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2024-07-03s390/unwind: disable KMSAN checksIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+4
The unwind code can read uninitialized frames. Furthermore, even in the good case, KMSAN does not emit shadow for backchains. Therefore disable it for the unwinding functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/uaccess: add the missing linux/instrumented.h #includeIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+1
uaccess.h uses instrument_get_user() and instrument_put_user(), which are defined in linux/instrumented.h. Currently we get this header from somewhere else by accident; prefer to be explicit about it and include it directly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/uaccess: add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user()Ilya Leoshkevich1-32/+79
put_user() uses inline assembly with precise constraints, so Clang is in principle capable of instrumenting it automatically. Unfortunately, one of the constraints contains a dereferenced user pointer, and Clang does not currently distinguish user and kernel pointers. Therefore KMSAN attempts to access shadow for user pointers, which is not a right thing to do. An obvious fix to add __no_sanitize_memory to __put_user_fn() does not work, since it's __always_inline. And __always_inline cannot be removed due to the __put_user_bad() trick. A different obvious fix of using the "a" instead of the "+Q" constraint degrades the code quality, which is very important here, since it's a hot path. Instead, repurpose the __put_user_asm() macro to define __put_user_{char,short,int,long}_noinstr() functions and mark them with __no_sanitize_memory. For the non-KMSAN builds make them __always_inline in order to keep the generated code quality. Also define __put_user_{char,short,int,long}() functions, which call the aforementioned ones and which *are* instrumented, because they call KMSAN hooks, which may be implemented as macros. The same applies to get_user() as well. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/traps: unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regsIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+6
This is normally done by the generic entry code, but the kernel_stack_overflow() flow bypasses it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/string: add KMSAN supportIlya Leoshkevich2-5/+31
Add KMSAN support for the s390 implementations of the string functions. Do this similar to how it's already done for KASAN, except that the optimized memset{16,32,64}() functions need to be disabled: it's important for KMSAN to know that they initialized something. The way boot code is built with regard to string functions is problematic, since most files think it's configured with sanitizers, but boot/string.c doesn't. This creates various problems with the memset64() definitions, depending on whether the code is built with sanitizers or fortify. This should probably be streamlined, but in the meantime resolve the issues by introducing the IN_BOOT_STRING_C macro, similar to the existing IN_ARCH_STRING_C macro. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/mm: define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modulesIlya Leoshkevich2-0/+19
The pages for the KMSAN metadata associated with most kernel mappings are taken from memblock by the common code. However, vmalloc and module metadata needs to be defined by the architectures. Be a little bit more careful than x86: allocate exactly MODULES_LEN for the module shadow and origins, and then take 2/3 of vmalloc for the vmalloc shadow and origins. This ensures that users passing small vmalloc= values on the command line do not cause module metadata collisions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/irqflags: do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSANIlya Leoshkevich2-4/+15
Lockdep generates the following false positives with KMSAN on s390x: [ 6.063666] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled()) [ ...] [ 6.577050] Call Trace: [ 6.619637] [<000000000690d2de>] check_flags+0x1fe/0x210 [ 6.665411] ([<000000000690d2da>] check_flags+0x1fa/0x210) [ 6.707478] [<00000000006cec1a>] lock_acquire+0x2ca/0xce0 [ 6.749959] [<00000000069820ea>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xea/0x190 [ 6.794912] [<00000000041fc988>] __stack_depot_save+0x218/0x5b0 [ 6.838420] [<000000000197affe>] __msan_poison_alloca+0xfe/0x1a0 [ 6.882985] [<0000000007c5827c>] start_kernel+0x70c/0xd50 [ 6.927454] [<0000000000100036>] startup_continue+0x36/0x40 Between trace_hardirqs_on() and `stosm __mask, 3` lockdep thinks that interrupts are on, but on the CPU they are still off. KMSAN instrumentation takes spinlocks, giving lockdep a chance to see and complain about this discrepancy. KMSAN instrumentation is inserted in order to poison the __mask variable. Disable instrumentation in the respective functions. They are very small and it's easy to see that no important metadata updates are lost because of this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/ftrace: unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler()Ilya Leoshkevich1-0/+2
s390 uses assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call kprobe_ftrace_handler(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view, ftrace_regs is poisoned on kprobe_ftrace_handler() entry. This causes KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite. Fix by trusting the assembly code and always unpoisoning ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/diag: unpoison diag224() output bufferIlya Leoshkevich1-4/+6
Diagnose 224 stores 4k bytes, which currently cannot be deduced from the inline assembly constraints. This leads to KMSAN false positives. Fix the constraints by using a 4k-sized struct instead of a raw pointer. While at it, prettify them too. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/cpumf: unpoison STCCTM output bufferIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+6
stcctm() uses the "Q" constraint for dest, therefore KMSAN does not understand that it fills multiple doublewords pointed to by dest, not just one. This results in false positives. Unpoison the whole dest manually with kmsan_unpoison_memory(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/cpacf: unpoison the results of cpacf_trng()Ilya Leoshkevich1-0/+3
Prevent KMSAN from complaining about buffers filled by cpacf_trng() being uninitialized. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/checksum: add a KMSAN checkIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+2
Add a KMSAN check to the CKSM inline assembly, similar to how it was done for ASAN in commit e42ac7789df6 ("s390/checksum: always use cksm instruction"). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Acked-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/boot: add the KMSAN runtime stubIlya Leoshkevich2-0/+7
It should be possible to have inline functions in the s390 header files, which call kmsan_unpoison_memory(). The problem is that these header files might be included by the decompressor, which does not contain KMSAN runtime, causing linker errors. Not compiling these calls if __SANITIZE_MEMORY__ is not defined - either by changing kmsan-checks.h or at the call sites - may cause unintended side effects, since calling these functions from an uninstrumented code that is linked into the kernel is valid use case. One might want to explicitly distinguish between the kernel and the decompressor. Checking for a decompressor-specific #define is quite heavy-handed, and will have to be done at all call sites. A more generic approach is to provide a dummy kmsan_unpoison_memory() definition. This produces some runtime overhead, but only when building with CONFIG_KMSAN. The benefit is that it does not disturb the existing KMSAN build logic and call sites don't need to be changed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390: use a larger stack for KMSANIlya Leoshkevich2-2/+2
Adjust the stack size for the KMSAN-enabled kernel like it was done for the KASAN-enabled one in commit 7fef92ccadd7 ("s390/kasan: double the stack size"). Both tools have similar requirements. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03s390/boot: turn off KMSANIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+2
All other sanitizers are disabled for boot as well. While at it, add a comment explaining why we need this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: accept ranges starting with 0 on s390Ilya Leoshkevich1-1/+4
On s390 the virtual address 0 is valid (current CPU's lowcore is mapped there), therefore KMSAN should not complain about it. Disable the respective check on s390. There doesn't seem to be a Kconfig option to describe this situation, so explicitly check for s390. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03lib/zlib: unpoison DFLTCC output buffersIlya Leoshkevich2-0/+29
The constraints of the DFLTCC inline assembly are not precise: they do not communicate the size of the output buffers to the compiler, so it cannot automatically instrument it. Add the manual kmsan_unpoison_memory() calls for the output buffers. The logic is the same as in [1]. [1] https://github.com/zlib-ng/zlib-ng/commit/1f5ddcc009ac3511e99fc88736a9e1a6381168c5 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: kfence: disable KMSAN when checking the canaryIlya Leoshkevich1-2/+9
KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary. The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented and sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range afterwards. Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only check_canary() is supposed to ever touch it. Instead, disable KMSAN checks around canary read accesses. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: slub: disable KMSAN when checking the padding bytesIlya Leoshkevich1-4/+12
Even though the KMSAN warnings generated by memchr_inv() are suppressed by metadata_access_enable(), its return value may still be poisoned. The reason is that the last iteration of memchr_inv() returns `*start != value ? start : NULL`, where *start is poisoned. Because of this, somewhat counterintuitively, the shadow value computed by visitSelectInst() is equal to `(uintptr_t)start`. One possibility to fix this, since the intention behind guarding memchr_inv() behind metadata_access_enable() is to touch poisoned metadata without triggering KMSAN, is to unpoison its return value. However, this approach is too fragile. So simply disable the KMSAN checks in the respective functions. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: slub: let KMSAN access metadataIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+2
Building the kernel with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and CONFIG_KMSAN causes KMSAN to complain about touching redzones in kfree(). Fix by extending the existing KASAN-related metadata_access_enable() and metadata_access_disable() functions to KMSAN. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: expose KMSAN_WARN_ON()Ilya Leoshkevich2-23/+26
KMSAN_WARN_ON() is required for implementing s390-specific KMSAN functions, but right now it's available only to the KMSAN internal functions. Expose it to subsystems through <linux/kmsan.h>. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: do not round up pg_data_t sizeIlya Leoshkevich1-1/+1
x86's alloc_node_data() rounds up node data size to PAGE_SIZE. It's not explained why it's needed, but it's most likely for performance reasons, since the padding bytes are not used anywhere. Some other architectures do it as well, e.g., mips rounds it up to the cache line size. kmsan_init_shadow() initializes metadata for each node data and assumes the x86 rounding, which does not match other architectures. This may cause the range end to overshoot the end of available memory, in turn causing virt_to_page_or_null() in kmsan_init_alloc_meta_for_range() to return NULL, which leads to kernel panic shortly after. Since the padding bytes are not used, drop the rounding. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata()Ilya Leoshkevich1-5/+3
Improve the readability by replacing the custom aligning logic with ALIGN_DOWN(). Unlike other places where a similar sequence is used, there is no size parameter that needs to be adjusted, so the standard macro fits. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: support SLAB_POISONIlya Leoshkevich2-5/+12
Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset(). There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object() can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change in the future. Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls. The downside is that init_object() is called from free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: introduce memset_no_sanitize_memory()Ilya Leoshkevich1-0/+18
Add a wrapper for memset() that prevents unpoisoning. This is useful for filling memory allocator redzones. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current taskIlya Leoshkevich7-10/+55
Like for KASAN, it's useful to temporarily disable KMSAN checks around, e.g., redzone accesses. Introduce kmsan_disable_current() and kmsan_enable_current(), which are similar to their KASAN counterparts. Make them reentrant in order to handle memory allocations in interrupt context. Repurpose the allow_reporting field for this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: export panic_on_kmsanIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+1
When building the kmsan test as a module, modpost fails with the following error message: ERROR: modpost: "panic_on_kmsan" [mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.ko] undefined! Export panic_on_kmsan in order to improve the KMSAN usability for modules. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: expose kmsan_get_metadata()Ilya Leoshkevich3-1/+10
Each s390 CPU has lowcore pages associated with it. Each CPU sees its own lowcore at virtual address 0 through a hardware mechanism called prefixing. Additionally, all lowcores are mapped to non-0 virtual addresses stored in the lowcore_ptr[] array. When lowcore is accessed through virtual address 0, one needs to resolve metadata for lowcore_ptr[raw_smp_processor_id()]. Expose kmsan_get_metadata() to make it possible to do this from the arch code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.hIlya Leoshkevich1-4/+4
Replace the x86-specific asm/pgtable_64_types.h #include with the linux/pgtable.h one, which all architectures have. While at it, sort the headers alphabetically for the sake of consistency with other KMSAN code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: f80be4571b19 ("kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core") Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush()Ilya Leoshkevich1-1/+0
The value assigned to prot is immediately overwritten on the next line with PAGE_KERNEL. The right hand side of the assignment has no side-effects. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: b073d7f8aee4 ("mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations") Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: fix kmsan_copy_to_user() on arches with overlapping address spacesIlya Leoshkevich1-1/+2
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and userspace overlap. Assume that we are handling user memory access in this case. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spacesIlya Leoshkevich1-1/+2
Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and userspace overlap. Skip the comparison when this is the case. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: increase the maximum store size to 4096Ilya Leoshkevich1-4/+3
The inline assembly block in s390's chsc() stores that much. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabledIlya Leoshkevich1-0/+1
KMSAN relies on memblock returning all available pages to it (see kmsan_memblock_free_pages()). It partitions these pages into 3 categories: pages available to the buddy allocator, shadow pages and origin pages. This partitioning is static. If new pages appear after kmsan_init_runtime(), it is considered an error. DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT causes this, so mark it as incompatible with KMSAN. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03kmsan: make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1Ilya Leoshkevich1-0/+5
It's useful to have both tests and kmsan.panic=1 during development, but right now the warnings, that the tests cause, lead to kernel panics. Temporarily set kmsan.panic=0 for the duration of the KMSAN testing. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03ftrace: unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func()Ilya Leoshkevich1-0/+1
Patch series "kmsan: Enable on s390", v7. Architectures use assembly code to initialize ftrace_regs and call ftrace_ops_list_func(). Therefore, from the KMSAN's point of view, ftrace_regs is poisoned on ftrace_ops_list_func entry(). This causes KMSAN warnings when running the ftrace testsuite. Fix by trusting the architecture-specific assembly code and always unpoisoning ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func. The issue was not encountered on x86_64 so far only by accident: assembly-allocated ftrace_regs was overlapping a stale partially unpoisoned stack frame. Poisoning stack frames before returns [1] makes the issue appear on x86_64 as well. [1] https://github.com/iii-i/llvm-project/commits/msan-poison-allocas-before-returning-2024-06-12/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <[email protected]> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Cc: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]> Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Cc: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03Docs/mm/damon/maintainer-profile: document DAMON community meetupsSeongJae Park1-0/+19
DAMON bi-weekly community meetup series has continued since 2022-08-15 for community members who prefer synchronous chat over asynchronous mails. Recently I got some feedbacks about the series from a few people. They told me the series is helpful for understanding of the project and particiapting to the development, but it could be further better in terms of the visibility. Based on that, I started sending meeting reminder for every occurrence. For people who don't subscribe the mailing list, however, adding an announcement on the official document could be helpful. Document the series on DAMON maintainer's profile for the purpose. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03Docs/mm/damon/maintainer-profile: introduce HacKerMaiLSeongJae Park1-0/+17
Patch series "Docs/mm/damon/maintaier-profile: document a mailing tool and community meetup series", v2. There is a mailing tool that developed and maintained by DAMON maintainer aiming to support DAMON community. Also there are DAMON community meetup series. Both are known to have rooms of improvements in terms of their visibility. Document those on the maintainer's profile document. This patch (of 2): Since DAMON was merged into mainline, I periodically received some questions around DAMON's mailing lists based workflow. The workflow is not different from the normal ones that well documented, but it is also true that it is not always easy and familiar for everyone. I personally overcame it by developing and using a simple tool, named HacKerMaiL (hkml)[1]. Based on my experience, I believe it is matured enough to be used for simple workflows like that of DAMON. Actually some DAMON contributors and Linux kernel developers other than myself told me they are using the tool. As DAMON maintainer, I also believe helping new DAMON community members onboarding to the worklow is one of the most important parts of my responsibilities. For the reason, the tool is announced[2] to support DAMON community. To further increasing the visibility of the fact, document the tool and the support plan on DAMON maintainer's profile. [1] https://github.com/damonitor/hackermail [2] https://github.com/damonitor/hackermail/commit/3909dad91301 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <[email protected]> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]> Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: read page_type using READ_ONCEDavid Hildenbrand1-3/+3
KCSAN complains about possible data races: while we check for a page_type -- for example for sanity checks -- we might concurrently modify the mapcount that overlays page_type. Let's use READ_ONCE to avoid load tearing (shouldn't make a difference) and to make KCSAN happy. Likely, we might also want to use WRITE_ONCE for the writer side of page_type, if KCSAN ever complains about that. But we'll not mess with that for now. Note: nothing should really be broken besides wrong KCSAN complaints. The sanity check that triggers this was added in commit 68f0320824fa ("mm/rmap: convert folio_add_file_rmap_range() into folio_add_file_rmap_[pte|ptes|pmd]()"). Even before that similar races likely where possible, ever since we added page_type in commit 6e292b9be7f4 ("mm: split page_type out from _mapcount"). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: memory: rename pages_per_huge_page to nr_pagesKefeng Wang1-12/+12
Since the callers are converted to use nr_pages naming, use it inside too. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: memory: improve copy_user_large_folio()Kefeng Wang2-17/+12
Use nr_pages instead of pages_per_huge_page and move the address alignment from copy_user_large_folio() into the callers since it is only needed when we don't know which address will be accessed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: memory: use folio in struct copy_subpage_argKefeng Wang1-6/+6
Directly use folio in struct copy_subpage_arg. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm: memory: convert clear_huge_page() to folio_zero_user()Kefeng Wang5-26/+21
Patch series "mm: improve clear and copy user folio", v2. Some folio conversions. An improvement is to move address alignment into the caller as it is only needed if we don't know which address will be accessed when clearing/copying user folios. This patch (of 4): Replace clear_huge_page() with folio_zero_user(), and take a folio instead of a page. Directly get number of pages by folio_nr_pages() to remove pages_per_huge_page argument, furthermore, move the address alignment from folio_zero_user() to the callers since the alignment is only needed when we don't know which address will be accessed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]> Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/page_alloc: reword the comment of buddy_merge_likely()Wei Yang1-3/+3
For page with order O, we are checking its order (O + 1)'s buddy. If it is free, we would like to put it to the tail and expect it would be merged to a page with order (O + 2). Reword the comment to reflect it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/page_alloc: fix a typo in comment about GFP flagWei Yang1-1/+1
The GFP flags used to choose the zonelist is __GFP_THISNODE. Let's change it to what exactly it should be. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/mm_init.c: move build check on MAX_ZONELISTS out of ifdefWei Yang1-1/+1
Current check on MAX_ZONELISTS is wrapped in CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT, which may not be triggered all the time. Let's move it out to a more general place. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/sparse: nr_pages won't be 0Wei Yang1-3/+0
Function subsection_map_init() is only used in free_area_init() in the loop of for_each_mem_pfn_range(). And we are sure in each iteration of for_each_mem_pfn_range(), start_pfn < end_pfn. So nr_pages is not possible to be 0 and we can remove the check. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/memory-failure: refactor log format in unpoison_memoryJiaqi Yan1-9/+9
Logs from memory_failure and other memory-failure.c code follow the format: "Memory failure: 0x{pfn}: ${lower_case_message}" Convert the logs in unpoison_memory to follow similar format: "Unpoison: 0x${pfn}: ${lower_case_message}" For example (from local test): [ 1331.938397] Unpoison: 0x144bc8: page was already unpoisoned No functional change in this commit. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jiaqi Yan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Jane Chu <[email protected]> Cc: Lance Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03mm/Kconfig: mention arm64 in DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR symbol help textJavier Martinez Canillas1-1/+1
Currently ppc64 and x86 are mentioned as architectures where a 65536 value is reasonable but arm64 isn't listed and it is also a 64-bit architecture. The help text says that for "arm" the value should be no higher than 32768 but it's only talking about 32-bit ARM. Adding arm64 to the above list can make this more clear and avoid confusing users who may think that the 32k limit would also apply to 64-bit ARM. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Cc: Brian Masney <[email protected]> Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Cc: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
2024-07-03maple_tree: modified return type of mas_wr_store_entry()JaeJoon Jung1-9/+6
Since the return value of mas_wr_store_entry() is not used, the return type can be changed to void. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: JaeJoon Jung <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>