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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"We can now scope a Landlock domain thanks to a new "scoped" field that
can deny interactions with resources outside of this domain.
The LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET flag denies connections to an
abstract UNIX socket created outside of the current scoped domain, and
the LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL flag denies sending a signal to processes
outside of the current scoped domain.
These restrictions also apply to nested domains according to their
scope. The related changes will also be useful to support other kind
of IPC isolations"
* tag 'landlock-6.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
samples/landlock: Add support for signal scoping
selftests/landlock: Test signal created by out-of-bound message
selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads
selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping
landlock: Add signal scoping
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
samples/landlock: Add support for abstract UNIX socket scoping
selftests/landlock: Test inherited restriction of abstract UNIX socket
selftests/landlock: Test connected and unconnected datagram UNIX socket
selftests/landlock: Test UNIX sockets with any address formats
selftests/landlock: Test abstract UNIX socket scoping
selftests/landlock: Test handling of unknown scope
landlock: Add abstract UNIX socket scoping
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Introduce a new "scoped" member to landlock_ruleset_attr that can
specify LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET to restrict connection to
abstract UNIX sockets from a process outside of the socket's domain.
Two hooks are implemented to enforce these restrictions:
unix_stream_connect and unix_may_send.
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/7
Signed-off-by: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5f7ad85243b78427242275b93481cfc7c127764b.1725494372.git.fahimitahera@gmail.com
[mic: Fix commit message formatting, improve documentation, simplify
hook_unix_may_send(), and cosmetic fixes including rename of
LANDLOCK_SCOPED_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET]
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are very few (3 in linux/file.h,
1 in net/socket.c, 3 in fs/overlayfs/file.c and 3 more in
explicit initializers).
Those can be dealt with in the commit converting to
new layout; accesses to struct fd::file are too many for that.
This commit converts (almost) all of f.file to
fd_file(f). It's not entirely mechanical ('file' is used as
a member name more than just in struct fd) and it does not
even attempt to distinguish the uses in pointer context from
those in boolean context; the latter will be eventually turned
into a separate helper (fd_empty()).
NOTE: mass conversion to fd_empty(), tempting as it
might be, is a bad idea; better do that piecewise in commit
that convert from fdget...() to CLASS(...).
[conflicts in fs/fhandle.c, kernel/bpf/syscall.c, mm/memcontrol.c
caught by git; fs/stat.c one got caught by git grep]
[fs/xattr.c conflict]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* Fix some typos, incomplete or confusing phrases.
* Split paragraphs where appropriate.
* List the same error code multiple times,
if it has multiple possible causes.
* Bring wording closer to the man page wording,
which has undergone more thorough review
(esp. for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE).
* Small semantic clarifications
* Call the ephemeral port range "ephemeral"
* Clarify reasons for EFAULT in landlock_add_rule()
* Clarify @rule_type doc for landlock_add_rule()
This is a collection of small fixes which I collected when preparing the
corresponding man pages [1].
Cc: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240715155554.2791018-1-gnoack@google.com [1]
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240715160328.2792835-2-gnoack@google.com
[mic: Add label to link, fix formatting spotted by make htmldocs,
synchronize userspace-api documentation's date]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Introduces the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right
and increments the Landlock ABI version to 5.
This access right applies to device-custom IOCTL commands
when they are invoked on block or character device files.
Like the truncate right, this right is associated with a file
descriptor at the time of open(2), and gets respected even when the
file descriptor is used outside of the thread which it was originally
opened in.
Therefore, a newly enabled Landlock policy does not apply to file
descriptors which are already open.
If the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right is handled, only a small
number of safe IOCTL commands will be permitted on newly opened device
files. These include FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC, as well
as other IOCTL commands for regular files which are implemented in
fs/ioctl.c.
Noteworthy scenarios which require special attention:
TTY devices are often passed into a process from the parent process,
and so a newly enabled Landlock policy does not retroactively apply to
them automatically. In the past, TTY devices have often supported
IOCTL commands like TIOCSTI and some TIOCLINUX subcommands, which were
letting callers control the TTY input buffer (and simulate
keypresses). This should be restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN programs on
modern kernels though.
Known limitations:
The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV access right is a coarse-grained
control over IOCTL commands.
Landlock users may use path-based restrictions in combination with
their knowledge about the file system layout to control what IOCTLs
can be done.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419161122.2023765-2-gnoack@google.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Because sandboxing can be used as an opportunistic security measure,
user space may not log unsupported features. Let the system
administrator know if an application tries to use Landlock but failed
because it isn't enabled at boot time. This may be caused by boot
loader configurations with outdated "lsm" kernel's command-line
parameter.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 265885daf3e5 ("landlock: Add syscall implementations")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227110550.3702236-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Add network rules support in the ruleset management helpers and the
landlock_create_ruleset() syscall. Extend user space API to support
network actions:
* Add new network access rights: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP and
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP.
* Add a new network rule type: LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT tied to struct
landlock_net_port_attr. The allowed_access field contains the network
access rights, and the port field contains the port value according to
the controlled protocol. This field can take up to a 64-bit value
but the maximum value depends on the related protocol (e.g. 16-bit
value for TCP). Network port is in host endianness [1].
* Add a new handled_access_net field to struct landlock_ruleset_attr
that contains network access rights.
* Increment the Landlock ABI version to 4.
Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect() LSM hooks, which enable
to control TCP socket binding and connection to specific ports.
Expand access_masks_t from u16 to u32 to be able to store network access
rights alongside filesystem access rights for rulesets' handled access
rights.
Access rights are not tied to socket file descriptors but checked at
bind() or connect() call time against the caller's Landlock domain. For
the filesystem, a file descriptor is a direct access to a file/data.
However, for network sockets, we cannot identify for which data or peer
a newly created socket will give access to. Indeed, we need to wait for
a connect or bind request to identify the use case for this socket.
Likewise a directory file descriptor may enable to open another file
(i.e. a new data item), but this opening is also restricted by the
caller's domain, not the file descriptor's access rights [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/263c1eb3-602f-57fe-8450-3f138581bee7@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026014751.414649-9-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
[mic: Extend commit message, fix typo in comments, and specify
endianness in the documentation]
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Change the landlock_add_rule() syscall to support new rule types with
next commits. Add the add_rule_path_beneath() helper to support current
filesystem rules.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026014751.414649-8-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a domain
only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
restrictions.
Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
Remove unnecessary inlining.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026014751.414649-3-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Rename ruleset's access masks and modify it's type to access_masks_t
to support network type rules in following commits. Add filesystem
helper functions to add and get filesystem mask.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026014751.414649-2-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and
file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using
truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
the flag.
In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned
offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can
shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address (reported
by Nathan Chancellor).
The following operations are restricted:
open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
creates a new file.
truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
right.
ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE
right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by
other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support
truncation with ftruncate(2).
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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It seems that all code should use double backquotes, which is also used
to convert "%" defines. Let's use an homogeneous style and remove all
use of simple backquotes (which should only be used for emphasis).
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220923154207.3311629-4-mic@digikod.net
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Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers
to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a
specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed
with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename,
and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This
lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an
inode.
Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed,
whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not
considered a threat to user data.
However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent
directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly.
Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by
being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure
that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory
itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is
not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible
for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking
it.
Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the
destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users.
Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to
require such destination access right to be also granted to the source
(to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to
the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination.
See the provided documentation for additional details.
New tests are provided with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-8-mic@digikod.net
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According to the Landlock goal to be a security feature available to
unprivileges processes, it makes more sense to first check for
no_new_privs before checking anything else (i.e. syscall arguments).
Merge inval_fd_enforce and unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs tests
into the new restrict_self_checks_ordering. This is similar to the
previous commit checking other syscalls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-10-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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This makes more sense to first check the ruleset FD and then the rule
attribute. It will be useful to factor out code for other rule types.
Add inval_add_rule_arguments tests, extension of empty_path_beneath_attr
tests, to also check error ordering for landlock_add_rule(2).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-9-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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It is not mandatory to pass a file descriptor obtained with the O_PATH
flag. Also, replace rule's accesses with ruleset's accesses.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160820.524344-2-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may
not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover,
this will help maintain style consistency between different developers.
This contains only whitespace changes.
Automatically formatted with:
clang-format-14 -i security/landlock/*.[ch] include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506160513.523257-3-mic@digikod.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Make the name of the anon inode fd "[landlock-ruleset]" instead of
"landlock-ruleset". This is minor but most anon inode fds already
carry square brackets around their name:
[eventfd]
[eventpoll]
[fanotify]
[fscontext]
[io_uring]
[pidfd]
[signalfd]
[timerfd]
[userfaultfd]
For the sake of consistency lets do the same for the landlock-ruleset anon
inode fd that comes with landlock. We did the same in
1cdc415f1083 ("uapi, fsopen: use square brackets around "fscontext" [ver #2]")
for the new mount api.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011133704.1704369-1-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
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Add a new flag LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION to
landlock_create_ruleset(2). This enables to retreive a Landlock ABI
version that is useful to efficiently follow a best-effort security
approach. Indeed, it would be a missed opportunity to abort the whole
sandbox building, because some features are unavailable, instead of
protecting users as much as possible with the subset of features
provided by the running kernel.
This new flag enables user space to identify the minimum set of Landlock
features supported by the running kernel without relying on a filesystem
interface (e.g. /proc/version, which might be inaccessible) nor testing
multiple syscall argument combinations (i.e. syscall bisection). New
Landlock features will be documented and tied to a minimum version
number (greater than 1). The current version will be incremented for
each new kernel release supporting new Landlock features. User space
libraries can leverage this information to seamlessly restrict processes
as much as possible while being compatible with newer APIs.
This is a much more lighter approach than the previous
landlock_get_features(2): the complexity is pushed to user space
libraries. This flag meets similar needs as securityfs versions:
selinux/policyvers, apparmor/features/*/version* and tomoyo/version.
Supporting this flag now will be convenient for backward compatibility.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the
same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
namespace.
All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.
Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
/dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.
See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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