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Merge power management, PCI and sysfs-related material and changes
related to handling ACPI tables for 5.19-rc1:
- Improve debug messages in the ACPI device PM code (Rafael Wysocki).
- Block ASUS B1400CEAE from suspend to idle by default (Mario
Limonciello).
- Improve handling of PCI devices that are in D3cold during system
initialization (Rafael Wysocki).
- Fix BERT error region memory mapping (Lorenzo Pieralisi).
- Add support for NVIDIA 16550-compatible port subtype to the SPCR
parsing code (Jeff Brasen).
- Use static for BGRT_SHOW kobj_attribute defines (Tom Rix).
- Fix missing prototype warning for acpi_agdi_init() (Ilkka Koskinen).
* acpi-pm:
ACPI: PM: Block ASUS B1400CEAE from suspend to idle by default
ACPI: PM: Always print final debug message in acpi_device_set_power()
ACPI: PM: Unify debug messages in acpi_device_set_power()
ACPI: PM: Change pr_fmt() in device_pm.c
ACPI: PM: Convert debug message in acpi_device_get_power()
* acpi-pci:
ACPI: bus: Avoid non-ACPI device objects in walks over children
PCI: ACPI: PM: Power up devices in D3cold before scanning them
ACPI: PM: Introduce acpi_dev_power_up_children_with_adr()
ACPI: bus: Introduce acpi_dev_for_each_child()
* acpi-sysfs:
ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping
* acpi-tables:
ACPI: AGDI: Fix missing prototype warning for acpi_agdi_init()
ACPI: BGRT: use static for BGRT_SHOW kobj_attribute defines
ACPI: SPCR: Add support for NVIDIA 16550-compatible port subtype
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Merge ACPICA material for 5.19-rc1:
- Add support for the Windows 11 _OSI string (Mario Limonciello)
- Add the CFMWS subtable to the CEDT table (Lawrence Hileman).
- iASL: NHLT: Treat Terminator as specific_config (Piotr Maziarz).
- iASL: NHLT: Fix parsing undocumented bytes at the end of Endpoint
Descriptor (Piotr Maziarz).
- iASL: NHLT: Rename linux specific strucures to device_info (Piotr
Maziarz).
- Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics to Load() and LoadTable() (Bob Moore).
- Clean up double word in comment (Tom Rix).
- Update copyright notices to the year 2022 (Bob Moore).
- Remove some tabs and // comments - automated cleanup (Bob Moore).
- Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member (Gustavo A. R.
Silva).
- Interpreter: Add units to time variable names (Paul Menzel).
- Add support for ARM Performance Monitoring Unit Table (Besar
Wicaksono).
- Inform users about ACPI spec violation related to sleep length (Paul
Menzel).
- iASL/MADT: Add OEM-defined subtable (Bob Moore).
- Interpreter: Fix some typo mistakes (Selvarasu Ganesan).
- Updates for revision E.d of IORT (Shameer Kolothum).
- Use ACPI_FORMAT_UINT64 for 64-bit output (Bob Moore).
- Update version to 20220331 (Bob Moore).
* acpica: (21 commits)
Revert "ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Warn about sleeps greater than 10 ms"
ACPICA: Update version to 20220331
ACPICA: exsystem.c: Use ACPI_FORMAT_UINT64 for 64-bit output
ACPICA: IORT: Updates for revision E.d
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Fix some typo mistakes
ACPICA: iASL/MADT: Add OEM-defined subtable
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Warn about sleeps greater than 10 ms
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Inform users about ACPI spec violation
ACPICA: Add support for ARM Performance Monitoring Unit Table.
ACPICA: executer/exsystem: Add units to time variable names
ACPICA: Headers: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member
ACPICA: Removed some tabs and // comments
ACPICA: Update copyright notices to the year 2022
ACPICA: Clean up double word in comment
ACPICA: Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics for LoadTable() operator
ACPICA: Add new ACPI 6.4 semantics to the Load() operator
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Rename linux specific strucures to device_info
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Fix parsing undocumented bytes at the end of Endpoint Descriptor
ACPICA: iASL: NHLT: Treat Terminator as specific_config
ACPICA: Add the subtable CFMWS to the CEDT table
...
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Create a maintainer entry for CAAM trusted keys in the Linux keyring.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
The CAAM does crypto acceleration, hardware number generation and
has a blob mechanism for encapsulation/decapsulation of sensitive material.
This blob mechanism depends on a device specific random 256-bit One Time
Programmable Master Key that is fused in each SoC at manufacturing
time. This key is unreadable and can only be used by the CAAM for AES
encryption/decryption of user data.
This makes it a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
Previous commits generalized trusted keys to support multiple backends
and added an API to access the CAAM blob mechanism. Based on these,
provide the necessary glue to use the CAAM for trusted keys.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <[email protected]> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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The NXP Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM)
can be used to protect user-defined data across system reboot:
- When the system is fused and boots into secure state, the master
key is a unique never-disclosed device-specific key
- random key is encrypted by key derived from master key
- data is encrypted using the random key
- encrypted data and its encrypted random key are stored alongside
- This blob can now be safely stored in non-volatile memory
On next power-on:
- blob is loaded into CAAM
- CAAM writes decrypted data either into memory or key register
Add functions to realize encrypting and decrypting into memory alongside
the CAAM driver.
They will be used in a later commit as a source for the trusted key
seal/unseal mechanism.
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Matthias Schiffer <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <[email protected]> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Steffen Trumtrar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Depending on SoC variant, a CAAM may be available, but with some futures
fused out. The LS1028A (non-E) SoC is one such SoC and while it
indicates BLOB support, BLOB operations will ultimately fail, because
there is no AES support. Add a new blob_present member to reflect
whether both BLOB support and the AES support it depends on is
available.
These will be used in a follow-up commit to allow blob driver
initialization to error out on SoCs without the necessary hardware
support instead of failing at runtime with a cryptic
caam_jr 8020000.jr: 20000b0f: CCB: desc idx 11: : Invalid CHA selected.
Co-developed-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also
generate the random key material. However, both users and future
backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust
source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy
pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources.
Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter,
that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up
to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use,
maintaining the existing behavior.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <[email protected]> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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With recent rework, trusted keys are no longer limited to TPM as trust
source. The Kconfig symbol is unchanged however leading to a few issues:
- TCG_TPM is required, even if only TEE is to be used
- Enabling TCG_TPM, but excluding it from available trusted sources
is not possible
- TEE=m && TRUSTED_KEYS=y will lead to TEE support being silently
dropped, which is not the best user experience
Remedy these issues by introducing two new boolean Kconfig symbols:
TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM and TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE with the appropriate
dependencies.
Any new code depending on the TPM trusted key backend in particular
or symbols exported by it will now need to explicitly state that it
depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
The latter to ensure the dependency is built and the former to ensure
it's reachable for module builds. There are no such users yet.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andreas Rammhold <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tim Harvey <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Walle <[email protected]> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
Tested-by: John Ernberg <[email protected]> # iMX8QXP
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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TPM2_GetCapability with a capability that has the property type value
of TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS returns a zero length list, when an Infineon
TPM2 is in field upgrade mode.
Since an Infineon TPM2.0 in field upgrade mode returns RC_SUCCESS on
TPM2_Startup, the field upgrade mode has to be detected by
TPM2_GetCapability.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Under certain conditions uninitialized memory will be accessed.
As described by TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Specification,
rev. 1.59 (Part 3: Commands), if a TPM2_GetCapability is received,
requesting a capability, the TPM in field upgrade mode may return a
zero length list.
Check the property count in tpm2_get_tpm_pt().
Fixes: 2ab3241161b3 ("tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in an error
message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make a
difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
As tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() emits an error message already and the
additional error message by the i2c core doesn't add any useful
information, change the return value to zero to suppress this error
message.
Note that if i2c_clientdata is NULL, there is something really fishy.
Assuming no memory corruption happened (then all bets are lost anyhow),
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() is only called after tpm_cr50_i2c_probe() returned
successfully. So there was a tpm chip registered before and after
tpm_cr50_i2c_remove() its privdata is freed but the associated character
device isn't removed. If after that happened userspace accesses the
character device it's likely that the freed memory is accessed. For that
reason the warning message is made a bit more frightening.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Accept one additional numerical value of DID:VID for next generation
Google TPM with new firmware, to be used in future Chromebooks.
The TPM with the new firmware has the code name TI50, and is going to
use the same interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Jes B. Klinke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Only tpm_tis and tpm_tis_synquacer have a dedicated way to access
multiple bytes at once, every other driver will just fall back to
read_bytes/write_bytes. Therefore, remove the read16/read32/write32
calls and move their logic to read_bytes/write_bytes.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Holland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return
an error code instead.
Fixes: d8d74ea3c002 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Return boolean values ("true" or "false") instead of 1 or 0 from bool
functions.
Signed-off-by: Haowen Bai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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The blacklist_init() function calls panic() for memory allocation
errors. This change documents the reason why we don't return -ENODEV.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only
meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for
builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the
user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it
already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and
then a valid hexadecimal string.
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper.
This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private,
which help to manage them consistently.
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate
hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist
key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a
keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed
out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was
available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
Cc: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
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Let's help users by documenting how to enable and check for Landlock in
the kernel and the running system. The userspace-api section may not be
the best place for this but it still makes sense to put all the user
documentation at the same place.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
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Summarize the rationale of filesystem access rights according to the
file type.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Explain how to set access rights per hierarchy in an efficient and safe
way, especially with the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER side effect (i.e.
partial ordering and constraints for access rights per hierarchy).
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Add LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER in the example and properly check to only
use it if the current kernel support it thanks to the Landlock ABI
version.
Move the file renaming and linking limitation to a new "Previous
limitations" section.
Improve documentation about the backward and forward compatibility,
including the rational for ruleset's handled_access_fs.
Update the document date.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Add LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER to the "roughly write" access rights and
leverage the Landlock ABI version to only try to enforce it if it is
supported by the running kernel.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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These test suites try to check all edge cases for directory and file
renaming or linking involving a new parent directory, with and without
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER and other access rights.
layout1:
* reparent_refer: Tests simple FS_REFER usage.
* reparent_link: Tests a mix of FS_MAKE_REG and FS_REFER with links.
* reparent_rename: Tests a mix of FS_MAKE_REG and FS_REFER with renames
and RENAME_EXCHANGE.
* reparent_exdev_layers_rename1/2: Tests renames with two layers.
* reparent_exdev_layers_exchange1/2/3: Tests exchanges with two layers.
* reparent_remove: Tests file and directory removal with rename.
* reparent_dom_superset: Tests access partial ordering.
layout1_bind:
* reparent_cross_mount: Tests FS_REFER propagation across mount points.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 95.4% of 604 lines according to
gcc/gcov-11.
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers
to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a
specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed
with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename,
and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This
lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an
inode.
Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed,
whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not
considered a threat to user data.
However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent
directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly.
Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by
being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure
that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory
itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is
not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible
for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking
it.
Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the
destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users.
Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to
require such destination access right to be also granted to the source
(to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to
the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination.
See the provided documentation for additional details.
New tests are provided with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and
RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the
rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the
switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs
using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock,
reduce the number of path walks).
AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This
should not change the current behavior (same check order), except
(different level of) speed boosts.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Move the SB_NOUSER and IS_PRIVATE dentry check to a standalone
is_nouser_or_private() helper. This will be useful for a following
commit.
Move get_mode_access() and maybe_remove() to make them usable by new
code provided by a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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The original behavior was to check if the full set of requested accesses
was allowed by at least a rule of every relevant layer. This didn't
take into account requests for multiple accesses and same-layer rules
allowing the union of these accesses in a complementary way. As a
result, multiple accesses requested on a file hierarchy matching rules
that, together, allowed these accesses, but without a unique rule
allowing all of them, was illegitimately denied. This case should be
rare in practice and it can only be triggered by the path_rename or
file_open hook implementations.
For instance, if, for the same layer, a rule allows execution
beneath /a/b and another rule allows read beneath /a, requesting access
to read and execute at the same time for /a/b should be allowed for this
layer.
This was an inconsistency because the union of same-layer rule accesses
was already allowed if requested once at a time anyway.
This fix changes the way allowed accesses are gathered over a path walk.
To take into account all these rule accesses, we store in a matrix all
layer granting the set of requested accesses, according to the handled
accesses. To avoid heap allocation, we use an array on the stack which
is 2*13 bytes. A following commit bringing the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
access right will increase this size to reach 112 bytes (2*14*4) in case
of link or rename actions.
Add a new layout1.layer_rule_unions test to check that accesses from
different rules pertaining to the same layer are ORed in a file
hierarchy. Also test that it is not the case for rules from different
layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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This refactoring will be useful in a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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The maximum number of nested Landlock domains is currently 64. Because
of the following fix and to help reduce the stack size, let's reduce it
to 16. This seems large enough for a lot of use cases (e.g. sandboxed
init service, spawning a sandboxed SSH service, in nested sandboxed
containers). Reducing the number of nested domains may also help to
discover misuse of Landlock (e.g. creating a domain per rule).
Add and use a dedicated layer_mask_t typedef to fit with the number of
layers. This might be useful when changing it and to keep it consistent
with the maximum number of layers.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Create and use the access_mask_t typedef to enforce a consistent access
mask size and uniformly use a 16-bits type. This will helps transition
to a 32-bits value one day.
Add a build check to make sure all (filesystem) access rights fit in.
This will be extended with a following commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Add inval_create_ruleset_arguments, extension of
inval_create_ruleset_flags, to also check error ordering for
landlock_create_ruleset(2).
This is similar to the previous commit checking landlock_add_rule(2).
Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.4% of 504 lines accorging to
gcc/gcov-11.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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According to the Landlock goal to be a security feature available to
unprivileges processes, it makes more sense to first check for
no_new_privs before checking anything else (i.e. syscall arguments).
Merge inval_fd_enforce and unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs tests
into the new restrict_self_checks_ordering. This is similar to the
previous commit checking other syscalls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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This makes more sense to first check the ruleset FD and then the rule
attribute. It will be useful to factor out code for other rule types.
Add inval_add_rule_arguments tests, extension of empty_path_beneath_attr
tests, to also check error ordering for landlock_add_rule(2).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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The O_PATH flag is currently not handled by Landlock. Let's make sure
this behavior will remain consistent with the same ruleset over time.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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These tests were missing to check the check_access_path() call with all
combinations of maybe_remove(old_dentry) and maybe_remove(new_dentry).
Extend layout1.link with a new complementary test and check that
REMOVE_FILE is not required to link a file.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Make sure that all filesystem access rights can be tied to directories.
Rename layout1.file_access_rights to layout1.file_and_dir_access_rights
to reflect this change.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Make sure that trying to use unknown access rights returns an error.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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This might be useful when the struct landlock_ruleset_attr will get more
fields.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Replace SYS_<syscall> with __NR_<syscall>. Using the __NR_<syscall>
notation, provided by UAPI, is useful to build tests on systems without
the SYS_<syscall> definitions.
Replace SYS_pivot_root with __NR_pivot_root, and SYS_move_mount with
__NR_move_mount.
Define renameat2() and RENAME_EXCHANGE if they are unknown to old build
systems.
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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It is not mandatory to pass a file descriptor obtained with the O_PATH
flag. Also, replace rule's accesses with ruleset's accesses.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may
not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover,
this will help maintain style consistency between different developers.
This contains only whitespace changes.
Automatically formatted with:
clang-format-14 -i samples/landlock/*.[ch]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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In preparation to a following commit, add clang-format on and
clang-format off stanzas around constant definitions. This enables to
keep aligned values, which is much more readable than packed
definitions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Let's follow a consistent and documented coding style. Everything may
not be to our liking but it is better than tacit knowledge. Moreover,
this will help maintain style consistency between different developers.
This contains only whitespace changes.
Automatically formatted with:
clang-format-14 -i tools/testing/selftests/landlock/*.[ch]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
[mic: Update style according to
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
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Combine all collected EDAC changes for submission into v5.19:
* edac-misc:
EDAC/xgene: Fix typo processsors -> processors
EDAC/i5100: Remove unused inline function i5100_nrecmema_dm_buf_id()
EDAC/ghes: Change ghes_hw from global to static
EDAC/armada_xp: Use devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
EDAC/synopsys: Add a SPDX identifier
EDAC/synopsys: Add driver support for i.MX platforms
EDAC/dmc520: Don't print an error for each unconfigured interrupt line
efi/cper: Reformat CPER memory error location to more readable
EDAC/ghes: Unify CPER memory error location reporting
efi/cper: Add a cper_mem_err_status_str() to decode error description
powerpc/85xx: Remove fsl,85... bindings
* edac-alloc-cleanup:
EDAC: Use kcalloc()
EDAC/mc: Get rid of edac_align_ptr()
EDAC/device: Sanitize edac_device_alloc_ctl_info() definition
EDAC/device: Get rid of the silly one-shot memory allocation in edac_device_alloc_ctl_info()
EDAC/pci: Get rid of the silly one-shot memory allocation in edac_pci_alloc_ctl_info()
EDAC/mc: Get rid of silly one-shot struct allocation in edac_mc_alloc()
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
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Return boolean values ("true" or "false") instead of 1 or 0 from bool
function. This fixes the following warnings from coccicheck:
./arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c:304:10-11: WARNING: return of 0/1 in
function 'check_div0' with return type bool
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
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