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Add a tracepoint for when a CSD is queued to a remote CPU's
call_single_queue. This allows finding exactly which CPU queued a given CSD
when looking at a csd_function_{entry,exit} event, and also enables us to
accurately measure IPI delivery time with e.g. a synthetic event:
$ echo 'hist:keys=cpu,csd.hex:ts=common_timestamp.usecs' >\
/sys/kernel/tracing/events/smp/csd_queue_cpu/trigger
$ echo 'csd_latency unsigned int dst_cpu; unsigned long csd; u64 time' >\
/sys/kernel/tracing/synthetic_events
$ echo \
'hist:keys=common_cpu,csd.hex:'\
'time=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts:'\
'onmatch(smp.csd_queue_cpu).trace(csd_latency,common_cpu,csd,$time)' >\
/sys/kernel/tracing/events/smp/csd_function_entry/trigger
$ trace-cmd record -e 'synthetic:csd_latency' hackbench
$ trace-cmd report
<...>-467 [001] 21.824263: csd_queue_cpu: cpu=0 callsite=try_to_wake_up+0x2ea func=sched_ttwu_pending csd=0xffff8880076148b8
<...>-467 [001] 21.824280: ipi_send_cpu: cpu=0 callsite=try_to_wake_up+0x2ea callback=generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x0
<...>-489 [000] 21.824299: csd_function_entry: func=sched_ttwu_pending csd=0xffff8880076148b8
<...>-489 [000] 21.824320: csd_latency: dst_cpu=0, csd=18446612682193848504, time=36
Suggested-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Tested-and-reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The recently added ipi_send_{cpu,cpumask} tracepoints allow finding sources
of IPIs targeting CPUs running latency-sensitive applications.
For NOHZ_FULL CPUs, all IPIs are interference, and those tracepoints are
sufficient to find them and work on getting rid of them. In some setups
however, not *all* IPIs are to be suppressed, but long-running IPI
callbacks can still be problematic.
Add a pair of tracepoints to mark the start and end of processing a CSD IPI
callback, similar to what exists for softirq, workqueue or timer callbacks.
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Tested-and-reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The tick period is aligned very early while the first clock_event_device is
registered. At that point the system runs in periodic mode and switches
later to one-shot mode if possible.
The next wake-up event is programmed based on the aligned value
(tick_next_period) but the delta value, that is used to program the
clock_event_device, is computed based on ktime_get().
With the subtracted offset, the device fires earlier than the exact time
frame. With a large enough offset the system programs the timer for the
next wake-up and the remaining time left is too small to make any boot
progress. The system hangs.
Move the alignment later to the setup of tick_sched timer. At this point
the system switches to oneshot mode and a high resolution clocksource is
available. At this point it is safe to align tick_next_period because
ktime_get() will now return accurate (not jiffies based) time.
[bigeasy: Patch description + testing].
Fixes: e9523a0d81899 ("tick/common: Align tick period with the HZ tick.")
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Reported-by: "Bhatnagar, Rishabh" <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Richard W.M. Jones <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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bpf_free_inode() is invoked as a RCU callback. Usually RCU callbacks are
invoked within softirq context. By setting rcutree.use_softirq=0 boot
option the RCU callbacks will be invoked in a per-CPU kthread with
bottom halves disabled which implies a RCU read section.
On PREEMPT_RT the context remains fully preemptible. The RCU read
section however does not allow schedule() invocation. The latter happens
in mutex_lock() performed by bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog() originated
from bpf_link_put().
It was pointed out that the bpf_link_put() invocation should not be
delayed if originated from close(). It was also pointed out that other
invocations from within a syscall should also avoid the workqueue.
Everyone else should use workqueue by default to remain safe in the
future (while auditing the code, every caller was preemptible except for
the RCU case).
Let bpf_link_put() use the worker unconditionally. Add
bpf_link_put_direct() which will directly free the resources and is used
by close() and from within __sys_bpf().
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
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kthread_park and wait_woken have a similar race that
kthread_stop and wait_woken used to have before it was fixed in
commit cb6538e740d7 ("sched/wait: Fix a kthread race with
wait_woken()"). Extend that fix to also cover kthread_park.
[jstultz: Made changes suggested by Peter to optimize
memory loads]
Signed-off-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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All callers of set_sched_topology() are within __init section. Mark
it __init too.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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cppcheck reports
kernel/sched/fair.c:7436:17: style: Local variable 'cpu_util' shadows outer function [shadowFunction]
unsigned long cpu_util;
^
Clean this up by renaming the variable to eff_util
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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There is a class of interrupt controllers out there that, once they
have signalled a given interrupt number, will still signal incoming
instances of the *same* interrupt despite the original interrupt
not having been EOIed yet.
As long as the new interrupt reaches the *same* CPU, nothing bad
happens, as that CPU still has its interrupts globally disabled,
and we will only take the new interrupt once the interrupt has
been EOIed.
However, things become more "interesting" if an affinity change comes
in while the interrupt is being handled. More specifically, while
the per-irq lock is being dropped. This results in the affinity change
taking place immediately. At this point, there is nothing that prevents
the interrupt from firing on the new target CPU. We end-up with the
interrupt running concurrently on two CPUs, which isn't a good thing.
And that's where things become worse: the new CPU notices that the
interrupt handling is in progress (irq_may_run() return false), and
*drops the interrupt on the floor*.
The whole race looks like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
-----------------------------|-----------------------------
interrupt start |
handle_fasteoi_irq | set_affinity(CPU 1)
handler |
... | interrupt start
... | handle_fasteoi_irq -> early out
handle_fasteoi_irq return | interrupt end
interrupt end |
If the interrupt was an edge, too bad. The interrupt is lost, and
the system will eventually die one way or another. Not great.
A way to avoid this situation is to detect this problem at the point
we handle the interrupt on the new target. Instead of dropping the
interrupt, use the resend mechanism to force it to be replayed.
Also, in order to limit the impact of this workaround to the pathetic
architectures that require it, gate it behind a new irq flag aptly
named IRQD_RESEND_WHEN_IN_PROGRESS.
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Gowans <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: KarimAllah Raslan <[email protected]>
Cc: Yipeng Zou <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhang Jianhua <[email protected]>
[maz: reworded commit mesage]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Adding a bit more info about what the flags are used for may help future
code readers.
Signed-off-by: James Gowans <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Liao Chang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
include/linux/mlx5/driver.h
617f5db1a626 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix affinity assignment")
dc13180824b7 ("net/mlx5: Enable devlink port for embedded cpu VF vports")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
47867f0a7e83 ("selftests: mptcp: join: skip check if MIB counter not supported")
425ba803124b ("selftests: mptcp: join: support RM_ADDR for used endpoints or not")
45b1a1227a7a ("mptcp: introduces more address related mibs")
0639fa230a21 ("selftests: mptcp: add explicit check for new mibs")
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230609-upstream-net-20230610-mptcp-selftests-support-old-kernels-part-3-v1-0-2896fe2ee8a3@tessares.net/
No adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Currently user events need to be manually deleted via the delete IOCTL
call or via the dynamic_events file. Most operators and processes wish
to have these events auto cleanup when they are no longer used by
anything to prevent them piling without manual maintenance. However,
some operators may not want this, such as pre-registering events via the
dynamic_events tracefs file.
Update user_event_put() to attempt an auto delete of the event if it's
the last reference. The auto delete must run in a work queue to ensure
proper behavior of class->reg() invocations that don't expect the call
to go away from underneath them during the unregister. Add work_struct
to user_event struct to ensure we can do this reliably.
Add a persist flag, that is not yet exposed, to ensure we can toggle
between auto-cleanup and leaving the events existing in the future. When
a non-zero flag is seen during register, return -EINVAL to ensure ABI
is clear for the user processes while we work out the best approach for
persistent events.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]/
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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Various parts of the code today track user_event's refcnt field directly
via a refcount_add/dec. This makes it hard to modify the behavior of the
last reference decrement in all code paths consistently. For example, in
the future we will auto-delete events upon the last reference going
away. This last reference could happen in many places, but we want it to
be consistently handled.
Add user_event_get() and user_event_put() for the add/dec. Update all
places where direct refcounts are being used to utilize these new
functions. In each location pass if event_mutex is locked or not. This
allows us to drop events automatically in future patches clearly. Ensure
when caller states the lock is held, it really is (or is not) held.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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Currently we don't have any available flags for user processes to use to
indicate options for user_events. We will soon have a flag to indicate
the event should or should not auto-delete once it's not being used by
anyone.
Add a reg_flags field to user_events and parameters to existing
functions to allow for this in future patches.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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During discussions it was suggested that user_ns is not a good place to
try to attach a tracing namespace. The current code has stubs to enable
that work that are very likely to change and incur a performance cost.
Remove the user_ns walk when creating a group and determining the system
name to use, since it's unlikely user_ns will be used in the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230601-urenkel-holzofen-cd9403b9cadd@brauner/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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The user_events support events that has empty arguments. But the trace event
is discarded and not really committed when the arguments is empty. Fix this
by not attempting to copy in zero-length data.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Acked-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: sunliming <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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Now the print_fields() print trace event fields in reverse order. Modify
it to the positive sequence.
Example outputs for a user event:
test0 u32 count1; u32 count2
Output before:
example-2547 [000] ..... 325.666387: test0: count2=0x2 (2) count1=0x1 (1)
Output after:
example-2742 [002] ..... 429.769370: test0: count1=0x1 (1) count2=0x2 (2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]
Fixes: 80a76994b2d88 ("tracing: Add "fields" option to show raw trace event fields")
Signed-off-by: sunliming <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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When A registering user event from dyn_events has no argments, it will pass the
matching check, regardless of whether there is a user event with the same name
and arguments. Add the matching check when the arguments of registering user
event is null.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: sunliming <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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User processes register name_args for events. If the same name but different
args event are registered. The trace outputs of second event are printed
as the first event. This is incorrect.
Return EADDRINUSE back to the user process if the same name but different args
event has being registered.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: sunliming <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Beau Belgrave <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier:
1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ...
--- checkpoint ---
7: r9 += r7
8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y
This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range.
Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states:
I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers,
thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical. If the
path 1-6 is taken by verifier first, and checkpoint is created at (6)
the path [1-4, 6] would be considered safe.
Changes in this commit:
- check_ids() is modified to disallow mapping multiple old_id to the
same cur_id.
- check_scalar_ids() is added, unlike check_ids() it treats ID zero as
a unique scalar ID.
- check_scalar_ids() needs to generate temporary unique IDs, field
'tmp_id_gen' is added to bpf_verifier_env::idmap_scratch to
facilitate this.
- regsafe() is updated to:
- use check_scalar_ids() for precise scalar registers.
- compare scalar registers using memcmp only for explore_alu_limits
branch. This simplifies control flow for scalar case, and has no
measurable performance impact.
- check_alu_op() is updated to avoid generating bpf_reg_state::id for
constant scalar values when processing BPF_MOV. ID is needed to
propagate range information for identical values, but there is
nothing to propagate for constants.
Fixes: 75748837b7e5 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
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Change mark_chain_precision() to track precision in situations
like below:
r2 = unknown value
...
--- state #0 ---
...
r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID
...
--- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
...
if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1
...
--- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
r3 = r10
r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2
At the beginning of the processing of each state, ensure that if a
register with a scalar ID is marked as precise, all registers sharing
this ID are also marked as precise.
This property would be used by a follow-up change in regsafe().
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
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When subprograms are in use, the main program is not jit'd after the
subprograms because jit_subprogs sets a value for prog->bpf_func upon
success. Subsequent calls to the JIT are bypassed when this value is
non-NULL. This leads to a situation where the main program and its
func[0] counterpart are both in the bpf kallsyms tree, but only func[0]
has an extable. Extables are only created during JIT. Now there are
two nearly identical program ksym entries in the tree, but only one has
an extable. Depending upon how the entries are placed, there's a chance
that a fault will call search_extable on the aux with the NULL entry.
Since jit_subprogs already copies state from func[0] to the main
program, include the extable pointer in this state duplication.
Additionally, ensure that the copy of the main program in func[0] is not
added to the bpf_prog_kallsyms table. Instead, let the main program get
added later in bpf_prog_load(). This ensures there is only a single
copy of the main program in the kallsyms table, and that its tag matches
the tag observed by tooling like bpftool.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de9b2f4b4724ef56efbb0339daaa66c8b68b1e7.1686616663.git.kjlx@templeofstupid.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"19 hotfixes. 14 are cc:stable and the remainder address issues which
were introduced during this development cycle or which were considered
inappropriate for a backport"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2023-06-12-12-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
zswap: do not shrink if cgroup may not zswap
page cache: fix page_cache_next/prev_miss off by one
ocfs2: check new file size on fallocate call
mailmap: add entry for John Keeping
mm/damon/core: fix divide error in damon_nr_accesses_to_accesses_bp()
epoll: ep_autoremove_wake_function should use list_del_init_careful
mm/gup_test: fix ioctl fail for compat task
nilfs2: reject devices with insufficient block count
ocfs2: fix use-after-free when unmounting read-only filesystem
lib/test_vmalloc.c: avoid garbage in page array
nilfs2: fix possible out-of-bounds segment allocation in resize ioctl
riscv/purgatory: remove PGO flags
powerpc/purgatory: remove PGO flags
x86/purgatory: remove PGO flags
kexec: support purgatories with .text.hot sections
mm/uffd: allow vma to merge as much as possible
mm/uffd: fix vma operation where start addr cuts part of vma
radix-tree: move declarations to header
nilfs2: fix incomplete buffer cleanup in nilfs_btnode_abort_change_key()
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We currently export the bpf_cpumask_any() and bpf_cpumask_any_and()
kfuncs. Intuitively, one would expect these to choose any CPU in the
cpumask, but what they actually do is alias to cpumask_first() and
cpmkas_first_and().
This is useless given that we already export bpf_cpumask_first() and
bpf_cpumask_first_and(), so this patch replaces them with kfuncs that
call cpumask_any_distribute() and cpumask_any_and_distribute(), which
actually choose any CPU from the cpumask (or the AND of two cpumasks for
the latter).
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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We currently provide bpf_cpumask_first(), bpf_cpumask_any(), and
bpf_cpumask_any_and() kfuncs. bpf_cpumask_any() and
bpf_cpumask_any_and() are confusing misnomers in that they actually just
call cpumask_first() and cpumask_first_and() respectively.
We'll replace them with bpf_cpumask_any_distribute() and
bpf_cpumask_any_distribute_and() kfuncs in a subsequent patch, so let's
ensure feature parity by adding a bpf_cpumask_first_and() kfunc to
account for bpf_cpumask_any_and() being removed.
Signed-off-by: David Vernet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Patch series "kexec: Fix kexec_file_load for llvm16 with PGO", v7.
When upreving llvm I realised that kexec stopped working on my test
platform.
The reason seems to be that due to PGO there are multiple .text sections
on the purgatory, and kexec does not supports that.
This patch (of 4):
Clang16 links the purgatory text in two sections when PGO is in use:
[ 1] .text PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040
00000000000011a1 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 16
[ 2] .rela.text RELA 0000000000000000 00003498
0000000000000648 0000000000000018 I 24 1 8
...
[17] .text.hot. PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00003220
000000000000020b 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 1
[18] .rela.text.hot. RELA 0000000000000000 00004428
0000000000000078 0000000000000018 I 24 17 8
And both of them have their range [sh_addr ... sh_addr+sh_size] on the
area pointed by `e_entry`.
This causes that image->start is calculated twice, once for .text and
another time for .text.hot. The second calculation leaves image->start
in a random location.
Because of this, the system crashes immediately after:
kexec_core: Starting new kernel
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 930457057abe ("kernel/kexec_file.c: split up __kexec_load_puragory")
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>
Cc: Albert Ou <[email protected]>
Cc: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Rix <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
All uses in the kernel are currently already oriented around
suspend/resume. As some other parts of the kernel may also use these
messages in functions that could also be used outside of
suspend/resume, only enable in suspend/resume path.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
|
|
We found a refcount UAF bug as follows:
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 342 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x148
Workqueue: events cpuset_hotplug_workfn
Call trace:
refcount_warn_saturate+0xa0/0x148
__refcount_add.constprop.0+0x5c/0x80
css_task_iter_advance_css_set+0xd8/0x210
css_task_iter_advance+0xa8/0x120
css_task_iter_next+0x94/0x158
update_tasks_root_domain+0x58/0x98
rebuild_root_domains+0xa0/0x1b0
rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x144/0x188
cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x138/0x5a0
process_one_work+0x1e8/0x448
worker_thread+0x228/0x3e0
kthread+0xe0/0xf0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
then a kernel panic will be triggered as below:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000c0000010
Call trace:
cgroup_apply_control_disable+0xa4/0x16c
rebind_subsystems+0x224/0x590
cgroup_destroy_root+0x64/0x2e0
css_free_rwork_fn+0x198/0x2a0
process_one_work+0x1d4/0x4bc
worker_thread+0x158/0x410
kthread+0x108/0x13c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
The race that cause this bug can be shown as below:
(hotplug cpu) | (umount cpuset)
mutex_lock(&cpuset_mutex) | mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex)
cpuset_hotplug_workfn |
rebuild_root_domains | rebind_subsystems
update_tasks_root_domain | spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock)
css_task_iter_start | list_move_tail(&cset->e_cset_node[ss->id]
while(css_task_iter_next) | &dcgrp->e_csets[ss->id]);
css_task_iter_end | spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock)
mutex_unlock(&cpuset_mutex) | mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex)
Inside css_task_iter_start/next/end, css_set_lock is hold and then
released, so when iterating task(left side), the css_set may be moved to
another list(right side), then it->cset_head points to the old list head
and it->cset_pos->next points to the head node of new list, which can't
be used as struct css_set.
To fix this issue, switch from all css_sets to only scgrp's css_sets to
patch in-flight iterators to preserve correct iteration, and then
update it->cset_head as well.
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg37935.html
Suggested-by: Michal Koutný <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>
Fixes: 2d8f243a5e6e ("cgroup: implement cgroup->e_csets[]")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
|
|
task_cgroup_path() is not used anymore. So remove it.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
|
|
This function is only used when CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is disabled, but
CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is enabled. When both are turned off, the prototype is
missing but the unused function is still compiled, as seen from this W=1
warning:
[...]
kernel/bpf/core.c:2075:6: error: no previous prototype for 'bpf_patch_call_args' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
[...]
Add a matching #ifdef for the definition to leave it out.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
|
|
Remove some unnecessary header files. No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
|
|
freezer_css_{online,offline}()
syzbot is again reporting circular locking dependency between
cpu_hotplug_lock and freezer_mutex. Do like what we did with
commit 57dcd64c7e036299 ("cgroup,freezer: hold cpu_hotplug_lock
before freezer_mutex").
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2ab700fe1829880a2ec6
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Tested-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: f5d39b020809 ("freezer,sched: Rewrite core freezer logic")
Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
|
|
The only overlap between the block open flags mapped into the fmode_t and
other uses of fmode_t are FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE. Define a new
blk_mode_t instead for use in blkdev_get_by_{dev,path}, ->open and
->ioctl and stop abusing fmode_t.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]> [rnbd]
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
|
The current interface for exclusive opens is rather confusing as it
requires both the FMODE_EXCL flag and a holder. Remove the need to pass
FMODE_EXCL and just key off the exclusive open off a non-NULL holder.
For blkdev_put this requires adding the holder argument, which provides
better debug checking that only the holder actually releases the hold,
but at the same time allows removing the now superfluous mode argument.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> [btrfs]
Acked-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]> [rnbd]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
|
holder is just an on-stack pointer that can easily be reused by other calls,
replace it with a static variable that doesn't change.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
|
The sys_ni_posix_timers() definition causes a warning when the declaration
is missing, so this needs to be added along with the normal syscalls,
outside of the #ifdef.
kernel/time/posix-stubs.c:26:17: error: no previous prototype for 'sys_ni_posix_timers' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
The crashk_low_res should be considered by /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size
to support two crash kernel regions shrinking if existing.
While doing it, crashk_low_res will only be shrunk when the entire
crashk_res is empty; and if the crashk_res is empty and crahk_low_res
is not, change crashk_low_res to be crashk_res.
[[email protected]: redo changelog]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
No functional change, in preparation for the next patch so that it is
easier to review.
[[email protected]: make __crash_shrink_memory() static]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
The major adjustments are:
1. end = start + new_size.
The 'end' here is not an accurate representation, because it is not the
new end of crashk_res, but the start of ram_res, difference 1. So
eliminate it and replace it with ram_res->start.
2. Use 'ram_res->start' and 'ram_res->end' as arguments to
crash_free_reserved_phys_range() to indicate that the memory covered by
'ram_res' is released from the crashk. And keep it close to
insert_resource().
3. Replace 'if (start == end)' with 'if (!new_size)', clear indication that
all crashk memory will be shrunken.
No functional change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
If the resource of crashk_res has been released, it is better to clear
crashk_res.start and crashk_res.end. Because 'end = start - 1' is not
reasonable, and in some places the test is based on crashk_res.end, not
resource_size(&crashk_res).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
The check '(crashk_res.parent != NULL)' is added by commit e05bd3367bd3
("kexec: fix Oops in crash_shrink_memory()"), but it's stale now. Because
if 'crashk_res' is not reserved, it will be zero in size and will be
intercepted by the above 'if (new_size >= old_size)'.
Ago:
if (new_size >= end - start + 1)
Now:
old_size = (end == 0) ? 0 : end - start + 1;
if (new_size >= old_size)
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Cc: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
Patch series "kexec: enable kexec_crash_size to support two crash kernel
regions".
When crashkernel=X fails to reserve region under 4G, it will fall back to
reserve region above 4G and a region of the default size will also be
reserved under 4G. Unfortunately, /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size only
supports one crash kernel region now, the user cannot sense the low memory
reserved by reading /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size. Also, low memory cannot
be freed by writing this file.
For example:
resource_size(crashk_res) = 512M
resource_size(crashk_low_res) = 256M
The result of 'cat /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size' is 512M, but it should be
768M. When we execute 'echo 0 > /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_size', the size
of crashk_res becomes 0 and resource_size(crashk_low_res) is still 256 MB,
which is incorrect.
Since crashk_res manages the memory with high address and crashk_low_res
manages the memory with low address, crashk_low_res is shrunken only when
all crashk_res is shrunken. And because when there is only one crash
kernel region, crashk_res is always used. Therefore, if all crashk_res is
shrunken and crashk_low_res still exists, swap them.
This patch (of 6):
If the value of parameter 'new_size' is in the semi-open and semi-closed
interval (crashk_res.end - KEXEC_CRASH_MEM_ALIGN + 1, crashk_res.end], the
calculation result of ram_res is:
ram_res->start = crashk_res.end + 1
ram_res->end = crashk_res.end
The operation of insert_resource() fails, and ram_res is not added to
iomem_resource. As a result, the memory of the control block ram_res is
leaked.
In fact, on all architectures, the start address and size of crashk_res
are already aligned by KEXEC_CRASH_MEM_ALIGN. Therefore, we do not need
to round up crashk_res.start again. Instead, we should round up
'new_size' in advance.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 6480e5a09237 ("kdump: add missing RAM resource in crash_shrink_memory()")
Fixes: 06a7f711246b ("kexec: premit reduction of the reserved memory size")
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
Avoid calculating array size twice in kexec_purgatory_setup_sechdrs().
Once using array_size(), and once open-coded.
Flagged by Coccinelle:
.../kexec_file.c:881:8-25: WARNING: array_size is already used (line 877) to compute the same size
No functional change intended.
Compile tested only.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
When lockup_detector_init()->watchdog_hardlockup_probe(), PMU may be not
ready yet. E.g. on arm64, PMU is not ready until
device_initcall(armv8_pmu_driver_init). And it is deeply integrated with
the driver model and cpuhp. Hence it is hard to push this initialization
before smp_init().
But it is easy to take an opposite approach and try to initialize the
watchdog once again later. The delayed probe is called using workqueues.
It need to allocate memory and must be proceed in a normal context. The
delayed probe is able to use if watchdog_hardlockup_probe() returns
non-zero which means the return code returned when PMU is not ready yet.
Provide an API - lockup_detector_retry_init() for anyone who needs to
delayed init lockup detector if they had ever failed at
lockup_detector_init().
The original assumption is: nobody should use delayed probe after
lockup_detector_check() which has __init attribute. That is, anyone uses
this API must call between lockup_detector_init() and
lockup_detector_check(), and the caller must have __init attribute
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.16.If4ad5dd5d09fb1309cebf8bcead4b6a5a7758ca7@changeid
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
On arm64, NMI support needs to be detected at runtime. Add a weak
function to the perf hardlockup detector so that an architecture can
implement it to detect whether NMIs are available.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.15.Ic55cb6f90ef5967d8aaa2b503a4e67c753f64d3a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
Implement a hardlockup detector that doesn't doesn't need any extra
arch-specific support code to detect lockups. Instead of using something
arch-specific we will use the buddy system, where each CPU watches out for
another one. Specifically, each CPU will use its softlockup hrtimer to
check that the next CPU is processing hrtimer interrupts by verifying that
a counter is increasing.
NOTE: unlike the other hard lockup detectors, the buddy one can't easily
show what's happening on the CPU that locked up just by doing a simple
backtrace. It relies on some other mechanism in the system to get
information about the locked up CPUs. This could be support for NMI
backtraces like [1], it could be a mechanism for printing the PC of locked
CPUs at panic time like [2] / [3], or it could be something else. Even
though that means we still rely on arch-specific code, this arch-specific
code seems to often be implemented even on architectures that don't have a
hardlockup detector.
This style of hardlockup detector originated in some downstream Android
trees and has been rebased on / carried in ChromeOS trees for quite a long
time for use on arm and arm64 boards. Historically on these boards we've
leveraged mechanism [2] / [3] to get information about hung CPUs, but we
could move to [1].
Although the original motivation for the buddy system was for use on
systems without an arch-specific hardlockup detector, it can still be
useful to use even on systems that _do_ have an arch-specific hardlockup
detector. On x86, for instance, there is a 24-part patch series [4] in
progress switching the arch-specific hard lockup detector from a scarce
perf counter to a less-scarce hardware resource. Potentially the buddy
system could be a simpler alternative to free up the perf counter but
still get hard lockup detection.
Overall, pros (+) and cons (-) of the buddy system compared to an
arch-specific hardlockup detector (which might be implemented using
perf):
+ The buddy system is usable on systems that don't have an
arch-specific hardlockup detector, like arm32 and arm64 (though it's
being worked on for arm64 [5]).
+ The buddy system may free up scarce hardware resources.
+ If a CPU totally goes out to lunch (can't process NMIs) the buddy
system could still detect the problem (though it would be unlikely
to be able to get a stack trace).
+ The buddy system uses the same timer function to pet the hardlockup
detector on the running CPU as it uses to detect hardlockups on
other CPUs. Compared to other hardlockup detectors, this means it
generates fewer interrupts and thus is likely better able to let
CPUs stay idle longer.
- If all CPUs are hard locked up at the same time the buddy system
can't detect it.
- If we don't have SMP we can't use the buddy system.
- The buddy system needs an arch-specific mechanism (possibly NMI
backtrace) to get info about the locked up CPU.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[2] https://issuetracker.google.com/172213129
[3] https://docs.kernel.org/trace/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.html
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.14.I6bf789d21d0c3d75d382e7e51a804a7a51315f2c@changeid
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
The fact that there watchdog_hardlockup_enable(),
watchdog_hardlockup_disable(), and watchdog_hardlockup_probe() are
declared __weak means that the configured hardlockup detector can define
non-weak versions of those functions if it needs to. Instead of doing
this, the perf hardlockup detector hooked itself into the default __weak
implementation, which was a bit awkward. Clean this up.
From comments, it looks as if the original design was done because the
__weak function were expected to implemented by the architecture and not
by the configured hardlockup detector. This got awkward when we tried to
add the buddy lockup detector which was not arch-specific but wanted to
hook into those same functions.
This is not expected to have any functional impact.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.13.I847d9ec852449350997ba00401d2462a9cb4302b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
|
|
Do a search and replace of:
- NMI_WATCHDOG_ENABLED => WATCHDOG_HARDLOCKUP_ENABLED
- SOFT_WATCHDOG_ENABLED => WATCHDOG_SOFTOCKUP_ENABLED
- watchdog_nmi_ => watchdog_hardlockup_
- nmi_watchdog_available => watchdog_hardlockup_available
- nmi_watchdog_user_enabled => watchdog_hardlockup_user_enabled
- soft_watchdog_user_enabled => watchdog_softlockup_user_enabled
- NMI_WATCHDOG_DEFAULT => WATCHDOG_HARDLOCKUP_DEFAULT
Then update a few comments near where names were changed.
This is specifically to make it less confusing when we want to introduce
the buddy hardlockup detector, which isn't using NMIs. As part of this,
we sanitized a few names for consistency.
[[email protected]: make variables static]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230525162822.1.I0fb41d138d158c9230573eaa37dc56afa2fb14ee@changeid
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.12.I91f7277bab4bf8c0cb238732ed92e7ce7bbd71a6@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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In preparation for the buddy hardlockup detector, which wants the same
petting logic as the current perf hardlockup detector, move the code to
watchdog.c. While doing this, rename the global variable to match others
nearby. As part of this change we have to change the code to account for
the fact that the CPU we're running on might be different than the one
we're checking.
Currently the code in watchdog.c is guarded by
CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF, which makes this change seem silly.
However, a future patch will change this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.11.I00dfd6386ee00da25bf26d140559a41339b53e57@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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In preparation for the buddy hardlockup detector where the CPU checking
for lockup might not be the currently running CPU, add a "cpu" parameter
to watchdog_hardlockup_check().
As part of this change, make hrtimer_interrupts an atomic_t since now the
CPU incrementing the value and the CPU reading the value might be
different. Technially this could also be done with just READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE, but atomic_t feels a little cleaner in this case.
While hrtimer_interrupts is made atomic_t, we change
hrtimer_interrupts_saved from "unsigned long" to "int". The "int" is
needed to match the data type backing atomic_t for hrtimer_interrupts.
Even if this changes us from 64-bits to 32-bits (which I don't think is
true for most compilers), it doesn't really matter. All we ever do is
increment it every few seconds and compare it to an old value so 32-bits
is fine (even 16-bits would be). The "signed" vs "unsigned" also doesn't
matter for simple equality comparisons.
hrtimer_interrupts_saved is _not_ switched to atomic_t nor even accessed
with READ_ONCE / WRITE_ONCE. The hrtimer_interrupts_saved is always
consistently accessed with the same CPU. NOTE: with the upcoming "buddy"
detector there is one special case. When a CPU goes offline/online then
we can change which CPU is the one to consistently access a given instance
of hrtimer_interrupts_saved. We still can't end up with a partially
updated hrtimer_interrupts_saved, however, because we end up petting all
affected CPUs to make sure the new and old CPU can't end up somehow
read/write hrtimer_interrupts_saved at the same time.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.10.I3a7d4dd8c23ac30ee0b607d77feb6646b64825c0@changeid
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Lecopzer Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Cc: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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