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path: root/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
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2019-08-09fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch codeThiago Jung Bauermann1-1/+0
Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense. To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c. Also, remove the export for sev_active() since it's only used in files that won't be built as modules. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lianbo Jiang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-08-09x86, s390/mm: Move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86-specific headerThiago Jung Bauermann1-13/+1
Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86's <asm/mem_encrypt.h>. Also remove the export for sme_active() since it's only used in files that won't be built as modules. sme_me_mask on the other hand is used in arch/x86/kvm/svm.c (via __sme_set() and __psp_pa()) which can be built as a module so its export needs to stay. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-06-19treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500Thomas Gleixner1-4/+1
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation # extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
2017-11-07x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supportTom Lendacky1-2/+5
Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is running with SEV active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2017-09-07x86/mm: Make the SME mask a u64Borislav Petkov1-4/+9
The SME encryption mask is for masking 64-bit pagetable entries. It being an unsigned long works fine on X86_64 but on 32-bit builds in truncates bits leading to Xen guests crashing very early. And regardless, the whole SME mask handling shouldnt've leaked into 32-bit because SME is X86_64-only feature. So, first make the mask u64. And then, add trivial 32-bit versions of the __sme_* macros so that nothing happens there. Reported-and-tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas <[email protected]> Fixes: 21729f81ce8a ("x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2017-07-18x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryptionTom Lendacky1-0/+8
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot() macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask. The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption mask from the page attribute. Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current __va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled for that physical location or not. Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active, this function: - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings with the encryption mask. - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask. - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask applied. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2017-07-18x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processingTom Lendacky1-0/+5
Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME). Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption. The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2017-07-18x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supportTom Lendacky1-0/+35
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent patches to mark pages as encrypted. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Larry Woodman <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>