if (current != p) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
 				     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto bad;
@@ -6263,19 +6377,24 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
 	 */
 	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
 	else
 		error = -EINVAL;
@@ -6332,7 +6451,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 		tsec->create_sid = sid;
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
 				     NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto abort_change;
@@ -6354,7 +6474,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 		}
 
 		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
-		error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto abort_change;
@@ -6363,7 +6484,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
 		ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
 		if (ptsid != 0) {
-			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					     ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
@@ -6489,7 +6611,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	ksec = key->security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
@@ -6525,7 +6648,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
 	ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
 	ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
 	ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
-	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
 			    INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
 }
@@ -6549,7 +6673,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
 	strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
 	ibendport.port = port_num;
 	ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
-	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
 			    INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
 }
@@ -6582,11 +6707,13 @@ static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
 				   NULL);
 		break;
 	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
 				   NULL);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -6626,14 +6753,16 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
 	if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
 		map = file->private_data;
 		bpfsec = map->security;
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 				   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
 		prog = file->private_data;
 		bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 				   BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
@@ -6647,7 +6776,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
 	bpfsec = map->security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 			    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
 }
 
@@ -6657,7 +6787,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
 	bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 			    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -6958,6 +7089,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
 	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
 	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+	selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
 
 	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
 	cred_init_security();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index de33dc9034b8..ef899bcfd2cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct selinux_audit_data {
 	u32 audited;
 	u32 denied;
 	int result;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -96,7 +97,8 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
 	return audited;
 }
 
-int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+		   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
 		   struct common_audit_data *a,
 		   unsigned flags);
@@ -121,7 +123,8 @@ int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
  * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
  * before calling the auditing code.
  */
-static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			    u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			    struct av_decision *avd,
 			    int result,
@@ -132,31 +135,35 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
-	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
 			      requested, audited, denied, result,
 			      a, flags);
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 #define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2	/* update extended permissions */
-int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			 unsigned flags,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
+		 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
 		       int flags);
 
-int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
 
 
-u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE		2
@@ -171,8 +178,11 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
 
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
-int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
-extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page);
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc);
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold);
 
 /* Attempt to free avc node cache */
 void avc_disable(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index 4e2a44d0ae66..88c384c5c09e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 
 #include "flask.h"
 
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno);
 
 /* Class/perm mapping support */
 struct security_class_mapping {
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index f1db09a5f521..23e762d529fa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
 /* limitation of boundary depth  */
 #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
 
+struct selinux_avc;
 struct selinux_ss;
 
 struct selinux_state {
@@ -103,10 +104,12 @@ struct selinux_state {
 	bool checkreqprot;
 	bool initialized;
 	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+	struct selinux_avc *avc;
 	struct selinux_ss *ss;
 };
 
 void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc);
 
 extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 28010f741cfe..186e727b737b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 41099cc3d5e2..4be683eeba01 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	old_value = enforcing_enabled(state);
 	if (new_value != old_value) {
-		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+		length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
 				      NULL);
 		if (length)
@@ -173,7 +174,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
 		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
 		if (new_value)
-			avc_ss_reset(0);
+			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
 		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
 		selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value);
 		if (!new_value)
@@ -375,7 +376,8 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 
 	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
@@ -439,7 +441,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
@@ -535,7 +538,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
@@ -594,7 +598,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
@@ -640,7 +645,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -685,7 +691,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
@@ -813,7 +820,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
@@ -866,7 +874,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	u32 len;
 	int nargs;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -967,7 +976,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1027,7 +1037,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	int i, rc;
 	u32 len, nsids;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1091,7 +1102,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1203,7 +1215,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1263,7 +1276,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 
 	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1403,10 +1417,13 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", avc_cache_threshold);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+			   avc_get_cache_threshold(state->avc));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -1415,11 +1432,14 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
 					     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			   SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
 			   NULL);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1440,7 +1460,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
+	avc_set_cache_threshold(state->avc, new_value);
 
 	ret = count;
 out:
@@ -1451,6 +1471,8 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 
@@ -1458,7 +1480,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	if (!page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+	length = avc_get_hash_stats(state->avc, page);
 	if (length >= 0)
 		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ccfa65f6bc17..8057e19dc15f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
 		state->initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 		selinux_complete_init();
-		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
 		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
@@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
 	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
 	kfree(oldmapping);
 
-	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
 	selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
@@ -2649,7 +2649,8 @@ out_unlock:
 	}
 	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
 		struct av_decision dummy_avd;
-		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
+					  fromsid, mysids[i],
 					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
 					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
 					  &dummy_avd);
@@ -2907,7 +2908,7 @@ int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
 out:
 	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (!rc) {
-		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
 		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index a5ac27de571f..91dc3783ed94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
@@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 	if (!ctx)
 		return 0;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
 			    NULL);
 }
@@ -164,7 +166,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
 	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
@@ -203,7 +206,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
 	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
 	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
-	return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			     fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
 			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
@@ -422,7 +426,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
 	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
 	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sk_sid, peer_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
@@ -465,6 +470,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
 	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
 	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 3ec30113264a7bcd389f51d1738e42da0f41bb5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 13:36:19 -0800
Subject: security: Add a cred_getsecid hook

For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid in the
bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a cred_getsecid
hook that makes this possible.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  |  6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h   |  1 +
 security/security.c        |  7 +++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  6 ++++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index e0ac011d07a5..bbc6a1240b2e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -554,6 +554,10 @@
  *	@new points to the new credentials.
  *	@old points to the original credentials.
  *	Transfer data from original creds to new creds
+ * @cred_getsecid:
+ *	Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c
+ *	@c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid.
+ *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  * @kernel_act_as:
  *	Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
  *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
@@ -1542,6 +1546,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				gfp_t gfp);
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+	void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
@@ -1825,6 +1830,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head cred_free;
 	struct list_head cred_prepare;
 	struct list_head cred_transfer;
+	struct list_head cred_getsecid;
 	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
 	struct list_head kernel_read_file;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3f5fd988ee87..116b8717a98c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14c291910d25..957e8bee3554 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1005,6 +1005,13 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
 }
 
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = 0;
+	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8abd542c6b7c..b7d4473edbde 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3844,6 +3844,11 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	*tsec = *old_tsec;
 }
 
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
 /*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
@@ -6482,6 +6487,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index feada2665322..ed20d36c1149 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2049,6 +2049,23 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	/* cbs copy rule list */
 }
 
+/**
+ * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
+ * @c: the object creds
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	skp = smk_of_task(c->security);
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
@@ -4733,6 +4750,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
-- 
cgit 


From d906c10d8a31654cb9167c9a2ebc7d3e43820bad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 13:36:20 -0800
Subject: IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy

The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
credentials that it did previously.

After this patch, an IMA policy rule along the lines of:

measure func=CREDS_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

will trigger if a process is executed and runs as unconfined_t, ignoring
the context of the parent process. This is in contrast to:

measure func=BPRM_CHECK subj_type=unconfined_t

which will trigger if the process that calls exec() is already executing
in unconfined_t, ignoring the context that the child process executes
into.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
- initialize ima_creds_status
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy  |  2 +-
 security/integrity/iint.c             |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  9 ++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  9 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 14 ++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 23 ++++++++++++-------
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |  9 ++++++--
 8 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 2028f2d093b2..b8465e00ba5f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
-		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
+		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
 				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 9700e96ab0f0..f266e4b3b7d4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	iint->ima_creds_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..35fe91aa1fc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	hook(FILE_CHECK)		\
 	hook(MMAP_CHECK)		\
 	hook(BPRM_CHECK)		\
+	hook(CREDS_CHECK)		\
 	hook(POST_SETATTR)		\
 	hook(MODULE_CHECK)		\
 	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK)		\
@@ -191,8 +192,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 };
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -212,8 +213,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 08fe405338e1..33b4458cdbef 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ err_out:
 /**
  * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
+ * @secid: secid of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -166,20 +168,21 @@ err_out:
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
  *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+		   int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f2803a40ff82..1b177461f20e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,11 +50,14 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
  */
 int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
+	u32 secid;
+
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH,
-				NULL);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -87,6 +90,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return iint->ima_mmap_status;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		return iint->ima_bprm_status;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		return iint->ima_creds_status;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
 	case POST_SETATTR:
 		return iint->ima_file_status;
@@ -107,6 +112,8 @@ static void ima_set_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		iint->ima_bprm_status = status;
 		break;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		iint->ima_creds_status = status;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
 	case POST_SETATTR:
 		iint->ima_file_status = status;
@@ -128,6 +135,9 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
 		break;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		iint->flags |= (IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
+		break;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
 	case POST_SETATTR:
 		iint->flags |= (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISED);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2cfb0c714967..a5d225ffc388 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
 }
 
-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
+			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
+			       enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -190,7 +191,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -324,9 +325,14 @@ out:
  */
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
-		return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
-					   MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+	u32 secid;
+
+	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -345,8 +351,18 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
  */
 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC,
-				   BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+	int ret;
+	u32 secid;
+
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -361,7 +377,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
 {
-	return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0,
+	u32 secid;
+
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened);
 }
@@ -440,6 +459,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
+	u32 secid;
 
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -462,7 +482,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+				   MAY_READ, func, 0);
 }
 
 static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 915f5572c6ff..e3da29af2c16 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -243,16 +243,17 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
+ * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
+ * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
+			    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 			    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int i;
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
-		u32 osid, sid;
+		u32 osid;
 		int retried = 0;
 
 		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -307,8 +308,7 @@ retry:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rule,
@@ -341,6 +341,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
 		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
 		return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
+	case CREDS_CHECK:
+		return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE;
 	case FILE_CHECK:
 	case POST_SETATTR:
 		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
@@ -353,6 +355,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
 /**
  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
+ * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
+ *        being made
+ * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -364,8 +369,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * list when walking it.  Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -376,7 +381,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
 		action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
@@ -713,6 +718,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = CREDS_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
 				 0)
 				entry->func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 50a8e3365df7..843ae23ba0ac 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -51,10 +51,14 @@
 #define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED	0x00020000
 #define IMA_READ_APPRAISE	0x00040000
 #define IMA_READ_APPRAISED	0x00080000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE	0x00100000
+#define IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED	0x00200000
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE)
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE)
 #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK	(IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \
-				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED)
+				 IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED | \
+				 IMA_CREDS_APPRAISED)
 
 /* iint cache atomic_flags */
 #define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR	0
@@ -121,6 +125,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status ima_read_status:4;
+	enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status:4;
 	struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash;
 };
-- 
cgit 


From 57b56ac6fecb05c3192586e4892572dd13d972de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 11:33:37 -0500
Subject: ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems

FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount
installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE
mounts in a non-init user namespace.

This patch addresses the new unprivileged non-init mounted filesystems,
which are untrusted, by failing the signature verification.

This patch defines two new flags SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE and
SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h                    |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index c6baf767619e..d9e60824c374 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1321,6 +1321,8 @@ extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
 
 /* sb->s_iflags to limit user namespace mounts */
 #define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE		0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
+#define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE	0x00000020
+#define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER		0x00000040
 
 /* Possible states of 'frozen' field */
 enum {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1b177461f20e..4bafb397ee91 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -302,7 +302,19 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	}
 
 out:
-	if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+	/*
+	 * File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
+	 * On these filesytems, that are mounted by an untrusted mounter,
+	 * fail the file signature verification.
+	 */
+	if ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags &
+	    (SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE | SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER)) ==
+	    (SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE | SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER)) {
+		status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		cause = "unverifiable-signature";
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+				    op, cause, rc, 0);
+	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
 		    (!xattr_value ||
 		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
@@ -319,6 +331,7 @@ out:
 	} else {
 		ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
 	}
+
 	ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
 	return status;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From d77ccdc644a59b412d8e101576134c90a0aa6797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 11:35:20 -0500
Subject: ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems

This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in a "secure"
environment, with a correctly enforced security policy, which is willing
to assume the inherent risk of specific fuse filesystems that are well
defined and properly implemented.

As there is no way for the kernel to detect file changes, the kernel
ignores the cached file integrity results and re-measures, re-appraises,
and re-audits the file.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a5d225ffc388..f550f25294a3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -230,9 +231,17 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
 				 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
 
-	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
-		/* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
+	/*
+	 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
+	 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
+	 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
+	 */
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
+	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
+	     !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER))) {
 		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	}
 
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
-- 
cgit 


From a9a4935d44b58c858a81393694bc232a96cdcbd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 23:07:34 -0500
Subject: ima: clear IMA_HASH

The IMA_APPRAISE and IMA_HASH policies overlap. Clear IMA_HASH properly.

Fixes: da1b0029f527 ("ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e3da29af2c16..40557c06300f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
 		if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
 			action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
-			action ^= IMA_HASH;
+			action &= ~IMA_HASH;
 		}
 
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
-- 
cgit 


From 9e67028e76514a8ee279d7d006dfb8069b5115ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 11:36:32 -0500
Subject: ima: fail signature verification based on policy

This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for example
using a pre-built kernel.

This patch defines a new builtin policy named "fail_securely", which can
be specified on the boot command line as an argument to "ima_policy=".

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 +++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c           | 11 ++++++-----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c               |  3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c             |  5 +++++
 security/integrity/integrity.h                  |  1 +
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 1d1d53f85ddd..2cc17dc7ab84 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1525,7 +1525,8 @@
 
 	ima_policy=	[IMA]
 			The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
-			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot"
+			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot |
+				 fail_securely"
 
 			The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
 			mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1540,6 +1541,11 @@
 			of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules,
 			firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
 
+			The "fail_securely" policy forces file signature
+			verification failure also on privileged mounted
+			filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE
+			flag.
+
 	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 4bafb397ee91..0c5f94b7b9c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -304,12 +304,13 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 out:
 	/*
 	 * File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
-	 * On these filesytems, that are mounted by an untrusted mounter,
-	 * fail the file signature verification.
+	 * When such filesystems are mounted by an untrusted mounter or on a
+	 * system not willing to accept such a risk, fail the file signature
+	 * verification.
 	 */
-	if ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags &
-	    (SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE | SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER)) ==
-	    (SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE | SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER)) {
+	if ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
+	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) ||
+	     (iint->flags & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
 		status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 		cause = "unverifiable-signature";
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f550f25294a3..5d122daf5c8a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -238,7 +238,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 */
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
 	    ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
-	     !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER))) {
+	     !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
+	     !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
 		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
 		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 40557c06300f..51a4cd999a49 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
 	char *p;
@@ -201,6 +202,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
+			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
 	}
 
 	return 1;
@@ -390,6 +393,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
 		if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) {
 			action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
 			action &= ~IMA_HASH;
+			if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
+				action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
 		}
 
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 843ae23ba0ac..8224880935e0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
 #define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
 #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG	0x08000000
+#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS	0x10000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-- 
cgit 


From 1a82cee3e69d8dc89dc2e9995770e7cab0a4c9d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:16:59 -0300
Subject: evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

These variables are not used where they are was defined.  There is no
point in declaring them there as extern.  Move and constify them, saving
2 bytes.

Function                                     old     new   delta
init_desc                                    273     271      -2
Total: Before=2112094, After=2112092, chg -0.00%

Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        | 2 --
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 +++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   | 2 --
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 04825393facb..45c4a89c02ff 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@
 		       EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
 
 extern int evm_initialized;
-extern char *evm_hmac;
-extern char *evm_hash;
 
 #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID		0x0001
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 691f3e09154c..a46fba322340 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
 
 static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
 
+static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
+static char * const evm_hash = "sha1";
+
 /**
  * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
  * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index a8d502827270..826926da7395 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -33,8 +33,6 @@ int evm_initialized;
 static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
 	"pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
 };
-char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
-char *evm_hash = "sha1";
 int evm_hmac_attrs;
 
 char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
-- 
cgit 


From 17d7b0af062f587f9cbedce3cb6f39a784651e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:17:00 -0300
Subject: evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

There is no gain from doing this except for some self-documenting.

Signed-off-by: Hernán Gonzalez <hernan@vanguardiasur.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 826926da7395..7a968faca739 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 
 int evm_initialized;
 
-static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
 	"pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
 };
 int evm_hmac_attrs;
-- 
cgit 


From a61ecd329cfa951b7d36c13e9e2a07e7761c0e89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 23:34:22 +0000
Subject: apparmor: fix error returns checks by making size a ssize_t

Currently variable size is a unsigned size_t, hence comparisons to
see if it is less than zero (for error checking) will always be
false.  Fix this by making size a ssize_t

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1466080 ("Unsigned compared against 0")

Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 57cc892e05a2..590b7e8cd21c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			   struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state)
 {
 	int i;
-	size_t size;
+	ssize_t size;
 	struct dentry *d;
 	char *value = NULL;
 	int value_size = 0, ret = profile->xattr_count;
-- 
cgit 


From d53c9f4d212c25b09670a71e2a993071d1e637a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 12:12:31 +0300
Subject: apparmor: Fix an error code in verify_table_headers()

We accidentally return a positive EPROTO instead of a negative -EPROTO.
Since 71 is not an error pointer, that means it eventually results in an
Oops in the caller.

Fixes: d901d6a298dc ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/match.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index dd4c995c5e25..280eba082c7b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ out:
 static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
 {
 	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
-	int error = EPROTO;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
 
 	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
 	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
-- 
cgit 


From 1180b4c757aab5506f1be367000364dd5cf5cd02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 22:31:38 -0700
Subject: apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement

When policy replacement occurs the symlinks in the profile directory
need to be updated to point to the new rawdata, otherwise once the
old rawdata is removed the symlink becomes broken.

Fix this by dynamically generating the symlink everytime it is read.
These links are used enough that their value needs to be cached and
this way we can avoid needing locking to read and update the link
value.

Fixes: a481f4d917835 ("apparmor: add custom apparmorfs that will be used by policy namespace files")
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1755563
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 701cb3e5ec3b..62301ddbbe5e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
  * @name: name of dentry to create
  * @parent: parent directory for this dentry
  * @target: if symlink, symlink target string
+ * @private: private data
  * @iops: struct of inode_operations that should be used
  *
  * If @target parameter is %NULL, then the @iops parameter needs to be
@@ -318,17 +319,17 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
 static struct dentry *aafs_create_symlink(const char *name,
 					  struct dentry *parent,
 					  const char *target,
+					  void *private,
 					  const struct inode_operations *iops)
 {
 	struct dentry *dent;
 	char *link = NULL;
 
 	if (target) {
-		link = kstrdup(target, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!link)
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
-	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, NULL, link, NULL,
+	dent = aafs_create(name, S_IFLNK | 0444, parent, private, link, NULL,
 			   iops);
 	if (IS_ERR(dent))
 		kfree(link);
@@ -1479,26 +1480,95 @@ static int profile_depth(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return depth;
 }
 
-static int gen_symlink_name(char *buffer, size_t bsize, int depth,
-			    const char *dirname, const char *fname)
+static char *gen_symlink_name(int depth, const char *dirname, const char *fname)
 {
+	char *buffer, *s;
 	int error;
+	int size = depth * 6 + strlen(dirname) + strlen(fname) + 11;
+
+	s = buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
-		if (bsize < 7)
-			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-		strcpy(buffer, "../../");
-		buffer += 6;
-		bsize -= 6;
+		strcpy(s, "../../");
+		s += 6;
+		size -= 6;
 	}
 
-	error = snprintf(buffer, bsize, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
-	if (error >= bsize || error < 0)
-		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	error = snprintf(s, size, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
+	if (error >= size || error < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
 
-	return 0;
+	return buffer;
+}
+
+static void rawdata_link_cb(void *arg)
+{
+	kfree(arg);
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_base(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done,
+					 const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_proxy *proxy = inode->i_private;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	char *target;
+	int depth;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
+	profile = labels_profile(label);
+	depth = profile_depth(profile);
+	target = gen_symlink_name(depth, profile->rawdata->name, name);
+	aa_put_label(label);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(target))
+		return target;
+
+	set_delayed_call(done, rawdata_link_cb, target);
+
+	return target;
 }
 
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_sha1(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "sha1");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_abi(struct dentry *dentry,
+					struct inode *inode,
+					struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "abi");
+}
+
+static const char *rawdata_get_link_data(struct dentry *dentry,
+					 struct inode *inode,
+					 struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+	return rawdata_get_link_base(dentry, inode, done, "raw_data");
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_sha1_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_sha1,
+};
+
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_abi_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_abi,
+};
+static const struct inode_operations rawdata_link_data_iops = {
+	.get_link	= rawdata_get_link_data,
+};
+
+
 /*
  * Requires: @profile->ns->lock held
  */
@@ -1569,34 +1639,28 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
 	}
 
 	if (profile->rawdata) {
-		char target[64];
-		int depth = profile_depth(profile);
-
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "sha1");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_sha1", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_sha1_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH] = dent;
 
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "abi");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_abi", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_abi_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI] = dent;
 
-		error = gen_symlink_name(target, sizeof(target), depth,
-					 profile->rawdata->name, "raw_data");
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto fail2;
-		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, target, NULL);
+		dent = aafs_create_symlink("raw_data", dir, NULL,
+					   profile->label.proxy,
+					   &rawdata_link_data_iops);
 		if (IS_ERR(dent))
 			goto fail;
+		aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy);
 		profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA] = dent;
 	}
 
-- 
cgit 


From fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 23:26:26 -0600
Subject: ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface

TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support.  If it is built as a
module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init.  tpm_pcr_read() in
IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually
there is a TPM chip on the system.

ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19)

Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel
and initializes before IMA.

Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 35ef69312811..6a8f67714c83 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
+	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
 	select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
 	help
 	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
-- 
cgit 


From e456ef88ae8c9ffd303e970c28dcce4474c3d356 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2018 16:08:36 -0700
Subject: ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()

In keeping with the directive to get rid of VLAs [1], let's drop the VLA
from ima_audit_measurement(). We need to adjust the return type of
ima_audit_measurement, because now this function can fail if an allocation
fails.

[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621

v2: just use audit_log_format instead of doing a second allocation
v3: ignore failures in ima_audit_measurement()

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 33b4458cdbef..bf88236b7a0b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -311,14 +311,17 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
+	char *hash;
 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
-	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
+	hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hash)
+		return;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
 		hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_hash->digest[i]);
 	hash[i * 2] = '\0';
@@ -326,18 +329,19 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
 			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 	if (!ab)
-		return;
+		goto out;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, "file=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=");
-	snprintf(algo_hash, sizeof(algo_hash), "%s:%s", algo_name, hash);
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " hash=\"%s:%s\"", algo_name, hash);
 
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
 	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+out:
+	kfree(hash);
+	return;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit 


From 11c60f23ed1367298207efb3bbf985203a95f480 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 17:20:17 -0300
Subject: integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS

This macro isn't used anymore since commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce
own integrity cache lock"), so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 8224880935e0..5e58e02ba8dc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
 
 /* iint cache flags */
 #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
-#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS	0x06000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x01000000
 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x02000000
 #define IMA_NEW_FILE		0x04000000
-- 
cgit 


From 1775cb87b063cd60a5021c38412f6024f93cc376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 17:20:18 -0300
Subject: ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()

The "goto out" statement doesn't have any purpose since there's no cleanup
to be done when returning early, so remove it. This also makes the rc
variable unnecessary so remove it as well.

Also, the xattr_len and fmt variables are redundant so remove them as well.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 11 +++--------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 28af43f63572..5afaa53decc5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -378,16 +378,11 @@ int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
-	int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
-	int rc = 0;
 
 	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
-		goto out;
+		return 0;
 
-	rc = ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, fmt,
-					   field_data);
-out:
-	return rc;
+	return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
+					     DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data);
 }
-- 
cgit 


From f5e51fa368fd6612608bc36f39e55cde08ce0039 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 17:33:42 -0300
Subject: ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()

Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch
statement, making the code easier to understand.

Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the
cause variable.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 0c5f94b7b9c3..8bd7a0733e51 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 			     int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
 	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
-	char *cause = "unknown";
+	const char *cause = "unknown";
 	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -241,16 +241,22 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 	}
 
 	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
-	if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
-	    (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
-	    (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
-		if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
-		    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
-			cause = "missing-HMAC";
-		else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
-			cause = "invalid-HMAC";
+	switch (status) {
+	case INTEGRITY_PASS:
+	case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
+	case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
+		break;
+	case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS:	/* No EVM protected xattrs. */
+	case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:		/* No security.evm xattr. */
+		cause = "missing-HMAC";
+		goto out;
+	case INTEGRITY_FAIL:		/* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
+		cause = "invalid-HMAC";
 		goto out;
+	default:
+		WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
 	}
+
 	switch (xattr_value->type) {
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
 		/* first byte contains algorithm id */
@@ -316,17 +322,20 @@ out:
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
 	} else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+		/* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
 		    (!xattr_value ||
 		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
 			if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
 				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-		} else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
-			   (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
-			   (xattr_value &&
-			    xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+		}
+
+		/* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */
+		if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
+		    xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 		}
+
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
 				    op, cause, rc, 0);
 	} else {
-- 
cgit 


From 70946c4ac2a9e036e3cf7048cd670507f5074b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 13:38:45 +0100
Subject: evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing

EVM might update the evm xattr while the VFS performs a remount to
readonly mode. This is not properly checked for, additionally check
the s_readonly_remount superblock flag before writing.

The bug can for example be observed with UBIFS. UBIFS checks the free
space on the device before and after a remount. With EVM enabled the
free space sometimes differs between both checks.

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 7a968faca739..9ea9c19a545c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+	struct inode *inode;
 	int rc, xattr_len;
 
 	if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ||
@@ -178,12 +179,15 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 					(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
 					calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
 		if (!rc) {
+			inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
 			if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
 				if (iint)
 					iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG;
 				evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE;
-			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
-				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) {
+			} else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+				   !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) &&
+				   !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
 				evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
 						    xattr_value,
 						    xattr_value_len);
-- 
cgit 


From 1c070b18d448211644cc0050e6c9a4a204bbcf63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Townsend <mtownsend1973@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 13:46:01 +0000
Subject: ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list

This is required to use SMACK and IMA/EVM together. Add it to the
default nomeasure/noappraise list like other pseudo filesystems.

Signed-off-by: Martin Townsend <mtownsend1973@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 51a4cd999a49..d89bebf85421 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC,
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SMACK_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-- 
cgit 


From ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 14:41:08 +0100
Subject: ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm

IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's
early use.  The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be
compiled-in.

The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When
the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA
initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls
ima_post_path_mknod()).  Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use
the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm.

Fixed crash:

$ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m

[    0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4
...
[    1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2)
...
[    2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[    2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[    2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[    2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4
[    2.613080] Supported: Yes
[    2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1
[    2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[    2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000
[    2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[    2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296
[    2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004
[    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728
[    2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f
[    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000
[    2.613080] FS:  00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.613080] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[    2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    2.613080] Call Trace:
[    2.613080]  ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0
[    2.613080]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40
[    2.613080]  SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220
[    2.613080]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
[    2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570
[    2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085
[    2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570
[    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f
[    2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660
[    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[    2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20
[    2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88
[    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]---
[    2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
[    2.673052]
[    2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled
[    2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 205bc69361ea..4e085a17124f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ int __init ima_init_crypto(void)
 		       hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], rc);
 		return rc;
 	}
+	pr_info("Allocated hash algorithm: %s\n",
+		hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo]);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5d122daf5c8a..74d0bd7e76d7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
  *	implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
  *	and ima_file_check.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
@@ -504,6 +507,16 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	ima_init_template_list();
 	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
 	error = ima_init();
+
+	if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo],
+			    CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) {
+		pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n",
+			hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+		hash_setup_done = 0;
+		hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+		error = ima_init();
+	}
+
 	if (!error) {
 		ima_initialized = 1;
 		ima_update_policy_flag();
-- 
cgit 


From df0ce17331e2501dbffc060041dfc6c5f85227b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 01:28:23 +0000
Subject: security: convert security hooks to use hlist

This changes security_hook_heads to use hlist_heads instead of
the circular doubly-linked list heads. This should cut down
the size of the struct by about half.

In addition, it allows mutation of the hooks at the tail of the
callback list without having to modify the head. The longer-term
purpose of this is to enable making the heads read only.

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     | 428 +++++++++++++-------------
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c |   4 +-
 security/security.c                           |  22 +-
 3 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index e0ac011d07a5..ac491137b10a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1731,230 +1731,230 @@ union security_list_options {
 };
 
 struct security_hook_heads {
-	struct list_head binder_set_context_mgr;
-	struct list_head binder_transaction;
-	struct list_head binder_transfer_binder;
-	struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
-	struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
-	struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
-	struct list_head capget;
-	struct list_head capset;
-	struct list_head capable;
-	struct list_head quotactl;
-	struct list_head quota_on;
-	struct list_head syslog;
-	struct list_head settime;
-	struct list_head vm_enough_memory;
-	struct list_head bprm_set_creds;
-	struct list_head bprm_check_security;
-	struct list_head bprm_committing_creds;
-	struct list_head bprm_committed_creds;
-	struct list_head sb_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head sb_free_security;
-	struct list_head sb_copy_data;
-	struct list_head sb_remount;
-	struct list_head sb_kern_mount;
-	struct list_head sb_show_options;
-	struct list_head sb_statfs;
-	struct list_head sb_mount;
-	struct list_head sb_umount;
-	struct list_head sb_pivotroot;
-	struct list_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
-	struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
-	struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
-	struct list_head dentry_init_security;
-	struct list_head dentry_create_files_as;
+	struct hlist_head binder_set_context_mgr;
+	struct hlist_head binder_transaction;
+	struct hlist_head binder_transfer_binder;
+	struct hlist_head binder_transfer_file;
+	struct hlist_head ptrace_access_check;
+	struct hlist_head ptrace_traceme;
+	struct hlist_head capget;
+	struct hlist_head capset;
+	struct hlist_head capable;
+	struct hlist_head quotactl;
+	struct hlist_head quota_on;
+	struct hlist_head syslog;
+	struct hlist_head settime;
+	struct hlist_head vm_enough_memory;
+	struct hlist_head bprm_set_creds;
+	struct hlist_head bprm_check_security;
+	struct hlist_head bprm_committing_creds;
+	struct hlist_head bprm_committed_creds;
+	struct hlist_head sb_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head sb_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head sb_copy_data;
+	struct hlist_head sb_remount;
+	struct hlist_head sb_kern_mount;
+	struct hlist_head sb_show_options;
+	struct hlist_head sb_statfs;
+	struct hlist_head sb_mount;
+	struct hlist_head sb_umount;
+	struct hlist_head sb_pivotroot;
+	struct hlist_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
+	struct hlist_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
+	struct hlist_head sb_parse_opts_str;
+	struct hlist_head dentry_init_security;
+	struct hlist_head dentry_create_files_as;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-	struct list_head path_unlink;
-	struct list_head path_mkdir;
-	struct list_head path_rmdir;
-	struct list_head path_mknod;
-	struct list_head path_truncate;
-	struct list_head path_symlink;
-	struct list_head path_link;
-	struct list_head path_rename;
-	struct list_head path_chmod;
-	struct list_head path_chown;
-	struct list_head path_chroot;
+	struct hlist_head path_unlink;
+	struct hlist_head path_mkdir;
+	struct hlist_head path_rmdir;
+	struct hlist_head path_mknod;
+	struct hlist_head path_truncate;
+	struct hlist_head path_symlink;
+	struct hlist_head path_link;
+	struct hlist_head path_rename;
+	struct hlist_head path_chmod;
+	struct hlist_head path_chown;
+	struct hlist_head path_chroot;
 #endif
-	struct list_head inode_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head inode_free_security;
-	struct list_head inode_init_security;
-	struct list_head inode_create;
-	struct list_head inode_link;
-	struct list_head inode_unlink;
-	struct list_head inode_symlink;
-	struct list_head inode_mkdir;
-	struct list_head inode_rmdir;
-	struct list_head inode_mknod;
-	struct list_head inode_rename;
-	struct list_head inode_readlink;
-	struct list_head inode_follow_link;
-	struct list_head inode_permission;
-	struct list_head inode_setattr;
-	struct list_head inode_getattr;
-	struct list_head inode_setxattr;
-	struct list_head inode_post_setxattr;
-	struct list_head inode_getxattr;
-	struct list_head inode_listxattr;
-	struct list_head inode_removexattr;
-	struct list_head inode_need_killpriv;
-	struct list_head inode_killpriv;
-	struct list_head inode_getsecurity;
-	struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
-	struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
-	struct list_head inode_getsecid;
-	struct list_head inode_copy_up;
-	struct list_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
-	struct list_head file_permission;
-	struct list_head file_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head file_free_security;
-	struct list_head file_ioctl;
-	struct list_head mmap_addr;
-	struct list_head mmap_file;
-	struct list_head file_mprotect;
-	struct list_head file_lock;
-	struct list_head file_fcntl;
-	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
-	struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
-	struct list_head file_receive;
-	struct list_head file_open;
-	struct list_head task_alloc;
-	struct list_head task_free;
-	struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
-	struct list_head cred_free;
-	struct list_head cred_prepare;
-	struct list_head cred_transfer;
-	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
-	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
-	struct list_head kernel_read_file;
-	struct list_head kernel_post_read_file;
-	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
-	struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
-	struct list_head task_setpgid;
-	struct list_head task_getpgid;
-	struct list_head task_getsid;
-	struct list_head task_getsecid;
-	struct list_head task_setnice;
-	struct list_head task_setioprio;
-	struct list_head task_getioprio;
-	struct list_head task_prlimit;
-	struct list_head task_setrlimit;
-	struct list_head task_setscheduler;
-	struct list_head task_getscheduler;
-	struct list_head task_movememory;
-	struct list_head task_kill;
-	struct list_head task_prctl;
-	struct list_head task_to_inode;
-	struct list_head ipc_permission;
-	struct list_head ipc_getsecid;
-	struct list_head msg_msg_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head msg_msg_free_security;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_free_security;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_associate;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_msgctl;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_msgsnd;
-	struct list_head msg_queue_msgrcv;
-	struct list_head shm_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head shm_free_security;
-	struct list_head shm_associate;
-	struct list_head shm_shmctl;
-	struct list_head shm_shmat;
-	struct list_head sem_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head sem_free_security;
-	struct list_head sem_associate;
-	struct list_head sem_semctl;
-	struct list_head sem_semop;
-	struct list_head netlink_send;
-	struct list_head d_instantiate;
-	struct list_head getprocattr;
-	struct list_head setprocattr;
-	struct list_head ismaclabel;
-	struct list_head secid_to_secctx;
-	struct list_head secctx_to_secid;
-	struct list_head release_secctx;
-	struct list_head inode_invalidate_secctx;
-	struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
-	struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
-	struct list_head inode_getsecctx;
+	struct hlist_head inode_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head inode_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head inode_init_security;
+	struct hlist_head inode_create;
+	struct hlist_head inode_link;
+	struct hlist_head inode_unlink;
+	struct hlist_head inode_symlink;
+	struct hlist_head inode_mkdir;
+	struct hlist_head inode_rmdir;
+	struct hlist_head inode_mknod;
+	struct hlist_head inode_rename;
+	struct hlist_head inode_readlink;
+	struct hlist_head inode_follow_link;
+	struct hlist_head inode_permission;
+	struct hlist_head inode_setattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_getattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_setxattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_post_setxattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_getxattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_listxattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_removexattr;
+	struct hlist_head inode_need_killpriv;
+	struct hlist_head inode_killpriv;
+	struct hlist_head inode_getsecurity;
+	struct hlist_head inode_setsecurity;
+	struct hlist_head inode_listsecurity;
+	struct hlist_head inode_getsecid;
+	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up;
+	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
+	struct hlist_head file_permission;
+	struct hlist_head file_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head file_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head file_ioctl;
+	struct hlist_head mmap_addr;
+	struct hlist_head mmap_file;
+	struct hlist_head file_mprotect;
+	struct hlist_head file_lock;
+	struct hlist_head file_fcntl;
+	struct hlist_head file_set_fowner;
+	struct hlist_head file_send_sigiotask;
+	struct hlist_head file_receive;
+	struct hlist_head file_open;
+	struct hlist_head task_alloc;
+	struct hlist_head task_free;
+	struct hlist_head cred_alloc_blank;
+	struct hlist_head cred_free;
+	struct hlist_head cred_prepare;
+	struct hlist_head cred_transfer;
+	struct hlist_head kernel_act_as;
+	struct hlist_head kernel_create_files_as;
+	struct hlist_head kernel_read_file;
+	struct hlist_head kernel_post_read_file;
+	struct hlist_head kernel_module_request;
+	struct hlist_head task_fix_setuid;
+	struct hlist_head task_setpgid;
+	struct hlist_head task_getpgid;
+	struct hlist_head task_getsid;
+	struct hlist_head task_getsecid;
+	struct hlist_head task_setnice;
+	struct hlist_head task_setioprio;
+	struct hlist_head task_getioprio;
+	struct hlist_head task_prlimit;
+	struct hlist_head task_setrlimit;
+	struct hlist_head task_setscheduler;
+	struct hlist_head task_getscheduler;
+	struct hlist_head task_movememory;
+	struct hlist_head task_kill;
+	struct hlist_head task_prctl;
+	struct hlist_head task_to_inode;
+	struct hlist_head ipc_permission;
+	struct hlist_head ipc_getsecid;
+	struct hlist_head msg_msg_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head msg_msg_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_associate;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgctl;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgsnd;
+	struct hlist_head msg_queue_msgrcv;
+	struct hlist_head shm_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head shm_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head shm_associate;
+	struct hlist_head shm_shmctl;
+	struct hlist_head shm_shmat;
+	struct hlist_head sem_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head sem_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head sem_associate;
+	struct hlist_head sem_semctl;
+	struct hlist_head sem_semop;
+	struct hlist_head netlink_send;
+	struct hlist_head d_instantiate;
+	struct hlist_head getprocattr;
+	struct hlist_head setprocattr;
+	struct hlist_head ismaclabel;
+	struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx;
+	struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid;
+	struct hlist_head release_secctx;
+	struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx;
+	struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
+	struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
+	struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-	struct list_head unix_stream_connect;
-	struct list_head unix_may_send;
-	struct list_head socket_create;
-	struct list_head socket_post_create;
-	struct list_head socket_bind;
-	struct list_head socket_connect;
-	struct list_head socket_listen;
-	struct list_head socket_accept;
-	struct list_head socket_sendmsg;
-	struct list_head socket_recvmsg;
-	struct list_head socket_getsockname;
-	struct list_head socket_getpeername;
-	struct list_head socket_getsockopt;
-	struct list_head socket_setsockopt;
-	struct list_head socket_shutdown;
-	struct list_head socket_sock_rcv_skb;
-	struct list_head socket_getpeersec_stream;
-	struct list_head socket_getpeersec_dgram;
-	struct list_head sk_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head sk_free_security;
-	struct list_head sk_clone_security;
-	struct list_head sk_getsecid;
-	struct list_head sock_graft;
-	struct list_head inet_conn_request;
-	struct list_head inet_csk_clone;
-	struct list_head inet_conn_established;
-	struct list_head secmark_relabel_packet;
-	struct list_head secmark_refcount_inc;
-	struct list_head secmark_refcount_dec;
-	struct list_head req_classify_flow;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_free_security;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_create;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
-	struct list_head tun_dev_open;
+	struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect;
+	struct hlist_head unix_may_send;
+	struct hlist_head socket_create;
+	struct hlist_head socket_post_create;
+	struct hlist_head socket_bind;
+	struct hlist_head socket_connect;
+	struct hlist_head socket_listen;
+	struct hlist_head socket_accept;
+	struct hlist_head socket_sendmsg;
+	struct hlist_head socket_recvmsg;
+	struct hlist_head socket_getsockname;
+	struct hlist_head socket_getpeername;
+	struct hlist_head socket_getsockopt;
+	struct hlist_head socket_setsockopt;
+	struct hlist_head socket_shutdown;
+	struct hlist_head socket_sock_rcv_skb;
+	struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_stream;
+	struct hlist_head socket_getpeersec_dgram;
+	struct hlist_head sk_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head sk_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head sk_clone_security;
+	struct hlist_head sk_getsecid;
+	struct hlist_head sock_graft;
+	struct hlist_head inet_conn_request;
+	struct hlist_head inet_csk_clone;
+	struct hlist_head inet_conn_established;
+	struct hlist_head secmark_relabel_packet;
+	struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_inc;
+	struct hlist_head secmark_refcount_dec;
+	struct hlist_head req_classify_flow;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_create;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_attach;
+	struct hlist_head tun_dev_open;
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
-	struct list_head ib_pkey_access;
-	struct list_head ib_endport_manage_subnet;
-	struct list_head ib_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head ib_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head ib_pkey_access;
+	struct hlist_head ib_endport_manage_subnet;
+	struct hlist_head ib_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head ib_free_security;
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-	struct list_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_policy_clone_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_policy_free_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_policy_delete_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc;
-	struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire;
-	struct list_head xfrm_state_free_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_state_delete_security;
-	struct list_head xfrm_policy_lookup;
-	struct list_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match;
-	struct list_head xfrm_decode_session;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_clone_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_delete_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_state_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_state_delete_security;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_policy_lookup;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match;
+	struct hlist_head xfrm_decode_session;
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	struct list_head key_alloc;
-	struct list_head key_free;
-	struct list_head key_permission;
-	struct list_head key_getsecurity;
+	struct hlist_head key_alloc;
+	struct hlist_head key_free;
+	struct hlist_head key_permission;
+	struct hlist_head key_getsecurity;
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	struct list_head audit_rule_init;
-	struct list_head audit_rule_known;
-	struct list_head audit_rule_match;
-	struct list_head audit_rule_free;
+	struct hlist_head audit_rule_init;
+	struct hlist_head audit_rule_known;
+	struct hlist_head audit_rule_match;
+	struct hlist_head audit_rule_free;
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-	struct list_head bpf;
-	struct list_head bpf_map;
-	struct list_head bpf_prog;
-	struct list_head bpf_map_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head bpf_map_free_security;
-	struct list_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
-	struct list_head bpf_prog_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head bpf;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_map;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_prog;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_map_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_map_free_security;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
+	struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 } __randomize_layout;
 
@@ -1963,8 +1963,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
  * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
  */
 struct security_hook_list {
-	struct list_head		list;
-	struct list_head		*head;
+	struct hlist_node		list;
+	struct hlist_head		*head;
 	union security_list_options	hook;
 	char				*lsm;
 } __randomize_layout;
@@ -2003,7 +2003,7 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-		list_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
+		hlist_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
index c4a345c3715b..6d5bbd31db7f 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
 	{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
 	/* big_key payload.data struct splashing */
 	{ "security/keys/big_key.c", "path", "void *" },
-	/* walk struct security_hook_heads as an array of struct list_head */
-	{ "security/security.c", "list_head", "security_hook_heads" },
+	/* walk struct security_hook_heads as an array of struct hlist_head */
+	{ "security/security.c", "hlist_head", "security_hook_heads" },
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14c291910d25..dd246a38b3f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
 int __init security_init(void)
 {
 	int i;
-	struct list_head *list = (struct list_head *) &security_hook_heads;
+	struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct list_head);
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
 	     i++)
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
 	pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
 
 	/*
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+		hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
 	}
 	if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
 		panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
 	do {							\
 		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
 								\
-		list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list)	\
+		hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
 			P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
 	} while (0)
 
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_lsm_notifier);
 	do {							\
 		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
 								\
-		list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+		hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
 			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
 			if (RC != 0)				\
 				break;				\
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
 	 * thinks it should not be set it won't.
 	 */
-	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
 		rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
 		if (rc <= 0) {
 			cap_sys_admin = 0;
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf
 	/*
 	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
 	 */
-	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
 		rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
 		if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return rc;
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void
 	/*
 	 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
 	 */
-	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
 		rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
 								flags);
 		if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
@@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	int rc = -ENOSYS;
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
 		thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 		if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
 			rc = thisrc;
@@ -1629,7 +1629,7 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
 	 * using the macro
 	 */
-	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
 				list) {
 		rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
 		break;
-- 
cgit 


From 588558eb6d0e0b6edfa65a67e906c2ffeba63ff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 14:35:58 +0100
Subject: apparmor: fix memory leak on buffer on error exit path

Currently on the error exit path the allocated buffer is not free'd
causing a memory leak. Fix this by kfree'ing it.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1466876 ("Resource leaks")

Fixes: 1180b4c757aa ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 62301ddbbe5e..f4308683c0af 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1497,8 +1497,10 @@ static char *gen_symlink_name(int depth, const char *dirname, const char *fname)
 	}
 
 	error = snprintf(s, size, "raw_data/%s/%s", dirname, fname);
-	if (error >= size || error < 0)
+	if (error >= size || error < 0) {
+		kfree(buffer);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+	}
 
 	return buffer;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From 514c60324960137e74457fdc233a339b985fa8a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2018 16:25:34 -0700
Subject: headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.h

Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious
reason.  It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h
from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that
don't already #include it.  Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source
files that do not use it.

This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig.  It would
be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes.  I have
neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes.

Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day
bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms.  Both of them reported 2 build failures
for which patches are included here (in v2).

[ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is
  right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the
  counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't
  combine all of those. ]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org
Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>	[2 build failures]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>	[2 build failures]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c                          | 1 +
 arch/powerpc/sysdev/msi_bitmap.c                          | 1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c                                    | 2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/smp.c                                    | 1 -
 arch/sparc/kernel/irq_64.c                                | 1 -
 arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c                                 | 1 -
 drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c                              | 1 +
 drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu_v1.c                              | 1 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c                            | 1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c                | 1 -
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192c/fw_common.c | 1 -
 drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/hal/fw.c                        | 2 +-
 drivers/staging/rtlwifi/pci.c                             | 1 -
 drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c                              | 1 -
 include/linux/slab.h                                      | 1 -
 kernel/ucount.c                                           | 1 +
 lib/test_firmware.c                                       | 1 +
 mm/cma.c                                                  | 1 +
 mm/memblock.c                                             | 1 +
 net/core/sysctl_net_core.c                                | 1 -
 net/ipv4/route.c                                          | 1 -
 security/apparmor/lsm.c                                   | 1 -
 security/keys/big_key.c                                   | 1 +
 23 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c
index a6198d4f0f03..5ca3e22d0512 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/dart_iommu.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
 #include <asm/iommu.h>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/msi_bitmap.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/msi_bitmap.c
index c4dae27172b3..6243a7e537d0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/msi_bitmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/msi_bitmap.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
 #include <asm/msi_bitmap.h>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
index c7a627620e5e..8c867b43c8eb 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
 #include <linux/log2.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
index a4a9fe1934e9..2f8f7d7dd9a8 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/irqflags.h>
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/irq_64.c
index d66dde833f5e..713670e6d13d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index 14437116ffea..77625b60a510 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
 #include <asm/proto.h>
 #include <asm/dma.h>
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c
index 2138102ef611..c5f4f7691b57 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/exynos-iommu.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/of_iommu.h>
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu_v1.c b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu_v1.c
index 542930cd183d..5a96fd14ac22 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu_v1.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu_v1.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
 #include <linux/iopoll.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/of_address.h>
 #include <linux/of_iommu.h>
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
index 1b4af54a4968..30371274409d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_net.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
 #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
 #include <linux/pinctrl/consumer.h>
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
index 2437422625bf..57bb8f049e59 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 #include "efuse.h"
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("lizhaoming	<chaoming_li@realsil.com.cn>");
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192c/fw_common.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192c/fw_common.c
index 015476e3f7e5..f3bff66e85d0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192c/fw_common.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192c/fw_common.c
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
 #include "../rtl8192ce/def.h"
 #include "fw_common.h"
 #include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
 static void _rtl92c_enable_fw_download(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, bool enable)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/hal/fw.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/hal/fw.c
index 03d091bad13a..6b67b38a6a9f 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/hal/fw.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/hal/fw.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #include "rtl8188e_hal.h"
 
 #include <linux/firmware.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 static void _rtl88e_enable_fw_download(struct adapter *adapt, bool enable)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtlwifi/pci.c b/drivers/staging/rtlwifi/pci.c
index 70a64a5f564a..d56810eabde7 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtlwifi/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtlwifi/pci.c
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 #include "efuse.h"
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 MODULE_AUTHOR("lizhaoming	<chaoming_li@realsil.com.cn>");
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
index 71458f493cf8..21d464a29cf8 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <xen/xen.h>
 
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 04402c637171..81ebd71f8c03 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@
 #define ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) <= \
 				(unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR)
 
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 struct mem_cgroup;
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index b4eeee03934f..f48d1b6376a4 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 #define UCOUNTS_HASHTABLE_BITS 10
diff --git a/lib/test_firmware.c b/lib/test_firmware.c
index 078a61480573..cee000ac54d8 100644
--- a/lib/test_firmware.c
+++ b/lib/test_firmware.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
 #define TEST_FIRMWARE_NAME	"test-firmware.bin"
 #define TEST_FIRMWARE_NUM_REQS	4
diff --git a/mm/cma.c b/mm/cma.c
index 0600fc08a9f4..5809bbe360d7 100644
--- a/mm/cma.c
+++ b/mm/cma.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/cma.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <trace/events/cma.h>
 
 #include "cma.h"
diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c
index 04406a930bfc..ecc6cb58cd33 100644
--- a/mm/memblock.c
+++ b/mm/memblock.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/poison.h>
 #include <linux/pfn.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index b3b609f0eeb5..b1a2c5e38530 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 8322e479f299..594a1c605c92 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@
 #include <net/rtnetlink.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #endif
 #include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 9a65eeaf7dfa..6134302c143c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
-#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index fa728f662a6f..933623784ccd 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/aead.h>
-- 
cgit 


From 58eacfffc41735c9155becc73cb7f4dcc60a46a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@polymtl.ca>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 20:33:28 -0400
Subject: init, tracing: instrument security and console initcall trace events

Trace events have been added around the initcall functions defined in
init/main.c. But console and security have their own initcalls. This adds
the trace events associated for those initcall functions.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1521765208.19745.2.camel@polymtl.ca

Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Abderrahmane Benbachir <abderrahmane.benbachir@polymtl.ca>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
 kernel/printk/printk.c | 7 ++++++-
 security/security.c    | 8 +++++++-
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c
index f274fbef821d..cb5b35341d69 100644
--- a/kernel/printk/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
+#include <trace/events/initcall.h>
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/printk.h>
 
@@ -2781,6 +2782,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_console);
  */
 void __init console_init(void)
 {
+	int ret;
 	initcall_t *call;
 
 	/* Setup the default TTY line discipline. */
@@ -2791,8 +2793,11 @@ void __init console_init(void)
 	 * inform about problems etc..
 	 */
 	call = __con_initcall_start;
+	trace_initcall_level("console");
 	while (call < __con_initcall_end) {
-		(*call)();
+		trace_initcall_start((*call));
+		ret = (*call)();
+		trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret);
 		call++;
 	}
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1cd8526cb0b7..987afe3d464c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
+#include <trace/events/initcall.h>
+
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
 /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
@@ -45,10 +47,14 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
 
 static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
 {
+	int ret;
 	initcall_t *call;
 	call = __security_initcall_start;
+	trace_initcall_level("security");
 	while (call < __security_initcall_end) {
-		(*call) ();
+		trace_initcall_start((*call));
+		ret = (*call) ();
+		trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret);
 		call++;
 	}
 }
-- 
cgit 


From fd40ffc72e2f74c7db61e400903e7d50a88bc0b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 14:36:05 -0400
Subject: selinux: fix missing dput() before selinuxfs unmount

Commit 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state") triggers a BUG
when SELinux is runtime-disabled (i.e. systemd or equivalent disables
SELinux before initial policy load via /sys/fs/selinux/disable based on
/etc/selinux/config SELINUX=disabled).

This does not manifest if SELinux is disabled via kernel command line
argument or if SELinux is enabled (permissive or enforcing).

Before:
  SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.
  BUG: Dentry 000000006d77e5c7{i=17,n=null}  still in use (1) [unmount of selinuxfs selinuxfs]

After:
  SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.

Fixes: 0619f0f5e36f ("selinux: wrap selinuxfs state")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4be683eeba01..245160373dab 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -2061,6 +2061,7 @@ __initcall(init_sel_fs);
 void exit_sel_fs(void)
 {
 	sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+	dput(selinux_null.dentry);
 	kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
 	unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
 }
-- 
cgit 


From c21a6970ae727839a2f300cd8dd957de0d0238c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 16:35:23 -0700
Subject: ipc/shm: introduce shmctl(SHM_STAT_ANY)

Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.

The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs.  These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.

Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates.  But I'm thinking
something like:

: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
:  .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
:  .\"	attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
:  .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
:  .\"
:  .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
:  .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
:  argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
:  the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
:  all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
:  .PP
:  The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
:  memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
:  kernel's internal array recording information about all
:  shared memory segments.
:  (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
:  operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
:  on the system.)
:  A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
:  \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
:  is not a valid command.
:  Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
:  operation, the index value specified in
:  .I shmid
:  referred to an array slot that is currently unused.

This patch (of 3):

There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command.  The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.  As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs).  Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.

This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 include/uapi/linux/shm.h   |  5 +++--
 ipc/shm.c                  | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  1 +
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/shm.h b/include/uapi/linux/shm.h
index 4de12a39b075..dde1344f047c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/shm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/shm.h
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ struct shmid_ds {
 #define SHM_UNLOCK 	12
 
 /* ipcs ctl commands */
-#define SHM_STAT 	13
-#define SHM_INFO 	14
+#define SHM_STAT	13
+#define SHM_INFO	14
+#define SHM_STAT_ANY    15
 
 /* Obsolete, used only for backwards compatibility */
 struct	shminfo {
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index acefe44fefef..1a28b6a96449 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -947,14 +947,14 @@ static int shmctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
 	memset(tbuf, 0, sizeof(*tbuf));
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (cmd == SHM_STAT) {
+	if (cmd == SHM_STAT || cmd == SHM_STAT_ANY) {
 		shp = shm_obtain_object(ns, shmid);
 		if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(shp);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 		id = shp->shm_perm.id;
-	} else {
+	} else { /* IPC_STAT */
 		shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
 		if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(shp);
@@ -962,9 +962,20 @@ static int shmctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
 		}
 	}
 
-	err = -EACCES;
-	if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
-		goto out_unlock;
+	/*
+	 * Semantically SHM_STAT_ANY ought to be identical to
+	 * that functionality provided by the /proc/sysvipc/
+	 * interface. As such, only audit these calls and
+	 * do not do traditional S_IRUGO permission checks on
+	 * the ipc object.
+	 */
+	if (cmd == SHM_STAT_ANY)
+		audit_ipc_obj(&shp->shm_perm);
+	else {
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	err = security_shm_shmctl(&shp->shm_perm, cmd);
 	if (err)
@@ -1104,6 +1115,7 @@ long ksys_shmctl(int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
 		return err;
 	}
 	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
 	case IPC_STAT: {
 		err = shmctl_stat(ns, shmid, cmd, &sem64);
 		if (err < 0)
@@ -1282,6 +1294,7 @@ long compat_ksys_shmctl(int shmid, int cmd, void __user *uptr)
 		return err;
 	}
 	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
 	case SHM_STAT:
 		err = shmctl_stat(ns, shmid, cmd, &sem64);
 		if (err < 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1eeb70e439d7..1287013f747d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6157,6 +6157,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
 		perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 73549007bf9e..0daab3019023 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3046,6 +3046,7 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
 		may = MAY_READ;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
-- 
cgit 


From a280d6dc77eb6002f269d58cd47c7c7e69b617b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 16:35:26 -0700
Subject: ipc/sem: introduce semctl(SEM_STAT_ANY)

There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command.  The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs).  Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.

This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 include/uapi/linux/sem.h   |  1 +
 ipc/sem.c                  | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  1 +
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sem.h b/include/uapi/linux/sem.h
index 9c3e745b0656..39a1876f039e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/sem.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/sem.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 /* ipcs ctl cmds */
 #define SEM_STAT 18
 #define SEM_INFO 19
+#define SEM_STAT_ANY 20
 
 /* Obsolete, used only for backwards compatibility and libc5 compiles */
 struct semid_ds {
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 2994da8ccc7f..06be75d9217a 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -1220,14 +1220,14 @@ static int semctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid,
 	memset(semid64, 0, sizeof(*semid64));
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (cmd == SEM_STAT) {
+	if (cmd == SEM_STAT || cmd == SEM_STAT_ANY) {
 		sma = sem_obtain_object(ns, semid);
 		if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(sma);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 		id = sma->sem_perm.id;
-	} else {
+	} else { /* IPC_STAT */
 		sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
 		if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(sma);
@@ -1235,9 +1235,14 @@ static int semctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid,
 		}
 	}
 
-	err = -EACCES;
-	if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, S_IRUGO))
-		goto out_unlock;
+	/* see comment for SHM_STAT_ANY */
+	if (cmd == SEM_STAT_ANY)
+		audit_ipc_obj(&sma->sem_perm);
+	else {
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, S_IRUGO))
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	err = security_sem_semctl(&sma->sem_perm, cmd);
 	if (err)
@@ -1626,6 +1631,7 @@ long ksys_semctl(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		return semctl_info(ns, semid, cmd, p);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
 		err = semctl_stat(ns, semid, cmd, &semid64);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
@@ -1732,6 +1738,7 @@ long compat_ksys_semctl(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int arg)
 		return semctl_info(ns, semid, cmd, p);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
 		err = semctl_stat(ns, semid, cmd, &semid64);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1287013f747d..927904d0f115 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6273,6 +6273,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 		break;
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
 		perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
 		break;
 	default:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0daab3019023..cb36498a5076 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3140,6 +3140,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
 	case GETALL:
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
 		may = MAY_READ;
 		break;
 	case SETVAL:
-- 
cgit 


From 23c8cec8cf679b10997a512abb1e86f0cedc42ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 16:35:30 -0700
Subject: ipc/msg: introduce msgctl(MSG_STAT_ANY)

There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command.  The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.

While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it.  Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs).  Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.

This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead.  In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180215162458.10059-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <robert.kettler@outlook.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 include/uapi/linux/msg.h   |  1 +
 ipc/msg.c                  | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  1 +
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/msg.h b/include/uapi/linux/msg.h
index 5d5ab81dc9be..e4a0d9a9a9e8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/msg.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/msg.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 /* ipcs ctl commands */
 #define MSG_STAT 11
 #define MSG_INFO 12
+#define MSG_STAT_ANY 13
 
 /* msgrcv options */
 #define MSG_NOERROR     010000  /* no error if message is too big */
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 114a21189613..56fd1c73eedc 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -497,14 +497,14 @@ static int msgctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int msqid,
 	memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (cmd == MSG_STAT) {
+	if (cmd == MSG_STAT || cmd == MSG_STAT_ANY) {
 		msq = msq_obtain_object(ns, msqid);
 		if (IS_ERR(msq)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(msq);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 		id = msq->q_perm.id;
-	} else {
+	} else { /* IPC_STAT */
 		msq = msq_obtain_object_check(ns, msqid);
 		if (IS_ERR(msq)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(msq);
@@ -512,9 +512,14 @@ static int msgctl_stat(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int msqid,
 		}
 	}
 
-	err = -EACCES;
-	if (ipcperms(ns, &msq->q_perm, S_IRUGO))
-		goto out_unlock;
+	/* see comment for SHM_STAT_ANY */
+	if (cmd == MSG_STAT_ANY)
+		audit_ipc_obj(&msq->q_perm);
+	else {
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (ipcperms(ns, &msq->q_perm, S_IRUGO))
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	err = security_msg_queue_msgctl(&msq->q_perm, cmd);
 	if (err)
@@ -572,6 +577,7 @@ long ksys_msgctl(int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
 		return err;
 	}
 	case MSG_STAT:	/* msqid is an index rather than a msg queue id */
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
 	case IPC_STAT:
 		err = msgctl_stat(ns, msqid, cmd, &msqid64);
 		if (err < 0)
@@ -690,6 +696,7 @@ long compat_ksys_msgctl(int msqid, int cmd, void __user *uptr)
 	}
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
 		err = msgctl_stat(ns, msqid, cmd, &msqid64);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 927904d0f115..4cafe6a19167 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6006,6 +6006,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
 		perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index cb36498a5076..0b414836bebd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3230,6 +3230,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
 		may = MAY_READ;
 		break;
 	case IPC_SET:
-- 
cgit