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Reflect the updated content in the query information UVC to the sysfs at
/sys/firmware/query
* new UV-query sysfs entry for the maximum number of retrievable
secrets the UV can store for one secure guest.
* new UV-query sysfs entry for the maximum number of association
secrets the UV can store for one secure guest.
* max_secrets contains the sum of max association and max retrievable
secrets.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Provide a kernel API to retrieve secrets from the UV secret store.
Add two new functions:
* `uv_get_secret_metadata` - get metadata for a given secret identifier
* `uv_retrieve_secret` - get the secret value for the secret index
With those two functions one can extract the secret for a given secret
id, if the secret is retrievable.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Utilize the new Query Ultravisor Keys UVC to give user space the
information which host-keys are installed on the system.
Create a new sysfs directory 'firmware/uv/keys' that contains the hash
of the host-key and the backup host-key of that system. Additionally,
the file 'all' contains the response from the UVC possibly containing
more key-hashes than currently known.
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Streamline the sysfs generation to make it more extensible.
Add a function to create a sysfs entry in the uv-sysfs dir.
Use this function for the query directory.
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Let's get rid of another follow_page() user and perform the UV calls under
PTL -- which likely should be fine.
No need for an additional reference while holding the PTL:
uv_destroy_folio() and uv_convert_from_secure_folio() raise the refcount,
so any concurrent make_folio_secure() would see an unexpted reference and
cannot set PG_arch_1 concurrently.
Do we really need a writable PTE? Likely yes, because the "destroy" part
is, in comparison to the export, a destructive operation. So we'll keep
the writability check for now.
We'll lose the secretmem check from follow_page(). Likely we don't care
about that here.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc: Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
Cc: Zi Yan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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All code was converted to using arch_make_folio_accessible(), let's drop
arch_make_page_accessible().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishal Moola (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Removing the CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST ifdefs and config
option as well as CONFIG_KVM ifdefs in uv files.
Having this configurable has been more of a pain than a help.
It's time to remove the ifdefs and the config option.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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Let's also implement HAVE_ARCH_MAKE_FOLIO_ACCESSIBLE, so we can convert
arch_make_page_accessible() to be a simple wrapper around
arch_make_folio_accessible(). Unfortunately, we cannot do that in the
header.
There are only two arch_make_page_accessible() calls remaining in gup.c.
We can now drop HAVE_ARCH_MAKE_PAGE_ACCESSIBLE completely form core-MM.
We'll handle that separately, once the s390x part landed.
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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uv_convert_from_secure_(folio|pte)()
Let's do the same as we did for uv_destroy_(folio|pte)() and
have the following variants:
(1) uv_convert_from_secure(): "low level" helper that operates on paddr
and does not mess with folios.
(2) uv_convert_from_secure_folio(): Consumes a folio to which we hold a
reference.
(3) uv_convert_from_secure_pte(): Consumes a PTE that holds a reference
through the mapping.
Unfortunately we need uv_convert_from_secure_pte(), because pfn_folio()
and friends are not available in pgtable.h.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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Let's have the following variants for destroying pages:
(1) uv_destroy(): Like uv_pin_shared() and uv_convert_from_secure(),
"low level" helper that operates on paddr and doesn't mess with folios.
(2) uv_destroy_folio(): Consumes a folio to which we hold a reference.
(3) uv_destroy_pte(): Consumes a PTE that holds a reference through the
mapping.
Unfortunately we need uv_destroy_pte(), because pfn_folio() and
friends are not available in pgtable.h.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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It's not used outside of uv.c, so let's make it a static function.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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We removed the usage of PG_arch_1 for page tables in commit
a51324c430db ("s390/cmma: rework no-dat handling").
Let's update the comment in UV to reflect that.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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Now that make_folio_secure() may only set PG_arch_1 for small folios,
let's convert relevant remaining UV code to only work on (small) folios
and simply reject large folios early. This way, we'll never end up
touching PG_arch_1 on tail pages of a large folio in UV code.
The folio_get()/folio_put() for functions that are documented to already
hold a folio reference look weird; likely they are required to make
concurrent gmap_make_secure() back off because the caller might only hold
an implicit reference due to the page mapping. So leave that alone for now.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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While s390x makes sure to never have PMD-mapped THP in processes that use
KVM -- by remapping them using PTEs in
thp_split_walk_pmd_entry()->split_huge_pmd() -- there is still the
possibility of having PTE-mapped THPs (large folios) mapped into guest
memory.
This would happen if user space allocates memory before calling
KVM_CREATE_VM (which would call s390_enable_sie()). With upstream QEMU,
this currently doesn't happen, because guest memory is setup and
conditionally preallocated after KVM_CREATE_VM.
Could it happen with shmem/file-backed memory when another process
allocated memory in the pagecache? Likely, although currently not a
common setup.
Trying to split any PTE-mapped large folios sounds like the right and
future-proof thing to do here. So let's call split_folio() and handle the
return values accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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Let's factor out handling of LRU cache draining and convert the if-else
chain to a switch-case.
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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folio_wait_writeback() requires that no spinlocks are held and that
a folio reference is held, as documented. After we dropped the PTL, the
folio could get freed concurrently. So grab a temporary reference.
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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Remove uses of deprecated page APIs, and move the check for large
folios to here to avoid taking the folio lock if the folio is too large.
We could do better here by attempting to split the large folio, but I'll
leave that improvement for someone who can test it.
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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These page APIs are deprecated, so convert the incoming page to a folio
and use the folio APIs instead. The ultravisor API cannot handle large
folios, so return -EINVAL if one has slipped through.
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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The inline function is_prot_virt_guest() in asm/uv.h makes use of the
prot_virt_guest symbol. As this inline function can be called by other
parts of the kernel (modules and built-in), the symbol should be
exported, similar to the prot_virt_host symbol.
One consumer of is_prot_virt_guest() will be the ap bus code.
Cc: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
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Introduces a function to check the existence of an UV feature.
Refactor feature bit checks to use the new function.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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Export the uv_pin_shared function so that it can be called from other
modules that carry a GPL-compatible license.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM64:
- Eager page splitting optimization for dirty logging, optionally
allowing for a VM to avoid the cost of hugepage splitting in the
stage-2 fault path.
- Arm FF-A proxy for pKVM, allowing a pKVM host to safely interact
with services that live in the Secure world. pKVM intervenes on
FF-A calls to guarantee the host doesn't misuse memory donated to
the hyp or a pKVM guest.
- Support for running the split hypervisor with VHE enabled, known as
'hVHE' mode. This is extremely useful for testing the split
hypervisor on VHE-only systems, and paves the way for new use cases
that depend on having two TTBRs available at EL2.
- Generalized framework for configurable ID registers from userspace.
KVM/arm64 currently prevents arbitrary CPU feature set
configuration from userspace, but the intent is to relax this
limitation and allow userspace to select a feature set consistent
with the CPU.
- Enable the use of Branch Target Identification (FEAT_BTI) in the
hypervisor.
- Use a separate set of pointer authentication keys for the
hypervisor when running in protected mode, as the host is untrusted
at runtime.
- Ensure timer IRQs are consistently released in the init failure
paths.
- Avoid trapping CTR_EL0 on systems with Enhanced Virtualization
Traps (FEAT_EVT), as it is a register commonly read from userspace.
- Erratum workaround for the upcoming AmpereOne part, which has
broken hardware A/D state management.
RISC-V:
- Redirect AMO load/store misaligned traps to KVM guest
- Trap-n-emulate AIA in-kernel irqchip for KVM guest
- Svnapot support for KVM Guest
s390:
- New uvdevice secret API
- CMM selftest and fixes
- fix racy access to target CPU for diag 9c
x86:
- Fix missing/incorrect #GP checks on ENCLS
- Use standard mmu_notifier hooks for handling APIC access page
- Drop now unnecessary TR/TSS load after VM-Exit on AMD
- Print more descriptive information about the status of SEV and
SEV-ES during module load
- Add a test for splitting and reconstituting hugepages during and
after dirty logging
- Add support for CPU pinning in demand paging test
- Add support for AMD PerfMonV2, with a variety of cleanups and minor
fixes included along the way
- Add a "nx_huge_pages=never" option to effectively avoid creating NX
hugepage recovery threads (because nx_huge_pages=off can be toggled
at runtime)
- Move handling of PAT out of MTRR code and dedup SVM+VMX code
- Fix output of PIC poll command emulation when there's an interrupt
- Add a maintainer's handbook to document KVM x86 processes,
preferred coding style, testing expectations, etc.
- Misc cleanups, fixes and comments
Generic:
- Miscellaneous bugfixes and cleanups
Selftests:
- Generate dependency files so that partial rebuilds work as
expected"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (153 commits)
Documentation/process: Add a maintainer handbook for KVM x86
Documentation/process: Add a label for the tip tree handbook's coding style
KVM: arm64: Fix misuse of KVM_ARM_VCPU_POWER_OFF bit index
RISC-V: KVM: Remove unneeded semicolon
RISC-V: KVM: Allow Svnapot extension for Guest/VM
riscv: kvm: define vcpu_sbi_ext_pmu in header
RISC-V: KVM: Expose IMSIC registers as attributes of AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel virtualization of AIA IMSIC
RISC-V: KVM: Expose APLIC registers as attributes of AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Add in-kernel emulation of AIA APLIC
RISC-V: KVM: Implement device interface for AIA irqchip
RISC-V: KVM: Skeletal in-kernel AIA irqchip support
RISC-V: KVM: Set kvm_riscv_aia_nr_hgei to zero
RISC-V: KVM: Add APLIC related defines
RISC-V: KVM: Add IMSIC related defines
RISC-V: KVM: Implement guest external interrupt line management
KVM: x86: Remove PRIx* definitions as they are solely for user space
s390/uv: Update query for secret-UVCs
s390/uv: replace scnprintf with sysfs_emit
s390/uvdevice: Add 'Lock Secret Store' UVC
...
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In rare transient cases, not yet made possible, pte_offset_map() and
pte_offset_map_lock() may not find a page table: handle appropriately.
Add comment on mm's contract with s390 above __zap_zero_pages(),
and fix old comment there: must be called after THP was disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: John David Anglin <[email protected]>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Simek <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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Update the query struct such that secret-UVC related
information can be parsed.
Add sysfs files for these new values.
'supp_add_secret_req_ver' notes the supported versions for the
Add Secret UVC. Bit 0 indicates that version 0x100 is supported,
bit 1 indicates 0x200, and so on.
'supp_add_secret_pcf' notes the supported plaintext flags for
the Add Secret UVC.
'supp_secret_types' notes the supported types of secrets.
Bit 0 indicates secret type 1, bit 1 indicates type 2, and so on.
'max_secrets' notes the maximum amount of secrets the secret store can
store per pv guest.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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Replace scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, ...) with the page size aware
sysfs_emit(buf, ...) which adds some sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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KVM needs the struct's values to be able to provide PV support.
The uvdevice is currently guest only and will need the struct's values
for call support checking and potential future expansions.
As uv.c is only compiled with CONFIG_PGSTE or
CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST we don't need a second check in
the code. Users of uv_info will need to fence for these two config
options for the time being.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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Fix a potential race in gmap_make_secure() and remove the last user of
follow_page() without FOLL_GET.
The old code is locking something it doesn't have a reference to, and
as explained by Jason and David in this discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Y9J4P%[email protected]/
it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting
unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the
unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.
There is also another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race
between the follow_page() and the get_locked_pte().
The main point is to remove the last use of follow_page() without
FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice
bonus.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Y9J4P%[email protected]/
Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
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If the appropriate UV feature bit is set, there is no need to perform
an export before import.
The misc feature indicates, among other things, that importing a shared
page from a different protected VM will automatically also transfer its
ownership.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
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Due to upcoming changes, it will be possible to temporarily have
multiple protected VMs in the same address space, although only one
will be actually active.
In that scenario, it is necessary to perform an export of every page
that is to be imported, since the hardware does not allow a page
belonging to a protected guest to be imported into a different
protected guest.
This also applies to pages that are shared, and thus accessible by the
host.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
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A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to
access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs
to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor.
With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
storage violations in normal operation. This happens for example if a
protected guest is rebooted with deferred destroy enabled and the new
guest is also protected.
When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been
destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a
secure storage violation is raised.
This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected
guests.
This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because
it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy
should be possible. Note that a secure page can only be destroyed if
its protected VM does not have any CPUs, which only happens when the
protected VM is being terminated. If that fails, a normal export of
the page is attempted.
This means that pages that trigger the exception will be made
non-secure (in one way or another) before attempting to use them again
for a different secure guest.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
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We have information about the supported attestation header version
and plaintext attestation flag bits.
Let's expose it via the sysfs files.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
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The new dump feature requires us to know how much memory is needed for
the "dump storage state" and "dump finalize" ultravisor call. These
values are reported via the UV query call.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
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We have information about the supported se header version and pcf bits
so let's expose it via the sysfs files.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
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memblock_alloc_try_nid() returns a virtual address, however in error
case the allocated memory is incorrectly freed with memblock_phys_free().
Properly use memblock_free() instead, and pass a physical address to
uv_init() to fix this.
Note: this doesn't fix a bug currently, since virtual and physical
addresses are identical.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"257 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: scripts, ocfs2, vfs, and
mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kconfig, dax, kasan, debug, pagecache,
gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, iomap, tracing, vmalloc,
pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, tools,
memblock, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, readahead, nommu, ksm,
vmstat, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap, zsmalloc, highmem, zram,
cleanups, kfence, and damon)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <[email protected]>: (257 commits)
mm/damon: remove return value from before_terminate callback
mm/damon: fix a few spelling mistakes in comments and a pr_debug message
mm/damon: simplify stop mechanism
Docs/admin-guide/mm/pagemap: wordsmith page flags descriptions
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: simplify the content
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix a wrong link
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix wrong example commands
mm/damon/dbgfs: add adaptive_targets list check before enable monitor_on
mm/damon: remove unnecessary variable initialization
Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon: add a document for DAMON_RECLAIM
mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based Reclamation (DAMON_RECLAIM)
selftests/damon: support watermarks
mm/damon/dbgfs: support watermarks
mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism
tools/selftests/damon: update for regions prioritization of schemes
mm/damon/dbgfs: support prioritization weights
mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization
mm/damon/schemes: prioritize regions within the quotas
mm/damon/selftests: support schemes quotas
mm/damon/dbgfs: support quotas of schemes
...
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Since memblock_free() operates on a physical range, make its name
reflect it and rename it to memblock_phys_free(), so it will be a
logical counterpart to memblock_phys_alloc().
The callers are updated with the below semantic patch:
@@
expression addr;
expression size;
@@
- memblock_free(addr, size);
+ memblock_phys_free(addr, size);
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Shahab Vahedi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Introduce variants of the convert and destroy page functions that also
clear the PG_arch_1 bit used to mark them as secure pages.
The PG_arch_1 flag is always allowed to overindicate; using the new
functions introduced here allows to reduce the extent of overindication
and thus improve performance.
These new functions can only be called on pages for which a reference
is already being held.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
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Improve make_secure_pte to avoid stalls when the system is heavily
overcommitted. This was especially problematic in kvm_s390_pv_unpack,
because of the loop over all pages that needed unpacking.
Due to the locks being held, it was not possible to simply replace
uv_call with uv_call_sched. A more complex approach was
needed, in which uv_call is replaced with __uv_call, which does not
loop. When the UVC needs to be executed again, -EAGAIN is returned, and
the caller (or its caller) will try again.
When -EAGAIN is returned, the path is the same as when the page is in
writeback (and the writeback check is also performed, which is
harmless).
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a672 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
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We should not walk/touch page tables outside of VMA boundaries when
holding only the mmap sem in read mode. Evil user space can modify the
VMA layout just before this function runs and e.g., trigger races with
page table removal code since commit dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages
with read mmap_sem in munmap").
find_vma() does not check if the address is >= the VMA start address;
use vma_lookup() instead.
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
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De-duplicate checks for Protected Host Virtualization in decompressor and
kernel.
Set prot_virt_host=0 in the decompressor in *any* of the following cases
and hand it over to the decompressed kernel:
* No explicit prot_virt=1 is given on the kernel command-line
* Protected Guest Virtualization is enabled
* Hardware support not present
* kdump or stand-alone dump
The decompressed kernel needs to use only is_prot_virt_host() instead of
performing again all checks done by the decompressor.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Egorenkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Turns out that the bit 61 in the TEID is not always 1 and if that's
the case the address space ID and the address are
unpredictable. Without an address and its address space ID we can't
export memory and hence we can only send a SIGSEGV to the process or
panic the kernel depending on who caused the exception.
Unfortunately bit 61 is only reliable if we have the "misc" UV feature
bit.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Fixes: 084ea4d611a3d ("s390/mm: add (non)secure page access exceptions handlers")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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Currently there are two separate places where kernel memory layout has
to be known and adjusted:
1. early kasan setup.
2. paging setup later.
Those 2 places had to be kept in sync and adjusted to reflect peculiar
technical details of one another. With additional factors which influence
kernel memory layout like ultravisor secure storage limit, complexity
of keeping two things in sync grew up even more.
Besides that if we look forward towards creating identity mapping and
enabling DAT before jumping into uncompressed kernel - that would also
require full knowledge of and control over kernel memory layout.
So, de-duplicate and move kernel memory layout setup logic into
the decompressor.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Baisong Zhong <[email protected]>
Fixes: 37564ed834ac ("s390/uv: add prot virt guest/host indication files")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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prot_virt_host is only available if CONFIG_KVM is enabled. So lets use
a variable initialized to zero and overwrite it when that config
option is set with prot_virt_host.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Fixes: 37564ed834ac ("s390/uv: add prot virt guest/host indication files")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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Let's export the prot_virt_guest and prot_virt_host variables into the
UV sysfs firmware interface to make them easily consumable by
administrators.
prot_virt_host being 1 indicates that we did the UV
initialization (opt-in)
prot_virt_guest being 1 indicates that the UV indicates the share and
unshare ultravisor calls which is an indication that we are running as
a protected guest.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
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The number reported by the query is N-1 and I think people reading the
sysfs file would expect N instead. For users creating VMs there's no
actual difference because KVM's limit is currently below the UV's
limit.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
Fixes: a0f60f8431999 ("s390/protvirt: Add sysfs firmware interface for Ultravisor information")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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Older firmware can return rc=0x107 rrc=0xd for destroy page if the
page is already non-secure. This should be handled like a success
as already done by newer firmware.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1a80b54d1ce1 ("s390/uv: add destroy page call")
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <[email protected]>
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Currently the kernel crashes in Kasan instrumentation code if
CONFIG_KASAN_S390_4_LEVEL_PAGING is used on protected virtualization
capable machine where the ultravisor imposes addressing limitations on
the host and those limitations are lower then KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET.
The problem is that Kasan has to know in advance where vmalloc/modules
areas would be. With protected virtualization enabled vmalloc/modules
areas are moved down to the ultravisor secure storage limit while kasan
still expects them at the very end of 4-level paging address space.
To fix that make Kasan recognize when protected virtualization is enabled
and predefine vmalloc/modules areas position which are compliant with
ultravisor secure storage limit.
Kasan shadow itself stays in place and might reside above that ultravisor
secure storage limit.
One slight difference compaired to a kernel without Kasan enabled is that
vmalloc/modules areas position is not reverted to default if ultravisor
initialization fails. It would still be below the ultravisor secure
storage limit.
Kernel layout with kasan, 4-level paging and protected virtualization
enabled (ultravisor secure storage limit is at 0x0000800000000000):
---[ vmemmap Area Start ]---
0x0000400000000000-0x0000400080000000
---[ vmemmap Area End ]---
---[ vmalloc Area Start ]---
0x00007fe000000000-0x00007fff80000000
---[ vmalloc Area End ]---
---[ Modules Area Start ]---
0x00007fff80000000-0x0000800000000000
---[ Modules Area End ]---
---[ Kasan Shadow Start ]---
0x0018000000000000-0x001c000000000000
---[ Kasan Shadow End ]---
0x001c000000000000-0x0020000000000000 1P PGD I
Kernel layout with kasan, 4-level paging and protected virtualization
disabled/unsupported:
---[ vmemmap Area Start ]---
0x0000400000000000-0x0000400060000000
---[ vmemmap Area End ]---
---[ Kasan Shadow Start ]---
0x0018000000000000-0x001c000000000000
---[ Kasan Shadow End ]---
---[ vmalloc Area Start ]---
0x001fffe000000000-0x001fffff80000000
---[ vmalloc Area End ]---
---[ Modules Area Start ]---
0x001fffff80000000-0x0020000000000000
---[ Modules Area End ]---
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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Avoid potential crash due to lack of secure storage limit. Check that
max_sec_stor_addr is not 0 before adjusting vmalloc position.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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To make early kernel address space layout definition possible parse
prot_virt option in the decompressor and pass it to the uncompressed
kernel. This enables kasan to take ultravisor secure storage limit into
consideration and pre-define vmalloc position correctly.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
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