| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
Replace all GPL license blurbs with an equivalent SPDX header (most
files are GPLv2, some are GPLv2+). While at it, drop some outdated
header changelogs as well.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Graf <[email protected]>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeffrey Hugo <[email protected]>
Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform.
Note that part of drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c is duplicated
by this patch, only in this case, it runs in the context of the kernel
proper rather than UEFI boot context. The reason for the duplication is
that maintaining the original code to run correctly on ARM/arm64 as well
as on all the quirky x86 firmware we support is enough of a burden as it
is, and adding the x86/Xen execution context to that mix just so we can
reuse a single routine just isn't worth it.
[ardb: explain rationale for code duplication]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Now that we unambiguously build the entire kernel with -fshort-wchar,
it is no longer necessary to open code efi_char16_t[] initializers as
arrays of characters, and we can move to the L"xxx" notation instead.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
gcc-7 shows these harmless warnings:
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:19:27: error: duplicate 'const' declaration specifier [-Werror=duplicate-decl-specifier]
static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:22:27: error: duplicate 'const' declaration specifier [-Werror=duplicate-decl-specifier]
Removing one of the specifiers gives us the expected behavior.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: de8cb458625c ("efi: Get and store the secure boot status")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The EFI stub currently prints a number of diagnostic messages that do
not carry a lot of information. Since these prints are not controlled
by 'loglevel' or other command line parameters, and since they appear on
the EFI framebuffer as well (if enabled), it would be nice if we could
turn them off.
So let's add support for the 'quiet' command line parameter in the stub,
and disable the non-error prints if it is passed.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
The newly refactored code that infers the firmware's Secure Boot state
prints the following error when the EFI variable 'SecureBoot' does not
exist:
EFI stub: ERROR: Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.
However, this variable is only guaranteed to be defined on a system that
is Secure Boot capable to begin with, and so it is not an error if it is
missing. So report Secure Boot as being disabled in this case, without
printing any error messages.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
A user can manually tell the shim boot loader to disable validation of
images it loads. When a user does this, it creates a UEFI variable called
MokSBState that does not have the runtime attribute set. Given that the
user explicitly disabled validation, we can honor that and not enable
secure boot mode if that variable is set.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
|
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the ARM stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot
loader or kexec. This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new
kernel.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|