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This was added by the recent "ipc/shm.c: add split function to
shm_vm_ops", but it is not necessary.
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Kdoc comments are added to the do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param and
do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param structures thare are used internally
for range checking.
The error codes returned by proc_dointvec_minmax() and
proc_douintvec_minmax() are also documented.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Patch series "ipc: Clamp *mni to the real IPCMNI limit", v3.
The sysctl parameters msgmni, shmmni and semmni have an inherent limit
of IPC_MNI (32k). However, users may not be aware of that because they
can write a value much higher than that without getting any error or
notification. Reading the parameters back will show the newly written
values which are not real.
Enforcing the limit by failing sysctl parameter write, however, can
break existing user applications. To address this delemma, a new flags
field is introduced into the ctl_table. The value CTL_FLAGS_CLAMP_RANGE
can be added to any ctl_table entries to enable a looser range clamping
without returning any error. For example,
.flags = CTL_FLAGS_CLAMP_RANGE,
This flags value are now used for the range checking of shmmni, msgmni
and semmni without breaking existing applications. If any out of range
value is written to those sysctl parameters, the following warning will
be printed instead.
Kernel parameter "shmmni" was set out of range [0, 32768], clamped to 32768.
Reading the values back will show 32768 instead of some fake values.
This patch (of 6):
Fix a typo.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting msq ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/msg (0444) and the MSG_STAT shmctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the msq metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new MSG_STAT_ANY command such that the msq ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object
metadata between /proc/sysvipc/sem (0444) and the SEM_STAT semctl
command. The later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO.
As such there can be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the
info is displayed anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the sma metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing
all the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an
overlook - so we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the
syscall or the procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie
ipcs). Some applications require getting the procfs info (without root
privileges) and can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to
500x in some reported cases for shm.
This patch introduces a new SEM_STAT_ANY command such that the sem ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Kettler <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Patch series "sysvipc: introduce STAT_ANY commands", v2.
The following patches adds the discussed (see [1]) new command for shm
as well as for sems and msq as they are subject to the same
discrepancies for ipc object permission checks between the syscall and
via procfs. These new commands are justified in that (1) we are stuck
with this semantics as changing syscall and procfs can break userland;
and (2) some users can benefit from performance (for large amounts of
shm segments, for example) from not having to parse the procfs
interface.
Once merged, I will submit the necesary manpage updates. But I'm thinking
something like:
: diff --git a/man2/shmctl.2 b/man2/shmctl.2
: index 7bb503999941..bb00bbe21a57 100644
: --- a/man2/shmctl.2
: +++ b/man2/shmctl.2
: @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
: .\" 2005-04-25, mtk -- noted aberrant Linux behavior w.r.t. new
: .\" attaches to a segment that has already been marked for deletion.
: .\" 2005-08-02, mtk: Added IPC_INFO, SHM_INFO, SHM_STAT descriptions.
: +.\" 2018-02-13, dbueso: Added SHM_STAT_ANY description.
: .\"
: .TH SHMCTL 2 2017-09-15 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
: .SH NAME
: @@ -242,6 +243,18 @@ However, the
: argument is not a segment identifier, but instead an index into
: the kernel's internal array that maintains information about
: all shared memory segments on the system.
: +.TP
: +.BR SHM_STAT_ANY " (Linux-specific)"
: +Return a
: +.I shmid_ds
: +structure as for
: +.BR SHM_STAT .
: +However, the
: +.I shm_perm.mode
: +is not checked for read access for
: +.IR shmid ,
: +resembing the behaviour of
: +/proc/sysvipc/shm.
: .PP
: The caller can prevent or allow swapping of a shared
: memory segment with the following \fIcmd\fP values:
: @@ -287,7 +300,7 @@ operation returns the index of the highest used entry in the
: kernel's internal array recording information about all
: shared memory segments.
: (This information can be used with repeated
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operations to obtain information about all shared memory segments
: on the system.)
: A successful
: @@ -328,7 +341,7 @@ isn't accessible.
: \fIshmid\fP is not a valid identifier, or \fIcmd\fP
: is not a valid command.
: Or: for a
: -.B SHM_STAT
: +.B SHM_STAT/SHM_STAT_ANY
: operation, the index value specified in
: .I shmid
: referred to an array slot that is currently unused.
This patch (of 3):
There is a permission discrepancy when consulting shm ipc object metadata
between /proc/sysvipc/shm (0444) and the SHM_STAT shmctl command. The
later does permission checks for the object vs S_IRUGO. As such there can
be cases where EACCESS is returned via syscall but the info is displayed
anyways in the procfs files.
While this might have security implications via info leaking (albeit no
writing to the shm metadata), this behavior goes way back and showing all
the objects regardless of the permissions was most likely an overlook - so
we are stuck with it. Furthermore, modifying either the syscall or the
procfs file can cause userspace programs to break (ie ipcs). Some
applications require getting the procfs info (without root privileges) and
can be rather slow in comparison with a syscall -- up to 500x in some
reported cases.
This patch introduces a new SHM_STAT_ANY command such that the shm ipc
object permissions are ignored, and only audited instead. In addition,
I've left the lsm security hook checks in place, as if some policy can
block the call, then the user has no other choice than just parsing the
procfs file.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/12/19/220
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Robert Kettler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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As using an unsafe module parameter is, by its very definition, an
expected user action, emitting a warning is overkill. Nothing has yet
gone wrong, and we add a taint flag for any future oops should something
actually go wrong. So instead of having a user controllable pr_warn,
downgrade it to a pr_notice for "a normal, but significant condition".
We make use of unsafe kernel parameters in igt
(https://cgit.freedesktop.org/drm/igt-gpu-tools/) (we have not yet
succeeded in removing all such debugging options), which generates a
warning and taints the kernel. The warning is unhelpful as we then need
to filter it out again as we check that every test themselves do not
provoke any kernel warnings.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 91f9d330cc14 ("module: make it possible to have unsafe, tainting module params")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Cc: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zhong <[email protected]>
Cc: Petri Latvala <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Fix sizeof argument to be the same as the data variable name. Probably
a copy/paste error.
Mostly harmless since both variables are unsigned int.
Fixes kernel bugzilla #197371:
Possible access to unintended variable in "kernel/sysctl.c" line 1339
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197371
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Petru Mihancea <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Once the dma request is passed to the DMA engine, the DMA subsystem
would hold a pointer to this structure and could call the completion
callback after do_dma_request() has timed out.
The current code deals with this by putting timed out SYNC requests to a
pending list and freeing them later, when the mport cdev device is
released. This still does not guarantee that the DMA subsystem is
really done with those transfers, so in theory
dma_xfer_callback/dma_req_free could be called after
mport_cdev_release_dma and could potentially access already freed
memory.
This patch simplifies the current handling by using a kref in the mport
dma request structure, so that it gets freed only when nobody uses it
anymore.
This also simplifies the code a bit, as FAF transfers are now handled in
the same way as SYNC and ASYNC transfers. There is no need anymore for
the pending list and for the dma workqueue which was used in case of FAF
transfers, so we remove them both.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ioan Nicu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexandre Bounine <[email protected]>
Cc: Barry Wood <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
Cc: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Cc: Frank Kunz <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Fix typo in the words 'receiver', 'specified', 'during'
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexandre Bounine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Since the stack rlimit is used in multiple places during exec and it can
be changed via other threads (via setrlimit()) or processes (via
prlimit()), the assumption that the value doesn't change cannot be made.
This leads to races with mm layout selection and argument size
calculations. This changes the exec path to use the rlimit stored in
bprm instead of in current. Before starting the thread, the bprm stack
rlimit is stored back to current.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Provide a final callback into fs/exec.c before start_thread() takes
over, to handle any last-minute changes, like the coming restoration of
the stack limit.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".
Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements
the approach.
[1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to [email protected], "Subject: existing rlimit races?"
This patch (of 3):
Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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All it takes to open a file and read 1 byte from it.
seq_file will be allocated along with any private allocations, and more
importantly seq file buffer which is 1 page by default.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180310085252.GB17121@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Glauber Costa <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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For fine-grained debugging and usercopy protection.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180310085027.GA17121@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Glauber Costa <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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One use of the reiserfs_warning() macro in journal_init_dev() is missing
a parameter, causing the following warning:
REISERFS warning (device loop0): journal_init_dev: Cannot open '%s': %i journal_init_dev:
This also causes a WARN_ONCE() warning in the vsprintf code, and then a
panic if panic_on_warn is set.
Please remove unsupported %/ in format string
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4480 at lib/vsprintf.c:2138 format_decode+0x77f/0x830 lib/vsprintf.c:2138
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
Just add another string argument to the macro invocation.
Addresses https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0627d4551fdc39bf1ef5d82cd9eef587047f7718
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This playing with signals to allow only fatal signals appears to predate
the introduction of wait_event_killable(), and I'm fairly sure that
wait_event_killable is what was meant to happen here.
[[email protected]: use wake_up() instead of wake_up_interruptible]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Use pr_cont() at the end of ramdisk loading. This will avoid the
rotator and an extra newline appearing in the dmesg.
Before:
RAMDISK: Loading 2436KiB [1 disk] into ram disk... |
done.
After:
RAMDISK: Loading 2436KiB [1 disk] into ram disk... done.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Using bool in a bitfield isn't a good idea as the alignment behavior is
arch implementation defined.
Suggest using unsigned int or u<8|16|32> instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Allow a space between a colon and subsequent opening bracket. This
sequence may occur in inline assembler statements like
asm(
"ldr %[out], [%[in]]\n\t"
: [out] "=r" (ret)
: [in] "r" (addr)
);
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Kernel style seems to prefer line wrapping an assignment with the
assignment operator on the previous line like:
<leading tabs> identifier =
expression;
over
<leading tabs> identifier
= expression;
somewhere around a 50:1 ratio
$ git grep -P "[^=]=\s*$" -- "*.[ch]" | wc -l
52008
$ git grep -P "^\s+[\*\/\+\|\%\-]?=[^=>]" | wc -l
1161
So add a --strict test for that condition.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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There are occasions where symbolic perms are used in a ternary like
return (channel == 0) ? S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR : S_IRUGO;
The current test will find the first use "S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR" but not the
second use "S_IRUGO" on the same line.
Improve the test to look for all instances on a line.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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completly -> completely
wacking -> whacking
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The get_quoted_string function does not expect invalid arguments.
The $stat test can return non-statements for complicated macros like
TRACE_EVENT.
Allow the $stat block and test for vsprintf misuses to exceed the actual
block length and possibly test invalid lines by validating the arguments
of get_quoted_string.
Return "" if either get_quoted_string argument is undefined.
Miscellanea:
o Properly align the comment for the vsprintf extension test
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9e9725342ca3dfc0f5e3e0b8ca3c482b0e5712cc.1520356392.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Usage of the new %px specifier potentially leaks sensitive information.
Printing kernel addresses exposes the kernel layout in memory, this is
potentially exploitable. We have tools in the kernel to help us do the
right thing. We can have checkpatch warn developers of potential
dangers of using %px.
Have checkpatch emit a warning for usage of specifier %px.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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checkpatch currently contains duplicate code. We can define a sub
routine and call that instead. This reduces code duplication and line
count.
Add subroutine get_stat_here().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Variables are declared and not used, we should remove them.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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checkpatch currently contains duplicate code. We can define a sub
routine and call that instead. This reduces code duplication and line
count.
Add subroutine get_stat_real()
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Add the crypto API *_ON_STACK to $declaration_macros.
Resolves the following false warning:
WARNING: Missing a blank line after declarations
+ int err;
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx_p->shash_tfm);
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Add SPDX license tag check based on the rules defined in
Documentation/process/license-rules.rst. To summarize, SPDX license
tags should be on the 1st line (or 2nd line in scripts) using the
appropriate comment style for the file type.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Philippe Ombredanne <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Igor Stoppa <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Bare email addresses with non alphanumeric characters require escape
quoting before being substituted in the parse_email routine.
e.g. Reported-by: [email protected]
Do so.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The entire point of printing the pointers in list_debug is to see if
there's any useful information in them (eg poison values, ASCII, etc);
obscuring them to see if they compare equal makes them much less useful.
If an attacker can force this message to be printed, we've already lost.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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test_ubsan_misaligned_access() is local to the source and does not need
to be in global scope, so make it static.
Cleans up sparse warning:
lib/test_ubsan.c:91:6: warning: symbol 'test_ubsan_misaligned_access' was not declared. Should it be static?
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Cc: Jinbum Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This is a test module for UBSAN. It triggers all undefined behaviors
that linux supports now, and detect them.
All test-cases have passed by compiling with gcc-5.5.0.
If use gcc-4.9.x, misaligned, out-of-bounds, object-size-mismatch will not
be detected. Because gcc-4.9.x doesn't support them.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180309102247.GA2944@pjb1027-Latitude-E5410
Signed-off-by: Jinbum Park <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This avoids an accidental stack VLA (since the compiler thinks the value
of "len" can change, even when marked "const"). This just replaces it
with a #define so it will DTRT.
Seen with -Wvla. Fixed as part of the directive to remove all VLAs from
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180307212555.GA17927@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Yury Norov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Keep all of the SOFTLOCKUP kconfig symbols together (instead of
injecting the HARDLOCKUP symbols in the midst of them) so that the
config tools display them with their dependencies.
Tested with 'make {menuconfig/nconfig/gconfig/xconfig}'.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 05a4a9527931 ("kernel/watchdog: split up config options")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Bounine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Barry Wood <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The original intent for always adding the anonymous struct in
task_struct was to make sure we had compiler coverage.
However, this caused pathological padding of 40 bytes at the start of
task_struct. Instead, move the anonymous struct to being only used when
struct layout randomization is enabled.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327213609.GA2964@beast
Fixes: 29e48ce87f1e ("task_struct: Allow randomized")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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clang-format is a tool to format C/C++/... code according to a set of
rules and heuristics. Like most tools, it is not perfect nor covers
every single case, but it is good enough to be helpful.
In particular, it is useful for quickly re-formatting blocks of code
automatically, for reviewing full files in order to spot coding style
mistakes, typos and possible improvements. It is also handy for sorting
``#includes``, for aligning variables and macros, for reflowing text and
other similar tasks. It also serves as a teaching tool/guide for
newcomers.
The tool itself has been already included in the repositories of popular
Linux distributions for a long time. The rules in this file are
intended for clang-format >= 4, which is easily available in most
distributions.
This commit adds the configuration file that contains the rules that the
tool uses to know how to format the code according to the kernel coding
style. This gives us several advantages:
* clang-format works out of the box with reasonable defaults;
avoiding that everyone has to re-do the configuration.
* Everyone agrees (eventually) on what is the most useful default
configuration for most of the kernel.
* If it becomes commonplace among kernel developers, clang-format
may feel compelled to support us better. They already recognize
the Linux kernel and its style in their documentation and in one
of the style sub-options.
Some of clang-format's features relevant for the kernel are:
* Uses clang's tooling support behind the scenes to parse and rewrite
the code. It is not based on ad-hoc regexps.
* Supports reasonably well the Linux kernel coding style.
* Fast enough to be used at the press of a key.
* There are already integrations (either built-in or third-party)
for many common editors used by kernel developers (e.g. vim,
emacs, Sublime, Atom...) that allow you to format an entire file
or, more usefully, just your selection.
* Able to parse unified diffs -- you can, for instance, reformat
only the lines changed by a git commit.
* Able to reflow text comments as well.
* Widely supported and used by hundreds of developers in highly
complex projects and organizations (e.g. the LLVM project itself,
Chromium, WebKit, Google, Mozilla...). Therefore, it will be
supported for a long time.
See more information about the tool at:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangFormat.html
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangFormatStyleOptions.html
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <[email protected]>
Cc: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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So "struct uts_namespace" can enjoy fine-grained SLAB debugging and
usercopy protection.
I'd prefer shorter name "utsns" but there is "user_namespace" already.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180228215158.GA23146@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Since the randstruct plugin can intentionally produce extremely unusual
kernel structure layouts (even performance pathological ones), some
maintainers want to be able to trivially determine if an Oops is coming
from a randstruct-built kernel, so as to keep their sanity when
debugging. This adds the new flag and initializes taint_mask
immediately when built with randstruct.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This consolidates the taint bit documentation into a single place with
both numeric and letter values. Additionally adds the missing TAINT_AUX
documentation.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This converts to using indexed initializers instead of comments, adds a
comment on why the taint flags can't be an enum, and make sure that no
one forgets to update the taint_flags when adding new bits.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The only tests I could come up with for /proc/uptime are:
- test that values increase monotonically for 1 second,
- bounce around CPUs and test the same thing.
Avoid glibc like plague for affinity given patches like this:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152130031912594&w=4
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180317165235.GB3445@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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In a typical for /proc "open+read+close" usecase, dentry is looked up
successfully on open only to be killed in dput() on close. In fact
dentries which aren't /proc/*/... and /proc/sys/* were almost NEVER
CACHED. Simple printk in proc_lookup_de() shows that.
Now that ->delete hook intelligently picks which dentries should live in
dcache and which should not, rbtree caching is not necessary as dcache
does it job, at last!
As a side effect, struct proc_dir_entry shrinks by one pointer which can
go into inline name.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180314231032.GA15854@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Perform reads with nearly everything in /proc, and some writing as well.
Hopefully memleak checkers and KASAN will find something.
[[email protected]: /proc/kmsg can and will block if read under root]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180316232147.GA20146@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: /proc/sysrq-trigger lives on the ground floor]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180317164911.GA3445@avx2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180315201251.GA12396@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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->count is honest reference count unlike ->in_use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313174550.GA4332@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Various subsystems can create files and directories in /proc with names
directly controlled by userspace.
Which means "/", "." and ".." are no-no.
"/" split is already taken care of, do the other 2 prohibited names.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180310001223.GB12443@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Test fork counter formerly known as ->last_pid, the only part of
/proc/loadavg which can be tested.
Testing in init pid namespace is not reliable because of background
activity.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180311152241.GA26247@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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mm_struct is not needed while printing as all the data was already
extracted.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180309223120.GC3843@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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