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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Move the command line preparation and the early command line parsing
earlier so that the command line parameters which affect
early_reserve_memory(), e.g. efi=nosftreserve, are taken into
account. This was broken when the invocation of
early_reserve_memory() was moved recently.
- Use an atomic type for the SGX page accounting, which is read and
written locklessly, to plug various race conditions related to it.
* tag 'x86-urgent-2021-11-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sgx: Fix free page accounting
x86/boot: Pull up cmdline preparation and early param parsing
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 perf fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Remove unneded PEBS disabling when taking LBR snapshots to prevent an
unchecked MSR access error.
- Fix IIO event constraints for Snowridge and Skylake server chips.
* tag 'perf-urgent-2021-11-21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/perf: Fix snapshot_branch_stack warning in VM
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix IIO event constraints for Snowridge
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix IIO event constraints for Skylake Server
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix filter_tid mask for CHA events on Skylake Server
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull s390 updates from Heiko Carstens:
- Add missing Kconfig option for ftrace direct multi sample, so it can
be compiled again, and also add s390 support for this sample.
- Update Christian Borntraeger's email address.
- Various fixes for memory layout setup. Besides other this makes it
possible to load shared DCSS segments again.
- Fix copy to user space of swapped kdump oldmem.
- Remove -mstack-guard and -mstack-size compile options when building
vdso binaries. This can happen when CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is disabled and
results in broken vdso code which causes more or less random
exceptions. Also remove the not needed -nostdlib option.
- Fix memory leak on cpu hotplug and return code handling in kexec
code.
- Wire up futex_waitv system call.
- Replace snprintf with sysfs_emit where appropriate.
* tag 's390-5.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
ftrace/samples: add s390 support for ftrace direct multi sample
ftrace/samples: add missing Kconfig option for ftrace direct multi sample
MAINTAINERS: update email address of Christian Borntraeger
s390/kexec: fix memory leak of ipl report buffer
s390/kexec: fix return code handling
s390/dump: fix copying to user-space of swapped kdump oldmem
s390: wire up sys_futex_waitv system call
s390/vdso: filter out -mstack-guard and -mstack-size
s390/vdso: remove -nostdlib compiler flag
s390: replace snprintf in show functions with sysfs_emit
s390/boot: simplify and fix kernel memory layout setup
s390/setup: re-arrange memblock setup
s390/setup: avoid using memblock_enforce_memory_limit
s390/setup: avoid reserving memory above identity mapping
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull exit-vs-signal handling fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a small set of changes where debuggers were no longer able to
intercept synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV, introduced by the exit
cleanups.
This is essentially the change you suggested with all of i's dotted
and the t's crossed so that ptrace can intercept all of the cases it
has been able to intercept the past, and all of the cases that made it
to exit without giving ptrace a chance still don't give ptrace a
chance"
* 'SA_IMMUTABLE-fixes-for-v5.16-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
signal: Replace force_fatal_sig with force_exit_sig when in doubt
signal: Don't always set SA_IMMUTABLE for forced signals
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When commit 5d1ceb3969b6 ("x86: Fix __get_wchan() for !STACKTRACE")
moved from stacktrace to native unwind_*() usage, the
try_get_task_stack() got lost, leading to use-after-free issues for
dying tasks.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: 5d1ceb3969b6 ("x86: Fix __get_wchan() for !STACKTRACE")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215031
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/YZV02RCRVHIa144u@fedora64.linuxtx.org/
Reported-by: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>
Reported-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Recently to prevent issues with SECCOMP_RET_KILL and similar signals
being changed before they are delivered SA_IMMUTABLE was added.
Unfortunately this broke debuggers[1][2] which reasonably expect
to be able to trap synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV even when
the target process is not configured to handle those signals.
Add force_exit_sig and use it instead of force_fatal_sig where
historically the code has directly called do_exit. This has the
implementation benefits of going through the signal exit path
(including generating core dumps) without the danger of allowing
userspace to ignore or change these signals.
This avoids userspace regressions as older kernels exited with do_exit
which debuggers also can not intercept.
In the future is should be possible to improve the quality of
implementation of the kernel by changing some of these force_exit_sig
calls to force_fatal_sig. That can be done where it matters on
a case-by-case basis with careful analysis.
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAP045AoMY4xf8aC_4QU_-j7obuEPYgTcnQQP3Yxk=2X90jtpjw@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117150258.GB5403@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed")
Fixes: a3616a3c0272 ("signal/m68k: Use force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) in fpsp040_die")
Fixes: 83a1f27ad773 ("signal/powerpc: On swapcontext failure force SIGSEGV")
Fixes: 9bc508cf0791 ("signal/s390: Use force_sigsegv in default_trap_handler")
Fixes: 086ec444f866 ("signal/sparc32: In setup_rt_frame and setup_fram use force_fatal_sig")
Fixes: c317d306d550 ("signal/sparc32: Exit with a fatal signal when try_to_clear_window_buffer fails")
Fixes: 695dd0d634df ("signal/x86: In emulate_vsyscall force a signal instead of calling do_exit")
Fixes: 1fbd60df8a85 ("signal/vm86_32: Properly send SIGSEGV when the vm86 state cannot be saved.")
Fixes: 941edc5bf174 ("exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871r3dqfv8.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"Selftest changes:
- Cleanups for the perf test infrastructure and mapping hugepages
- Avoid contention on mmap_sem when the guests start to run
- Add event channel upcall support to xen_shinfo_test
x86 changes:
- Fixes for Xen emulation
- Kill kvm_map_gfn() / kvm_unmap_gfn() and broken gfn_to_pfn_cache
- Fixes for migration of 32-bit nested guests on 64-bit hypervisor
- Compilation fixes
- More SEV cleanups
Generic:
- Cap the return value of KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS to both KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS
and num_online_cpus(). Most architectures were only using one of
the two"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (42 commits)
KVM: x86: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS
KVM: s390: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by num_online_cpus()
KVM: RISC-V: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS
KVM: PPC: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS
KVM: MIPS: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS
KVM: arm64: Cap KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS by kvm_arm_default_max_vcpus()
KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state
selftests: KVM: Add /x86_64/sev_migrate_tests to .gitignore
riscv: kvm: fix non-kernel-doc comment block
KVM: SEV: Fix typo in and tweak name of cmd_allowed_from_miror()
KVM: SEV: Drop a redundant setting of sev->asid during initialization
KVM: SEV: WARN if SEV-ES is marked active but SEV is not
KVM: SEV: Set sev_info.active after initial checks in sev_guest_init()
KVM: SEV: Disallow COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM if target has created vCPUs
KVM: Kill kvm_map_gfn() / kvm_unmap_gfn() and gfn_to_pfn_cache
KVM: nVMX: Use a gfn_to_hva_cache for vmptrld
KVM: nVMX: Use kvm_read_guest_offset_cached() for nested VMCS check
KVM: x86/xen: Use sizeof_field() instead of open-coding it
KVM: nVMX: Use kvm_{read,write}_guest_cached() for shadow_vmcs12
KVM: x86/xen: Fix get_attr of KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO
...
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Currently it is not possible to build the ftrace direct multi example
anymore due to broken config dependencies. Fix this by adding
SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI config option.
This broke when merging s390-5.16-1 due to an incorrect merge conflict
resolution proposed by me.
Also rename SAMPLE_FTRACE_MULTI_DIRECT to SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI
so it matches the module name.
Fixes: 0b707e572a19 ("Merge tag 's390-5.16-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux")
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115195614.3173346-2-hca@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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It doesn't make sense to return the recommended maximum number of
vCPUs which exceeds the maximum possible number of vCPUs.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211116163443.88707-7-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When processing a hypercall for a guest with protected state, currently
SEV-ES guests, the guest CS segment register can't be checked to
determine if the guest is in 64-bit mode. For an SEV-ES guest, it is
expected that communication between the guest and the hypervisor is
performed to shared memory using the GHCB. In order to use the GHCB, the
guest must have been in long mode, otherwise writes by the guest to the
GHCB would be encrypted and not be able to be comprehended by the
hypervisor.
Create a new helper function, is_64_bit_hypercall(), that assumes the
guest is in 64-bit mode when the guest has protected state, and returns
true, otherwise invoking is_64_bit_mode() to determine the mode. Update
the hypercall related routines to use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of
is_64_bit_mode().
Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to is_64_bit_mode() to catch occurences of calls to
this helper function for a guest running with protected state.
Fixes: f1c6366e3043 ("KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e0b20c770c9d0d1403f23d83e785385104211f74.1621878537.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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* Fixes for Xen emulation
* Kill kvm_map_gfn() / kvm_unmap_gfn() and broken gfn_to_pfn_cache
* Fixes for migration of 32-bit nested guests on 64-bit hypervisor
* Compilation fixes
* More SEV cleanups
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Rename cmd_allowed_from_miror() to is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(), fixing
a typo and making it obvious that the result is a boolean where
false means "not allowed".
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove a fully redundant write to sev->asid during SEV/SEV-ES guest
initialization. The ASID is set a few lines earlier prior to the call to
sev_platform_init(), which doesn't take "sev" as a param, i.e. can't
muck with the ASID barring some truly magical behind-the-scenes code.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN if the VM is tagged as SEV-ES but not SEV. KVM relies on SEV and
SEV-ES being set atomically, and guards common flows with "is SEV", i.e.
observing SEV-ES without SEV means KVM has a fatal bug.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Set sev_info.active during SEV/SEV-ES activation before calling any code
that can potentially consume sev_info.es_active, e.g. set "active" and
"es_active" as a pair immediately after the initial sanity checks. KVM
generally expects that es_active can be true if and only if active is
true, e.g. sev_asid_new() deliberately avoids sev_es_guest() so that it
doesn't get a false negative. This will allow WARNing in sev_es_guest()
if the VM is tagged as SEV-ES but not SEV.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Reject COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM if the destination VM has created vCPUs.
KVM relies on SEV activation to occur before vCPUs are created, e.g. to
set VMCB flags and intercepts correctly.
Fixes: 54526d1fd593 ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109215101.2211373-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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And thus another call to kvm_vcpu_map() can die.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211115165030.7422-7-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Kill another mostly gratuitous kvm_vcpu_map() which could just use the
userspace HVA for it.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211115165030.7422-6-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211115165030.7422-4-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Using kvm_vcpu_map() for reading from the guest is entirely gratuitous,
when all we do is a single memcpy and unmap it again. Fix it up to use
kvm_read_guest()... but in fact I couldn't bring myself to do that
without also making it use a gfn_to_hva_cache for both that *and* the
copy in the other direction.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211115165030.7422-5-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In commit 319afe68567b ("KVM: xen: do not use struct gfn_to_hva_cache") we
stopped storing this in-kernel as a GPA, and started storing it as a GFN.
Which means we probably should have stopped calling gpa_to_gfn() on it
when userspace asks for it back.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 319afe68567b ("KVM: xen: do not use struct gfn_to_hva_cache")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20211115165030.7422-2-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Incorporate EFER.LMA into kvm_mmu_extended_role, as it used to compute the
guest root level and is not reflected in kvm_mmu_page_role.level when TDP
is in use. When simply running the guest, it is impossible for EFER.LMA
and kvm_mmu.root_level to get out of sync, as the guest cannot transition
from PAE paging to 64-bit paging without toggling CR0.PG, i.e. without
first bouncing through a different MMU context. And stuffing guest state
via KVM_SET_SREGS{,2} also ensures a full MMU context reset.
However, if KVM_SET_SREGS{,2} is followed by KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, e.g. to
set guest state when migrating the VM while L2 is active, the vCPU state
will reflect L2, not L1. If L1 is using TDP for L2, then root_mmu will
have been configured using L2's state, despite not being used for L2. If
L2.EFER.LMA != L1.EFER.LMA, and L2 is using PAE paging, then root_mmu will
be configured for guest PAE paging, but will match the mmu_role for 64-bit
paging and cause KVM to not reconfigure root_mmu on the next nested VM-Exit.
Alternatively, the root_mmu's role could be invalidated after a successful
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE that yields vcpu->arch.mmu != vcpu->arch.root_mmu,
i.e. that switches the active mmu to guest_mmu, but doing so is unnecessarily
tricky, and not even needed if L1 and L2 do have the same role (e.g., they
are both 64-bit guests and run with the same CR4).
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211115131837.195527-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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state load
When loading nested state, don't use check vcpu->arch.efer to get the
L1 host's 64-bit vs. 32-bit state and don't check it for consistency
with respect to VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, as register state in vCPU
may be stale when KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE is called---and architecturally
does not exist. When restoring L2 state in KVM, the CPU is placed in
non-root where nested VMX code has no snapshot of L1 host state: VMX
(conditionally) loads host state fields loaded on VM-exit, but they need
not correspond to the state before entry. A simple case occurs in KVM
itself, where the host RIP field points to vmx_vmexit rather than the
instruction following vmlaunch/vmresume.
However, for the particular case of L1 being in 32- or 64-bit mode
on entry, the exit controls can be treated instead as the source of
truth regarding the state of L1 on entry, and can be used to check
that vmcs12.VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE matches vmcs12.HOST_EFER if
vmcs12.VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER is set. The consistency check on CPU
EFER vs. vmcs12.VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, instead, happens only
on VM-Enter. That's because, again, there's conceptually no "current"
L1 EFER to check on KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211115131837.195527-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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In 64-bit mode, x86 instruction encoding allows us to use the low 8 bits
of any GPR as an 8-bit operand. In 32-bit mode, however, we can only use
the [abcd] registers. For which, GCC has the "q" constraint instead of
the less restrictive "r".
Also fix st->preempted, which is an input/output operand rather than an
input.
Fixes: 7e2175ebd695 ("KVM: x86: Fix recording of guest steal time / preempted status")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <89bf72db1b859990355f9c40713a34e0d2d86c98.camel@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The lack a static declaration currently results in:
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:128:26: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features'
when compiling with "W=1".
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 760849b1476c ("KVM: x86: Make sure KVM_CPUID_FEATURES really are KVM_CPUID_FEATURES")
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20211115144131.5943-1-pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When running in VM intel_pmu_snapshot_branch_stack triggers WRMSR warning
like:
[ ] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x3f1 (tried to write 0x0000000000000000) at rIP: 0xffffffff81011a5b (intel_pmu_snapshot_branch_stack+0x3b/0xd0)
This can be triggered with BPF selftests:
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t get_branch_snapshot
This warning is caused by __intel_pmu_pebs_disable_all() in the VM.
Since it is not necessary to disable PEBS for LBR, remove it from
intel_pmu_snapshot_branch_stack and intel_pmu_snapshot_arch_branch_stack.
Fixes: c22ac2a3d4bd ("perf: Enable branch record for software events")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112054510.2667030-1-songliubraving@fb.com
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According to the latest uncore document, DATA_REQ_OF_CPU (0x83),
DATA_REQ_BY_CPU (0xc0) and COMP_BUF_OCCUPANCY (0xd5) events have
constraints. Add uncore IIO constraints for Snowridge.
Fixes: 210cc5f9db7a ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add uncore support for Snow Ridge server")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Antonov <alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115090334.3789-4-alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com
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According to the latest uncore document, COMP_BUF_OCCUPANCY (0xd5) event
can be collected on 2-3 counters. Update uncore IIO event constraints for
Skylake Server.
Fixes: cd34cd97b7b4 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Skylake server uncore support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Antonov <alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115090334.3789-3-alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com
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According Uncore Reference Manual: any of the CHA events may be filtered
by Thread/Core-ID by using tid modifier in CHA Filter 0 Register.
Update skx_cha_hw_config() to follow Uncore Guide.
Fixes: cd34cd97b7b4 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Skylake server uncore support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Antonov <alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115090334.3789-2-alexander.antonov@linux.intel.com
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The SGX driver maintains a single global free page counter,
sgx_nr_free_pages, that reflects the number of free pages available
across all NUMA nodes. Correspondingly, a list of free pages is
associated with each NUMA node and sgx_nr_free_pages is updated
every time a page is added or removed from any of the free page
lists. The main usage of sgx_nr_free_pages is by the reclaimer
that runs when it (sgx_nr_free_pages) goes below a watermark
to ensure that there are always some free pages available to, for
example, support efficient page faults.
With sgx_nr_free_pages accessed and modified from a few places
it is essential to ensure that these accesses are done safely but
this is not the case. sgx_nr_free_pages is read without any
protection and updated with inconsistent protection by any one
of the spin locks associated with the individual NUMA nodes.
For example:
CPU_A CPU_B
----- -----
spin_lock(&nodeA->lock); spin_lock(&nodeB->lock);
... ...
sgx_nr_free_pages--; /* NOT SAFE */ sgx_nr_free_pages--;
spin_unlock(&nodeA->lock); spin_unlock(&nodeB->lock);
Since sgx_nr_free_pages may be protected by different spin locks
while being modified from different CPUs, the following scenario
is possible:
CPU_A CPU_B
----- -----
{sgx_nr_free_pages = 100}
spin_lock(&nodeA->lock); spin_lock(&nodeB->lock);
sgx_nr_free_pages--; sgx_nr_free_pages--;
/* LOAD sgx_nr_free_pages = 100 */ /* LOAD sgx_nr_free_pages = 100 */
/* sgx_nr_free_pages-- */ /* sgx_nr_free_pages-- */
/* STORE sgx_nr_free_pages = 99 */ /* STORE sgx_nr_free_pages = 99 */
spin_unlock(&nodeA->lock); spin_unlock(&nodeB->lock);
In the above scenario, sgx_nr_free_pages is decremented from two CPUs
but instead of sgx_nr_free_pages ending with a value that is two less
than it started with, it was only decremented by one while the number
of free pages were actually reduced by two. The consequence of
sgx_nr_free_pages not being protected is that its value may not
accurately reflect the actual number of free pages on the system,
impacting the availability of free pages in support of many flows.
The problematic scenario is when the reclaimer does not run because it
believes there to be sufficient free pages while any attempt to allocate
a page fails because there are no free pages available. In the SGX driver
the reclaimer's watermark is only 32 pages so after encountering the
above example scenario 32 times a user space hang is possible when there
are no more free pages because of repeated page faults caused by no
free pages made available.
The following flow was encountered:
asm_exc_page_fault
...
sgx_vma_fault()
sgx_encl_load_page()
sgx_encl_eldu() // Encrypted page needs to be loaded from backing
// storage into newly allocated SGX memory page
sgx_alloc_epc_page() // Allocate a page of SGX memory
__sgx_alloc_epc_page() // Fails, no free SGX memory
...
if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES)) // Wake reclaimer
wake_up(&ksgxd_waitq);
return -EBUSY; // Return -EBUSY giving reclaimer time to run
return -EBUSY;
return -EBUSY;
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
The reclaimer is triggered in above flow with the following code:
static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark)
{
return sgx_nr_free_pages < watermark &&
!list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list);
}
In the problematic scenario there were no free pages available yet the
value of sgx_nr_free_pages was above the watermark. The allocation of
SGX memory thus always failed because of a lack of free pages while no
free pages were made available because the reclaimer is never started
because of sgx_nr_free_pages' incorrect value. The consequence was that
user space kept encountering VM_FAULT_NOPAGE that caused the same
address to be accessed repeatedly with the same result.
Change the global free page counter to an atomic type that
ensures simultaneous updates are done safely. While doing so, move
the updating of the variable outside of the spin lock critical
section to which it does not belong.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 901ddbb9ecf5 ("x86/sgx: Add a basic NUMA allocation scheme to sgx_alloc_epc_page()")
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a95a40743bbd3f795b465f30922dde7f1ea9e0eb.1637004094.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
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In vcpu_load_eoi_exitmap(), currently the eoi_exit_bitmap[4] array is
initialized only when Hyper-V context is available, in other path it is
just passed to kvm_x86_ops.load_eoi_exitmap() directly from on the stack,
which would cause unexpected interrupt delivery/handling issues, e.g. an
*old* linux kernel that relies on PIT to do clock calibration on KVM might
randomly fail to boot.
Fix it by passing ioapic_handled_vectors to load_eoi_exitmap() when Hyper-V
context is not available.
Fixes: f2bc14b69c38 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Prepare to meet unallocated Hyper-V context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Huang Le <huangle1@jd.com>
Message-Id: <62115b277dab49ea97da5633f8522daf@jd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly check for MSR_HYPERCALL and MSR_VP_INDEX support when probing
for running as a Hyper-V guest instead of waiting until hyperv_init() to
detect the bogus configuration. Add messages to give the admin a heads
up that they are likely running on a broken virtual machine setup.
At best, silently disabling Hyper-V is confusing and difficult to debug,
e.g. the kernel _says_ it's using all these fancy Hyper-V features, but
always falls back to the native versions. At worst, the half baked setup
will crash/hang the kernel.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104182239.1302956-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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Check for a valid hv_vp_index array prior to derefencing hv_vp_index when
setting Hyper-V's TSC change callback. If Hyper-V setup failed in
hyperv_init(), the kernel will still report that it's running under
Hyper-V, but will have silently disabled nearly all functionality.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #75
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:set_hv_tscchange_cb+0x15/0xa0
Code: <8b> 04 82 8b 15 12 17 85 01 48 c1 e0 20 48 0d ee 00 01 00 f6 c6 08
...
Call Trace:
kvm_arch_init+0x17c/0x280
kvm_init+0x31/0x330
vmx_init+0xba/0x13a
do_one_initcall+0x41/0x1c0
kernel_init_freeable+0x1f2/0x23b
kernel_init+0x16/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fixes: 93286261de1b ("x86/hyperv: Reenlightenment notifications support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104182239.1302956-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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Dan reports that Anjaneya Chagam can no longer use the efi=nosoftreserve
kernel command line parameter to suppress "soft reservation" behavior.
This is due to the fact that the following call-chain happens at boot:
early_reserve_memory
|-> efi_memblock_x86_reserve_range
|-> efi_fake_memmap_early
which does
if (!efi_soft_reserve_enabled())
return;
and that would have set EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE after having parsed
"nosoftreserve".
However, parse_early_param() gets called *after* it, leading to the boot
cmdline not being taken into account.
Therefore, carve out the command line preparation into a separate
function which does the early param parsing too. So that it all goes
together.
And then call that function before early_reserve_memory() so that the
params would have been parsed by then.
Fixes: 8aa83e6395ce ("x86/setup: Call early_reserve_memory() earlier")
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Anjaneya Chagam <anjaneya.chagam@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e8dd8993c38702ee6dd73b3c11f158617e665607.camel@intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 static call update from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for static calls to make the trampoline patching more
robust by placing explicit signature bytes after the call trampoline
to prevent patching random other jumps like the CFI jump table
entries"
* tag 'locking-urgent-2021-11-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
static_call,x86: Robustify trampoline patching
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Avoid touching ~100 config files in order to be able to select the
preemption model
- clear cluster CPU masks too, on the CPU unplug path
- prevent use-after-free in cfs
- Prevent a race condition when updating CPU cache domains
- Factor out common shared part of smp_prepare_cpus() into a common
helper which can be called by both baremetal and Xen, in order to fix
a booting of Xen PV guests
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
preempt: Restore preemption model selection configs
arch_topology: Fix missing clear cluster_cpumask in remove_cpu_topology()
sched/fair: Prevent dead task groups from regaining cfs_rq's
sched/core: Mitigate race cpus_share_cache()/update_top_cache_domain()
x86/smp: Factor out parts of native_smp_prepare_cpus()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent unintentional page sharing by checking whether a page
reference to a PMU samples page has been acquired properly before
that
- Make sure the LBR_SELECT MSR is saved/restored too
- Reset the LBR_SELECT MSR when resetting the LBR PMU to clear any
residual data left
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Avoid put_page() when GUP fails
perf/x86/vlbr: Add c->flags to vlbr event constraints
perf/x86/lbr: Reset LBR_SELECT during vlbr reset
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the model number of a new, Raptor Lake CPU, to intel-family.h
- Do not log spurious corrected MCEs on SKL too, due to an erratum
- Clarify the path of paravirt ops patches upstream
- Add an optimization to avoid writing out AMX components to sigframes
when former are in init state
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Add Raptor Lake to Intel family
x86/mce: Add errata workaround for Skylake SKX37
MAINTAINERS: Add some information to PARAVIRT_OPS entry
x86/fpu: Optimize out sigframe xfeatures when in init state
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Pull more kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"New x86 features:
- Guest API and guest kernel support for SEV live migration
- SEV and SEV-ES intra-host migration
Bugfixes and cleanups for x86:
- Fix misuse of gfn-to-pfn cache when recording guest steal time /
preempted status
- Fix selftests on APICv machines
- Fix sparse warnings
- Fix detection of KVM features in CPUID
- Cleanups for bogus writes to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN
- Fixes and cleanups for MSR bitmap handling
- Cleanups for INVPCID
- Make x86 KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS consistent with other architectures
Bugfixes for ARM:
- Fix finalization of host stage2 mappings
- Tighten the return value of kvm_vcpu_preferred_target()
- Make sure the extraction of ESR_ELx.EC is limited to architected
bits"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (34 commits)
KVM: SEV: unify cgroup cleanup code for svm_vm_migrate_from
KVM: x86: move guest_pv_has out of user_access section
KVM: x86: Drop arbitrary KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS
KVM: Move INVPCID type check from vmx and svm to the common kvm_handle_invpcid()
KVM: VMX: Add a helper function to retrieve the GPR index for INVPCID, INVVPID, and INVEPT
KVM: nVMX: Clean up x2APIC MSR handling for L2
KVM: VMX: Macrofy the MSR bitmap getters and setters
KVM: nVMX: Handle dynamic MSR intercept toggling
KVM: nVMX: Query current VMCS when determining if MSR bitmaps are in use
KVM: x86: Don't update vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val when a bogus value was written to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN
KVM: x86: Rename kvm_lapic_enable_pv_eoi()
KVM: x86: Make sure KVM_CPUID_FEATURES really are KVM_CPUID_FEATURES
KVM: x86: Add helper to consolidate core logic of SET_CPUID{2} flows
kvm: mmu: Use fast PF path for access tracking of huge pages when possible
KVM: x86/mmu: Properly dereference rcu-protected TDP MMU sptep iterator
KVM: x86: inhibit APICv when KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ active
kvm: x86: Convert return type of *is_valid_rdpmc_ecx() to bool
KVM: x86: Fix recording of guest steal time / preempted status
selftest: KVM: Add intra host migration tests
selftest: KVM: Add open sev dev helper
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull vm86 fix from Eric Biederman:
"Just the removal of an unnecessary (and incorrect) test from a BUG_ON"
* 'exit-cleanups-for-v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
signal/vm86_32: Remove pointless test in BUG_ON
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kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> writes[1]:
>
> Greeting,
>
> FYI, we noticed the following commit (built with gcc-9):
>
> commit: 1a4d21a23c4ca7467726be7db9ae8077a62b2c62 ("signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON")
> https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
>
> in testcase: trinity
> version: trinity-static-i386-x86_64-1c734c75-1_2020-01-06
> with following parameters:
>
>
> [ 70.645554][ T3747] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109!
> [ 70.646185][ T3747] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 70.646682][ T3747] CPU: 0 PID: 3747 Comm: trinity-c6 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-00009-g1a4d21a23c4c #1
> [ 70.647598][ T3747] EIP: save_v86_state (arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109 (discriminator 3))
> [ 70.648113][ T3747] Code: 89 c3 64 8b 35 60 b8 25 c2 83 ec 08 89 55 f0 8b 96 10 19 00 00 89 55 ec e8 c6 2d 0c 00 fb 8b 55 ec 85 d2 74 05 83 3a 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 8b 86 10 19 00 00 8b 4b 38 8b 78 48 31 cf 89 f8 8b 7a 4c 81
> [ 70.650136][ T3747] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f5f49fac ECX: 0000000b EDX: f610b600
> [ 70.650852][ T3747] ESI: f5f79cc0 EDI: f5f79cc0 EBP: f5f49f04 ESP: f5f49ef0
> [ 70.651593][ T3747] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 70.652413][ T3747] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00004000 CR3: 35fc7000 CR4: 000406d0
> [ 70.653169][ T3747] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
> [ 70.653897][ T3747] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400
> [ 70.654382][ T3747] Call Trace:
> [ 70.654719][ T3747] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:792 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:867)
> [ 70.655288][ T3747] exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:174 kernel/entry/common.c:209)
> [ 70.655854][ T3747] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:126 kernel/entry/common.c:317)
> [ 70.656450][ T3747] irqentry_exit (kernel/entry/common.c:406)
> [ 70.656897][ T3747] exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1535)
> [ 70.657369][ T3747] ? sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1488)
> [ 70.657989][ T3747] handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1085)
vm86_32.c:109 is: "BUG_ON(!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86)"
When trying to understand the failure Brian Gerst pointed out[2] that
the code does not need protection against vm86->user_vm86 being NULL.
The copy_from_user code will already handles that case if the address
is going to fault.
Looking futher I realized that if we care about not allowing struct
vm86plus_struct at address 0 it should be do_sys_vm86 (the system
call) that does the filtering. Not way down deep when the emulation
has completed in save_v86_state.
So let's just remove the silly case of attempting to filter a
userspace address with a BUG_ON. Existing userspace can't break and
it won't make the kernel any more attackable as the userspace access
helpers will handle it, if it isn't a good userspace pointer.
I have run the reproducer the fuzzer gave me before I made this change
and it reproduced, and after I made this change and I have not seen
the reported failure. So it does looks like this fixes the reported
issue.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112074030.GB19820@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAMzpN2jkK5sAv-Kg_kVnCEyVySiqeTdUORcC=AdG1gV6r8nUew@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Tested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add model ID for Raptor Lake.
[ dhansen: These get added as soon as possible so that folks doing
development can leverage them. ]
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112182835.924977-1-tony.luck@intel.com
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Errata SKX37 is word-for-word identical to the other errata listed in
this workaround. I happened to notice this after investigating a CMCI
storm on a Skylake host. While I can't confirm this was the root cause,
spurious corrected errors does sound like a likely suspect.
Fixes: 2976908e4198 ("x86/mce: Do not log spurious corrected mce errors")
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211029205759.GA7385@codemonkey.org.uk
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Use the same cleanup code independent of whether the cgroup to be
uncharged and unref'd is the source or the destination cgroup. Use a
bool to track whether the destination cgroup has been charged, which also
fixes a bug in the error case: the destination cgroup must be uncharged
only if it does not match the source.
Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When UBSAN is enabled, the code emitted for the call to guest_pv_has
includes a call to __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value. objtool
complains that this call happens with UACCESS enabled; to avoid
the warning, pull the calls to user_access_begin into both arms
of the "if" statement, after the check for guest_pv_has.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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* Fix misuse of gfn-to-pfn cache when recording guest steal time / preempted status
* Fix selftests on APICv machines
* Fix sparse warnings
* Fix detection of KVM features in CPUID
* Cleanups for bogus writes to MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN
* Fixes and cleanups for MSR bitmap handling
* Cleanups for INVPCID
* Make x86 KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS consistent with other architectures
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Add support for AMD SEV and SEV-ES intra-host migration support. Intra
host migration provides a low-cost mechanism for userspace VMM upgrades.
In the common case for intra host migration, we can rely on the normal
ioctls for passing data from one VMM to the next. SEV, SEV-ES, and other
confidential compute environments make most of this information opaque, and
render KVM ioctls such as "KVM_GET_REGS" irrelevant. As a result, we need
the ability to pass this opaque metadata from one VMM to the next. The
easiest way to do this is to leave this data in the kernel, and transfer
ownership of the metadata from one KVM VM (or vCPU) to the next. In-kernel
hand off makes it possible to move any data that would be
unsafe/impossible for the kernel to hand directly to userspace, and
cannot be reproduced using data that can be handed to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS is used to get the "recommended" maximum number of
VCPUs and arm64/mips/riscv report num_online_cpus(). Powerpc reports
either num_online_cpus() or num_present_cpus(), s390 has multiple
constants depending on hardware features. On x86, KVM reports an
arbitrary value of '710' which is supposed to be the maximum tested
value but it's possible to test all KVM_MAX_VCPUS even when there are
less physical CPUs available.
Drop the arbitrary '710' value and return num_online_cpus() on x86 as
well. The recommendation will match other architectures and will mean
'no CPU overcommit'.
For reference, QEMU only queries KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS to print a warning
when the requested vCPU number exceeds it. The static limit of '710'
is quite weird as smaller systems with just a few physical CPUs should
certainly "recommend" less.
Suggested-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211111134733.86601-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle #GP on INVPCID due to an invalid type in the common switch
statement instead of relying on the callers (VMX and SVM) to manually
validate the type.
Unlike INVVPID and INVEPT, INVPCID is not explicitly documented to check
the type before reading the operand from memory, so deferring the
type validity check until after that point is architecturally allowed.
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109174426.2350547-3-vipinsh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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INVVPID, and INVEPT
handle_invept(), handle_invvpid(), handle_invpcid() read the same reg2
field in vmcs.VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO to get the index of the GPR that
holds the invalidation type. Add a helper to retrieve reg2 from VMX
instruction info to consolidate and document the shift+mask magic.
Signed-off-by: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20211109174426.2350547-2-vipinsh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|