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2020-12-06x86/uprobes: Do not use prefixes.nbytes when looping over prefixes.bytesMasami Hiramatsu1-4/+6
Since insn.prefixes.nbytes can be bigger than the size of insn.prefixes.bytes[] when a prefix is repeated, the proper check must be insn.prefixes.bytes[i] != 0 and i < 4 instead of using insn.prefixes.nbytes. Introduce a for_each_insn_prefix() macro for this purpose. Debugged by Kees Cook <[email protected]>. [ bp: Massage commit message, sync with the respective header in tools/ and drop "we". ] Fixes: 2b1444983508 ("uprobes, mm, x86: Add the ability to install and remove uprobes breakpoints") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160697103739.3146288.7437620795200799020.stgit@devnote2
2020-12-03x86/sgx: Return -EINVAL on a zero length buffer in sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
The sgx_enclave_add_pages.length field is documented as * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size) Fail with -EINVAL, when the caller gives a zero length buffer of data to be added as pages to an enclave. Right now 'ret' is returned as uninitialized in that case. [ bp: Flesh out commit message. ] Fixes: c6d26d370767 ("x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/X8ehQssnslm194ld@mwanda/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-03x86/platform/uv: Fix UV4 hub revision adjustmentMike Travis1-1/+1
Currently, UV4 is incorrectly identified as UV4A and UV4A as UV5. Hub chip starts with revision 1, fix it. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 647128f1536e ("x86/platform/uv: Update UV MMRs for UV5") Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dimitri Sivanich <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-02signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code typeGabriel Krisman Bertazi1-1/+1
SYS_USER_DISPATCH will be triggered when a syscall is sent to userspace by the Syscall User Dispatch mechanism. This adjusts eventual BUILD_BUG_ON around the tree. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01x86/mce: Rename kill_it to kill_current_taskGabriele Paoloni1-8/+8
Currently, if an MCE happens in user-mode or while the kernel is copying data from user space, 'kill_it' is used to check if execution of the interrupted task can be recovered or not; the flag name however is not very meaningful, hence rename it to match its goal. [ bp: Massage commit message, rename the queue_task_work() arg too. ] Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01x86/mce: Remove redundant call to irq_work_queue()Gabriele Paoloni1-3/+0
Currently, __mc_scan_banks() in do_machine_check() does the following callchain: __mc_scan_banks()->mce_log()->irq_work_queue(&mce_irq_work). Hence, the call to irq_work_queue() below after __mc_scan_banks() seems redundant. Just remove it. Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01x86/mce: Panic for LMCE only if mca_cfg.tolerant < 3Gabriele Paoloni1-1/+1
Right now for LMCE, if no_way_out is set, mce_panic() is called regardless of mca_cfg.tolerant. This is not correct as, if mca_cfg.tolerant = 3, the code should never panic. Add that check. [ bp: use local ptr 'cfg'. ] Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01x86/mce: Move the mce_panic() call and 'kill_it' assignments to the right placesGabriele Paoloni1-11/+4
Right now, for local MCEs the machine calls panic(), if needed, right after lmce is set. For MCE broadcasting, mce_reign() takes care of calling mce_panic(). Hence: - improve readability by moving the conditional evaluation of tolerant up to when kill_it is set first; - move the mce_panic() call up into the statement where mce_end() fails. [ bp: Massage, remove comment in the mce_end() failure case because it is superfluous; use local ptr 'cfg' in both tests. ] Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01Merge tag 'v5.10-rc6' into ras/coreBorislav Petkov17-172/+319
Merge the -rc6 tag to pick up dependent changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
2020-12-01x86/resctrl: Clean up unused function parameter in rmdir pathXiaochen Shen1-10/+7
Commit fd8d9db3559a ("x86/resctrl: Remove superfluous kernfs_get() calls to prevent refcount leak") removed superfluous kernfs_get() calls in rdtgroup_ctrl_remove() and rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(). That change resulted in an unused function parameter to these two functions. Clean up the unused function parameter in rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(), rdtgroup_rmdir_mon() and their callers rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl() and rdtgroup_rmdir(). Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-12-01Merge tag 'v5.10-rc6' into x86/cacheBorislav Petkov17-172/+319
Merge -rc6 tag to pick up dependent changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
2020-12-01x86/resctrl: Fix AMD L3 QOS CDP enable/disableBabu Moger3-2/+14
When the AMD QoS feature CDP (code and data prioritization) is enabled or disabled, the CDP bit in MSR 0000_0C81 is written on one of the CPUs in an L3 domain (core complex). That is not correct - the CDP bit needs to be updated on all the logical CPUs in the domain. This was not spelled out clearly in the spec earlier. The specification has been updated and the updated document, "AMD64 Technology Platform Quality of Service Extensions Publication # 56375 Revision: 1.02 Issue Date: October 2020" is available now. Refer the section: Code and Data Prioritization. Fix the issue by adding a new flag arch_has_per_cpu_cfg in rdt_cache data structure. The documentation can be obtained at: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56375.pdf Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 4d05bf71f157 ("x86/resctrl: Introduce AMD QOS feature") Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160675180380.15628.3309402017215002347.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu
2020-11-29Merge tag 'locking-urgent-2020-11-29' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-5/+7
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull locking fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "Two more places which invoke tracing from RCU disabled regions in the idle path. Similar to the entry path the low level idle functions have to be non-instrumentable" * tag 'locking-urgent-2020-11-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: intel_idle: Fix intel_idle() vs tracing sched/idle: Fix arch_cpu_idle() vs tracing
2020-11-29Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc6' of ↵Linus Torvalds3-43/+32
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: "A couple of urgent fixes which accumulated this last week: - Two resctrl fixes to prevent refcount leaks when manipulating the resctrl fs (Xiaochen Shen) - Correct prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) reporting (Anand K Mistry) - A fix to not lose already seen MCE severity which determines whether the machine can recover (Gabriele Paoloni)" * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce: Do not overwrite no_way_out if mce_end() fails x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb x86/resctrl: Add necessary kernfs_put() calls to prevent refcount leak x86/resctrl: Remove superfluous kernfs_get() calls to prevent refcount leak
2020-11-27Merge tag 'iommu-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Pull iommu fixes from Will Deacon: "Here's another round of IOMMU fixes for -rc6 consisting mainly of a bunch of independent driver fixes. Thomas agreed for me to take the x86 'tboot' fix here, as it fixes a regression introduced by a vt-d change. - Fix intel iommu driver when running on devices without VCCAP_REG - Fix swiotlb and "iommu=pt" interaction under TXT (tboot) - Fix missing return value check during device probe() - Fix probe ordering for Qualcomm SMMU implementation - Ensure page-sized mappings are used for AMD IOMMU buffers with SNP RMP" * tag 'iommu-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: iommu/vt-d: Don't read VCCAP register unless it exists x86/tboot: Don't disable swiotlb when iommu is forced on iommu: Check return of __iommu_attach_device() arm-smmu-qcom: Ensure the qcom_scm driver has finished probing iommu/amd: Enforce 4k mapping for certain IOMMU data structures
2020-11-27x86/mce: Do not overwrite no_way_out if mce_end() failsGabriele Paoloni1-2/+4
Currently, if mce_end() fails, no_way_out - the variable denoting whether the machine can recover from this MCE - is determined by whether the worst severity that was found across the MCA banks associated with the current CPU, is of panic severity. However, at this point no_way_out could have been already set by mca_start() after looking at all severities of all CPUs that entered the MCE handler. If mce_end() fails, check first if no_way_out is already set and, if so, stick to it, otherwise use the local worst value. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-27Merge branch 'linus' into sched/core, to resolve semantic conflictIngo Molnar11-110/+268
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
2020-11-25x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpbAnand K Mistry1-2/+2
When spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb is specified on the command line, IBPB is force-enabled and STIPB is conditionally-enabled (or not available). However, since 21998a351512 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.") the spectre_v2_user_ibpb variable is set to SPECTRE_V2_USER_{PRCTL,SECCOMP} instead of SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, which is the actual behaviour. Because the issuing of IBPB relies on the switch_mm_*_ibpb static branches, the mitigations behave as expected. Since 1978b3a53a74 ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP") this discrepency caused the misreporting of IB speculation via prctl(). On CPUs with STIBP always-on and spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb, prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) would return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE instead of PR_SPEC_DISABLE since both IBPB and STIPB are always on. It also allowed prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) to set the IB speculation mode, even though the flag is ignored. Similarly, for CPUs without SMT, prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) should also return PR_SPEC_DISABLE since IBPB is always on and STIBP is not available. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 21998a351512 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.") Fixes: 1978b3a53a74 ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP") Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110123349.1.Id0cbf996d2151f4c143c90f9028651a5b49a5908@changeid
2020-11-25x86/tboot: Don't disable swiotlb when iommu is forced onLu Baolu1-4/+1
After commit 327d5b2fee91c ("iommu/vt-d: Allow 32bit devices to uses DMA domain"), swiotlb could also be used for direct memory access if IOMMU is enabled but a device is configured to pass through the DMA translation. Keep swiotlb when IOMMU is forced on, otherwise, some devices won't work if "iommu=pt" kernel parameter is used. Fixes: 327d5b2fee91 ("iommu/vt-d: Allow 32bit devices to uses DMA domain") Reported-and-tested-by: Adrian Huang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210237 Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
2020-11-24smp: Cleanup smp_call_function*()Peter Zijlstra1-4/+3
Get rid of the __call_single_node union and cleanup the API a little to avoid external code relying on the structure layout as much. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
2020-11-24sched/idle: Fix arch_cpu_idle() vs tracingPeter Zijlstra1-5/+7
We call arch_cpu_idle() with RCU disabled, but then use local_irq_{en,dis}able(), which invokes tracing, which relies on RCU. Switch all arch_cpu_idle() implementations to use raw_local_irq_{en,dis}able() and carefully manage the lockdep,rcu,tracing state like we do in entry. (XXX: we really should change arch_cpu_idle() to not return with interrupts enabled) Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-24x86/crashdump/32: Simplify copy_oldmem_page()Thomas Gleixner1-38/+10
Replace kmap_atomic_pfn() with kmap_local_pfn() which is preemptible and can take page faults. Remove the indirection of the dump page and the related cruft which is not longer required. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-24x86/resctrl: Add necessary kernfs_put() calls to prevent refcount leakXiaochen Shen1-7/+25
On resource group creation via a mkdir an extra kernfs_node reference is obtained by kernfs_get() to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed on deletion. Currently the extra kernfs_node reference count is only dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_kn_unlock() while the rdtgroup structure is removed in a few other locations that lack the matching reference drop. In call paths of rmdir and umount, when a control group is removed, kernfs_remove() is called to remove the whole kernfs nodes tree of the control group (including the kernfs nodes trees of all child monitoring groups), and then rdtgroup structure is freed by kfree(). The rdtgroup structures of all child monitoring groups under the control group are freed by kfree() in free_all_child_rdtgrp(). Before calling kfree() to free the rdtgroup structures, the kernfs node of the control group itself as well as the kernfs nodes of all child monitoring groups still take the extra references which will never be dropped to 0 and the kernfs nodes will never be freed. It leads to reference count leak and kernfs_node_cache memory leak. For example, reference count leak is observed in these two cases: (1) mount -t resctrl resctrl /sys/fs/resctrl mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1 mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1/mon_groups/m1 umount /sys/fs/resctrl (2) mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1 mkdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1/mon_groups/m1 rmdir /sys/fs/resctrl/c1 The same reference count leak issue also exists in the error exit paths of mkdir in mkdir_rdt_prepare() and rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon(). Fix this issue by following changes to make sure the extra kernfs_node reference on rdtgroup is dropped before freeing the rdtgroup structure. (1) Introduce rdtgroup removal helper rdtgroup_remove() to wrap up kernfs_put() and kfree(). (2) Call rdtgroup_remove() in rdtgroup removal path where the rdtgroup structure is about to be freed by kfree(). (3) Call rdtgroup_remove() or kernfs_put() as appropriate in the error exit paths of mkdir where an extra reference is taken by kernfs_get(). Fixes: f3cbeacaa06e ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add rmdir support") Fixes: e02737d5b826 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add tasks files") Fixes: 60cf5e101fd4 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add mkdir to resctrl file system") Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-24x86/resctrl: Remove superfluous kernfs_get() calls to prevent refcount leakXiaochen Shen1-33/+2
Willem reported growing of kernfs_node_cache entries in slabtop when repeatedly creating and removing resctrl subdirectories as well as when repeatedly mounting and unmounting the resctrl filesystem. On resource group (control as well as monitoring) creation via a mkdir an extra kernfs_node reference is obtained to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed on deletion. The kernfs_node reference count is dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_kn_unlock(). With the above explaining the need for one kernfs_get()/kernfs_put() pair in resctrl there are more places where a kernfs_node reference is obtained without a corresponding release. The excessive amount of reference count on kernfs nodes will never be dropped to 0 and the kernfs nodes will never be freed in the call paths of rmdir and umount. It leads to reference count leak and kernfs_node_cache memory leak. Remove the superfluous kernfs_get() calls and expand the existing comments surrounding the remaining kernfs_get()/kernfs_put() pair that remains in use. Superfluous kernfs_get() calls are removed from two areas: (1) In call paths of mount and mkdir, when kernfs nodes for "info", "mon_groups" and "mon_data" directories and sub-directories are created, the reference count of newly created kernfs node is set to 1. But after kernfs_create_dir() returns, superfluous kernfs_get() are called to take an additional reference. (2) kernfs_get() calls in rmdir call paths. Fixes: 17eafd076291 ("x86/intel_rdt: Split resource group removal in two") Fixes: 4af4a88e0c92 ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mount,umount support") Fixes: f3cbeacaa06e ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add rmdir support") Fixes: d89b7379015f ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mon_data") Fixes: c7d9aac61311 ("x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Add mkdir support for RDT monitoring") Fixes: 5dc1d5c6bac2 ("x86/intel_rdt: Simplify info and base file lists") Fixes: 60cf5e101fd4 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add mkdir to resctrl file system") Fixes: 4e978d06dedb ("x86/intel_rdt: Add "info" files to resctrl file system") Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Tested-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-24x86/sgx: Fix sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() kernel-doc commentBorislav Petkov1-1/+1
Fix ./arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c:666: warning: Function parameter or member \ 'encl' not described in 'sgx_ioc_enclave_provision' ./arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c:666: warning: Excess function parameter \ 'enclave' description in 'sgx_ioc_enclave_provision' Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-23signal: clear non-uapi flag bits when passing/returning sa_flagsPeter Collingbourne1-7/+0
Previously we were not clearing non-uapi flag bits in sigaction.sa_flags when storing the userspace-provided sa_flags or when returning them via oldact. Start doing so. This allows userspace to detect missing support for flag bits and allows the kernel to use non-uapi bits internally, as we are already doing in arch/x86 for two flag bits. Now that this change is in place, we no longer need the code in arch/x86 that was hiding these bits from userspace, so remove it. This is technically a userspace-visible behavior change for sigaction, as the unknown bits returned via oldact.sa_flags are no longer set. However, we are free to define the behavior for unknown bits exactly because their behavior is currently undefined, so for now we can define the meaning of each of them to be "clear the bit in oldact.sa_flags unless the bit becomes known in the future". Furthermore, this behavior is consistent with OpenBSD [1], illumos [2] and XNU [3] (FreeBSD [4] and NetBSD [5] fail the syscall if unknown bits are set). So there is some precedent for this behavior in other kernels, and in particular in XNU, which is probably the most popular kernel among those that I looked at, which means that this change is less likely to be a compatibility issue. Link: [1] https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/f634a6a4b5bf832e9c1de77f7894ae2625e74484/sys/kern/kern_sig.c#L278 Link: [2] https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/76f19f5fdc974fe5be5c82a556e43a4df93f1de1/usr/src/uts/common/syscall/sigaction.c#L86 Link: [3] https://github.com/apple/darwin-xnu/blob/a449c6a3b8014d9406c2ddbdc81795da24aa7443/bsd/kern/kern_sig.c#L480 Link: [4] https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/blob/eded70c37057857c6e23fae51f86b8f8f43cd2d0/sys/kern/kern_sig.c#L699 Link: [5] https://github.com/NetBSD/src/blob/3365779becdcedfca206091a645a0e8e22b2946e/sys/kern/sys_sig.c#L473 Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I35aab6f5be932505d90f3b3450c083b4db1eca86 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/878dbcb5f47bc9b11881c81f745c0bef5c23f97f.1605235762.git.pcc@google.com Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
2020-11-22Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc5' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-57/+29
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - An IOMMU VT-d build fix when CONFIG_PCI_ATS=n along with a revert of same because the proper one is going through the IOMMU tree (Thomas Gleixner) - An Intel microcode loader fix to save the correct microcode patch to apply during resume (Chen Yu) - A fix to not access user memory of other processes when dumping opcode bytes (Thomas Gleixner) * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: Revert "iommu/vt-d: Take CONFIG_PCI_ATS into account" x86/dumpstack: Do not try to access user space code of other tasks x86/microcode/intel: Check patch signature before saving microcode for early loading iommu/vt-d: Take CONFIG_PCI_ATS into account
2020-11-21x86/mce, cper: Pass x86 CPER through the MCA handling chainSmita Koralahalli2-0/+66
The kernel uses ACPI Boot Error Record Table (BERT) to report fatal errors that occurred in a previous boot. The MCA errors in the BERT are reported using the x86 Processor Error Common Platform Error Record (CPER) format. Currently, the record prints out the raw MSR values and AMD relies on the raw record to provide MCA information. Extract the raw MSR values of MCA registers from the BERT and feed them into mce_log() to decode them properly. The implementation is SMCA-specific as the raw MCA register values are given in the register offset order of the SMCA address space. [ bp: Massage. ] [ Fix a build breakage in patch v1. ] Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Smita Koralahalli <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Punit Agrawal <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-20Merge tag 'iommu-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Pull iommu fixes from Will Deacon: "Two straightforward vt-d fixes: - Fix boot when intel iommu initialisation fails under TXT (tboot) - Fix intel iommu compilation error when DMAR is enabled without ATS and temporarily update IOMMU MAINTAINERs entry" * tag 'iommu-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: MAINTAINERS: Temporarily add myself to the IOMMU entry iommu/vt-d: Fix compile error with CONFIG_PCI_ATS not set iommu/vt-d: Avoid panic if iommu init fails in tboot system
2020-11-20x86/head64: Remove duplicate includeWang Qing1-1/+0
Remove duplicate header include. Signed-off-by: Wang Qing <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19Merge branches 'cpuinfo.2020.11.06a', 'doc.2020.11.06a', ↵Paul E. McKenney2-2/+1
'fixes.2020.11.19b', 'lockdep.2020.11.02a', 'tasks.2020.11.06a' and 'torture.2020.11.06a' into HEAD cpuinfo.2020.11.06a: Speedups for /proc/cpuinfo. doc.2020.11.06a: Documentation updates. fixes.2020.11.19b: Miscellaneous fixes. lockdep.2020.11.02a: Lockdep-RCU updates to avoid "unused variable". tasks.2020.11.06a: Tasks-RCU updates. torture.2020.11.06a': Torture-test updates.
2020-11-19x86/smpboot: Move rcu_cpu_starting() earlierPaul E. McKenney2-2/+1
The call to rcu_cpu_starting() in mtrr_ap_init() is not early enough in the CPU-hotplug onlining process, which results in lockdep splats as follows: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.9.0+ #268 Not tainted ----------------------------- kernel/kprobes.c:300 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from offline CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by swapper/1/0. stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.9.0+ #268 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 __is_insn_slot_addr+0x15d/0x170 kernel_text_address+0xba/0xe0 ? get_stack_info+0x22/0xa0 __kernel_text_address+0x9/0x30 show_trace_log_lvl+0x17d/0x380 ? dump_stack+0x77/0x97 dump_stack+0x77/0x97 __lock_acquire+0xdf7/0x1bf0 lock_acquire+0x258/0x3d0 ? vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x2c0 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40 ? vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x2c0 vprintk_emit+0x6d/0x2c0 printk+0x4d/0x69 start_secondary+0x1c/0x100 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb8/0xbb This is avoided by moving the call to rcu_cpu_starting up near the beginning of the start_secondary() function. Note that the raw_smp_processor_id() is required in order to avoid calling into lockdep before RCU has declared the CPU to be watched for readers. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/160223032121.7002.1269740091547117869.tip-bot2@tip-bot2/ Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
2020-11-19x86/resctrl: Constify kernfs_opsRikard Falkeborn2-3/+3
The only usage of the kf_ops field in the rftype struct is to pass it as argument to __kernfs_create_file(), which accepts a pointer to const. Make it a pointer to const. This makes it possible to make rdtgroup_kf_single_ops and kf_mondata_ops const, which allows the compiler to put them in read-only memory. Signed-off-by: Rikard Falkeborn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19x86/topology: Set cpu_die_id only if DIE_TYPE foundYazen Ghannam1-2/+8
CPUID Leaf 0x1F defines a DIE_TYPE level (nb: ECX[8:15] level type == 0x5), but CPUID Leaf 0xB does not. However, detect_extended_topology() will set struct cpuinfo_x86.cpu_die_id regardless of whether a valid Die ID was found. Only set cpu_die_id if a DIE_TYPE level is found. CPU topology code may use another value for cpu_die_id, e.g. the AMD NodeId on AMD-based systems. Code ordering should be maintained so that the CPUID Leaf 0x1F Die ID value will take precedence on systems that may use another value. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19x86/CPU/AMD: Remove amd_get_nb_id()Yazen Ghannam5-13/+7
The Last Level Cache ID is returned by amd_get_nb_id(). In practice, this value is the same as the AMD NodeId for callers of this function. The NodeId is saved in struct cpuinfo_x86.cpu_die_id. Replace calls to amd_get_nb_id() with the logical CPU's cpu_die_id and remove the function. Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19x86/CPU/AMD: Save AMD NodeId as cpu_die_idYazen Ghannam3-15/+13
AMD systems provide a "NodeId" value that represents a global ID indicating to which "Node" a logical CPU belongs. The "Node" is a physical structure equivalent to a Die, and it should not be confused with logical structures like NUMA nodes. Logical nodes can be adjusted based on firmware or other settings whereas the physical nodes/dies are fixed based on hardware topology. The NodeId value can be used when a physical ID is needed by software. Save the AMD NodeId to struct cpuinfo_x86.cpu_die_id. Use the value from CPUID or MSR as appropriate. Default to phys_proc_id otherwise. Do so for both AMD and Hygon systems. Drop the node_id parameter from cacheinfo_*_init_llc_id() as it is no longer needed. Update the x86 topology documentation. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19x86/sgx: Return -ERESTARTSYS in sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
Return -ERESTARTSYS instead of -EINTR in sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() when interrupted before any pages have been processed. At this point ioctl can be obviously safely restarted. Reported-by: Haitao Huang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-19Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-11-15' of ↵Will Deacon1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into for-next/iommu/fixes Pull in x86 fixes from Thomas, as they include a change to the Intel DMAR code on which we depend: * tag 'x86-urgent-2020-11-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: iommu/vt-d: Cure VF irqdomain hickup x86/platform/uv: Fix copied UV5 output archtype x86/platform/uv: Drop last traces of uv_flush_tlb_others
2020-11-19x86/msr: Downgrade unrecognized MSR messageBorislav Petkov1-2/+2
It is a warning and not an error so use pr_warn(). Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Clarify 'laundry_list' lockingDave Hansen2-9/+20
Short Version: The SGX section->laundry_list structure is effectively thread-local, but declared next to some shared structures. Its semantics are clear as mud. Fix that. No functional changes. Compile tested only. Long Version: The SGX hardware keeps per-page metadata. This can provide things like permissions, integrity and replay protection. It also prevents things like having an enclave page mapped multiple times or shared between enclaves. But, that presents a problem for kexec()'d kernels (or any other kernel that does not run immediately after a hardware reset). This is because the last kernel may have been rude and forgotten to reset pages, which would trigger the "shared page" sanity check. To fix this, the SGX code "launders" the pages by running the EREMOVE instruction on all pages at boot. This is slow and can take a long time, so it is performed off in the SGX-specific ksgxd instead of being synchronous at boot. The init code hands the list of pages to launder in a per-SGX-section list: ->laundry_list. The only code to touch this list is the init code and ksgxd. This means that no locking is necessary for ->laundry_list. However, a lock is required for section->page_list, which is accessed while creating enclaves and by ksgxd. This lock (section->lock) is acquired by ksgxd while also processing ->laundry_list. It is easy to confuse the purpose of the locking as being for ->laundry_list and ->page_list. Rename ->laundry_list to ->init_laundry_list to make it clear that this is not normally used at runtime. Also add some comments clarifying the locking, and reorganize 'sgx_epc_section' to put 'lock' near the things it protects. Note: init_laundry_list is 128 bytes of wasted space at runtime. It could theoretically be dynamically allocated and then freed after the laundering process. But it would take nearly 128 bytes of extra instructions to do that. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/head/64: Remove unused GET_CR2_INTO() macroArvind Sankar2-10/+0
Commit 4b47cdbda6f1 ("x86/head/64: Move early exception dispatch to C code") removed the usage of GET_CR2_INTO(). Drop the definition as well, and related definitions in paravirt.h and asm-offsets.h Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driverJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+111
Enclave memory is normally inaccessible from outside the enclave. This makes enclaves hard to debug. However, enclaves can be put in a debug mode when they are being built. In that mode, enclave data *can* be read and/or written by using the ENCLS[EDBGRD] and ENCLS[EDBGWR] functions. This is obviously only for debugging and destroys all the protections present with normal enclaves. But, enclaves know their own debug status and can adjust their behavior appropriately. Add a vm_ops->access() implementation which can be used to read and write memory inside debug enclaves. This is typically used via ptrace() APIs. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimerJarkko Sakkinen6-27/+1134
Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use. Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages. In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in the process. Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks, similar to normal kswapd. All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are currently reclaimable. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signalingSean Christopherson1-0/+10
vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions, in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers. Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel should not be directly visible to userspace. Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any, will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISIONJarkko Sakkinen3-1/+62
The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do “stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand over the keys to the castle , an enclave must often prove that it is running on an SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in providing proof. There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this happen: 1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on a single system, or even in a single application. 2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they do not exist. 3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special hardware key. They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key. Any user who can create a provisioning enclave can access the processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges. Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which allows creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more strict permissions than the plain enclave device. The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty. This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl(). [ bp: Touchups. ] Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INITJarkko Sakkinen4-1/+230
Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or, they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the transition from being malleable to locked-down. Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the enclave can be measured to verify its integrity. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGESJarkko Sakkinen2-0/+285
SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction. Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity. The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_ measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize. Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATEJarkko Sakkinen6-0/+154
Add an ioctl() that performs the ECREATE function of the ENCLS instruction, which creates an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS). Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18x86/sgx: Add an SGX misc driver interfaceJarkko Sakkinen6-1/+345
Intel(R) SGX is a new hardware functionality that can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and data called enclaves. New hardware protects enclave code and data from outside access and modification. Add a driver that presents a device file and ioctl API to build and manage enclaves. [ bp: Small touchups, remove unused encl variable in sgx_encl_find() as Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> ] Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <[email protected]> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
2020-11-18iommu/vt-d: Avoid panic if iommu init fails in tboot systemZhenzhong Duan1-3/+0
"intel_iommu=off" command line is used to disable iommu but iommu is force enabled in a tboot system for security reason. However for better performance on high speed network device, a new option "intel_iommu=tboot_noforce" is introduced to disable the force on. By default kernel should panic if iommu init fail in tboot for security reason, but it's unnecessory if we use "intel_iommu=tboot_noforce,off". Fix the code setting force_on and move intel_iommu_tboot_noforce from tboot code to intel iommu code. Fixes: 7304e8f28bb2 ("iommu/vt-d: Correctly disable Intel IOMMU force on") Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Lukasz Hawrylko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
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