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Split the check for having a vmexit handler to svm_check_exit_valid,
and make svm_handle_invalid_exit only handle a vmexit that is
already not valid.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210811122927.900604-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop @shared from tdp_mmu_link_page() and hardcode it to work for
mmu_lock being held for read. The helper has exactly one caller and
in all likelihood will only ever have exactly one caller. Even if KVM
adds a path to install translations without an initiating page fault,
odds are very, very good that the path will just be a wrapper to the
"page fault" handler (both SNP and TDX RFCs propose patches to do
exactly that).
No functional change intended.
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810224554.2978735-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Existing KVM code tracks the number of large pages regardless of their
sizes. Therefore, when large page of 1GB (or larger) is adopted, the
information becomes less useful because lpages counts a mix of 1G and 2M
pages.
So remove the lpages since it is easy for user space to aggregate the info.
Instead, provide a comprehensive page stats of all sizes from 4K to 512G.
Suggested-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Cc: Jing Zhang <jingzhangos@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210803044607.599629-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Factor in whether or not the old/new SPTEs are shadow-present when
adjusting the large page stats in the TDP MMU. A modified MMIO SPTE can
toggle the page size bit, as bit 7 is used to store the MMIO generation,
i.e. is_large_pte() can get a false positive when called on a MMIO SPTE.
Ditto for nuking SPTEs with REMOVED_SPTE, which sets bit 7 in its magic
value.
Opportunistically move the logic below the check to verify at least one
of the old/new SPTEs is shadow present.
Use is/was_leaf even though is/was_present would suffice. The code
generation is roughly equivalent since all flags need to be computed
prior to the code in question, and using the *_leaf flags will minimize
the diff in a future enhancement to account all pages, i.e. will change
the check to "is_leaf != was_leaf".
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Fixes: 1699f65c8b65 ("kvm/x86: Fix 'lpages' kvm stat for TDM MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210803044607.599629-3-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop an unnecessary is_shadow_present_pte() check when updating the rmaps
after installing a non-MMIO SPTE. set_spte() is used only to create
shadow-present SPTEs, e.g. MMIO SPTEs are handled early on, mmu_set_spte()
runs with mmu_lock held for write, i.e. the SPTE can't be zapped between
writing the SPTE and updating the rmaps.
Opportunistically combine the "new SPTE" logic for large pages and rmaps.
No functional change intended.
Suggested-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210803044607.599629-2-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add new types of KVM stats, linear and logarithmic histogram.
Histogram are very useful for observing the value distribution
of time or size related stats.
Signed-off-by: Jing Zhang <jingzhangos@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210802165633.1866976-2-jingzhangos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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APIC base relocation is not supported anyway and won't work
correctly so just drop the code that handles it and keep AVIC
MMIO bar at the default APIC base.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-17-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently it is possible to have the following scenario:
1. AVIC is disabled by svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl
2. svm_vcpu_blocking calls avic_vcpu_put which does nothing
3. svm_vcpu_unblocking enables the AVIC (due to KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE)
and then calls avic_vcpu_load
4. warning is triggered in avic_vcpu_load since
AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK was never cleared
While it is possible to just remove the warning, it seems to be more robust
to fully disable/enable AVIC in svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl by calling the
avic_vcpu_load/avic_vcpu_put
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-16-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-15-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Since AVIC can be inhibited and uninhibited rapidly it is possible that
we have nothing to do by the time the svm_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl
is called.
Detect and avoid this, which will be useful when we will start calling
avic_vcpu_load/avic_vcpu_put when the avic inhibition state changes.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-14-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that kvm_request_apicv_update doesn't need to drop the kvm->srcu lock,
we can call kvm_request_apicv_update directly.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-13-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_HYPERV is currently unconditionally forced upon
SynIC activation as SynIC's AutoEOI is incompatible with APICv/AVIC. It is,
however, possible to track whether the feature was actually used by the
guest and only inhibit APICv/AVIC when needed.
TLFS suggests a dedicated 'HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED' flag to let
Windows know that AutoEOI feature should be avoided. While it's up to
KVM userspace to set the flag, KVM can help a bit by exposing global
APICv/AVIC enablement.
Maxim:
- always set HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED in kvm_get_hv_cpuid,
since this feature can be used regardless of AVIC
Paolo:
- use arch.apicv_update_lock to protect the hv->synic_auto_eoi_used
instead of atomic ops
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-12-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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It is never a good idea to enter a guest on a vCPU when the
AVIC inhibition state doesn't match the enablement of
the AVIC on the vCPU.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-11-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently on SVM, the kvm_request_apicv_update toggles the APICv
memslot without doing any synchronization.
If there is a mismatch between that memslot state and the AVIC state,
on one of the vCPUs, an APIC mmio access can be lost:
For example:
VCPU0: enable the APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT
VCPU1: access an APIC mmio register.
Since AVIC is still disabled on VCPU1, the access will not be intercepted
by it, and neither will it cause MMIO fault, but rather it will just be
read/written from/to the dummy page mapped into the
APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT.
Fix that by adding a lock guarding the AVIC state changes, and carefully
order the operations of kvm_request_apicv_update to avoid this race:
1. Take the lock
2. Send KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE
3. Update the apic inhibit reason
4. Release the lock
This ensures that at (2) all vCPUs are kicked out of the guest mode,
but don't yet see the new avic state.
Then only after (4) all other vCPUs can update their AVIC state and resume.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-10-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Thanks to the former patches, it is now possible to keep the APICv
memslot always enabled, and it will be invisible to the guest
when it is inhibited
This code is based on a suggestion from Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/19/2970
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-9-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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on AMD, APIC virtualization needs to dynamicaly inhibit the AVIC in a
response to some events, and this is problematic and not efficient to do by
enabling/disabling the memslot that covers APIC's mmio range.
Plus due to SRCU locking, it makes it more complex to
request AVIC inhibition.
Instead, the APIC memslot will be always enabled, but be invisible
to the guest, such as the MMU code will not install a SPTE for it,
when it is inhibited and instead jump straight to emulating the access.
When inhibiting the AVIC, this SPTE will be zapped.
This code is based on a suggestion from Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/19/2970
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This will allow it to return RET_PF_EMULATE for APIC mmio
emulation.
This code is based on a patch from Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/19/2970
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-7-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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try_async_pf is a wrong name for this function, since this code
is used when asynchronous page fault is not enabled as well.
This code is based on a patch from Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/19/2970
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This together with previous patch, ensures that
kvm_zap_gfn_range doesn't race with page fault
running on another vcpu, and will make this page fault code
retry instead.
This is based on a patch suggested by Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/22/1025
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This comment makes it clear that the range of gfns that this
function receives is non inclusive.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address expects (start gfn, number of pages),
and not (start gfn, end gfn)
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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This together with the next patch will fix a future race between
kvm_zap_gfn_range and the page fault handler, which will happen
when AVIC memslot is going to be only partially disabled.
The performance impact is minimal since kvm_zap_gfn_range is only
called by users, update_mtrr() and kvm_post_set_cr0().
Both only use it if the guest has non-coherent DMA, in order to
honor the guest's UC memtype.
MTRR and CD setup only happens at boot, and generally in an area
where the page tables should be small (for CD) or should not
include the affected GFNs at all (for MTRRs).
This is based on a patch suggested by Sean Christopherson:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/7/22/1025
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210810205251.424103-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use this file to dump rmap statistic information. The statistic is done by
calculating the rmap count and the result is log-2-based.
An example output of this looks like (idle 6GB guest, right after boot linux):
Rmap_Count: 0 1 2-3 4-7 8-15 16-31 32-63 64-127 128-255 256-511 512-1023
Level=4K: 3086676 53045 12330 1272 502 121 76 2 0 0 0
Level=2M: 5947 231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Level=1G: 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210730220455.26054-5-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce kvm_mmu_slot_lpages() to calculcate lpage_info and rmap array size.
The other __kvm_mmu_slot_lpages() can take an extra parameter of npages rather
than fetching from the memslot pointer. Start to use the latter one in
kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata().
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210730220455.26054-4-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If L1 disables VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts, and doesn't enable
Virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE (currently not supported for the nested hypervisor),
then VMLOAD/VMSAVE must operate on the L1 physical memory, which is only
possible by making L0 intercept these instructions.
Failure to do so allowed the nested guest to run VMLOAD/VMSAVE unintercepted,
and thus read/write portions of the host physical memory.
Fixes: 89c8a4984fc9 ("KVM: SVM: Enable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature")
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Clear nested.pi_pending on nested VM-Enter even if L2 will run without
posted interrupts enabled. If nested.pi_pending is left set from a
previous L2, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() will pick up the
stale flag and exit to userspace with an "internal emulation error" due
the new L2 not having a valid nested.pi_desc.
Arguably, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() should first check for
posted interrupts being enabled, but it's also completely reasonable that
KVM wouldn't screw up a fundamental flag. Not to mention that the mere
existence of nested.pi_pending is a long-standing bug as KVM shouldn't
move the posted interrupt out of the IRR until it's actually processed,
e.g. KVM effectively drops an interrupt when it performs a nested VM-Exit
with a "pending" posted interrupt. Fixing the mess is a future problem.
Prior to vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() interpreting a null PI
descriptor as an error, this was a benign bug as the null PI descriptor
effectively served as a check on PI not being enabled. Even then, the
new flow did not become problematic until KVM started checking the result
of kvm_check_nested_events().
Fixes: 705699a13994 ("KVM: nVMX: Enable nested posted interrupt processing")
Fixes: 966eefb89657 ("KVM: nVMX: Disable vmcs02 posted interrupts if vmcs12 PID isn't mappable")
Fixes: 47d3530f86c0 ("KVM: x86: Exit to userspace when kvm_check_nested_events fails")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810144526.2662272-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The ROL16(val, n) macro is repeatedly defined in several vmcs-related
files, and it has never been used outside the KVM context.
Let's move it to vmcs.h without any intended functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20210809093410.59304-4-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the declaration of kvm_spurious_fault() to KVM's "private" x86.h,
it should never be called by anything other than low level KVM code.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
[sean: rebased to a series without __ex()/__kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210809173955.1710866-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove the __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() and __ex() macros now that all
VMX and SVM instructions use asm goto to handle the fault (or in the
case of VMREAD, completely custom logic). Drop kvm_spurious_fault()'s
asmlinkage annotation as __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() was the only
flow that invoked it from assembly code.
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210809173955.1710866-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Now that nested VMX pulls KVM's desired VMCS controls from vmcs01 instead
of re-calculating on the fly, bury the helpers that do the calcluations
in vmx.c.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810171952.2758100-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove the secondary execution controls cache now that it's effectively
dead code; it is only read immediately after it is written.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810171952.2758100-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When preparing controls for vmcs02, grab KVM's desired controls from
vmcs01's shadow state instead of recalculating the controls from scratch,
or in the secondary execution controls, instead of using the dedicated
cache. Calculating secondary exec controls is eye-poppingly expensive
due to the guest CPUID checks, hence the dedicated cache, but the other
calculations aren't exactly free either.
Explicitly clear several bits (x2APIC, DESC exiting, and load EFER on
exit) as appropriate as they may be set in vmcs01, whereas the previous
implementation relied on dynamic bits being cleared in the calculator.
Intentionally propagate VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL from
vmcs01 to vmcs02. Whether or not PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is loaded depends on
whether or not perf itself is active, so unless perf stops between the
exit from L1 and entry to L2, vmcs01 will hold the desired value. This
is purely an optimization as atomic_switch_perf_msrs() will set/clear
the control as needed at VM-Enter, i.e. it avoids two extra VMWRITEs in
the case where perf is active (versus starting with the bits clear in
vmcs02, which was the previous behavior).
Cc: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810171952.2758100-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The commit efdab992813fb ("KVM: x86: fix escape of guest dr6 to the host")
fixed a bug by resetting DR6 unconditionally when the vcpu being scheduled out.
But writing to debug registers is slow, and it can be visible in perf results
sometimes, even if neither the host nor the guest activate breakpoints.
Since KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT on Intel processors is the only case
where DR6 gets the guest value, and it never happens at all on SVM,
the register can be cleared in vmx.c right after reading it.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit c77fb5fe6f03 ("KVM: x86: Allow the guest to run with dirty debug
registers") allows the guest accessing to DRs without exiting when
KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT and we need to ensure that they are synchronized
on entry to the guest---including DR6 that was not synced before the commit.
But the commit sets the hardware DR6 not only when KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT,
but also when KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED. The second case is unnecessary
and just leads to a more case which leaks stale DR6 to the host which has
to be resolved by unconditionally reseting DR6 in kvm_arch_vcpu_put().
Even if KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT, however, setting the host DR6 only matters
on VMX because SVM always uses the DR6 value from the VMCB. So move this
line to vmx.c and make it conditional on KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT.
Reported-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Commit ae561edeb421 ("KVM: x86: DR0-DR3 are not clear on reset") added code to
ensure eff_db are updated when they're modified through non-standard paths.
But there is no reason to also update hardware DRs unless hardware breakpoints
are active or DR exiting is disabled, and in those cases updating hardware is
handled by KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT and KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED.
KVM_DEBUGREG_RELOAD just causes unnecesarry load of hardware DRs and is better
to be removed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <20210809174307.145263-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Merge topic branch with fixes for 5.14-rc6 and 5.15 merge window.
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Merge topic branch with fixes for both 5.14-rc6 and 5.15.
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Add yet another spinlock for the TDP MMU and take it when marking indirect
shadow pages unsync. When using the TDP MMU and L1 is running L2(s) with
nested TDP, KVM may encounter shadow pages for the TDP entries managed by
L1 (controlling L2) when handling a TDP MMU page fault. The unsync logic
is not thread safe, e.g. the kvm_mmu_page fields are not atomic, and
misbehaves when a shadow page is marked unsync via a TDP MMU page fault,
which runs with mmu_lock held for read, not write.
Lack of a critical section manifests most visibly as an underflow of
unsync_children in clear_unsync_child_bit() due to unsync_children being
corrupted when multiple CPUs write it without a critical section and
without atomic operations. But underflow is the best case scenario. The
worst case scenario is that unsync_children prematurely hits '0' and
leads to guest memory corruption due to KVM neglecting to properly sync
shadow pages.
Use an entirely new spinlock even though piggybacking tdp_mmu_pages_lock
would functionally be ok. Usurping the lock could degrade performance when
building upper level page tables on different vCPUs, especially since the
unsync flow could hold the lock for a comparatively long time depending on
the number of indirect shadow pages and the depth of the paging tree.
For simplicity, take the lock for all MMUs, even though KVM could fairly
easily know that mmu_lock is held for write. If mmu_lock is held for
write, there cannot be contention for the inner spinlock, and marking
shadow pages unsync across multiple vCPUs will be slow enough that
bouncing the kvm_arch cacheline should be in the noise.
Note, even though L2 could theoretically be given access to its own EPT
entries, a nested MMU must hold mmu_lock for write and thus cannot race
against a TDP MMU page fault. I.e. the additional spinlock only _needs_ to
be taken by the TDP MMU, as opposed to being taken by any MMU for a VM
that is running with the TDP MMU enabled. Holding mmu_lock for read also
prevents the indirect shadow page from being freed. But as above, keep
it simple and always take the lock.
Alternative #1, the TDP MMU could simply pass "false" for can_unsync and
effectively disable unsync behavior for nested TDP. Write protecting leaf
shadow pages is unlikely to noticeably impact traditional L1 VMMs, as such
VMMs typically don't modify TDP entries, but the same may not hold true for
non-standard use cases and/or VMMs that are migrating physical pages (from
L1's perspective).
Alternative #2, the unsync logic could be made thread safe. In theory,
simply converting all relevant kvm_mmu_page fields to atomics and using
atomic bitops for the bitmap would suffice. However, (a) an in-depth audit
would be required, (b) the code churn would be substantial, and (c) legacy
shadow paging would incur additional atomic operations in performance
sensitive paths for no benefit (to legacy shadow paging).
Fixes: a2855afc7ee8 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Allow parallel page faults for the TDP MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210812181815.3378104-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Set the min_level for the TDP iterator at the root level when zapping all
SPTEs to optimize the iterator's try_step_down(). Zapping a non-leaf
SPTE will recursively zap all its children, thus there is no need for the
iterator to attempt to step down. This avoids rereading the top-level
SPTEs after they are zapped by causing try_step_down() to short-circuit.
In most cases, optimizing try_step_down() will be in the noise as the cost
of zapping SPTEs completely dominates the overall time. The optimization
is however helpful if the zap occurs with relatively few SPTEs, e.g. if KVM
is zapping in response to multiple memslot updates when userspace is adding
and removing read-only memslots for option ROMs. In that case, the task
doing the zapping likely isn't a vCPU thread, but it still holds mmu_lock
for read and thus can be a noisy neighbor of sorts.
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210812181414.3376143-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Pass "all ones" as the end GFN to signal "zap all" for the TDP MMU and
really zap all SPTEs in this case. As is, zap_gfn_range() skips non-leaf
SPTEs whose range exceeds the range to be zapped. If shadow_phys_bits is
not aligned to the range size of top-level SPTEs, e.g. 512gb with 4-level
paging, the "zap all" flows will skip top-level SPTEs whose range extends
beyond shadow_phys_bits and leak their SPs when the VM is destroyed.
Use the current upper bound (based on host.MAXPHYADDR) to detect that the
caller wants to zap all SPTEs, e.g. instead of using the max theoretical
gfn, 1 << (52 - 12). The more precise upper bound allows the TDP iterator
to terminate its walk earlier when running on hosts with MAXPHYADDR < 52.
Add a WARN on kmv->arch.tdp_mmu_pages when the TDP MMU is destroyed to
help future debuggers should KVM decide to leak SPTEs again.
The bug is most easily reproduced by running (and unloading!) KVM in a
VM whose host.MAXPHYADDR < 39, as the SPTE for gfn=0 will be skipped.
=============================================================================
BUG kvm_mmu_page_header (Not tainted): Objects remaining in kvm_mmu_page_header on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Slab 0x000000004d8f7af1 objects=22 used=2 fp=0x00000000624d29ac flags=0x4000000000000200(slab|zone=1)
CPU: 0 PID: 1582 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #420
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
slab_err+0x95/0xc9
__kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x3c/0x158
kmem_cache_destroy+0x3d/0xf0
kvm_mmu_module_exit+0xa/0x30 [kvm]
kvm_arch_exit+0x5d/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_exit+0x78/0x90 [kvm]
vmx_exit+0x1a/0x50 [kvm_intel]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x13f/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: faaf05b00aec ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210812181414.3376143-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use vmx_need_pf_intercept() when determining if L0 wants to handle a #PF
in L2 or if the VM-Exit should be forwarded to L1. The current logic fails
to account for the case where #PF is intercepted to handle
guest.MAXPHYADDR < host.MAXPHYADDR and ends up reflecting all #PFs into
L1. At best, L1 will complain and inject the #PF back into L2. At
worst, L1 will eat the unexpected fault and cause L2 to hang on infinite
page faults.
Note, while the bug was technically introduced by the commit that added
support for the MAXPHYADDR madness, the shame is all on commit
a0c134347baf ("KVM: VMX: introduce vmx_need_pf_intercept").
Fixes: 1dbf5d68af6f ("KVM: VMX: Add guest physical address check in EPT violation and misconfig")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210812045615.3167686-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When a nested EPT violation/misconfig is injected into the guest,
the shadow EPT PTEs associated with that address need to be synced.
This is done by kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault() before it calls
nested_ept_inject_page_fault(). However, that will only sync the
shadow EPT PTE associated with the current L1 EPTP. Since the ASID
is based on EP4TA rather than the full EPTP, so syncing the current
EPTP is not enough. The SPTEs associated with any other L1 EPTPs
in the prev_roots cache with the same EP4TA also need to be synced.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210806222229.1645356-1-junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Merge common topic branch for 5.14-rc6 and 5.15 merge window.
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hv_vcpu is initialized again a dozen lines below, and at this
point vcpu->arch.hyperv is not valid. Remove the initializer.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Remove an ancient restriction that disallowed exposing EFER.NX to the
guest if EFER.NX=0 on the host, even if NX is fully supported by the CPU.
The motivation of the check, added by commit 2cc51560aed0 ("KVM: VMX:
Avoid saving and restoring msr_efer on lightweight vmexit"), was to rule
out the case of host.EFER.NX=0 and guest.EFER.NX=1 so that KVM could run
the guest with the host's EFER.NX and thus avoid context switching EFER
if the only divergence was the NX bit.
Fast forward to today, and KVM has long since stopped running the guest
with the host's EFER.NX. Not only does KVM context switch EFER if
host.EFER.NX=1 && guest.EFER.NX=0, KVM also forces host.EFER.NX=0 &&
guest.EFER.NX=1 when using shadow paging (to emulate SMEP). Furthermore,
the entire motivation for the restriction was made obsolete over a decade
ago when Intel added dedicated host and guest EFER fields in the VMCS
(Nehalem timeframe), which reduced the overhead of context switching EFER
from 400+ cycles (2 * WRMSR + 1 * RDMSR) to a mere ~2 cycles.
In practice, the removed restriction only affects non-PAE 32-bit kernels,
as EFER.NX is set during boot if NX is supported and the kernel will use
PAE paging (32-bit or 64-bit), regardless of whether or not the kernel
will actually use NX itself (mark PTEs non-executable).
Alternatively and/or complementarily, startup_32_smp() in head_32.S could
be modified to set EFER.NX=1 regardless of paging mode, thus eliminating
the scenario where NX is supported but not enabled. However, that runs
the risk of breaking non-KVM non-PAE kernels (though the risk is very,
very low as there are no known EFER.NX errata), and also eliminates an
easy-to-use mechanism for stressing KVM's handling of guest vs. host EFER
across nested virtualization transitions.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210805183804.1221554-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The proper spelling for the acronym referring to the Edge/Level Control
Register is ELCR rather than ECLR. Adjust references accordingly. No
functional change.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.2107200251080.9461@angie.orcam.me.uk
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Merge common topic branch for 5.14-rc6 and 5.15 merge window.
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Use the secondary_exec_controls_get() accessor in vmx_has_waitpkg() to
effectively get the controls for the current VMCS, as opposed to using
vmx->secondary_exec_controls, which is the cached value of KVM's desired
controls for vmcs01 and truly not reflective of any particular VMCS.
While the waitpkg control is not dynamic, i.e. vmcs01 will always hold
the same waitpkg configuration as vmx->secondary_exec_controls, the same
does not hold true for vmcs02 if the L1 VMM hides the feature from L2.
If L1 hides the feature _and_ does not intercept MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,
L2 could incorrectly read/write L1's virtual MSR instead of taking a #GP.
Fixes: 6e3ba4abcea5 ("KVM: vmx: Emulate MSR IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810171952.2758100-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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gfn_to_rmap was removed in the previous patch so there is no need to
retain the double underscore on __gfn_to_rmap.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210804222844.1419481-7-dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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