| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
We can receive ICMP errors from client or from
tunneling real server. While the former can be
scheduled to real server, the latter should
not be scheduled, they are decapsulated only when
existing connection is found.
Fixes: 6044eeffafbe ("ipvs: attempt to schedule icmp packets")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN started reporting an error when accessing ct->timeout for the
first time without initialization:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nf_ct_refresh_acct+0x1ae/0x470 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1765
...
dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x131/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:624
__msan_warning+0x7a/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310
__nf_ct_refresh_acct+0x1ae/0x470 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1765
nf_ct_refresh_acct ./include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h:201
nf_conntrack_udp_packet+0xb44/0x1040 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_udp.c:122
nf_conntrack_handle_packet net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1605
nf_conntrack_in+0x1250/0x26c9 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1696
...
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:205
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:159
kmsan_kmalloc+0xa9/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:173
kmem_cache_alloc+0x554/0xb10 mm/slub.c:2789
__nf_conntrack_alloc+0x16f/0x690 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1342
init_conntrack+0x6cb/0x2490 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1421
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: cc16921351d8ba1 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid same-timeout update")
Cc: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
|
Luca Moro says:
------
The issue lies in the filtering of ICMP and ICMPv6 errors that include an
inner IP datagram.
For these packets, icmp_error_message() extract the ICMP error and inner
layer to search of a known state.
If a state is found the packet is tagged as related (IP_CT_RELATED).
The problem is that there is no correlation check between the inner and
outer layer of the packet.
So one can encapsulate an error with an inner layer matching a known state,
while its outer layer is directed to a filtered host.
In this case the whole packet will be tagged as related.
This has various implications from a rule bypass (if a rule to related
trafic is allow), to a known state oracle.
Unfortunately, we could not find a real statement in a RFC on how this case
should be filtered.
The closest we found is RFC5927 (Section 4.3) but it is not very clear.
A possible fix would be to check that the inner IP source is the same than
the outer destination.
We believed this kind of attack was not documented yet, so we started to
write a blog post about it.
You can find it attached to this mail (sorry for the extract quality).
It contains more technical details, PoC and discussion about the identified
behavior.
We discovered later that
https://www.gont.com.ar/papers/filtering-of-icmp-error-messages.pdf
described a similar attack concept in 2004 but without the stateful
filtering in mind.
-----
This implements above suggested fix:
In icmp(v6) error handler, take outer destination address, then pass
that into the common function that does the "related" association.
After obtaining the nf_conn of the matching inner-headers connection,
check that the destination address of the opposite direction tuple
is the same as the outer address and only set RELATED if thats the case.
Reported-by: Luca Moro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
|
When an icmp error such as pkttoobig is received, conntrack checks
if the "inner" header (header of packet that did not fit link mtu)
is matches an existing connection, and, if so, sets that packet as
being related to the conntrack entry it found.
It was recently reported that this "related" setting also works
if the inner header is from another, different connection (i.e.,
artificial/forged icmp error).
Add a test, followup patch will add additional "inner dst matches
outer dst in reverse direction" check before setting related state.
Link: https://www.synacktiv.com/posts/systems/icmp-reachable.html
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
|
The recent commit 98081ca62cba ("ALSA: hda - Record the current power
state before suspend/resume calls") made the HD-audio driver to store
the PM state in power_state field. This forgot, however, the
initialization at power up. Although the codec drivers usually don't
need to refer to this field in the normal operation, let's initialize
it properly for consistency.
Fixes: 98081ca62cba ("ALSA: hda - Record the current power state before suspend/resume calls")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
|
The in-kernel afs filesystem client counts the number of server-level
callback invalidation events (CB.InitCallBackState* RPC operations) that it
receives from the server. This is stored in cb_s_break in various
structures, including afs_server and afs_vnode.
If an inode is examined by afs_validate(), say, the afs_server copy is
compared, along with other break counters, to those in afs_vnode, and if
one or more of the counters do not match, it is considered that the
server's callback promise is broken. At points where this happens,
AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED is cleared to indicate that the status must be
refetched from the server.
afs_validate() issues an FS.FetchStatus operation to get updated metadata -
and based on the updated data_version may invalidate the pagecache too.
However, the break counters are also used to determine whether to note a
new callback in the vnode (which would set the AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED flag)
and whether to cache the permit data included in the YFSFetchStatus record
by the server.
The problem comes when the server sends us a CB.InitCallBackState op. The
first such instance doesn't cause cb_s_break to be incremented, but rather
causes AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW to be cleared - but thereafter, say some hours
after last use and all the volumes have been automatically unmounted and
the server has forgotten about the client[*], this *will* likely cause an
increment.
[*] There are other circumstances too, such as the server restarting or
needing to make space in its callback table.
Note that the server won't send us a CB.InitCallBackState op until we talk
to it again.
So what happens is:
(1) A mount for a new volume is attempted, a inode is created for the root
vnode and vnode->cb_s_break and AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED aren't set
immediately, as we don't have a nominated server to talk to yet - and
we may iterate through a few to find one.
(2) Before the operation happens, afs_fetch_status(), say, notes in the
cursor (fc.cb_break) the break counter sum from the vnode, volume and
server counters, but the server->cb_s_break is currently 0.
(3) We send FS.FetchStatus to the server. The server sends us back
CB.InitCallBackState. We increment server->cb_s_break.
(4) Our FS.FetchStatus completes. The reply includes a callback record.
(5) xdr_decode_AFSCallBack()/xdr_decode_YFSCallBack() check to see whether
the callback promise was broken by checking the break counter sum from
step (2) against the current sum.
This fails because of step (3), so we don't set the callback record
and, importantly, don't set AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED on the vnode.
This does not preclude the syscall from progressing, and we don't loop here
rechecking the status, but rather assume it's good enough for one round
only and will need to be rechecked next time.
(6) afs_validate() it triggered on the vnode, probably called from
d_revalidate() checking the parent directory.
(7) afs_validate() notes that AFS_VNODE_CB_PROMISED isn't set, so doesn't
update vnode->cb_s_break and assumes the vnode to be invalid.
(8) afs_validate() needs to calls afs_fetch_status(). Go back to step (2)
and repeat, every time the vnode is validated.
This primarily affects volume root dir vnodes. Everything subsequent to
those inherit an already incremented cb_s_break upon mounting.
The issue is that we assume that the callback record and the cached permit
information in a reply from the server can't be trusted after getting a
server break - but this is wrong since the server makes sure things are
done in the right order, holding up our ops if necessary[*].
[*] There is an extremely unlikely scenario where a reply from before the
CB.InitCallBackState could get its delivery deferred till after - at
which point we think we have a promise when we don't. This, however,
requires unlucky mass packet loss to one call.
AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW tries to paper over the cracks for the initial mount from
a server we've never contacted before, but this should be unnecessary.
It's also further insulated from the problem on an initial mount by
querying the server first with FS.GetCapabilities, which triggers the
CB.InitCallBackState.
Fix this by
(1) Remove AFS_SERVER_FL_NEW.
(2) In afs_calc_vnode_cb_break(), don't include cb_s_break in the
calculation.
(3) In afs_cb_is_broken(), don't include cb_s_break in the check.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
|
__pagevec_release() complains loudly if any page in the vector is still
locked. The pages need to be locked for generic_error_remove_page(), but
that function doesn't actually unlock them.
Unlock the pages afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <[email protected]>
|
|
Differentiate an abort due to an unmarshalling error from an abort due to
other errors, such as ENETUNREACH. It doesn't make sense to set abort code
RXGEN_*_UNMARSHAL in such a case, so use RX_USER_ABORT instead.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
|
__tracepoint_str cannot be const because the tracepoint_str
section is not read-only. Remove the stray const.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
|
|
get_seconds() has a limited range on 32-bit architectures and is
deprecated because of that. While AFS uses the same limits for
its inode timestamps on the wire protocol, let's just use the
simpler current_time() as we do for other file systems.
This will still zero out the 'tv_nsec' field of the timestamps
internally.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix typos in user-visible resctrl parameters, and also fix assembly
constraint bugs that might result in miscompilation"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm: Use stricter assembly constraints in bitops
x86/resctrl: Fix typos in the mba_sc mount option
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix the alarm_timer_remaining() return value"
* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
alarmtimer: Return correct remaining time
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix a NULL pointer dereference crash in certain environments"
* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/fair: Do not re-read ->h_load_next during hierarchical load calculation
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Six kernel side fixes: three related to NMI handling on AMD systems, a
race fix, a kexec initialization fix and a PEBS sampling fix"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Fix perf_event_disable_inatomic() race
x86/perf/amd: Remove need to check "running" bit in NMI handler
x86/perf/amd: Resolve NMI latency issues for active PMCs
x86/perf/amd: Resolve race condition when disabling PMC
perf/x86/intel: Initialize TFA MSR
perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Fixes a crash when accessing /proc/lockdep"
* 'locking-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
locking/lockdep: Zap lock classes even with lock debugging disabled
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Two genirq fixes, plus an irqchip driver error handling fix"
* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
genirq: Respect IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE in irq_chip_set_wake_parent()
genirq: Initialize request_mutex if CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=n
irqchip/irq-ls1x: Missing error code in ls1x_intc_of_init()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Fix an objtool warning plus fix a u64_to_user_ptr() macro expansion
bug"
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
objtool: Add rewind_stack_do_exit() to the noreturn list
linux/kernel.h: Use parentheses around argument in u64_to_user_ptr()
|
|
Recompile IP options since IPCB may not be valid anymore when
ipv4_link_failure is called from arp_error_report.
Refer to the commit 3da1ed7ac398 ("net: avoid use IPCB in cipso_v4_error")
and the commit before that (9ef6b42ad6fd) for a similar issue.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
David Howells says:
====================
rxrpc: Fixes
Here is a collection of fixes for rxrpc:
(1) rxrpc_error_report() needs to call sock_error() to clear the error
code from the UDP transport socket, lest it be unexpectedly revisited
on the next kernel_sendmsg() call. This has been causing all sorts of
weird effects in AFS as the effects have typically been felt by the
wrong RxRPC call.
(2) Allow a kernel user of AF_RXRPC to easily detect if an rxrpc call has
completed.
(3) Allow errors incurred by attempting to transmit data through the UDP
socket to get back up the stack to AFS.
(4) Make AFS use (2) to abort the synchronous-mode call waiting loop if
the rxrpc-level call completed.
(5) Add a missing tracepoint case for tracing abort reception.
(6) Fix detection and handling of out-of-order ACKs.
====================
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The rxrpc packet serial number cannot be safely used to compute out of
order ack packets for several reasons:
1. The allocation of serial numbers cannot be assumed to imply the order
by which acks are populated and transmitted. In some rxrpc
implementations, delayed acks and ping acks are transmitted
asynchronously to the receipt of data packets and so may be transmitted
out of order. As a result, they can race with idle acks.
2. Serial numbers are allocated by the rxrpc connection and not the call
and as such may wrap independently if multiple channels are in use.
In any case, what matters is whether the ack packet provides new
information relating to the bounds of the window (the firstPacket and
previousPacket in the ACK data).
Fix this by discarding packets that appear to wind back the window bounds
rather than on serial number procession.
Fixes: 298bc15b2079 ("rxrpc: Only take the rwind and mtu values from latest ACK")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Trace received calls that are aborted due to a connection abort, typically
because of authentication failure. Without this, connection aborts don't
show up in the trace log.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Check the state of the rxrpc call backing an afs call in each iteration of
the call wait loop in case the rxrpc call has already been terminated at
the rxrpc layer.
Interrupt the wait loop and mark the afs call as complete if the rxrpc
layer call is complete.
There were cases where rxrpc errors were not passed up to afs, which could
result in this loop waiting forever for an afs call to transition to
AFS_CALL_COMPLETE while the rx call was already complete.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Change rxrpc_queue_packet()'s signature so that it can return any error
code it may encounter when trying to send the packet.
This allows the caller to eventually do something in case of error - though
it should be noted that the packet has been queued and a resend is
scheduled.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Make rxrpc_kernel_check_life() pass back the life counter through the
argument list and return true if the call has not yet completed.
Suggested-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
When an ICMP or ICMPV6 error is received, the error will be attached
to the socket (sk_err) and the report function will get called.
Clear any pending error here by calling sock_error().
This would cause the following attempt to use the socket to fail with
the error code stored by the ICMP error, resulting in unexpected errors
with various side effects depending on the context.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
The err2 error return path calls qede_ptp_disable that cleans up
on an error and frees ptp. After this, the free'd ptp is dereferenced
when ptp->clock is set to NULL and the code falls-through to error
path err1 that frees ptp again.
Fix this by calling qede_ptp_disable and exiting via an error
return path that does not set ptp->clock or kfree ptp.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Write to pointer after free")
Fixes: 035744975aec ("qede: Add support for PTP resource locking.")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Currently if a pci dma mapping failure is detected a free'd
memblock address is returned rather than a NULL (that indicates
an error). Fix this by ensuring NULL is returned on this error case.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Use after free")
Fixes: 528f727279ae ("vxge: code cleanup and reorganization")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
Code which initializes the "clk_init_data.ops" checks pll->rate_table
before that field is ever assigned to so it always picks
"clk_pll1416x_min_ops".
This breaks dynamic rate rounding for features such as cpufreq.
Fix by checking pll_clk->rate_table instead, here pll_clk refers to
the constant initialization data coming from per-soc clk driver.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <[email protected]>
Fixes: 8646d4dcc7fb ("clk: imx: Add PLLs driver for imx8mm soc")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/iwlwifi/iwlwifi-fixes
Second batch of iwlwifi fixes intended for v5.1
* fix for a potential deadlock in the TX path;
* a fix for offloaded rate-control;
* support new PCI HW IDs which use a new FW;
|
|
Move ieee80211_tx_status_ext() outside of status_list lock section
in order to avoid locking dependency and possible deadlock reposed by
LOCKDEP in below warning.
Also do mt76_tx_status_lock() just before it's needed.
[ 440.224832] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 440.224833] 5.1.0-rc2+ #22 Not tainted
[ 440.224834] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 440.224835] kworker/u16:28/2362 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 440.224836] 0000000089b8cacf (&(&q->lock)->rlock#2){+.-.}, at: mt76_wake_tx_queue+0x4c/0xb0 [mt76]
[ 440.224842]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 440.224842] 000000002cfedc59 (&(&sta->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_cb+0x32/0x1f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.224863]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 440.224863]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 440.224864]
-> #3 (&(&sta->lock)->rlock){+.-.}:
[ 440.224869] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[ 440.224880] ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session+0xe4/0x3d0 [mac80211]
[ 440.224894] minstrel_ht_get_rate+0x45c/0x510 [mac80211]
[ 440.224906] rate_control_get_rate+0xc1/0x140 [mac80211]
[ 440.224918] ieee80211_tx_h_rate_ctrl+0x195/0x3c0 [mac80211]
[ 440.224930] ieee80211_xmit_fast+0x26d/0xa50 [mac80211]
[ 440.224942] __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xfc/0x310 [mac80211]
[ 440.224954] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x38/0x390 [mac80211]
[ 440.224956] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb8/0x300
[ 440.224957] __dev_queue_xmit+0x7d4/0xbb0
[ 440.224968] ip6_finish_output2+0x246/0x860 [ipv6]
[ 440.224978] mld_sendpack+0x1bd/0x360 [ipv6]
[ 440.224987] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x1a4/0x2f0 [ipv6]
[ 440.224989] call_timer_fn+0x89/0x2a0
[ 440.224990] run_timer_softirq+0x1bd/0x4d0
[ 440.224992] __do_softirq+0xdb/0x47c
[ 440.224994] irq_exit+0xfa/0x100
[ 440.224996] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9a/0x220
[ 440.224997] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
[ 440.224999] cpuidle_enter_state+0xc1/0x470
[ 440.225000] do_idle+0x21a/0x260
[ 440.225001] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[ 440.225004] start_secondary+0x135/0x170
[ 440.225006] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
[ 440.225007]
-> #2 (&(&sta->rate_ctrl_lock)->rlock){+.-.}:
[ 440.225009] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[ 440.225022] rate_control_tx_status+0x4f/0xb0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225031] ieee80211_tx_status_ext+0x142/0x1a0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225035] mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x2e4/0x340 [mt76x02_lib]
[ 440.225037] mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x31/0x40 [mt76x02_lib]
[ 440.225040] mt76u_tx_status_data+0x51/0xa0 [mt76_usb]
[ 440.225042] process_one_work+0x237/0x5d0
[ 440.225043] worker_thread+0x3c/0x390
[ 440.225045] kthread+0x11d/0x140
[ 440.225046] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 440.225047]
-> #1 (&(&list->lock)->rlock#8){+.-.}:
[ 440.225049] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[ 440.225052] mt76_tx_status_skb_add+0x51/0x100 [mt76]
[ 440.225054] mt76x02u_tx_prepare_skb+0xbd/0x116 [mt76x02_usb]
[ 440.225056] mt76u_tx_queue_skb+0x5f/0x180 [mt76_usb]
[ 440.225058] mt76_tx+0x93/0x190 [mt76]
[ 440.225070] ieee80211_tx_frags+0x148/0x210 [mac80211]
[ 440.225081] __ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x1b0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225092] ieee80211_tx+0xde/0x110 [mac80211]
[ 440.225105] __ieee80211_tx_skb_tid_band+0x72/0x90 [mac80211]
[ 440.225122] ieee80211_send_auth+0x1f3/0x360 [mac80211]
[ 440.225141] ieee80211_auth.cold.40+0x6c/0x100 [mac80211]
[ 440.225156] ieee80211_mgd_auth.cold.50+0x132/0x15f [mac80211]
[ 440.225171] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x149/0x360 [cfg80211]
[ 440.225181] nl80211_authenticate+0x273/0x2e0 [cfg80211]
[ 440.225183] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x196/0x3a0
[ 440.225184] genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0x8e
[ 440.225185] netlink_rcv_skb+0x3a/0xf0
[ 440.225187] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[ 440.225188] netlink_unicast+0x16d/0x210
[ 440.225189] netlink_sendmsg+0x204/0x3b0
[ 440.225191] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
[ 440.225193] ___sys_sendmsg+0x259/0x2b0
[ 440.225194] __sys_sendmsg+0x47/0x80
[ 440.225196] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
[ 440.225197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 440.225198]
-> #0 (&(&q->lock)->rlock#2){+.-.}:
[ 440.225200] lock_acquire+0xb9/0x1a0
[ 440.225202] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[ 440.225204] mt76_wake_tx_queue+0x4c/0xb0 [mt76]
[ 440.225215] ieee80211_agg_start_txq+0xe8/0x2b0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225225] ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_cb+0xb8/0x1f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225235] ieee80211_ba_session_work+0x1c1/0x2f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225236] process_one_work+0x237/0x5d0
[ 440.225237] worker_thread+0x3c/0x390
[ 440.225239] kthread+0x11d/0x140
[ 440.225240] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 440.225240]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 440.225241] Chain exists of:
&(&q->lock)->rlock#2 --> &(&sta->rate_ctrl_lock)->rlock --> &(&sta->lock)->rlock
[ 440.225243] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 440.225244] CPU0 CPU1
[ 440.225244] ---- ----
[ 440.225245] lock(&(&sta->lock)->rlock);
[ 440.225245] lock(&(&sta->rate_ctrl_lock)->rlock);
[ 440.225246] lock(&(&sta->lock)->rlock);
[ 440.225247] lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock#2);
[ 440.225248]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 440.225249] 5 locks held by kworker/u16:28/2362:
[ 440.225250] #0: 0000000048fcd291 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b5/0x5d0
[ 440.225252] #1: 00000000f1c6828f ((work_completion)(&sta->ampdu_mlme.work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1b5/0x5d0
[ 440.225254] #2: 00000000433d2b2c (&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_ba_session_work+0x5c/0x2f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225265] #3: 000000002cfedc59 (&(&sta->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_cb+0x32/0x1f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225276] #4: 000000009d7b9a44 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: ieee80211_agg_start_txq+0x33/0x2b0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225286]
stack backtrace:
[ 440.225288] CPU: 2 PID: 2362 Comm: kworker/u16:28 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc2+ #22
[ 440.225289] Hardware name: LENOVO 20KGS23S0P/20KGS23S0P, BIOS N23ET55W (1.30 ) 08/31/2018
[ 440.225300] Workqueue: phy0 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211]
[ 440.225301] Call Trace:
[ 440.225304] dump_stack+0x85/0xc0
[ 440.225306] print_circular_bug.isra.38.cold.58+0x15c/0x195
[ 440.225307] check_prev_add.constprop.48+0x5f0/0xc00
[ 440.225309] ? check_prev_add.constprop.48+0x39d/0xc00
[ 440.225311] ? __lock_acquire+0x41d/0x1100
[ 440.225312] __lock_acquire+0xd98/0x1100
[ 440.225313] ? __lock_acquire+0x41d/0x1100
[ 440.225315] lock_acquire+0xb9/0x1a0
[ 440.225317] ? mt76_wake_tx_queue+0x4c/0xb0 [mt76]
[ 440.225319] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40
[ 440.225321] ? mt76_wake_tx_queue+0x4c/0xb0 [mt76]
[ 440.225323] mt76_wake_tx_queue+0x4c/0xb0 [mt76]
[ 440.225334] ieee80211_agg_start_txq+0xe8/0x2b0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225344] ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_cb+0xb8/0x1f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225354] ieee80211_ba_session_work+0x1c1/0x2f0 [mac80211]
[ 440.225356] process_one_work+0x237/0x5d0
[ 440.225358] worker_thread+0x3c/0x390
[ 440.225359] ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x70/0x70
[ 440.225360] kthread+0x11d/0x140
[ 440.225362] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x40/0x40
[ 440.225363] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 88046b2c9f6d ("mt76: add support for reporting tx status with skb")
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
|
Currently rt2x00 devices retransmit the management frames with
incremented sequence number if hardware is assigning the sequence.
This is HW bug fixed already for non-QOS data frames, but it should
be fixed for management frames except beacon.
Without fix retransmitted frames have wrong SN:
AlphaNet_e8:fb:36 Vivotek_52:31:51 Authentication, SN=1648, FN=0, Flags=........C Frame is not being retransmitted 1648 1
AlphaNet_e8:fb:36 Vivotek_52:31:51 Authentication, SN=1649, FN=0, Flags=....R...C Frame is being retransmitted 1649 1
AlphaNet_e8:fb:36 Vivotek_52:31:51 Authentication, SN=1650, FN=0, Flags=....R...C Frame is being retransmitted 1650 1
With the fix SN stays correctly the same:
88:6a:e3:e8:f9:a2 8c:f5:a3:88:76:87 Authentication, SN=1450, FN=0, Flags=........C
88:6a:e3:e8:f9:a2 8c:f5:a3:88:76:87 Authentication, SN=1450, FN=0, Flags=....R...C
88:6a:e3:e8:f9:a2 8c:f5:a3:88:76:87 Authentication, SN=1450, FN=0, Flags=....R...C
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vijayakumar Durai <[email protected]>
[sgruszka: simplify code, change comments and changelog]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
|
Now that the sequence number allocation is fixed, we can finally send a BAR
at powersave wakeup time to refresh the receiver side reorder window
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
|
If the MT_TXD3_SN_VALID flag is not set in the tx descriptor, the hardware
assigns the sequence number. However, the rest of the code assumes that the
sequence number specified in the 802.11 header gets transmitted.
This was causing issues with the aggregation setup, which worked for the
initial one (where the sequence numbers were still close), but not for
further teardown/re-establishing of sessions.
Additionally, the overwrite of the TID sequence number in WTBL2 was resetting
the hardware assigned sequence numbers, causing them to drift further apart.
Fix this by using the software assigned sequence numbers
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
|
Fixes lockdep complaint and a potential race condition
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to udpv6_pre_connect()
is shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.
(This patch is bogus if it is guaranteed that udpv6_pre_connect() is
always called after checking "struct sockaddr"->sa_family. In that case,
we want a comment why we don't need to check valid address length here.)
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bpf_bind() is
shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind() is shorter
than sizeof(struct sockaddr_llc) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind() is shorter
than sizeof(struct sockaddr_sco) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind() is shorter
than sizeof(struct sockaddr_rxrpc) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind() is shorter
than sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to connect() is shorter
than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind() is shorter
than sizeof("struct sockaddr_mISDN"->family) bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
syzbot is reporting uninitialized value at rds_connect() [1] and
rds_bind() [2]. This is because syzbot is passing ulen == 0 whereas
these functions expect that it is safe to access sockaddr->family field
in order to determine minimal address length for validation.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f4e61c010416c1e6f0fa3ffe247561b60a50ad71
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4bf9e41b7e055c3823fdcd83e8c58ca7270e38f
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
|
CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT would be dropped.
Merge two flag setting together to correct the error.
Fixes: 5a1cc4c27ad2 ("clk: mediatek: Add flags to mtk_gate")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Weiyi Lu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
|
|
Got accidently dropped when 2+1 level support was added.
Fixes: 6a42fd6fbf534096 ("drm/amdgpu: implement 2+1 PD support for Raven v3")
Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
|
sriov TDR
shadow was added into shadow_list by amdgpu_bo_create_shadow.
meanwhile, shadow->tbo.mem was not fully configured.
tbo.mem would be fully configured by amdgpu_vm_sdma_map_table until calling amdgpu_vm_clear_bo.
If sriov TDR occurred between amdgpu_bo_create_shadow and amdgpu_vm_sdma_map_table,
amdgpu_device_recover_vram would deal with shadow without tbo.mem.start.
Signed-off-by: Wentao Lou <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
|
|
Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig:
"Fix a sparc64 sun4v_pci regression introduced in this merged window,
and a dma-debug stracktrace regression from the big refactor last
merge window"
* tag 'dma-mapping-5.1-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping:
dma-debug: only skip one stackframe entry
sparc64/pci_sun4v: fix ATU checks for large DMA masks
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu
Pull IOMMU fix from Joerg Roedel:
"Fix an AMD IOMMU issue where the driver didn't correctly setup the
exclusion range in the hardware registers, resulting in exclusion
ranges being one page too big.
This can cause data corruption of the address of that last page is
used by DMA operations"
* tag 'iommu-fix-v5.1-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu:
iommu/amd: Set exclusion range correctly
|
|
Pull clang-format update from Miguel Ojeda:
"The usual roughly-per-release .clang-format macro list update"
* tag 'clang-format-for-linus-v5.1-rc5' of git://github.com/ojeda/linux:
clang-format: Update with the latest for_each macro list
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc
Pull MMC host fixes from Ulf Hansson:
- alcor: Stabilize data write requests
- sdhci-omap: Fix command error path during tuning
* tag 'mmc-v5.1-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc:
mmc: sdhci-omap: Don't finish_mrq() on a command error during tuning
mmc: alcor: don't write data before command has completed
|