| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Remove the late "lpage is disallowed" check from set_spte() now that the
initial check is performed after acquiring mmu_lock. Fold the guts of
the remaining helper, __mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(), into
kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust() to eliminate the unnecessary slot !NULL check.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Fold max_mapping_level() into kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust() now that HugeTLB
mappings are handled in kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(), i.e. there isn't a
need to pre-calculate the max mapping level. Co-locating all hugepage
checks eliminates a memslot lookup, at the cost of performing the
__mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() checks while holding mmu_lock.
The latency of lpage_is_disallowed() is likely negligible relative to
the rest of the code run while holding mmu_lock, and can be offset to
some extent by eliminating the mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() check in
set_spte() in a future patch. Eliminating the check in set_spte() is
made possible by performing the initial lpage_is_disallowed() checks
while holding mmu_lock.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Zap any compound page, e.g. THP or HugeTLB pages, when zapping sptes
that can potentially be converted to huge sptes after disabling dirty
logging on the associated memslot. Note, this approach could result in
false positives, e.g. if a random compound page is mapped into the
guest, but mapping non-huge compound pages into the guest is far from
the norm, and toggling dirty logging is not a frequent operation.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove logic to retrieve the original gfn now that HugeTLB mappings are
are identified in FNAME(fetch), i.e. FNAME(page_fault) no longer adjusts
the level or gfn.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove KVM's HugeTLB specific logic and instead rely on walking the host
page tables (already done for THP) to identify HugeTLB mappings.
Eliminating the HugeTLB-only logic avoids taking mmap_sem and calling
find_vma() for all hugepage compatible page faults, and simplifies KVM's
page fault code by consolidating all hugepage adjustments into a common
helper.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove fast_page_fault()'s optimization to stop the shadow walk if the
iterator level drops below the intended map level. The intended map
level is only acccurate for HugeTLB mappings (THP mappings are detected
after fast_page_fault()), i.e. it's not required for correctness, and
a future patch will also move HugeTLB mapping detection to after
fast_page_fault().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Explicitly walk the host page tables to identify THP mappings instead
of relying solely on the metadata in struct page. This sets the stage
for using a common method of identifying huge mappings regardless of the
underlying implementation (HugeTLB vs THB vs DAX), and hopefully avoids
the pitfalls of relying on metadata to identify THP mappings, e.g. see
commit 169226f7e0d2 ("mm: thp: handle page cache THP correctly in
PageTransCompoundMap") and the need for KVM to explicitly check for a
THP compound page. KVM will also naturally work with 1gb THP pages, if
they are ever supported.
Walking the tables for THP mappings is likely marginally slower than
querying metadata, but a future patch will reuse the walk to identify
HugeTLB mappings, at which point eliminating the existing VMA lookup for
HugeTLB will make this a net positive.
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Barret Rhoden <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Refactor transparent_hugepage_adjust() in preparation for walking the
host page tables to identify hugepage mappings, initially for THP pages,
and eventualy for HugeTLB and DAX-backed pages as well. The latter
cases support 1gb pages, i.e. the adjustment logic needs access to the
max allowed level.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Add a helper, lookup_address_in_mm(), to traverse the page tables of a
given mm struct. KVM will use the helper to retrieve the host mapping
level, e.g. 4k vs. 2mb vs. 1gb, of a compound (or DAX-backed) page
without having to resort to implementation specific metadata. E.g. KVM
currently uses different logic for HugeTLB vs. THP, and would add a
third variant for DAX-backed files.
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Use kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva() when retrieving the host page size so that the
correct set of memslots is used when handling x86 page faults in SMM.
Fixes: 54bf36aac520 ("KVM: x86: use vcpu-specific functions to read/write/translate GFNs")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Add a helper, is_transparent_hugepage(), to explicitly check whether a
compound page is a THP and use it when populating KVM's secondary MMU.
The explicit check fixes a bug where a remapped compound page, e.g. for
an XDP Rx socket, is mapped into a KVM guest and is mistaken for a THP,
which results in KVM incorrectly creating a huge page in its secondary
MMU.
Fixes: 936a5fe6e6148 ("thp: kvm mmu transparent hugepage support")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Limit KVM's mapping level for HugeTLB based on its calculated max_level.
The max_level check prior to invoking host_mapping_level() only filters
out the case where KVM cannot create a 2mb mapping, it doesn't handle
the scenario where KVM can create a 2mb but not 1gb mapping, and the
host is using a 1gb HugeTLB mapping.
Fixes: 2f57b7051fe8 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Persist gfn_lpage_is_disallowed() to max_level")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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kvm_vector_hashing_enabled() is just called in kvm.ko module.
Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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vmx_set_segment() clears segment cache unconditionally, so we should not
clear it again by calling vmx_segment_cache_clear().
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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These two conditions are in conflict, adding 'else' to reduce checking.
Signed-off-by: Haiwei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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According to section "Checks on Guest Control Registers, Debug Registers, and
and MSRs" in Intel SDM vol 3C, the following checks are performed on vmentry
of nested guests:
If the "load debug controls" VM-entry control is 1, bits 63:32 in the DR7
field must be 0.
In KVM, GUEST_DR7 is set prior to the vmcs02 VM-entry by kvm_set_dr() and the
latter synthesizes a #GP if any bit in the high dword in the former is set.
Hence this field needs to be checked in software.
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karl Heubaum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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For ring-based dirty log tracking, it will be more efficient to account
writes during schedule-out or schedule-in to the currently running VCPU.
We would like to do it even if the write doesn't use the current VCPU's
address space, as is the case for cached writes (see commit 4e335d9e7ddb,
"Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache"", 2017-05-02).
Therefore, add a mechanism to track the currently-loaded kvm_vcpu struct.
There is already something similar in KVM/ARM; one important difference
is that kvm_arch_vcpu_{load,put} have two callers in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:
we have to update both the architecture-independent vcpu_{load,put} and
the preempt notifiers.
Another change made in the process is to allow using kvm_get_running_vcpu()
in preemptible code. This is allowed because preempt notifiers ensure
that the value does not change even after the VCPU thread is migrated.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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The helper x86_set_memory_region() is only used in vmx_set_tss_addr()
and kvm_arch_destroy_vm(). Push the lock upper in both cases. With
that, drop x86_set_memory_region().
This prepares to allow __x86_set_memory_region() to return a HVA
mapped, because the HVA will need to be protected by the lock too even
after __x86_set_memory_region() returns.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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We've already got the slots_lock, so we should be safe.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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nested_enable_evmcs()
In nested_enable_evmcs() evmcs_already_enabled check doesn't really do
anything: controls are already sanitized and we return '0' regardless.
Just drop the check.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove the CONFIG_X86_64 condition from the low level non-canonical
helpers to effectively enable non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM.
Non-canonical checks are performed by hardware if the CPU *supports*
64-bit mode, whether or not the CPU is actually in 64-bit mode is
irrelevant.
For the most part, skipping non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM is ok-ish
because 32-bit KVM always (hopefully) drops bits 63:32 of whatever value
it's checking before propagating it to hardware, and architecturally,
the expected behavior for the guest is a bit of a grey area since the
vCPU itself doesn't support 64-bit mode. I.e. a 32-bit KVM guest can
observe the missed checks in several paths, e.g. INVVPID and VM-Enter,
but it's debatable whether or not the missed checks constitute a bug
because technically the vCPU doesn't support 64-bit mode.
The primary motivation for enabling the non-canonical checks is defense
in depth. As mentioned above, a guest can trigger a missed check via
INVVPID or VM-Enter. INVVPID is straightforward as it takes a 64-bit
virtual address as part of its 128-bit INVVPID descriptor and fails if
the address is non-canonical, even if INVVPID is executed in 32-bit PM.
Nested VM-Enter is a bit more convoluted as it requires the guest to
write natural width VMCS fields via memory accesses and then VMPTRLD the
VMCS, but it's still possible. In both cases, KVM is saved from a true
bug only because its flows that propagate values to hardware (correctly)
take "unsigned long" parameters and so drop bits 63:32 of the bad value.
Explicitly performing the non-canonical checks makes it less likely that
a bad value will be propagated to hardware, e.g. in the INVVPID case,
if __invvpid() didn't implicitly drop bits 63:32 then KVM would BUG() on
the resulting unexpected INVVPID failure due to hardware rejecting the
non-canonical address.
The only downside to enabling the non-canonical checks is that it adds a
relatively small amount of overhead, but the affected flows are not hot
paths, i.e. the overhead is negligible.
Note, KVM technically could gate the non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM
with static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LM), but on bare metal that's an even
bigger waste of code for everyone except the 0.00000000000001% of the
population running on Yonah, and nested 32-bit on 64-bit already fudges
things with respect to 64-bit CPU behavior.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
[Also do so in nested_vmx_check_host_state as reported by Krish. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Writes to MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL should never fail if the VM-exit
and VM-entry controls are exposed to L1. Promote the checks to perform a
full WARN if kvm_set_msr() fails and remove the now unused macro
SET_MSR_OR_WARN().
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove an unused struct x86_emulate_ctxt * param from low level helpers
used to access guest FPU state. The unused param was left behind by
commit 6ab0b9feb82a ("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu").
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Reload the current thread's FPU state, which contains the guest's FPU
state, to the CPU registers if necessary during vcpu_enter_guest().
TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can be set any time control is transferred out of KVM,
e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages() or if a
softirq occurs while KVM is scheduled in.
Moving the handling of TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD from vcpu_enter_guest() to
kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), effectively kvm_sched_in(), papered over a bug
where kvm_put_guest_fpu() failed to account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD. The
easiest way to the kvm_put_guest_fpu() bug was to run with involuntary
preemption enable, thus handling TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD during kvm_sched_in()
made the bug go away. But, removing the handling in vcpu_enter_guest()
exposed KVM to the rare case of a softirq triggering kernel_fpu_begin()
between vcpu_load() and vcpu_enter_guest().
Now that kvm_{load,put}_guest_fpu() correctly handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD,
revert the commit to both restore the vcpu_enter_guest() behavior and
eliminate the superfluous switch_fpu_return() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load().
Note, leaving the handling in kvm_arch_vcpu_load() isn't wrong per se,
but it is unnecessary, and most critically, makes it extremely difficult
to find bugs such as the kvm_put_guest_fpu() issue due to shrinking the
window where a softirq can corrupt state.
A sample trace triggered by warning if TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set while
vcpu state is loaded:
<IRQ>
gcmaes_crypt_by_sg.constprop.12+0x26e/0x660
? 0xffffffffc024547d
? __qdisc_run+0x83/0x510
? __dev_queue_xmit+0x45e/0x990
? ip_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x570
? fib4_rule_action+0x61/0x70
? fib4_rule_action+0x70/0x70
? fib_rules_lookup+0x13f/0x1c0
? helper_rfc4106_decrypt+0x82/0xa0
? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
? esp_output_tail+0x8f4/0xa5a [esp4]
? skb_ext_add+0xd3/0x170
? xfrm_input+0x7a6/0x12c0
? xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xae/0xd0
? xfrm4_transport_finish+0x200/0x200
? udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1ba/0x460
? udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.63+0x72/0x90
? __udp4_lib_rcv+0x51b/0xb00
? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x1c0
? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x50
? ip_local_deliver+0xe0/0xf0
? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c0/0x1c0
? ip_rcv+0xbc/0xd0
? ip_rcv_finish_core.isra.19+0x380/0x380
? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x7e/0x90
? netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0
? napi_gro_receive+0xed/0x150
? 0xffffffffc0243c77
? net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0
? __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2f8
? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x6a/0x80
? irq_exit+0xe6/0xf0
? do_IRQ+0x7f/0xd0
? common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
</IRQ>
? irq_entries_start+0x20/0x660
? vmx_get_interrupt_shadow+0x2f0/0x710 [kvm_intel]
? kvm_set_msr_common+0xfc7/0x2380 [kvm]
? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x3a/0xa0
? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x107/0x560 [kvm]
? kvm_init+0x6bf/0xd00 [kvm]
? __seccomp_filter+0x7a/0x680
? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630
? security_file_ioctl+0x32/0x50
? ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
? do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1a0
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---[ end trace 9564a1ccad733a90 ]---
This reverts commit e751732486eb3f159089a64d1901992b1357e7cc.
Fixes: e751732486eb3 ("KVM: X86: Fix fpu state crash in kvm guest")
Reported-by: Derek Yerger <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Lambertz <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Lock the FPU regs and reload the current thread's FPU state, which holds
the guest's FPU state, to the CPU registers if necessary prior to
accessing guest FPU state as part of emulation. kernel_fpu_begin() can
be called from softirq context, therefore KVM must ensure softirqs are
disabled (locking the FPU regs disables softirqs) when touching CPU FPU
state.
Note, for all intents and purposes this reverts commit 6ab0b9feb82a7
("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu"), but at the time it
was applied, removing get/put_fpu() was correct. The re-introduction
of {get,put}_fpu() is necessitated by the deferring of FPU state load.
Fixes: 5f409e20b7945 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD similar to how fpu__copy() handles the flag
when duplicating FPU state to a new task struct. TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can
be set any time control is transferred out of KVM, be it voluntarily,
e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages, or
involuntarily, e.g. if softirq runs after an IRQ occurs. Therefore,
KVM must account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD whenever it is (potentially)
accessing CPU FPU state.
Fixes: 5f409e20b7945 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This reverts commit 95145c25a78cc0a9d3cbc75708abde432310c5a1.
The next few patches will fix the issue so the warning is not
needed anymore; revert it separately to simplify application to
stable kernels.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Short-circuit kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr() when pic intr is accepted, there
is no need to proceed further. Also remove unnecessary var r.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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The exception pending event is cleared by kvm_clear_exception_queue(). We
shouldn't clear it again.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.
Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.
Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in vmx_handle_exit().
While exit_reason is set by the hardware and therefore should not be
attacker-influenced, an unknown exit_reason could potentially be used to
perform such an attack.
Fixes: 55d2375e58a6 ("KVM: nVMX: Move nested code to dedicated files")
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(). When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value. Using constants
prevents the attack.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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in x86.c
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and
get_msr_mce().
Both functions contain index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: 890ca9aefa78 ("KVM: Add MCE support")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and
get_fixed_pmc() functions.
They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled)
MSR number.
Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: de9aef5e1ad6 ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: 0105d1a52640 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.
This patch depends on patch
"KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks".
Fixes: 70f93dae32ac ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.
Fixes: a2c118bfab8b ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.
Fixes: 85f455f7ddbe ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
These functions contain index computations that use the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.
Fixes: 045a282ca415 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Current SVM implementation does not have support for handling PKU. Guests
running on a host with future AMD cpus that support the feature will read
garbage from the PKRU register and will hit segmentation faults on boot as
memory is getting marked as protected that should not be. Ensure that cpuid
from SVM does not advertise the feature.
Signed-off-by: John Allen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 0556cbdc2fbc ("x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() now that all
arch specific implementations are nops.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Add an arm specific hook to free the arm64-only sve_state. Doing so
eliminates the last functional code from kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() across
all architectures and paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_init()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() entirely.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter). Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(). This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely.
Note, calling kvmppc_mmu_destroy() if kvmppc_core_vcpu_create() fails
may or may not be necessary. Move it along with the more obvious call
to kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_uninit() so as not to inadvertantly introduce a
functional change and/or bug.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter). Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(). This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter). This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_init() entirely.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() now that all arch specific implementations
are nops.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Fold setup() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code. This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_setup().
Note, BookE directly implements kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() and PPC's common
kvm_arch_vcpu_create() is responsible for its own cleanup, thus the only
cleanup required when directly invoking kvmppc_core_vcpu_setup() is to
call .vcpu_free(), which is the BookE specific portion of PPC's
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() by way of kvmppc_core_vcpu_free().
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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