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Adds support for fan curves defined for the middle fan which
is available on some ASUS ROG laptops.
Signed-off-by: Luke D. Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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Some newer ASUS ROG laptops now have a middle/center fan in addition
to the CPU and GPU fans. This new fan typically blows across the
heatpipes and VRMs betweent eh CPU and GPU.
This commit exposes that fan to PWM control plus showing RPM.
Signed-off-by: Luke D. Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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Expose a WMI method in sysfs platform for showing which connected
charger the laptop is currently using.
Signed-off-by: Luke D. Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
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This adds the infrastructure for an execution context for GEM buffers
which is similar to the existing TTMs execbuf util and intended to replace
it in the long term.
The basic functionality is that we abstracts the necessary loop to lock
many different GEM buffers with automated deadlock and duplicate handling.
v2: drop xarray and use dynamic resized array instead, the locking
overhead is unnecessary and measurable.
v3: drop duplicate tracking, radeon is really the only one needing that.
v4: fixes issues pointed out by Danilo, some typos in comments and a
helper for lock arrays of GEM objects.
v5: some suggestions by Boris Brezillon, especially just use one retry
macro, drop loop in prepare_array, use flags instead of bool
v6: minor changes suggested by Thomas, Boris and Danilo
v7: minor typos pointed out by checkpatch.pl fixed
Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
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Export this function to work in pair with 'nand_status_op()' which is
already exported.
Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/[email protected]
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Merge series from Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>:
The first three patches moves intlog10() to be available in entire
kernel. The last one removes copy of it in one driver. Besides already
good Lines of Code (LoC) statistics the upcoming users, if any, can
utilize the exported functions.
The series can be routed via ASoC tree (as Mauro suggested).
Note, int_log.h is separated from math.h due to licensing.
I dunno if we can mix two in a single header file. In any
case we may do it later on.
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When underlying device is removed mtd core will crash
in case user space is holding open handle.
Need to use proper refcounting so device is release
only when has no users.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/[email protected]
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By introducing support for ->fill_link_info to the perf_event link, users
gain the ability to inspect it using `bpftool link show`. While the current
approach involves accessing this information via `bpftool perf show`,
consolidating link information for all link types in one place offers
greater convenience. Additionally, this patch extends support to the
generic perf event, which is not currently accommodated by
`bpftool perf show`. While only the perf type and config are exposed to
userspace, other attributes such as sample_period and sample_freq are
ignored. It's important to note that if kptr_restrict is not permitted, the
probed address will not be exposed, maintaining security measures.
A new enum bpf_perf_event_type is introduced to help the user understand
which struct is relevant.
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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To avoid returning uninitialized or random values when querying the file
descriptor (fd) and accessing probe_addr, it is necessary to clear the
variable prior to its use.
Fixes: 41bdc4b40ed6 ("bpf: introduce bpf subcommand BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY")
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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With the addition of support for fill_link_info to the kprobe_multi link,
users will gain the ability to inspect it conveniently using the
`bpftool link show`. This enhancement provides valuable information to the
user, including the count of probed functions and their respective
addresses. It's important to note that if the kptr_restrict setting is not
permitted, the probed address will not be exposed, ensuring security.
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Sections .text..refcount were previously used to hold an error path code
for fast refcount overflow protection on x86, see commit 7a46ec0e2f48
("locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow
protection") and commit 564c9cc84e2a ("locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Use
unique .text section for refcount exceptions").
The code was replaced and removed in commit fb041bb7c0a9
("locking/refcount: Consolidate implementations of refcount_t") and no
sections .text..refcount are present since then.
Remove then a relic referencing these sections from TEXT_TEXT to avoid
confusing people, like me. This is a non-functional change.
Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
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The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which require some core mm changes to function
properly.
One of the properties is that the shadow stack pointer (SSP), which is a
CPU register that points to the shadow stack like the stack pointer points
to the stack, can't be pointing outside of the 32 bit address space when
the CPU is executing in 32 bit mode. It is desirable to prevent executing
in 32 bit mode when shadow stack is enabled because the kernel can't easily
support 32 bit signals.
On x86 it is possible to transition to 32 bit mode without any special
interaction with the kernel, by doing a "far call" to a 32 bit segment.
So the shadow stack implementation can use this address space behavior
as a feature, by enforcing that shadow stack memory is always mapped
outside of the 32 bit address space. This way userspace will trigger a
general protection fault which will in turn trigger a segfault if it
tries to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled.
This provides a clean error generating border for the user if they try
attempt to do 32 bit mode shadow stack, rather than leave the kernel in a
half working state for userspace to be surprised by.
So to allow future shadow stack enabling patches to map shadow stacks
out of the 32 bit address space, introduce MAP_ABOVE4G. The behavior
is pretty much like MAP_32BIT, except that it has the opposite address
range. The are a few differences though.
If both MAP_32BIT and MAP_ABOVE4G are provided, the kernel will use the
MAP_ABOVE4G behavior. Like MAP_32BIT, MAP_ABOVE4G is ignored in a 32 bit
syscall.
Since the default search behavior is top down, the normal kaslr base can
be used for MAP_ABOVE4G. This is unlike MAP_32BIT which has to add its
own randomization in the bottom up case.
For MAP_32BIT, only the bottom up search path is used. For MAP_ABOVE4G
both are potentially valid, so both are used. In the bottomup search
path, the default behavior is already consistent with MAP_ABOVE4G since
mmap base should be above 4GB.
Without MAP_ABOVE4G, the shadow stack will already normally be above 4GB.
So without introducing MAP_ABOVE4G, trying to transition to 32 bit mode
with shadow stack enabled would usually segfault anyway. This is already
pretty decent guard rails. But the addition of MAP_ABOVE4G is some small
complexity spent to make it make it more complete.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-21-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
One sharp edge is that PTEs that are both Write=0 and Dirty=1 are
treated as shadow by the CPU, but this combination used to be created by
the kernel on x86. Previous patches have changed the kernel to now avoid
creating these PTEs unless they are for shadow stack memory. In case any
missed corners of the kernel are still creating PTEs like this for
non-shadow stack memory, and to catch any re-introductions of the logic,
warn if any shadow stack PTEs (Write=0, Dirty=1) are found in non-shadow
stack VMAs when they are being zapped. This won't catch transient cases
but should have decent coverage.
In order to check if a PTE is shadow stack in core mm code, add two arch
breakouts arch_check_zapped_pte/pmd(). This will allow shadow stack
specific code to be kept in arch/x86.
Only do the check if shadow stack is supported by the CPU and configured
because in rare cases older CPUs may write Dirty=1 to a Write=0 CPU on
older CPUs. This check is handled in pte_shstk()/pmd_shstk().
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-18-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
The architecture of shadow stack constrains the ability of userspace to
move the shadow stack pointer (SSP) in order to prevent corrupting or
switching to other shadow stacks. The RSTORSSP instruction can move the
SSP to different shadow stacks, but it requires a specially placed token
in order to do this. However, the architecture does not prevent
incrementing the stack pointer to wander onto an adjacent shadow stack. To
prevent this in software, enforce guard pages at the beginning of shadow
stack VMAs, such that there will always be a gap between adjacent shadow
stacks.
Make the gap big enough so that no userspace SSP changing operations
(besides RSTORSSP), can move the SSP from one stack to the next. The
SSP can be incremented or decremented by CALL, RET and INCSSP. CALL and
RET can move the SSP by a maximum of 8 bytes, at which point the shadow
stack would be accessed.
The INCSSP instruction can also increment the shadow stack pointer. It
is the shadow stack analog of an instruction like:
addq $0x80, %rsp
However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp and
INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the memory
of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be thought of
as acting like this:
READ_ONCE(ssp); // read+discard top element on stack
ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stack
READ_ONCE(ssp-8); // read+discard last popped stack element
The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before it
would read the memory. Therefore, a single page gap will be enough to
prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack, since
it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a fault.
This could be accomplished by using VM_GROWSDOWN, but this has a
downside. The behavior would allow shadow stacks to grow, which is
unneeded and adds a strange difference to how most regular stacks work.
In the maple tree code, there is some logic for retrying the unmapped
area search if a guard gap is violated. This retry should happen for
shadow stack guard gap violations as well. This logic currently only
checks for VM_GROWSDOWN for start gaps. Since shadow stacks also have
a start gap as well, create an new define VM_STARTGAP_FLAGS to hold
all the VM flag bits that have start gaps, and make mmap use it.
Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-17-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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New hardware extensions implement support for shadow stack memory, such
as x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Add a new VM flag to
identify these areas, for example, to be used to properly indicate shadow
stack PTEs to the hardware.
Shadow stack VMA creation will be tightly controlled and limited to
anonymous memory to make the implementation simpler and since that is all
that is required. The solution will rely on pte_mkwrite() to create the
shadow stack PTEs, so it will not be required for vm_get_page_prot() to
learn how to create shadow stack memory. For this reason document that
VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be mixed with VM_SHARED.
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-15-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function
properly.
Future patches will introduce a new VM flag VM_SHADOW_STACK that will be
VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5. VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 through VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 are
bits 32-36, and bit 37 is the unrelated VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT. For the sake
of order, make all VM_HIGH_ARCH_BITs stay together by moving
VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38. This will allow VM_SHADOW_STACK to be
introduced as 37.
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-6-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap(). Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-5-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). Future patches will make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.
But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.
So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.
Previous work pte_mkwrite() renamed pte_mkwrite_novma() and converted
callers that don't have a VMA were to use pte_mkwrite_novma(). So now
change pte_mkwrite() to take a VMA and change the remaining callers to
pass a VMA. Apply the same changes for pmd_mkwrite().
No functional change.
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-4-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow
stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires
some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable,
but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE
bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code
will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that
call pte_mkwrite(). The goal is to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so
that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular
writable or shadow stack mappings.
But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of
each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some
are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some
pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA.
So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be
renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite()
added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can
be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers
can be changed to take/pass a VMA.
Start the process by renaming pte_mkwrite() to pte_mkwrite_novma() and
adding the pte_mkwrite() wrapper in linux/pgtable.h. Apply the same
pattern for pmd_mkwrite(). Since not all archs have a pmd_mkwrite_novma(),
create a new arch config HAS_HUGE_PAGE that can be used to tell if
pmd_mkwrite() should be defined. Otherwise in the !HAS_HUGE_PAGE cases the
compiler would not be able to find pmd_mkwrite_novma().
No functional change.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZjSu7c9sFYZb3q04108stgHff2wfbokGCCgW7riz+8Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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Export symbols for MediaTek UFS driver's PM flow and IRQ handler.
Signed-off-by: Po-Wen Kao <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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This change reduces the number of parentheses that are required in the
definition of this function and also when using this function.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Avri Altman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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The next patch defines a very similar interface, which I copied from
this definition. Since I'm touching it anyway I don't see any reason
not to just go fix this one up.
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <ef644540cfd8717f30bcc5e4c32f06c80b6c156e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
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This attribute has never been used, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Pull in the currently staged SCSI fixes for 6.5.
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Fix
- spelling typos
- capitalization of acronyms
in the comments.
While at it, fix the multi-line comment style.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Rename SPI_MASTER_GPIO_SS to SPI_CONTROLLER_GPIO_SS and
convert the users to SPI_CONTROLLER_GPIO_SS to follow
the new naming shema.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Convert the users from SPI_MASTER_MUST_TX and/or SPI_MASTER_MUST_RX
to SPI_CONTROLLER_MUST_TX and/or SPI_CONTROLLER_MUST_RX respectively
and kill the not used anymore definitions.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Convert the users from SPI_MASTER_NO_TX and/or SPI_MASTER_NO_RX
to SPI_CONTROLLER_NO_TX and/or SPI_CONTROLLER_NO_RX respectively
and kill the not used anymore definitions.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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Boris needs 6.5-rc1 in drm-misc-fixes to prevent a conflict.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]>
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Before removing checkpoint buffer from the t_checkpoint_list, we have to
check both BH_Dirty and BH_Lock bits together to distinguish buffers
have not been or were being written back. But __cp_buffer_busy() checks
them separately, it first check lock state and then check dirty, the
window between these two checks could be raced by writing back
procedure, which locks buffer and clears buffer dirty before I/O
completes. So it cannot guarantee checkpointing buffers been written
back to disk if some error happens later. Finally, it may clean
checkpoint transactions and lead to inconsistent filesystem.
jbd2_journal_forget() and __journal_try_to_free_buffer() also have the
same problem (journal_unmap_buffer() escape from this issue since it's
running under the buffer lock), so fix them through introducing a new
helper to try holding the buffer lock and remove really clean buffer.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217490
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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journal_clean_one_cp_list() and journal_shrink_one_cp_list() are almost
the same, so merge them into journal_shrink_one_cp_list(), remove the
nr_to_scan parameter, always scan and try to free the whole checkpoint
list.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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Since t_checkpoint_io_list was stop using in jbd2_log_do_checkpoint()
now, it's time to remove the whole t_checkpoint_io_list logic.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
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rethook_free()
Ensure running fprobe_exit_handler() has finished before
calling rethook_free() in the unregister_fprobe() so that caller can free
the fprobe right after unregister_fprobe().
unregister_fprobe() ensured that all running fprobe_entry/exit_handler()
have finished by calling unregister_ftrace_function() which synchronizes
RCU. But commit 5f81018753df ("fprobe: Release rethook after the ftrace_ops
is unregistered") changed to call rethook_free() after
unregister_ftrace_function(). So call rethook_stop() to make rethook
disabled before unregister_ftrace_function() and ensure it again.
Here is the possible code flow that can call the exit handler after
unregister_fprobe().
------
CPU1 CPU2
call unregister_fprobe(fp)
...
__fprobe_handler()
rethook_hook() on probed function
unregister_ftrace_function()
return from probed function
rethook hooks
find rh->handler == fprobe_exit_handler
call fprobe_exit_handler()
rethook_free():
set rh->handler = NULL;
return from unreigster_fprobe;
call fp->exit_handler() <- (*)
------
(*) At this point, the exit handler is called after returning from
unregister_fprobe().
This fixes it as following;
------
CPU1 CPU2
call unregister_fprobe()
...
rethook_stop():
set rh->handler = NULL;
__fprobe_handler()
rethook_hook() on probed function
unregister_ftrace_function()
return from probed function
rethook hooks
find rh->handler == NULL
return from rethook
rethook_free()
return from unreigster_fprobe;
------
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/168873859949.156157.13039240432299335849.stgit@devnote2/
Fixes: 5f81018753df ("fprobe: Release rethook after the ftrace_ops is unregistered")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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Based on commit c4f135d643823a86 ("workqueue: Wrap flush_workqueue() using
a macro"), all in-tree users stopped flushing system-wide workqueues.
Therefore, start emitting runtime message so that all out-of-tree users
will understand that they need to update their code.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
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RISC-V has an extended form of mapping symbols that we use to encode
the ISA when it changes in the middle of an ELF. This trips up modpost
as a build failure, I haven't yet verified it yet but I believe the
kallsyms difference should result in stacks looking sane again.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
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Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM
infrastructure. Keep the existing behavior of including in the HMAC
calculation only the first xattr provided by LSMs.
Changing the evm_inode_init_security() definition requires passing the
xattr array allocated by security_inode_init_security(), and the number of
xattrs filled by previously invoked LSMs.
Use the newly introduced lsm_get_xattr_slot() to position EVM correctly in
the xattrs array, like a regular LSM, and to increment the number of filled
slots. For now, the LSM infrastructure allocates enough xattrs slots to
store the EVM xattr, without using the reservation mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
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Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr
and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata.
Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security
blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the
lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it
needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should
allocate.
Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full
xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current
number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter
would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by
other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM
requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized).
Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the
number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes
structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of
filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr
slot to fill.
Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and
initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the
former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the
description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the
inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and
fill the reserved slots in the xattr array.
Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is
done only in case of successful memory allocation.
Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook
from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook
conventions.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
[PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
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Sorting headers alphabetically helps locating duplicates, and
make it easier to figure out where to insert new headers.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit f16a0b4d0f0edd7b78a332fcf507be2187fac21e
Version 20230628.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/f16a0b4d
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit 2eded5a6a13d892b7dc3be6096e7b1e8d4407600
Update RHCT table with below details.
1) Add additional structure to describe the Cache Management
Operation (CMO) related information.
2) Add structure to describe MMU type.
3) Convert the current reserved field to flags and define
a flag to indicate timer capability.
This codefirst ECR is approved by UEFI forum and will
be part of next ACPI spec version.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/2eded5a6
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit 8c048cee4ea7b9ded8db3e1b3b9c14e21e084a2c
This adds 3 different external interrupt controller
definitions in MADT for RISC-V.
1) RISC-V PLIC is a platform interrupt controller for
handling wired interrupt in a RISC-V systems.
2) RISC-V IMSIC is MSI interrupt controller to
support MSI interrupts.
3) RISC-V APLIC has dual functionality. First it can
act like PLIC and direct all wired interrupts to
the CPU which doesn't have MSI controller. Second,
when the CPU has MSI controller (IMSIC), it will
act as a converter from wired interrupts to MSI.
Update the existing RINTC structure also to support
these external interrupt controllers.
This codefirst ECR is approved by UEFI forum and will
be part of next ACPI spec version.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/8c048cee
Signed-off-by: Haibo, Xu <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Haibo, Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sunil V L <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit be56820b03d8aeabfa6709c4d99bf1711afe7ef1
Replace magic number with a define. Linux kernel code will utilize this
define.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/be56820b
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit 32a50922b66a9e288b9a9b4740de86a542668a43
ACPI_CEDT_DSMAS_NON_VOLATILE -> ACPI_CDAT_DSMAS_NON_VOLATILE
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/32a50922
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit dc6fd1d12903015726a8a6f87f63e86141576a68
The GED device is described by a _HID of ACPI0013.
This code traverses the namespace identifying all GED devices.
For each GED device in the namespace we record 1) the Interrupt objects
and the _EVT method.
This information is used when an interrupt is simulate.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/dc6fd1d1
Signed-off-by: Jose Marinho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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It's no longer used. While in there, also update the comment as to why
it can coexist with the rb_node.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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As per NVMe command set specification 1.0c Storage tag size is 7 bits.
Fixes: 4020aad85c67 ("nvme: add support for enhanced metadata")
Signed-off-by: Ankit Kumar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
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... instead of using a one-second polling timer.
Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit c71a12dfc66593fa9730c62a519161c4a7fca9f6
remove SEEK_SET/SEEK_END duplicate macro on zephyr header which through
error while run zephyr CI jobs.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/c71a12df
Signed-off-by: Najumon B.A <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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ACPICA commit aea0a5cfce262ce2ab16fd96d87c12cf5e756380
We're storing a persistent pointer to an ephemeral local variable
which technically is a dangling pointer and the compiler is correct.
However, since we never indirect the pointer, this is a safe
operation and we can suppress the warning.
Also, some C run-times (like MUSL) aren't including <stdint.h>
indirectly so we must include it explicitly or we won't have the
type definition for uintptr_t.
Fixes issue #867.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/aea0a5cf
Signed-off-by: Philip Prindeville <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
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The interface for fcntl expects the argument passed for the command
F_DIRNOTIFY to be of type int. The current code wrongly treats it as
a long. In order to avoid access to undefined bits, we should explicitly
cast the argument to int.
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <[email protected]>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: David Laight <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luca Vizzarro <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
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