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2019-05-30treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156Thomas Gleixner5-73/+5
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed filesThomas Gleixner2-0/+2
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for missed filesThomas Gleixner9-0/+9
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
2019-05-19Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.2-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull more Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada: - remove unneeded use of cc-option, cc-disable-warning, cc-ldoption - exclude tracked files from .gitignore - re-enable -Wint-in-bool-context warning - refactor samples/Makefile - stop building immediately if syncconfig fails - do not sprinkle error messages when $(CC) does not exist - move arch/alpha/defconfig to the configs subdirectory - remove crappy header search path manipulation - add comment lines to .config to clarify the end of menu blocks - check uniqueness of module names (adding new warnings intentionally) * tag 'kbuild-v5.2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (24 commits) kconfig: use 'else ifneq' for Makefile to improve readability kbuild: check uniqueness of module names kconfig: Terminate menu blocks with a comment in the generated config kbuild: add LICENSES to KBUILD_ALLDIRS kbuild: remove 'addtree' and 'flags' magic for header search paths treewide: prefix header search paths with $(srctree)/ media: prefix header search paths with $(srctree)/ media: remove unneeded header search paths alpha: move arch/alpha/defconfig to arch/alpha/configs/defconfig kbuild: terminate Kconfig when $(CC) or $(LD) is missing kbuild: turn auto.conf.cmd into a mandatory include file .gitignore: exclude .get_maintainer.ignore and .gitattributes kbuild: add all Clang-specific flags unconditionally kbuild: Don't try to add '-fcatch-undefined-behavior' flag kbuild: add some extra warning flags unconditionally kbuild: add -Wvla flag unconditionally arch: remove dangling asm-generic wrappers samples: guard sub-directories with CONFIG options kbuild: re-enable int-in-bool-context warning MAINTAINERS: kbuild: Add pattern for scripts/*vmlinux* ...
2019-05-19Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull core fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This fixes a particularly thorny munmap() bug with MPX, plus fixes a host build environment assumption in objtool" * 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: objtool: Allow AR to be overridden with HOSTAR x86/mpx, mm/core: Fix recursive munmap() corruption
2019-05-18treewide: prefix header search paths with $(srctree)/Masahiro Yamada1-1/+1
Currently, the Kbuild core manipulates header search paths in a crazy way [1]. To fix this mess, I want all Makefiles to add explicit $(srctree)/ to the search paths in the srctree. Some Makefiles are already written in that way, but not all. The goal of this work is to make the notation consistent, and finally get rid of the gross hacks. Having whitespaces after -I does not matter since commit 48f6e3cf5bc6 ("kbuild: do not drop -I without parameter"). [1]: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9632347/ Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
2019-05-16Merge branch 'linus' into x86/urgent, to pick up dependent changesIngo Molnar6-37/+27
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-05-14mm/memory_hotplug: make __remove_pages() and arch_remove_memory() never failDavid Hildenbrand2-9/+6
All callers of arch_remove_memory() ignore errors. And we should really try to remove any errors from the memory removal path. No more errors are reported from __remove_pages(). BUG() in s390x code in case arch_remove_memory() is triggered. We may implement that properly later. WARN in case powerpc code failed to remove the section mapping, which is better than ignoring the error completely right now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: Fenghua Yu <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Cc: Stefan Agner <[email protected]> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Arun KS <[email protected]> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]> Cc: Rob Herring <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Banman <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Travis <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
2019-05-14mm, memory_hotplug: provide a more generic restrictions for memory hotplugMichal Hocko2-8/+8
arch_add_memory, __add_pages take a want_memblock which controls whether the newly added memory should get the sysfs memblock user API (e.g. ZONE_DEVICE users do not want/need this interface). Some callers even want to control where do we allocate the memmap from by configuring altmap. Add a more generic hotplug context for arch_add_memory and __add_pages. struct mhp_restrictions contains flags which contains additional features to be enabled by the memory hotplug (MHP_MEMBLOCK_API currently) and altmap for alternative memmap allocator. This patch shouldn't introduce any functional change. [[email protected]: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
2019-05-14mm: simplify MEMORY_ISOLATION && COMPACTION || CMA into CONTIG_ALLOCAlexandre Ghiti1-1/+1
This condition allows to define alloc_contig_range, so simplify it into a more accurate naming. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <[email protected]> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rich Felker <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
2019-05-09x86/mpx, mm/core: Fix recursive munmap() corruptionDave Hansen1-4/+6
This is a bit of a mess, to put it mildly. But, it's a bug that only seems to have showed up in 4.20 but wasn't noticed until now, because nobody uses MPX. MPX has the arch_unmap() hook inside of munmap() because MPX uses bounds tables that protect other areas of memory. When memory is unmapped, there is also a need to unmap the MPX bounds tables. Barring this, unused bounds tables can eat 80% of the address space. But, the recursive do_munmap() that gets called vi arch_unmap() wreaks havoc with __do_munmap()'s state. It can result in freeing populated page tables, accessing bogus VMA state, double-freed VMAs and more. See the "long story" further below for the gory details. To fix this, call arch_unmap() before __do_unmap() has a chance to do anything meaningful. Also, remove the 'vma' argument and force the MPX code to do its own, independent VMA lookup. == UML / unicore32 impact == Remove unused 'vma' argument to arch_unmap(). No functional change. I compile tested this on UML but not unicore32. == powerpc impact == powerpc uses arch_unmap() well to watch for munmap() on the VDSO and zeroes out 'current->mm->context.vdso_base'. Moving arch_unmap() makes this happen earlier in __do_munmap(). But, 'vdso_base' seems to only be used in perf and in the signal delivery that happens near the return to userspace. I can not find any likely impact to powerpc, other than the zeroing happening a little earlier. powerpc does not use the 'vma' argument and is unaffected by its removal. I compile-tested a 64-bit powerpc defconfig. == x86 impact == For the common success case this is functionally identical to what was there before. For the munmap() failure case, it's possible that some MPX tables will be zapped for memory that continues to be in use. But, this is an extraordinarily unlikely scenario and the harm would be that MPX provides no protection since the bounds table got reset (zeroed). I can't imagine anyone doing this: ptr = mmap(); // use ptr ret = munmap(ptr); if (ret) // oh, there was an error, I'll // keep using ptr. Because if you're doing munmap(), you are *done* with the memory. There's probably no good data in there _anyway_. This passes the original reproducer from Richard Biener as well as the existing mpx selftests/. The long story: munmap() has a couple of pieces: 1. Find the affected VMA(s) 2. Split the start/end one(s) if neceesary 3. Pull the VMAs out of the rbtree 4. Actually zap the memory via unmap_region(), including freeing page tables (or queueing them to be freed). 5. Fix up some of the accounting (like fput()) and actually free the VMA itself. This specific ordering was actually introduced by: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap") during the 4.20 merge window. The previous __do_munmap() code was actually safe because the only thing after arch_unmap() was remove_vma_list(). arch_unmap() could not see 'vma' in the rbtree because it was detached, so it is not even capable of doing operations unsafe for remove_vma_list()'s use of 'vma'. Richard Biener reported a test that shows this in dmesg: [1216548.787498] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:0000000017ce560b idx:1 val:551 [1216548.787500] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: 24576 What triggered this was the recursive do_munmap() called via arch_unmap(). It was freeing page tables that has not been properly zapped. But, the problem was bigger than this. For one, arch_unmap() can free VMAs. But, the calling __do_munmap() has variables that *point* to VMAs and obviously can't handle them just getting freed while the pointer is still in use. I tried a couple of things here. First, I tried to fix the page table freeing problem in isolation, but I then found the VMA issue. I also tried having the MPX code return a flag if it modified the rbtree which would force __do_munmap() to re-walk to restart. That spiralled out of control in complexity pretty fast. Just moving arch_unmap() and accepting that the bonkers failure case might eat some bounds tables seems like the simplest viable fix. This was also reported in the following kernel bugzilla entry: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203123 There are some reports that this commit triggered this bug: dd2283f2605 ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap") While that commit certainly made the issues easier to hit, I believe the fundamental issue has been with us as long as MPX itself, thus the Fixes: tag below is for one of the original MPX commits. [ mingo: Minor edits to the changelog and the patch. ] Reported-by: Richard Biener <[email protected]> Reported-by: H.J. Lu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Anton Ivanov <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Guan Xuetao <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Jeff Dike <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Fixes: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-05-08x86/mm: Do not use set_{pud, pmd}_safe() when splitting a large pageBrijesh Singh3-43/+114
The commit 0a9fe8ca844d ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population") triggers this warning in SEV guests: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h:87 phys_pmd_init+0x30d/0x386 Call Trace: kernel_physical_mapping_init+0xce/0x259 early_set_memory_enc_dec+0x10f/0x160 kvm_smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x71/0x9d start_kernel+0x1c9/0x50b secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 A SEV guest calls kernel_physical_mapping_init() to clear the encryption mask from an existing mapping. While doing so, it also splits large pages into smaller. To split a page, kernel_physical_mapping_init() allocates a new page and updates the existing entry. The set_{pud,pmd}_safe() helpers trigger a warning when updating an entry with a page in the present state. Add a new kernel_physical_mapping_change() helper which uses the non-safe variants of set_{pmd,pud,p4d}() and {pmd,pud,p4d}_populate() routines when updating the entry. Since kernel_physical_mapping_change() may replace an existing entry with a new entry, the caller is responsible to flush the TLB at the end. Change early_set_memory_enc_dec() to use kernel_physical_mapping_change() when it wants to clear the memory encryption mask from the page table entry. [ bp: - massage commit message. - flesh out comment according to dhansen's request. - align function arguments at opening brace. ] Fixes: 0a9fe8ca844d ("x86/mm: Validate kernel_physical_mapping_init() PTE population") Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-05-07Merge branch 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-17/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 FPU state handling updates from Borislav Petkov: "This contains work started by Rik van Riel and brought to fruition by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior with the main goal to optimize when to load FPU registers: only when returning to userspace and not on every context switch (while the task remains in the kernel). In addition, this optimization makes kernel_fpu_begin() cheaper by requiring registers saving only on the first invocation and skipping that in following ones. What is more, this series cleans up and streamlines many aspects of the already complex FPU code, hopefully making it more palatable for future improvements and simplifications. Finally, there's a __user annotations fix from Jann Horn" * 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits) x86/fpu: Fault-in user stack if copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() fails x86/pkeys: Add PKRU value to init_fpstate x86/fpu: Restore regs in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() in order to use the fastpath x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace x86/fpu: Merge the two code paths in __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Restore from kernel memory on the 64-bit path too x86/fpu: Inline copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing() x86/fpu: Update xstate's PKRU value on write_pkru() x86/fpu: Prepare copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Always store the registers in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/entry: Add TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it x86/fpu: Only write PKRU if it is different from current x86/pkeys: Provide *pkru() helpers x86/fpu: Use a feature number instead of mask in two more helpers x86/fpu: Make __raw_xsave_addr() use a feature number instead of mask x86/fpu: Add an __fpregs_load_activate() internal helper ...
2019-05-07Merge tag 'printk-for-5.2' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk Pull printk updates from Petr Mladek: - Allow state reset of printk_once() calls. - Prevent crashes when dereferencing invalid pointers in vsprintf(). Only the first byte is checked for simplicity. - Make vsprintf warnings consistent and inlined. - Treewide conversion of obsolete %pf, %pF to %ps, %pF printf modifiers. - Some clean up of vsprintf and test_printf code. * tag 'printk-for-5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pmladek/printk: lib/vsprintf: Make function pointer_string static vsprintf: Limit the length of inlined error messages vsprintf: Avoid confusion between invalid address and value vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers vsprintf: Consolidate handling of unknown pointer specifiers vsprintf: Factor out %pO handler as kobject_string() vsprintf: Factor out %pV handler as va_format() vsprintf: Factor out %p[iI] handler as ip_addr_string() vsprintf: Do not check address of well-known strings vsprintf: Consistent %pK handling for kptr_restrict == 0 vsprintf: Shuffle restricted_pointer() printk: Tie printk_once / printk_deferred_once into .data.once for reset treewide: Switch printk users from %pf and %pF to %ps and %pS, respectively lib/test_printf: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
2019-05-06Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds6-136/+192
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The changes in here are: - text_poke() fixes and an extensive set of executability lockdowns, to (hopefully) eliminate the last residual circumstances under which we are using W|X mappings even temporarily on x86 kernels. This required a broad range of surgery in text patching facilities, module loading, trampoline handling and other bits. - tweak page fault messages to be more informative and more structured. - remove DISCONTIGMEM support on x86-32 and make SPARSEMEM the default. - reduce KASLR granularity on 5-level paging kernels from 512 GB to 1 GB. - misc other changes and updates" * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits) x86/mm: Initialize PGD cache during mm initialization x86/alternatives: Add comment about module removal races x86/kprobes: Use vmalloc special flag x86/ftrace: Use vmalloc special flag bpf: Use vmalloc special flag modules: Use vmalloc special flag mm/vmalloc: Add flag for freeing of special permsissions mm/hibernation: Make hibernation handle unmapped pages x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_*() functions x86/alternatives: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() x86/jump-label: Remove support for custom text poker x86/modules: Avoid breaking W^X while loading modules x86/kprobes: Set instruction page as executable x86/ftrace: Set trampoline pages as executable x86/kgdb: Avoid redundant comparison of patched code x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching fork: Provide a function for copying init_mm uprobes: Initialize uprobes earlier x86/mm: Save debug registers when loading a temporary mm ...
2019-05-06Merge branch 'x86-irq-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-20/+47
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 irq updates from Ingo Molnar: "Here are the main changes in this tree: - Introduce x86-64 IRQ/exception/debug stack guard pages to detect stack overflows immediately and deterministically. - Clean up over a decade worth of cruft accumulated. The outcome of this should be more clear-cut faults/crashes when any of the low level x86 CPU stacks overflow, instead of silent memory corruption and sporadic failures much later on" * 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits) x86/irq: Fix outdated comments x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug code x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages x86/irq/64: Init hardirq_stack_ptr during CPU hotplug x86/irq/32: Handle irq stack allocation failure proper x86/irq/32: Invoke irq_ctx_init() from init_IRQ() x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE x86/dumpstack/64: Speedup in_exception_stack() x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack x86/exceptions: Enable IST guard pages x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array x86/cpu: Prepare TSS.IST setup for guard pages x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist x86/irq/64: Use cpu entry area instead of orig_ist x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist ...
2019-05-06Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-5/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar: "This includes the following changes: - cpu_has() cleanups - sync_bitops.h modernization to the rmwcc.h facility, similarly to bitops.h - continued LTO annotations/fixes - misc cleanups and smaller cleanups" * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/um/vdso: Drop unnecessary cc-ldoption x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit build x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .text x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so x86/asm: Modernize sync_bitops.h x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has() x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has() x86/asm: Clarify static_cpu_has()'s intended use x86/uaccess: Fix implicit cast of __user pointer x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has()
2019-05-06Merge branch 'core-speculation-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull speculation mitigation update from Ingo Molnar: "This adds the "mitigations=" bootline option, which offers a cross-arch set of options that will work on x86, PowerPC and s390 that will map to the arch specific option internally" * 'core-speculation-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: s390/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option powerpc/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option
2019-05-05x86/mm: Initialize PGD cache during mm initializationNadav Amit1-4/+6
Poking-mm initialization might require to duplicate the PGD in early stage. Initialize the PGD cache earlier to prevent boot failures. Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Fixes: 4fc19708b165 ("x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patching") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-30mm/hibernation: Make hibernation handle unmapped pagesRick Edgecombe1-4/+0
Make hibernate handle unmapped pages on the direct map when CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_ALIAS=y is set. These functions allow for setting pages to invalid configurations, so now hibernate should check if the pages have valid mappings and handle if they are unmapped when doing a hibernate save operation. Previously this checking was already done when CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y was configured. It does not appear to have a big hibernating performance impact. The speed of the saving operation before this change was measured as 819.02 MB/s, and after was measured at 813.32 MB/s. Before: [ 4.670938] PM: Wrote 171996 kbytes in 0.21 seconds (819.02 MB/s) After: [ 4.504714] PM: Wrote 178932 kbytes in 0.22 seconds (813.32 MB/s) Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-30x86/mm/cpa: Add set_direct_map_*() functionsRick Edgecombe1-3/+11
Add two new functions set_direct_map_default_noflush() and set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() for setting the direct map alias for the page to its default valid permissions and to an invalid state that cannot be cached in a TLB, respectively. These functions do not flush the TLB. Note, __kernel_map_pages() does something similar but flushes the TLB and doesn't reset the permission bits to default on all architectures. Also add an ARCH config ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP for specifying whether these have an actual implementation or a default empty one. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-30x86/alternatives: Initialize temporary mm for patchingNadav Amit1-0/+37
To prevent improper use of the PTEs that are used for text patching, the next patches will use a temporary mm struct. Initailize it by copying the init mm. The address that will be used for patching is taken from the lower area that is usually used for the task memory. Doing so prevents the need to frequently synchronize the temporary-mm (e.g., when BPF programs are installed), since different PGDs are used for the task memory. Finally, randomize the address of the PTEs to harden against exploits that use these PTEs. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-30Merge tag 'v5.1-rc7' into x86/mm, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar1-0/+6
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-26x86/mm/tlb: Remove 'struct flush_tlb_info' from the stackNadav Amit1-34/+82
Move flush_tlb_info variables off the stack. This allows to align flush_tlb_info to cache-line and avoid potentially unnecessary cache line movements. It also allows to have a fixed virtual-to-physical translation of the variables, which reduces TLB misses. Use per-CPU struct for flush_tlb_mm_range() and flush_tlb_kernel_range(). Add debug assertions to ensure there are no nested TLB flushes that might overwrite the per-CPU data. For arch_tlbbatch_flush() use a const struct. Results when running a microbenchmarks that performs 10^6 MADV_DONTEED operations and touching a page, in which 3 additional threads run a busy-wait loop (5 runs, PTI and retpolines are turned off): base off-stack ---- --------- avg (usec/op) 1.629 1.570 (-3%) stddev 0.014 0.009 Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-26Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm, to pick up dependent fixIngo Molnar4-4/+5
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-24x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from 64-bit implementation of vmalloc_fault()Jiri Kosina1-2/+0
In-NMI warnings have been added to vmalloc_fault() via: ebc8827f75 ("x86: Barf when vmalloc and kmemcheck faults happen in NMI") back in the time when our NMI entry code could not cope with nested NMIs. These days, it's perfectly fine to take a fault in NMI context and we don't have to care about the fact that IRET from the fault handler might cause NMI nesting. This warning has already been removed from 32-bit implementation of vmalloc_fault() in: 6863ea0cda8 ("x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()") but the 64-bit version was omitted. Remove the bogus warning also from 64-bit implementation of vmalloc_fault(). Reported-by: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Fixes: 6863ea0cda8 ("x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-24x86/mm: Fix a crash with kmemleak_scan()Qian Cai1-0/+6
The first kmemleak_scan() call after boot would trigger the crash below because this callpath: kernel_init free_initmem mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem free_init_pages unmaps memory inside the .bss when DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y. kmemleak_init() will register the .data/.bss sections and then kmemleak_scan() will scan those addresses and dereference them looking for pointer references. If free_init_pages() frees and unmaps pages in those sections, kmemleak_scan() will crash if referencing one of those addresses: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffbd402000 CPU: 12 PID: 325 Comm: kmemleak Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4+ #4 RIP: 0010:scan_block Call Trace: scan_gray_list kmemleak_scan kmemleak_scan_thread kthread ret_from_fork Since kmemleak_free_part() is tolerant to unknown objects (not tracked by kmemleak), it is fine to call it from free_init_pages() even if not all address ranges passed to this function are known to kmemleak. [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: b3f0907c71e0 ("x86/mm: Add .bss..decrypted section to hold shared variables") Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-21x86/fault: Make fault messages more succinctBorislav Petkov1-3/+3
So we are going to be staring at those in the next years, let's make them more succinct. In particular: - change "address = " to "address: " - "-privileged" reads funny. It should be simply "kernel" or "user" - "from kernel code" reads funny too. "kernel mode" or "user mode" is more natural. An actual example says more than 1000 words, of course: [ 0.248370] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000005b8 [ 0.249120] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 0.249717] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-19x86/fault: Decode and print #PF oops in human readable formSean Christopherson1-31/+11
Linus pointed out that deciphering the raw #PF error code and printing a more human readable message are two different things, and also that printing the negative cases is mostly just noise[1]. For example, the USER bit doesn't mean the fault originated in user code and stating that an oops wasn't due to a protection keys violation isn't interesting since an oops on a keys violation is a one-in-a-million scenario. Remove the per-bit decoding of the error code and instead print: - the raw error code - why the fault occurred - the effective privilege level of the access - the type of access - whether the fault originated in user code or kernel code This provides the user with the information needed to triage 99.9% of oopses without polluting the log with useless information or conflating the error_code with the CPL. Sample output: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address = 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor-privileged instruction fetch from kernel code #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page BUG: unable to handle page fault for address = ffffbeef00000000 #PF: supervisor-privileged instruction fetch from kernel code #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page BUG: unable to handle page fault for address = ffffc90000230000 #PF: supervisor-privileged write access from kernel code #PF: error_code(0x000b) - reserved bit violation [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whk_fsnxVMvF1T2fFCaP2WrvSybABrLQCWLJyCvHw6NKA@mail.gmail.com Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-19x86/fault: Reword initial BUG message for unhandled page faultsSean Christopherson1-3/+6
Reword the NULL pointer dereference case to simply state that a NULL pointer was dereferenced, i.e. drop "unable to handle" as that implies that there are instances where the kernel actual does handle NULL pointer dereferences, which is not true barring funky exception fixup. For the non-NULL case, replace "kernel paging request" with "page fault" as the kernel can technically oops on faults that originated in user code. Dropping "kernel" also allows future patches to provide detailed information on where the fault occurred, e.g. user vs. kernel, without conflicting with the initial BUG message. In both cases, replace "at address=" with wording more appropriate to the oops, as "at" may be interpreted as stating that the address is the RIP of the instruction that faulted. Last, and probably least, further qualify the NULL-pointer path by checking that the fault actually originated in kernel code. It's technically possible for userspace to map address 0, and not printing a super specific message is the least of our worries if the kernel does manage to oops on an actual NULL pointer dereference from userspace. Before: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at ffffbeef00000000 BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffbeef00000000 After: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address = 0000000000000008 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address = ffffbeef00000000 Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-18x86/mm/KASLR: Fix the size of the direct mapping sectionBaoquan He1-1/+1
kernel_randomize_memory() uses __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT to calculate the maximum amount of system RAM supported. The size of the direct mapping section is obtained from the smaller one of the below two values: (actual system RAM size + padding size) vs (max system RAM size supported) This calculation is wrong since commit b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52"). In it, __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT was changed to be 52, regardless of whether the kernel is using 4-level or 5-level page tables. Thus, it will always use 4 PB as the maximum amount of system RAM, even in 4-level paging mode where it should actually be 64 TB. Thus, the size of the direct mapping section will always be the sum of the actual system RAM size plus the padding size. Even when the amount of system RAM is 64 TB, the following layout will still be used. Obviously KALSR will be weakened significantly. |____|_______actual RAM_______|_padding_|______the rest_______| 0 64TB ~120TB Instead, it should be like this: |____|_______actual RAM_______|_________the rest______________| 0 64TB ~120TB The size of padding region is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING, which is 10 TB by default. The above issue only exists when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING is set to a non-zero value, which is the case when CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is enabled. Otherwise, using __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT doesn't affect KASLR. Fix it by replacing __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: b83ce5ee9147 ("x86/mm/64: Make __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT always 52") Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190417083536.GE7065@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
2019-04-17x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+3
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> (on x86) Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: Jon Masters <[email protected]> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Price <[email protected]> Cc: Phil Auld <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-04-17x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stackThomas Gleixner1-1/+3
The debug IST stack is actually two separate debug stacks to handle #DB recursion. This is required because the CPU starts always at top of stack on exception entry, which means on #DB recursion the second #DB would overwrite the stack of the first. The low level entry code therefore adjusts the top of stack on entry so a secondary #DB starts from a different stack page. But the stack pages are adjacent without a guard page between them. Split the debug stack into 3 stacks which are separated by guard pages. The 3rd stack is never mapped into the cpu_entry_area and is only there to catch triple #DB nesting: --- top of DB_stack <- Initial stack --- end of DB_stack guard page --- top of DB1_stack <- Top of stack after entering first #DB --- end of DB1_stack guard page --- top of DB2_stack <- Top of stack after entering second #DB --- end of DB2_stack guard page If DB2 would not act as the final guard hole, a second #DB would point the top of #DB stack to the stack below #DB1 which would be valid and not catch the not so desired triple nesting. The backing store does not allocate any memory for DB2 and its guard page as it is not going to be mapped into the cpu_entry_area. - Adjust the low level entry code so it adjusts top of #DB with the offset between the stacks instead of exception stack size. - Make the dumpstack code aware of the new stacks. - Adjust the in_debug_stack() implementation and move it into the NMI code where it belongs. As this is NMI hotpath code, it just checks the full area between top of DB_stack and bottom of DB1_stack without checking for the guard page. That's correct because the NMI cannot hit a stackpointer pointing to the guard page between DB and DB1 stack. Even if it would, then the NMI operation still is unaffected, but the resume of the debug exception on the topmost DB stack will crash by touching the guard page. [ bp: Make exception_stack_names static const char * const ] Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_istThomas Gleixner1-1/+2
The orig_ist[] array is a shadow copy of the IST array in the TSS. The reason why it exists is that older kernels used two TSS variants with different pointers into the debug stack. orig_ist[] contains the real starting points. There is no point anymore to do so because the same information can be retrieved using the base address of the cpu entry area mapping and the offsets of the various exception stacks. No functional change. Preparation for removing orig_ist. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/cpu_entry_area: Provide exception stack accessorThomas Gleixner1-0/+4
Store a pointer to the per cpu entry area exception stack mappings to allow fast retrieval. Required for converting various places from using the shadow IST array to directly doing address calculations on the actual mapping address. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/cpu_entry_area: Prepare for IST guard pagesThomas Gleixner1-7/+30
To allow guard pages between the IST stacks each stack needs to be mapped individually. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/exceptions: Add structs for exception stacksThomas Gleixner1-5/+3
At the moment everything assumes a full linear mapping of the various exception stacks. Adding guard pages to the cpu entry area mapping of the exception stacks will break that assumption. As a preparatory step convert both the real storage and the effective mapping in the cpu entry area from character arrays to structures. To ensure that both arrays have the same ordering and the same size of the individual stacks fill the members with a macro. The guard size is the only difference between the two resulting structures. For now both have guard size 0 until the preparation of all usage sites is done. Provide a couple of helper macros which are used in the following conversions. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/cpu_entry_area: Cleanup setup functionsThomas Gleixner1-10/+9
No point in retrieving the entry area pointer over and over. Do it once and use unsigned int for 'cpu' everywhere. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-17x86/exceptions: Make IST index zero basedThomas Gleixner1-1/+1
The defines for the exception stack (IST) array in the TSS are using the SDM convention IST1 - IST7. That causes all sorts of code to subtract 1 for array indices related to IST. That's confusing at best and does not provide any value. Make the indices zero based and fixup the usage sites. The only code which needs to adjust the 0 based index is the interrupt descriptor setup which needs to add 1 now. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> Cc: Dou Liyang <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-16x86/mm/tlb: Revert "x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info"Peter Zijlstra1-1/+1
Revert the following commit: 515ab7c41306: ("x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info") I found out (the hard way) that under some .config options (notably L1_CACHE_SHIFT=7) and compiler combinations this on-stack alignment leads to a 320 byte stack usage, which then triggers a KASAN stack warning elsewhere. Using 320 bytes of stack space for a 40 byte structure is ludicrous and clearly not right. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Acked-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Fixes: 515ab7c41306 ("x86/mm: Align TLB invalidation info") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [ Minor changelog edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-16x86/mm: Prevent bogus warnings with "noexec=off"Thomas Gleixner2-2/+3
Xose Vazquez Perez reported boot warnings when NX is disabled on the kernel command line. __early_set_fixmap() triggers this warning: attempted to set unsupported pgprot: 8000000000000163 bits: 8000000000000000 supported: 7fffffffffffffff WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h:537 __early_set_fixmap+0xa2/0xff because it uses __default_kernel_pte_mask to mask out unsupported bits. Use __supported_pte_mask instead. Disabling NX on the command line also triggers the NX warning in the page table mapping check: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c:262 note_page+0x2ae/0x650 .... Make the warning depend on NX set in __supported_pte_mask. Reported-by: Xose Vazquez Perez <[email protected]> Tested-by: Xose Vazquez Perez <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2019-04-12x86/pkeys: Add PKRU value to init_fpstateSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-0/+6
The task's initial PKRU value is set partly for fpu__clear()/ copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(). It is not part of init_fpstate.xsave and instead it is set explicitly. If the user removes the PKRU state from XSAVE in the signal handler then __fpu__restore_sig() will restore the missing bits from `init_fpstate' and initialize the PKRU value to 0. Add the `init_pkru_value' to `init_fpstate' so it is set to the init value in such a case. In theory copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs() could be removed because restoring the PKRU at return-to-userland should be enough. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <[email protected]> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> Cc: kvm ML <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-11x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU stateRik van Riel1-1/+0
While most of a task's FPU state is only needed in user space, the protection keys need to be in place immediately after a context switch. The reason is that any access to userspace memory while running in kernel mode also needs to abide by the memory permissions specified in the protection keys. The "eager switch" is a preparation for loading the FPU state on return to userland. Instead of decoupling PKRU state from xstate, update PKRU within xstate on write operations by the kernel. For user tasks the PKRU should be always read from the xsave area and it should not change anything because the PKRU value was loaded as part of FPU restore. For kernel threads the default "init_pkru_value" will be written. Before this commit, the kernel thread would end up with a random value which it inherited from the previous user task. [ bigeasy: save pkru to xstate, no cache, don't use __raw_xsave_addr() ] [ bp: update commit message, sort headers properly in asm/fpu/xstate.h ] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Aubrey Li <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: kvm ML <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-11x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing itSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-7/+0
write_pkru() checks if the current value is the same as the expected value. So instead of just checking if the current and new value is zero (and skip the write in such a case) we can benefit from that. Remove the zero check of PKRU, __write_pkru() provides such a check now. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> Cc: kvm ML <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-10x86/fpu: Use a feature number instead of mask in two more helpersSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-3/+3
After changing the argument of __raw_xsave_addr() from a mask to number Dave suggested to check if it makes sense to do the same for get_xsave_addr(). As it turns out it does. Only get_xsave_addr() needs the mask to check if the requested feature is part of what is supported/saved and then uses the number again. The shift operation is cheaper compared to fls64() (find last bit set). Also, the feature number uses less opcode space compared to the mask. :) Make the get_xsave_addr() argument a xfeature number instead of a mask and fix up its callers. Furthermore, use xfeature_nr and xfeature_mask consistently. This results in the following changes to the kvm code: feature -> xfeature_mask index -> xfeature_nr Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> Cc: kvm ML <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <[email protected]> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Siarhei Liakh <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-10x86/fpu: Remove fpu->initializedSebastian Andrzej Siewior1-6/+1
The struct fpu.initialized member is always set to one for user tasks and zero for kernel tasks. This avoids saving/restoring the FPU registers for kernel threads. The ->initialized = 0 case for user tasks has been removed in previous changes, for instance, by doing an explicit unconditional init at fork() time for FPU-less systems which was otherwise delayed until the emulated opcode. The context switch code (switch_fpu_prepare() + switch_fpu_finish()) can't unconditionally save/restore registers for kernel threads. Not only would it slow down the switch but also load a zeroed xcomp_bv for XSAVES. For kernel_fpu_begin() (+end) the situation is similar: EFI with runtime services uses this before alternatives_patched is true. Which means that this function is used too early and it wasn't the case before. For those two cases, use current->mm to distinguish between user and kernel thread. For kernel_fpu_begin() skip save/restore of the FPU registers. During the context switch into a kernel thread don't do anything. There is no reason to save the FPU state of a kernel thread. The reordering in __switch_to() is important because the current() pointer needs to be valid before switch_fpu_finish() is invoked so ->mm is seen of the new task instead the old one. N.B.: fpu__save() doesn't need to check ->mm because it is called by user tasks only. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Aubrey Li <[email protected]> Cc: Babu Moger <[email protected]> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]> Cc: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Cc: kvm ML <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: x86-ml <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-09treewide: Switch printk users from %pf and %pF to %ps and %pS, respectivelySakari Ailus1-2/+2
%pF and %pf are functionally equivalent to %pS and %ps conversion specifiers. The former are deprecated, therefore switch the current users to use the preferred variant. The changes have been produced by the following command: git grep -l '%p[fF]' | grep -v '^\(tools\|Documentation\)/' | \ while read i; do perl -i -pe 's/%pf/%ps/g; s/%pF/%pS/g;' $i; done And verifying the result. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> (for btrfs) Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> (for mm/memblock.c) Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> (for drivers/pci) Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
2019-04-08x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()Borislav Petkov3-5/+5
Using static_cpu_has() is pointless on those paths, convert them to the boot_cpu_has() variant. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-05x86/mm/KASLR: Reduce randomization granularity for 5-level paging to 1GBBaoquan He1-8/+2
The current randomization granularity of 5-level is 512 GB. The mapping of the real mode trampoline has been reduced to one PUD entry, so there is no restriction anymore. Reduce the granularity to 1GB for 5-level paging mode which allows better randomization. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2019-04-05x86/mm/KASLR: Use only one PUD entry for real mode trampolineBaoquan He1-47/+37
The current code builds identity mapping for the real mode trampoline by borrowing page tables from the direct mapping section if KASLR is enabled. It copies present entries of the first PUD table in 4-level paging mode, or the first P4D table in 5-level paging mode. However, there's only a very small area under low 1 MB reserved for the real mode trampoline in reserve_real_mode() so it makes no sense to build up a really large mapping for it. Reduce it to one PUD (1GB) entry. This matches the randomization granularity in 4-level paging mode and allows to change the randomization granularity in 5-level paging mode from 512GB to 1GB later. [ tglx: Massaged changelog and comments ] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]