From 66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Desnoyers Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 12:11:30 +1030 Subject: Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature. This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y. Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules. With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module. Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt). Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Acked-by: Steven Rostedt NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar CC: Thomas Gleixner CC: David Howells CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell --- include/linux/kernel.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'include/linux/kernel.h') diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 196d1ea86df0..471090093c67 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -469,6 +469,7 @@ extern enum system_states { #define TAINT_CRAP 10 #define TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND 11 #define TAINT_OOT_MODULE 12 +#define TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE 13 extern const char hex_asc[]; #define hex_asc_lo(x) hex_asc[((x) & 0x0f)] -- cgit From 8c90487cdc64847b4fdd812ab3047f426fec4d13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Jones Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 10:49:49 -0500 Subject: Rename TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP to TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC Rename TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP to TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, so we can repurpose the flag to encompass a wider range of pushing the CPU beyond its warrany. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140226154949.GA770@redhat.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- include/linux/kernel.h | 2 +- kernel/module.c | 2 +- kernel/panic.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux/kernel.h') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index b85e43a5a462..ce8b8ff0e0ef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static void amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD" " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); + add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 196d1ea86df0..08fb02477641 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ extern enum system_states { #define TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE 0 #define TAINT_FORCED_MODULE 1 -#define TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP 2 +#define TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC 2 #define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD 3 #define TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK 4 #define TAINT_BAD_PAGE 5 diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index d24fcf29cb64..ca2c1aded7ee 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ static size_t module_flags_taint(struct module *mod, char *buf) buf[l++] = 'C'; /* * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added. - * TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, TAINT_BAD_PAGE don't + * TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, TAINT_BAD_PAGE don't * apply to modules. */ return l; diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 6d6300375090..2270cfd1d6be 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ struct tnt { static const struct tnt tnts[] = { { TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G' }, { TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' ' }, - { TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, 'S', ' ' }, + { TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, 'S', ' ' }, { TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' ' }, { TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' ' }, { TAINT_BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' ' }, -- cgit From 58f86cc89c3372d3e61d5b71e5513ec5a0b02848 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rusty Russell Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 12:00:34 +1030 Subject: VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS: stricter checking for sysfs perms. Summary of http://lkml.org/lkml/2014/3/14/363 : Ted: module_param(queue_depth, int, 444) Joe: 0444! Rusty: User perms >= group perms >= other perms? Joe: CLASS_ATTR, DEVICE_ATTR, SENSOR_ATTR and SENSOR_ATTR_2? Side effect of stricter permissions means removing the unnecessary S_IFREG from several callers. Note that the BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perm) & 2) test was removed: a fair number of drivers fail this test, so that will be the debate for a future patch. Suggested-by: Joe Perches Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas for drivers/pci/slot.c Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell --- drivers/pci/slot.c | 6 +++--- fs/fuse/cuse.c | 4 ++-- fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c | 2 +- fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/kernel.h | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/moduleparam.h | 8 +++----- include/linux/sysfs.h | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux/kernel.h') diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c index 7dd62fa9d0bd..396c200b9ddb 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/slot.c +++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c @@ -116,11 +116,11 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj) } static struct pci_slot_attribute pci_slot_attr_address = - __ATTR(address, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO), address_read_file, NULL); + __ATTR(address, S_IRUGO, address_read_file, NULL); static struct pci_slot_attribute pci_slot_attr_max_speed = - __ATTR(max_bus_speed, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO), max_speed_read_file, NULL); + __ATTR(max_bus_speed, S_IRUGO, max_speed_read_file, NULL); static struct pci_slot_attribute pci_slot_attr_cur_speed = - __ATTR(cur_bus_speed, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO), cur_speed_read_file, NULL); + __ATTR(cur_bus_speed, S_IRUGO, cur_speed_read_file, NULL); static struct attribute *pci_slot_default_attrs[] = { &pci_slot_attr_address.attr, diff --git a/fs/fuse/cuse.c b/fs/fuse/cuse.c index b96a49b37d66..77cf5eeeabd1 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/cuse.c +++ b/fs/fuse/cuse.c @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static ssize_t cuse_class_waiting_show(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", atomic_read(&cc->fc.num_waiting)); } -static DEVICE_ATTR(waiting, S_IFREG | 0400, cuse_class_waiting_show, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(waiting, 0400, cuse_class_waiting_show, NULL); static ssize_t cuse_class_abort_store(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static ssize_t cuse_class_abort_store(struct device *dev, fuse_abort_conn(&cc->fc); return count; } -static DEVICE_ATTR(abort, S_IFREG | 0200, NULL, cuse_class_abort_store); +static DEVICE_ATTR(abort, 0200, NULL, cuse_class_abort_store); static struct attribute *cuse_class_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_waiting.attr, diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c index a4b07730b2e1..b7f57271d49c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/cluster/sys.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr, return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", O2NM_API_VERSION); } static struct kobj_attribute attr_version = - __ATTR(interface_revision, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, version_show, NULL); + __ATTR(interface_revision, S_IRUGO, version_show, NULL); static struct attribute *o2cb_attrs[] = { &attr_version.attr, diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c index 1324e6600e57..25e9f7b5bad3 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/stackglue.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_max_locking_protocol_show(struct kobject *kobj, } static struct kobj_attribute ocfs2_attr_max_locking_protocol = - __ATTR(max_locking_protocol, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, + __ATTR(max_locking_protocol, S_IRUGO, ocfs2_max_locking_protocol_show, NULL); static ssize_t ocfs2_loaded_cluster_plugins_show(struct kobject *kobj, @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_loaded_cluster_plugins_show(struct kobject *kobj, } static struct kobj_attribute ocfs2_attr_loaded_cluster_plugins = - __ATTR(loaded_cluster_plugins, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, + __ATTR(loaded_cluster_plugins, S_IRUGO, ocfs2_loaded_cluster_plugins_show, NULL); static ssize_t ocfs2_active_cluster_plugin_show(struct kobject *kobj, @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_active_cluster_plugin_show(struct kobject *kobj, } static struct kobj_attribute ocfs2_attr_active_cluster_plugin = - __ATTR(active_cluster_plugin, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, + __ATTR(active_cluster_plugin, S_IRUGO, ocfs2_active_cluster_plugin_show, NULL); static ssize_t ocfs2_cluster_stack_show(struct kobject *kobj, @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ static ssize_t ocfs2_cluster_stack_store(struct kobject *kobj, static struct kobj_attribute ocfs2_attr_cluster_stack = - __ATTR(cluster_stack, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, + __ATTR(cluster_stack, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, ocfs2_cluster_stack_show, ocfs2_cluster_stack_store); diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 471090093c67..4679eddc110a 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -842,4 +842,12 @@ static inline void ftrace_dump(enum ftrace_dump_mode oops_dump_mode) { } # define REBUILD_DUE_TO_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD #endif +/* Permissions on a sysfs file: you didn't miss the 0 prefix did you? */ +#define VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(perms) \ + (BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perms) < 0) + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perms) > 0777) + \ + /* User perms >= group perms >= other perms */ \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(((perms) >> 6) < (((perms) >> 3) & 7)) + \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((((perms) >> 3) & 7) < ((perms) & 7)) + \ + (perms)) #endif diff --git a/include/linux/moduleparam.h b/include/linux/moduleparam.h index 175f6995d1af..204a67743804 100644 --- a/include/linux/moduleparam.h +++ b/include/linux/moduleparam.h @@ -186,14 +186,12 @@ struct kparam_array parameters. */ #define __module_param_call(prefix, name, ops, arg, perm, level) \ /* Default value instead of permissions? */ \ - static int __param_perm_check_##name __attribute__((unused)) = \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO((perm) < 0 || (perm) > 0777 || ((perm) & 2)) \ - + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(sizeof(""prefix) > MAX_PARAM_PREFIX_LEN); \ - static const char __param_str_##name[] = prefix #name; \ + static const char __param_str_##name[] = prefix #name; \ static struct kernel_param __moduleparam_const __param_##name \ __used \ __attribute__ ((unused,__section__ ("__param"),aligned(sizeof(void *)))) \ - = { __param_str_##name, ops, perm, level, { arg } } + = { __param_str_##name, ops, VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(perm), \ + level, { arg } } /* Obsolete - use module_param_cb() */ #define module_param_call(name, set, get, arg, perm) \ diff --git a/include/linux/sysfs.h b/include/linux/sysfs.h index 30b2ebee6439..f517e6e488c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/sysfs.h +++ b/include/linux/sysfs.h @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ struct attribute_group { */ #define __ATTR(_name, _mode, _show, _store) { \ - .attr = {.name = __stringify(_name), .mode = _mode }, \ + .attr = {.name = __stringify(_name), \ + .mode = VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(_mode) }, \ .show = _show, \ .store = _store, \ } -- cgit