| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Where XHLOCK_{SOFT,HARD} are save/restore points in the xhlocks[] to
ensure the temporal IRQ events don't interact with task state, the
XHLOCK_PROC is a fundament different beast that just happens to share
the interface.
The purpose of XHLOCK_PROC is to annotate independent execution inside
one task. For example workqueues, each work should appear to run in its
own 'pristine' 'task'.
Remove XHLOCK_PROC in favour of its own interface to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Byungchul Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
For understanding how the workload maps to memory channels and hardware
behavior, it's very important to collect address maps with physical
addresses. For example, 3D XPoint access can only be found by filtering
the physical address.
Add a new sample type for physical address.
perf already has a facility to collect data virtual address. This patch
introduces a function to convert the virtual address to physical address.
The function is quite generic and can be extended to any architecture as
long as a virtual address is provided.
- For kernel direct mapping addresses, virt_to_phys is used to convert
the virtual addresses to physical address.
- For user virtual addresses, __get_user_pages_fast is used to walk the
pages tables for user physical address.
- This does not work for vmalloc addresses right now. These are not
resolved, but code to do that could be added.
The new sample type requires collecting the virtual address. The
virtual address will not be output unless SAMPLE_ADDR is applied.
For security, the physical address can only be exposed to root or
privileged user.
Tested-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
I just noticed that hw.itrace_started and hw.config are aliased to the
same location. Now, the PT driver happens to use both, which works out
fine by sheer luck:
- STORE(hw.itrace_start) is ordered before STORE(hw.config), in the
program order, although there are no compiler barriers to ensure that,
- to the perf_log_itrace_start() hw.itrace_start looks set at the same
time as when it is intended to be set because both stores happen in the
same path,
- hw.config is never reset to zero in the PT driver.
Now, the use of hw.config by the PT driver makes more sense (it being a
HW PMU) than messing around with itrace_started, which is an awkward API
to begin with.
This patch replaces hw.itrace_started with an attach_state bit and an
API call for the PMU drivers to use to communicate the condition.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
When running perf on the ftrace:function tracepoint, there is a bug
which can be reproduced by:
perf record -e ftrace:function -a sleep 20 &
perf record -e ftrace:function ls
perf script
ls 10304 [005] 171.853235: ftrace:function:
perf_output_begin
ls 10304 [005] 171.853237: ftrace:function:
perf_output_begin
ls 10304 [005] 171.853239: ftrace:function:
task_tgid_nr_ns
ls 10304 [005] 171.853240: ftrace:function:
task_tgid_nr_ns
ls 10304 [005] 171.853242: ftrace:function:
__task_pid_nr_ns
ls 10304 [005] 171.853244: ftrace:function:
__task_pid_nr_ns
We can see that all the function traces are doubled.
The problem is caused by the inconsistency of the register
function perf_ftrace_event_register() with the probe function
perf_ftrace_function_call(). The former registers one probe
for every perf_event. And the latter handles all perf_events
on the current cpu. So when two perf_events on the current cpu,
the traces of them will be doubled.
So this patch adds an extra parameter "event" for perf_tp_event,
only send sample data to this event when it's not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
While examining the kernel source code, I found a dangerous operation that
could turn into a double-fetch situation (a race condition bug) where the same
userspace memory region are fetched twice into kernel with sanity checks after
the first fetch while missing checks after the second fetch.
1. The first fetch happens in line 9573 get_user(size, &uattr->size).
2. Subsequently the 'size' variable undergoes a few sanity checks and
transformations (line 9577 to 9584).
3. The second fetch happens in line 9610 copy_from_user(attr, uattr, size)
4. Given that 'uattr' can be fully controlled in userspace, an attacker can
race condition to override 'uattr->size' to arbitrary value (say, 0xFFFFFFFF)
after the first fetch but before the second fetch. The changed value will be
copied to 'attr->size'.
5. There is no further checks on 'attr->size' until the end of this function,
and once the function returns, we lose the context to verify that 'attr->size'
conforms to the sanity checks performed in step 2 (line 9577 to 9584).
6. My manual analysis shows that 'attr->size' is not used elsewhere later,
so, there is no working exploit against it right now. However, this could
easily turns to an exploitable one if careless developers start to use
'attr->size' later.
To fix this, override 'attr->size' from the second fetch to the one from the
first fetch, regardless of what is actually copied in.
In this way, it is assured that 'attr->size' is consistent with the checks
performed after the first fetch.
Signed-off-by: Meng Xu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
"err" is set to zero if bpf_map_area_alloc() fails so it means we return
ERR_PTR(0) which is NULL. The caller, find_and_alloc_map(), is not
expecting NULL returns and will oops.
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
After userspace pushes sockets into a sockmap it may not be receiving
data (assuming stream_{parser|verdict} programs are attached). But, it
may still want to manage the socks. A common pattern is to poll/select
for a POLLRDHUP event so we can close the sock.
This patch adds the logic to wake up these listeners.
Also add TCP_SYN_SENT to the list of events to handle. We don't want
to break the connection just because we happen to be in this state.
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
When attaching a program to sockmap we need to check map type
is correct.
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
References to psock must be done inside RCU critical section.
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The addition of map_flags BPF_SOCKMAP_STRPARSER flags was to handle a
specific use case where we want to have BPF parse program disabled on
an entry in a sockmap.
However, Alexei found the API a bit cumbersome and I agreed. Lets
remove the STRPARSER flag and support the use case by allowing socks
to be in multiple maps. This allows users to create two maps one with
programs attached and one without. When socks are added to maps they
now inherit any programs attached to the map. This is a nice
generalization and IMO improves the API.
The API rules are less ambiguous and do not need a flag:
- When a sock is added to a sockmap we have two cases,
i. The sock map does not have any attached programs so
we can add sock to map without inheriting bpf programs.
The sock may exist in 0 or more other maps.
ii. The sock map has an attached BPF program. To avoid duplicate
bpf programs we only add the sock entry if it does not have
an existing strparser/verdict attached, returning -EBUSY if
a program is already attached. Otherwise attach the program
and inherit strparser/verdict programs from the sock map.
This allows for socks to be in a multiple maps for redirects and
inherit a BPF program from a single map.
Also this patch simplifies the logic around BPF_{EXIST|NOEXIST|ANY}
flags. In the original patch I tried to be extra clever and only
update map entries when necessary. Now I've decided the complexity
is not worth it. If users constantly update an entry with the same
sock for no reason (i.e. update an entry without actually changing
any parameters on map or sock) we still do an alloc/release. Using
this and allowing multiple entries of a sock to exist in a map the
logic becomes much simpler.
Note: Now that multiple maps are supported the "maps" pointer called
when a socket is closed becomes a list of maps to remove the sock from.
To keep the map up to date when a sock is added to the sockmap we must
add the map/elem in the list. Likewise when it is removed we must
remove it from the list. This results in searching the per psock list
on delete operation. On TCP_CLOSE events we walk the list and remove
the psock from all map/entry locations. I don't see any perf
implications in this because at most I have a psock in two maps. If
a psock were to be in many maps its possibly this might be noticeable
on delete but I can't think of a reason to dup a psock in many maps.
The sk_callback_lock is used to protect read/writes to the list. This
was convenient because in all locations we were taking the lock
anyways just after working on the list. Also the lock is per sock so
in normal cases we shouldn't see any contention.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
In the initial sockmap API we provided strparser and verdict programs
using a single attach command by extending the attach API with a the
attach_bpf_fd2 field.
However, if we add other programs in the future we will be adding a
field for every new possible type, attach_bpf_fd(3,4,..). This
seems a bit clumsy for an API. So lets push the programs using two
new type fields.
BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_PARSER
BPF_SK_SKB_STREAM_VERDICT
This has the advantage of having a readable name and can easily be
extended in the future.
Updates to samples and sockmap included here also generalize tests
slightly to support upcoming patch for multiple map support.
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
We want the binder fix in here as well for testing and merge issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
|
Tim Chen and Kan Liang have been battling a customer load that shows
extremely long page wakeup lists. The cause seems to be constant NUMA
migration of a hot page that is shared across a lot of threads, but the
actual root cause for the exact behavior has not been found.
Tim has a patch that batches the wait list traversal at wakeup time, so
that we at least don't get long uninterruptible cases where we traverse
and wake up thousands of processes and get nasty latency spikes. That
is likely 4.14 material, but we're still discussing the page waitqueue
specific parts of it.
In the meantime, I've tried to look at making the page wait queues less
expensive, and failing miserably. If you have thousands of threads
waiting for the same page, it will be painful. We'll need to try to
figure out the NUMA balancing issue some day, in addition to avoiding
the excessive spinlock hold times.
That said, having tried to rewrite the page wait queues, I can at least
fix up some of the braindamage in the current situation. In particular:
(a) we don't want to continue walking the page wait list if the bit
we're waiting for already got set again (which seems to be one of
the patterns of the bad load). That makes no progress and just
causes pointless cache pollution chasing the pointers.
(b) we don't want to put the non-locking waiters always on the front of
the queue, and the locking waiters always on the back. Not only is
that unfair, it means that we wake up thousands of reading threads
that will just end up being blocked by the writer later anyway.
Also add a comment about the layout of 'struct wait_page_key' - there is
an external user of it in the cachefiles code that means that it has to
match the layout of 'struct wait_bit_key' in the two first members. It
so happens to match, because 'struct page *' and 'unsigned long *' end
up having the same values simply because the page flags are the first
member in struct page.
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix a timer granularity handling race+bug, which would manifest itself
by spuriously increasing timeouts of some timers (from 1 jiffy to ~500
jiffies in the worst case measured) in certain nohz states"
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
timers: Fix excessive granularity of new timers after a nohz idle
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fix from Ingo Molnar:
"A single fix to not allow nonsensical event groups that result in
kernel warnings"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Fix group {cpu,task} validation
|
|
In comqit fc6eead7c1e2 ("time: Clean up CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW time
handling"), the following code got mistakenly added to the update of the
raw timekeeper:
/* Update the monotonic raw base */
seconds = tk->raw_sec;
nsec = (u32)(tk->tkr_raw.xtime_nsec >> tk->tkr_raw.shift);
tk->tkr_raw.base = ns_to_ktime(seconds * NSEC_PER_SEC + nsec);
Which adds the raw_sec value and the shifted down raw xtime_nsec to the
base value.
But the read function adds the shifted down tk->tkr_raw.xtime_nsec value
another time, The result of this is that ktime_get_raw() users (which are
all internal users) see the raw time move faster then it should (the rate
at which can vary with the current size of tkr_raw.xtime_nsec), which has
resulted in at least problems with graphics rendering performance.
The change tried to match the monotonic base update logic:
seconds = (u64)(tk->xtime_sec + tk->wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec);
nsec = (u32) tk->wall_to_monotonic.tv_nsec;
tk->tkr_mono.base = ns_to_ktime(seconds * NSEC_PER_SEC + nsec);
Which adds the wall_to_monotonic.tv_nsec value, but not the
tk->tkr_mono.xtime_nsec value to the base.
To fix this, simplify the tkr_raw.base accumulation to only accumulate the
raw_sec portion, and do not include the tkr_raw.xtime_nsec portion, which
will be added at read time.
Fixes: fc6eead7c1e2 ("time: Clean up CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW time handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Mentz <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
|
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
There is code duplicated over all architecture's headers for
futex_atomic_op_inuser. Namely op decoding, access_ok check for uaddr,
and comparison of the result.
Remove this duplication and leave up to the arches only the needed
assembly which is now in arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser.
This effectively distributes the Will Deacon's arm64 fix for undefined
behaviour reported by UBSAN to all architectures. The fix was done in
commit 5f16a046f8e1 (arm64: futex: Fix undefined behaviour with
FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT usage). Look there for an example dump.
And as suggested by Thomas, check for negative oparg too, because it was
also reported to cause undefined behaviour report.
Note that s390 removed access_ok check in d12a29703 ("s390/uaccess:
remove pointless access_ok() checks") as access_ok there returns true.
We introduce it back to the helper for the sake of simplicity (it gets
optimized away anyway).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> [s390]
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <[email protected]> [for tile]
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> [core/arm64]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jonas Bonn <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Stafford Horne <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Simek <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Kuo <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
|
kernel/irq/proc.c: In function ‘show_irq_affinity’:
include/linux/cpumask.h:24:29: warning: ‘mask’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
#define cpumask_bits(maskp) ((maskp)->bits)
gcc is silly, but admittedly it can't know that this won't be called with
anything else than the enumerated constants.
Shut up the warning by creating a default clause.
Fixes: 6bc6d4abd22e ("genirq/proc: Use the the accessor to report the effective affinity
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
|
This code generates a Smatch warning:
kernel/irq/irqdomain.c:1511 irq_domain_push_irq()
warn: variable dereferenced before check 'root_irq_data' (see line 1508)
irq_get_irq_data() can return a NULL pointer, but the code dereferences
the returned pointer before checking it.
Move the NULL pointer check before the dereference.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog to be precise and conforming to the instructions
in submitting-patches and added a Fixes tag. Sigh! ]
Fixes: 495c38d3001f ("irqdomain: Add irq_domain_{push,pop}_irq() functions")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Daney <[email protected]>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170825121409.6rfv4vt6ztz2oqkt@mwanda
|
|
kernel/irq/proc.c:69:2-3: Unneeded semicolon
Remove unneeded semicolon.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/semicolon.cocci
Fixes: 0d3f54257dc3 ("genirq: Introduce effective affinity mask")
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170822075053.GA93890@lkp-hsx02
|
|
Currently we unconditionally destroy all sysctl bits and regenerate
them after we've rebuild the domains (even if that rebuild is a
no-op).
And since we unconditionally (re)build the sysctl for all possible
CPUs, onlining all CPUs gets us O(n^2) time. Instead change this to
only rebuild the bits for CPUs we've actually installed new domains
on.
Reported-by: Ofer Levi(SW) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Fix partition_sched_domains() to try and preserve the existing machine
wide domain instead of unconditionally destroying it. We do this by
attempting to allocate the new single domain, only when that fails to
we reuse the fallback_doms.
When using fallback_doms we need to first destroy and then recreate
because both the old and new could be backed by it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Ofer Levi(SW) <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
When disabling cpuset.sched_load_balance we expect to be able to online
CPUs without generating sched_domains. However this is currently
completely broken.
What happens is that we generate the sched_domains and then destroy
them. This is because of the spurious 'default' domain build in
cpuset_update_active_cpus(). That builds a single machine wide domain
and then schedules a work to build the 'real' domains. The work then
finds there are _no_ domains and destroys the lot again.
Furthermore, if there actually were cpusets, building the machine wide
domain is actively wrong, because it would allow tasks to 'escape' their
cpuset. Also I don't think its needed, the scheduler really should
respect the active mask.
Reported-by: Ofer Levi(SW) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Mike provided a better comment for destroy_sched_domain() ...
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Found this issue by kmemleak: the 'sg' and 'sgc' pointers from
__sdt_alloc() might be leaked as each domain holds many groups' ref,
but in destroy_sched_domain(), it only declined the first group ref.
Onlining and offlining a CPU can trigger this leak, and cause OOM.
Reproducer for my 6 CPUs machine:
while true
do
echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu5/online;
echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu5/online;
done
unreferenced object 0xffff88007d772a80 (size 64):
comm "cpuhp/5", pid 39, jiffies 4294719962 (age 35.251s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
c0 22 77 7d 00 88 ff ff 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ."w}............
40 2a 77 7d 00 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 @*w}............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8176525a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff8121efe1>] __kmalloc_node+0xf1/0x280
[<ffffffff810d94a8>] build_sched_domains+0x1e8/0xf20
[<ffffffff810da674>] partition_sched_domains+0x304/0x360
[<ffffffff81139557>] cpuset_update_active_cpus+0x17/0x40
[<ffffffff810bdb2e>] sched_cpu_activate+0xae/0xc0
[<ffffffff810900e0>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x90/0x400
[<ffffffff81090597>] cpuhp_up_callbacks+0x37/0xb0
[<ffffffff81090887>] cpuhp_thread_fun+0xd7/0xf0
[<ffffffff810b37e0>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x110/0x160
[<ffffffff810af5d9>] kthread+0x109/0x140
[<ffffffff81770e45>] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
unreferenced object 0xffff88007d772a40 (size 64):
comm "cpuhp/5", pid 39, jiffies 4294719962 (age 35.251s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 4f 3c fc ff 00 00 00 00 ........O<......
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8176525a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff8121efe1>] __kmalloc_node+0xf1/0x280
[<ffffffff810da16d>] build_sched_domains+0xead/0xf20
[<ffffffff810da674>] partition_sched_domains+0x304/0x360
[<ffffffff81139557>] cpuset_update_active_cpus+0x17/0x40
[<ffffffff810bdb2e>] sched_cpu_activate+0xae/0xc0
[<ffffffff810900e0>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x90/0x400
[<ffffffff81090597>] cpuhp_up_callbacks+0x37/0xb0
[<ffffffff81090887>] cpuhp_thread_fun+0xd7/0xf0
[<ffffffff810b37e0>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x110/0x160
[<ffffffff810af5d9>] kthread+0x109/0x140
[<ffffffff81770e45>] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The new completion/crossrelease annotations interact unfavourable with
the extant flush_work()/flush_workqueue() annotations.
The problem is that when a single work class does:
wait_for_completion(&C)
and
complete(&C)
in different executions, we'll build dependencies like:
lock_map_acquire(W)
complete_acquire(C)
and
lock_map_acquire(W)
complete_release(C)
which results in the dependency chain: W->C->W, which lockdep thinks
spells deadlock, even though there is no deadlock potential since
works are ran concurrently.
One possibility would be to change the work 'lock' to recursive-read,
but that would mean hitting a lockdep limitation on recursive locks.
Also, unconditinoally switching to recursive-read here would fail to
detect the actual deadlock on single-threaded workqueues, which do
have a problem with this.
For now, forcefully disregard these locks for crossrelease.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The flush_work() annotation as introduced by commit:
e159489baa71 ("workqueue: relax lockdep annotation on flush_work()")
hits on the lockdep problem with recursive read locks.
The situation as described is:
Work W1: Work W2: Task:
ARR(Q) ARR(Q) flush_workqueue(Q)
A(W1) A(W2) A(Q)
flush_work(W2) R(Q)
A(W2)
R(W2)
if (special)
A(Q)
else
ARR(Q)
R(Q)
where: A - acquire, ARR - acquire-read-recursive, R - release.
Where under 'special' conditions we want to trigger a lock recursion
deadlock, but otherwise allow the flush_work(). The allowing is done
by using recursive read locks (ARR), but lockdep is broken for
recursive stuff.
However, there appears to be no need to acquire the lock if we're not
'special', so if we remove the 'else' clause things become much
simpler and no longer need the recursion thing at all.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
In an XDP redirect applications using tracepoint xdp:xdp_redirect to
diagnose TX overrun, I noticed perf_swevent_get_recursion_context()
was consuming 2% CPU. This was reduced to 1.85% with this simple
change.
Looking at the annotated asm code, it was clear that the unlikely case
in_nmi() test was chosen (by the compiler) as the most likely
event/branch. This small adjustment makes the compiler (GCC version
7.1.1 20170622 (Red Hat 7.1.1-3)) put in_nmi() as an unlikely branch.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150342256382.16595.986861478681783732.stgit@firesoul
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The exiting/dead task has no PIDs and in this case perf_event_pid/tid()
return zero, change them to return -1 to distinguish this case from
idle threads.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The aux_watermark member of struct ring_buffer represents the period (in
terms of bytes) at which wakeup events should be generated when data is
written to the aux buffer in non-snapshot mode. On hardware that cannot
generate an interrupt when the aux_head reaches an arbitrary wakeup index
(such as ARM SPE), the aux_head sampled from handle->head in
perf_aux_output_{skip,end} may in fact be past the wakeup index. This
can lead to wakeup slowly falling behind the head. For example, consider
the case where hardware can only generate an interrupt on a page-boundary
and the aux buffer is initialised as follows:
// Buffer size is 2 * PAGE_SIZE
rb->aux_head = rb->aux_wakeup = 0
rb->aux_watermark = PAGE_SIZE / 2
following the first perf_aux_output_begin call, the handle is
initialised with:
handle->head = 0
handle->size = 2 * PAGE_SIZE
handle->wakeup = PAGE_SIZE / 2
and the hardware will be programmed to generate an interrupt at
PAGE_SIZE.
When the interrupt is raised, the hardware head will be at PAGE_SIZE,
so calling perf_aux_output_end(handle, PAGE_SIZE) puts the ring buffer
into the following state:
rb->aux_head = PAGE_SIZE
rb->aux_wakeup = PAGE_SIZE / 2
rb->aux_watermark = PAGE_SIZE / 2
and then the next call to perf_aux_output_begin will result in:
handle->head = handle->wakeup = PAGE_SIZE
for which the semantics are unclear and, for a smaller aux_watermark
(e.g. PAGE_SIZE / 4), then the wakeup would in fact be behind head at
this point.
This patch fixes the problem by rounding down the aux_head (as sampled
from the handle) to the nearest aux_watermark boundary when updating
rb->aux_wakeup, therefore taking into account any overruns by the
hardware.
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The aux_head and aux_wakeup members of struct ring_buffer are defined
using the local_t type, despite the fact that they are only accessed via
the perf_aux_output_*() functions, which cannot race with each other for a
given ring buffer.
This patch changes the type of the members to long, so we can avoid
using the local_*() API where it isn't needed.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the
events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group
inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that
these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups.
Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW
context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and
pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this
verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc
elsewhere.
For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint
HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event
that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time.
However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via
event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs
violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them
into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots.
This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings
from arch backends.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu,
int group_fd, unsigned long flags)
{
return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags);
}
char watched_char;
struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT,
.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW,
.bp_addr = (unsigned long)&watched_char,
.bp_len = 1,
.size = sizeof(wp_attr),
};
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int leader, ret;
cpu_set_t cpus;
/*
* Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled.
*/
CPU_ZERO(&cpus);
CPU_SET(0, &cpus);
ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &cpus);
if (ret) {
printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n");
return 1;
}
/* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */
leader = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
if (leader < 0) {
printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader);
return 1;
}
/*
* Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a
* different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to
* schedule.
*/
ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret);
return 1;
} else {
printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n");
}
/*
* Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same
* task, CPU0 only.
*/
do {
ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
} while (ret >= 0);
/*
* Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous
* installation of the follower event.
*/
printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n");
for (;;) {
prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're
moving events.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
commit bbb03029a899 ("strparser: Generalize strparser") added more
function pointers to 'struct strp_callbacks'; however, kcm_attach() was
not updated to initialize them. This could cause the ->lock() and/or
->unlock() function pointers to be set to garbage values, causing a
crash in strp_work().
Fix the bug by moving the callback structs into static memory, so
unspecified members are zeroed. Also constify them while we're at it.
This bug was found by syzkaller, which encountered the following splat:
IP: 0x55
PGD 3b1ca067
P4D 3b1ca067
PUD 3b12f067
PMD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 1194 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4-next-20170811 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: kstrp strp_work
task: ffff88006bb0e480 task.stack: ffff88006bb10000
RIP: 0010:0x55
RSP: 0018:ffff88006bb17540 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88006ce4bd60 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 1ffff1000d9c97bd RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88006ce4bc48
RBP: ffff88006bb17558 R08: ffffffff81467ab2 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88006bb17438 R11: ffff88006bb17940 R12: ffff88006ce4bc48
R13: ffff88003c683018 R14: ffff88006bb17980 R15: ffff88003c683000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000055 CR3: 000000003c145000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
process_one_work+0xbf3/0x1bc0 kernel/workqueue.c:2098
worker_thread+0x223/0x1860 kernel/workqueue.c:2233
kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Code: Bad RIP value.
RIP: 0x55 RSP: ffff88006bb17540
CR2: 0000000000000055
---[ end trace f0e4920047069cee ]---
Here is a C reproducer (requires CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y and
CONFIG_AF_KCM=y):
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/kcm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static const struct bpf_insn bpf_insns[3] = {
{ .code = 0xb7 }, /* BPF_MOV64_IMM(0, 0) */
{ .code = 0x95 }, /* BPF_EXIT_INSN() */
};
static const union bpf_attr bpf_attr = {
.prog_type = 1,
.insn_cnt = 2,
.insns = (uintptr_t)&bpf_insns,
.license = (uintptr_t)"",
};
int main(void)
{
int bpf_fd = syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_LOAD,
&bpf_attr, sizeof(bpf_attr));
int inet_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
int kcm_fd = socket(AF_KCM, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
ioctl(kcm_fd, SIOCKCMATTACH,
&(struct kcm_attach) { .fd = inet_fd, .bpf_fd = bpf_fd });
}
Fixes: bbb03029a899 ("strparser: Generalize strparser")
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Tom Herbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Various bug fixes:
- Two small memory leaks in error paths.
- A missed return error code on an error path.
- A fix to check the tracing ring buffer CPU when it doesn't exist
(caused by setting maxcpus on the command line that is less than
the actual number of CPUs, and then onlining them manually).
- A fix to have the reset of boot tracers called by lateinit_sync()
instead of just lateinit(). As some of the tracers register via
lateinit(), and if the clear happens before the tracer is
registered, it will never start even though it was told to via the
kernel command line"
* tag 'trace-v4.13-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix freeing of filter in create_filter() when set_str is false
tracing: Fix kmemleak in tracing_map_array_free()
ftrace: Check for null ret_stack on profile function graph entry function
ring-buffer: Have ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() return error on offline CPU
tracing: Missing error code in tracer_alloc_buffers()
tracing: Call clear_boot_tracer() at lateinit_sync
|
|
The memory_pressure control file was incorrectly set up without
a private value (0, by default). As a result, this control
file was treated like memory_migrate on read. By adding back the
FILE_MEMORY_PRESSURE private value, the correct memory pressure value
will be returned.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7dbdb199d3bf ("cgroup: replace cftype->mode with CFTYPE_WORLD_WRITABLE")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
|
|
Performing the following task with kmemleak enabled:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/irq/irq_handler_entry/
# echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq >' > trigger
# echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq > 31' > trigger
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff8800b9290308 (size 32):
comm "bash", pid 1114, jiffies 4294848451 (age 141.139s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81cef5aa>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff81357938>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x290
[<ffffffff81261c09>] create_filter_start.constprop.28+0x99/0x940
[<ffffffff812639c9>] create_filter+0xa9/0x160
[<ffffffff81263bdc>] create_event_filter+0xc/0x10
[<ffffffff812655e5>] set_trigger_filter+0xe5/0x210
[<ffffffff812660c4>] event_enable_trigger_func+0x324/0x490
[<ffffffff812652e2>] event_trigger_write+0x1a2/0x260
[<ffffffff8138cf87>] __vfs_write+0xd7/0x380
[<ffffffff8138f421>] vfs_write+0x101/0x260
[<ffffffff8139187b>] SyS_write+0xab/0x130
[<ffffffff81cfd501>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
The function create_filter() is passed a 'filterp' pointer that gets
allocated, and if "set_str" is true, it is up to the caller to free it, even
on error. The problem is that the pointer is not freed by create_filter()
when set_str is false. This is a bug, and it is not up to the caller to free
the filter on error if it doesn't care about the string.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 38b78eb85 ("tracing: Factorize filter creation")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
|
|
kmemleak reported the below leak when I was doing clear of the hist
trigger. With this patch, the kmeamleak is gone.
unreferenced object 0xffff94322b63d760 (size 32):
comm "bash", pid 1522, jiffies 4403687962 (age 2442.311s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 01 00 00 04 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 ................
10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 a8 7a f2 31 94 ff ff ..........z.1...
backtrace:
[<ffffffff9e96c27a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff9e424cba>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xca/0x1d0
[<ffffffff9e377736>] tracing_map_array_alloc+0x26/0x140
[<ffffffff9e261be0>] kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
[<ffffffff9e38b935>] create_hist_data+0x535/0x750
[<ffffffff9e38bd47>] event_hist_trigger_func+0x1f7/0x420
[<ffffffff9e38893d>] event_trigger_write+0xfd/0x1a0
[<ffffffff9e44dfc7>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x170
[<ffffffff9e44f552>] vfs_write+0xb2/0x1b0
[<ffffffff9e450b85>] SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
[<ffffffff9e203857>] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x150
[<ffffffff9e977ce7>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
unreferenced object 0xffff9431f27aa880 (size 128):
comm "bash", pid 1522, jiffies 4403687962 (age 2442.311s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 8c 2a 32 94 ff ff 00 f0 8b 2a 32 94 ff ff ...*2......*2...
00 e0 8b 2a 32 94 ff ff 00 d0 8b 2a 32 94 ff ff ...*2......*2...
backtrace:
[<ffffffff9e96c27a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff9e425348>] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x220
[<ffffffff9e3777c1>] tracing_map_array_alloc+0xb1/0x140
[<ffffffff9e261be0>] kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50
[<ffffffff9e38b935>] create_hist_data+0x535/0x750
[<ffffffff9e38bd47>] event_hist_trigger_func+0x1f7/0x420
[<ffffffff9e38893d>] event_trigger_write+0xfd/0x1a0
[<ffffffff9e44dfc7>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x170
[<ffffffff9e44f552>] vfs_write+0xb2/0x1b0
[<ffffffff9e450b85>] SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
[<ffffffff9e203857>] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x150
[<ffffffff9e977ce7>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 08d43a5fa063 ("tracing: Add lock-free tracing_map")
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
|
|
There's a small race when function graph shutsdown and the calling of the
registered function graph entry callback. The callback must not reference
the task's ret_stack without first checking that it is not NULL. Note, when
a ret_stack is allocated for a task, it stays allocated until the task exits.
The problem here, is that function_graph is shutdown, and a new task was
created, which doesn't have its ret_stack allocated. But since some of the
functions are still being traced, the callbacks can still be called.
The normal function_graph code handles this, but starting with commit
8861dd303c ("ftrace: Access ret_stack->subtime only in the function
profiler") the profiler code references the ret_stack on function entry, but
doesn't check if it is NULL first.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196611
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 8861dd303c ("ftrace: Access ret_stack->subtime only in the function profiler")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
|
|
When a timer base is idle, it is forwarded when a new timer is added
to ensure that granularity does not become excessive. When not idle,
the timer tick is expected to increment the base.
However there are several problems:
- If an existing timer is modified, the base is forwarded only after
the index is calculated.
- The base is not forwarded by add_timer_on.
- There is a window after a timer is restarted from a nohz idle, after
it is marked not-idle and before the timer tick on this CPU, where a
timer may be added but the ancient base does not get forwarded.
These result in excessive granularity (a 1 jiffy timeout can blow out
to 100s of jiffies), which cause the rcu lockup detector to trigger,
among other things.
Fix this by keeping track of whether the timer base has been idle
since it was last run or forwarded, and if so then forward it before
adding a new timer.
There is still a case where mod_timer optimises the case of a pending
timer mod with the same expiry time, where the timer can see excessive
granularity relative to the new, shorter interval. A comment is added,
but it's not changed because it is an important fastpath for
networking.
This has been tested and found to fix the RCU softlockup messages.
Testing was also done with tracing to measure requested versus
achieved wakeup latencies for all non-deferrable timers in an idle
system (with no lockup watchdogs running). Wakeup latency relative to
absolute latency is calculated (note this suffers from round-up skew
at low absolute times) and analysed:
max avg std
upstream 506.0 1.20 4.68
patched 2.0 1.08 0.15
The bug was noticed due to the lockup detector Kconfig changes
dropping it out of people's .configs and resulting in larger base
clk skew When the lockup detectors are enabled, no CPU can go idle for
longer than 4 seconds, which limits the granularity errors.
Sub-optimal timer behaviour is observable on a smaller scale in that
case:
max avg std
upstream 9.0 1.05 0.19
patched 2.0 1.04 0.11
Fixes: Fixes: a683f390b93f ("timers: Forward the wheel clock whenever possible")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
Tested-by: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
No need to test for it in fast-path, every dev in bpf_dtab_netdev
is guaranteed to be non-NULL, otherwise dev_map_update_elem() will
fail in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The liveness tracking algorithm is quite subtle; add comments to explain it.
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The optimisation it does is broken when the 'new' register value has a
variable offset and the 'old' was constant. I broke it with my pointer
types unification (see Fixes tag below), before which the 'new' value
would have type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ and would thus not compare equal;
other changes in that patch mean that its original behaviour (ignore
min/max values) cannot be restored.
Tests on a sample set of cilium programs show no change in count of
processed instructions.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The fact that writes occurred in reaching the continuation state does
not screen off its reads from us, because we're not really its parent.
So detect 'not really the parent' in do_propagate_liveness, and ignore
write marks in that case.
Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning")
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|