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In most configurations, kmalloc() happens to return naturally aligned
(i.e. aligned to the block size itself) blocks for power of two sizes.
That means some kmalloc() users might unknowingly rely on that
alignment, until stuff breaks when the kernel is built with e.g.
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG or CONFIG_SLOB, and blocks stop being aligned. Then
developers have to devise workaround such as own kmem caches with
specified alignment [1], which is not always practical, as recently
evidenced in [2].
The topic has been discussed at LSF/MM 2019 [3]. Adding a
'kmalloc_aligned()' variant would not help with code unknowingly relying
on the implicit alignment. For slab implementations it would either
require creating more kmalloc caches, or allocate a larger size and only
give back part of it. That would be wasteful, especially with a generic
alignment parameter (in contrast with a fixed alignment to size).
Ideally we should provide to mm users what they need without difficult
workarounds or own reimplementations, so let's make the kmalloc()
alignment to size explicitly guaranteed for power-of-two sizes under all
configurations. What this means for the three available allocators?
* SLAB object layout happens to be mostly unchanged by the patch. The
implicitly provided alignment could be compromised with
CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB due to redzoning, however SLAB disables redzoning for
caches with alignment larger than unsigned long long. Practically on at
least x86 this includes kmalloc caches as they use cache line alignment,
which is larger than that. Still, this patch ensures alignment on all
arches and cache sizes.
* SLUB layout is also unchanged unless redzoning is enabled through
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG and boot parameter for the particular kmalloc cache.
With this patch, explicit alignment is guaranteed with redzoning as
well. This will result in more memory being wasted, but that should be
acceptable in a debugging scenario.
* SLOB has no implicit alignment so this patch adds it explicitly for
kmalloc(). The potential downside is increased fragmentation. While
pathological allocation scenarios are certainly possible, in my testing,
after booting a x86_64 kernel+userspace with virtme, around 16MB memory
was consumed by slab pages both before and after the patch, with
difference in the noise.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c3157c8e8e0e7588312b40c853f65c02fe6c957a.1566399731.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/787740/
[[email protected]: documentation fixlet, per Matthew]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Patch series "guarantee natural alignment for kmalloc()", v2.
This patch (of 2):
SLOB currently doesn't account its pages at all, so in /proc/meminfo the
Slab field shows zero. Modifying a counter on page allocation and
freeing should be acceptable even for the small system scenarios SLOB is
intended for. Since reclaimable caches are not separated in SLOB,
account everything as unreclaimable.
SLUB currently doesn't account kmalloc() and kmalloc_node() allocations
larger than order-1 page, that are passed directly to the page
allocator. As they also don't appear in /proc/slabinfo, it might look
like a memory leak. For consistency, account them as well. (SLAB
doesn't actually use page allocator directly, so no change there).
Ideally SLOB and SLUB would be handled in separate patches, but due to
the shared kmalloc_order() function and different kfree()
implementations, it's easier to patch both at once to prevent
inconsistencies.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: "Darrick J . Wong" <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This patch is an incremental improvement on the existing
memory.{low,min} relative reclaim work to base its scan pressure
calculations on how much protection is available compared to the current
usage, rather than how much the current usage is over some protection
threshold.
This change doesn't change the experience for the user in the normal
case too much. One benefit is that it replaces the (somewhat arbitrary)
100% cutoff with an indefinite slope, which makes it easier to ballpark
a memory.low value.
As well as this, the old methodology doesn't quite apply generically to
machines with varying amounts of physical memory. Let's say we have a
top level cgroup, workload.slice, and another top level cgroup,
system-management.slice. We want to roughly give 12G to
system-management.slice, so on a 32GB machine we set memory.low to 20GB
in workload.slice, and on a 64GB machine we set memory.low to 52GB.
However, because these are relative amounts to the total machine size,
while the amount of memory we want to generally be willing to yield to
system.slice is absolute (12G), we end up putting more pressure on
system.slice just because we have a larger machine and a larger workload
to fill it, which seems fairly unintuitive. With this new behaviour, we
don't end up with this unintended side effect.
Previously the way that memory.low protection works is that if you are
50% over a certain baseline, you get 50% of your normal scan pressure.
This is certainly better than the previous cliff-edge behaviour, but it
can be improved even further by always considering memory under the
currently enforced protection threshold to be out of bounds. This means
that we can set relatively low memory.low thresholds for variable or
bursty workloads while still getting a reasonable level of protection,
whereas with the previous version we may still trivially hit the 100%
clamp. The previous 100% clamp is also somewhat arbitrary, whereas this
one is more concretely based on the currently enforced protection
threshold, which is likely easier to reason about.
There is also a subtle issue with the way that proportional reclaim
worked previously -- it promotes having no memory.low, since it makes
pressure higher during low reclaim. This happens because we base our
scan pressure modulation on how far memory.current is between memory.min
and memory.low, but if memory.low is unset, we only use the overage
method. In most cromulent configurations, this then means that we end
up with *more* pressure than with no memory.low at all when we're in low
reclaim, which is not really very usable or expected.
With this patch, memory.low and memory.min affect reclaim pressure in a
more understandable and composable way. For example, from a user
standpoint, "protected" memory now remains untouchable from a reclaim
aggression standpoint, and users can also have more confidence that
bursty workloads will still receive some amount of guaranteed
protection.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Roman points out that when when we do the low reclaim pass, we scale the
reclaim pressure relative to position between 0 and the maximum
protection threshold.
However, if the maximum protection is based on memory.elow, and
memory.emin is above zero, this means we still may get binary behaviour
on second-pass low reclaim. This is because we scale starting at 0, not
starting at memory.emin, and since we don't scan at all below emin, we
end up with cliff behaviour.
This should be a fairly uncommon case since usually we don't go into the
second pass, but it makes sense to scale our low reclaim pressure
starting at emin.
You can test this by catting two large sparse files, one in a cgroup
with emin set to some moderate size compared to physical RAM, and
another cgroup without any emin. In both cgroups, set an elow larger
than 50% of physical RAM. The one with emin will have less page
scanning, as reclaim pressure is lower.
Rebase on top of and apply the same idea as what was applied to handle
cgroup_memory=disable properly for the original proportional patch
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] ("mm,
memcg: Handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection").
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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cgroup v2 introduces two memory protection thresholds: memory.low
(best-effort) and memory.min (hard protection). While they generally do
what they say on the tin, there is a limitation in their implementation
that makes them difficult to use effectively: that cliff behaviour often
manifests when they become eligible for reclaim. This patch implements
more intuitive and usable behaviour, where we gradually mount more
reclaim pressure as cgroups further and further exceed their protection
thresholds.
This cliff edge behaviour happens because we only choose whether or not
to reclaim based on whether the memcg is within its protection limits
(see the use of mem_cgroup_protected in shrink_node), but we don't vary
our reclaim behaviour based on this information. Imagine the following
timeline, with the numbers the lruvec size in this zone:
1. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=999999. 0 pages may be scanned.
2. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000000. 0 pages may be scanned.
3. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000001. 1000001* pages may be
scanned. (?!)
* Of course, we won't usually scan all available pages in the zone even
without this patch because of scan control priority, over-reclaim
protection, etc. However, as shown by the tests at the end, these
techniques don't sufficiently throttle such an extreme change in input,
so cliff-like behaviour isn't really averted by their existence alone.
Here's an example of how this plays out in practice. At Facebook, we are
trying to protect various workloads from "system" software, like
configuration management tools, metric collectors, etc (see this[0] case
study). In order to find a suitable memory.low value, we start by
determining the expected memory range within which the workload will be
comfortable operating. This isn't an exact science -- memory usage deemed
"comfortable" will vary over time due to user behaviour, differences in
composition of work, etc, etc. As such we need to ballpark memory.low,
but doing this is currently problematic:
1. If we end up setting it too low for the workload, it won't have
*any* effect (see discussion above). The group will receive the full
weight of reclaim and won't have any priority while competing with the
less important system software, as if we had no memory.low configured
at all.
2. Because of this behaviour, we end up erring on the side of setting
it too high, such that the comfort range is reliably covered. However,
protected memory is completely unavailable to the rest of the system,
so we might cause undue memory and IO pressure there when we *know* we
have some elasticity in the workload.
3. Even if we get the value totally right, smack in the middle of the
comfort zone, we get extreme jumps between no pressure and full
pressure that cause unpredictable pressure spikes in the workload due
to the current binary reclaim behaviour.
With this patch, we can set it to our ballpark estimation without too much
worry. Any undesirable behaviour, such as too much or too little reclaim
pressure on the workload or system will be proportional to how far our
estimation is off. This means we can set memory.low much more
conservatively and thus waste less resources *without* the risk of the
workload falling off a cliff if we overshoot.
As a more abstract technical description, this unintuitive behaviour
results in having to give high-priority workloads a large protection
buffer on top of their expected usage to function reliably, as otherwise
we have abrupt periods of dramatically increased memory pressure which
hamper performance. Having to set these thresholds so high wastes
resources and generally works against the principle of work conservation.
In addition, having proportional memory reclaim behaviour has other
benefits. Most notably, before this patch it's basically mandatory to set
memory.low to a higher than desirable value because otherwise as soon as
you exceed memory.low, all protection is lost, and all pages are eligible
to scan again. By contrast, having a gradual ramp in reclaim pressure
means that you now still get some protection when thresholds are exceeded,
which means that one can now be more comfortable setting memory.low to
lower values without worrying that all protection will be lost. This is
important because workingset size is really hard to know exactly,
especially with variable workloads, so at least getting *some* protection
if your workingset size grows larger than you expect increases user
confidence in setting memory.low without a huge buffer on top being
needed.
Thanks a lot to Johannes Weiner and Tejun Heo for their advice and
assistance in thinking about how to make this work better.
In testing these changes, I intended to verify that:
1. Changes in page scanning become gradual and proportional instead of
binary.
To test this, I experimented stepping further and further down
memory.low protection on a workload that floats around 19G workingset
when under memory.low protection, watching page scan rates for the
workload cgroup:
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
| memory.low | test (pgscan/s) | control (pgscan/s) | % of control |
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
| 21G | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| 17G | 867 | 3799 | 23% |
| 12G | 1203 | 3543 | 34% |
| 8G | 2534 | 3979 | 64% |
| 4G | 3980 | 4147 | 96% |
| 0 | 3799 | 3980 | 95% |
+------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
As you can see, the test kernel (with a kernel containing this
patch) ramps up page scanning significantly more gradually than the
control kernel (without this patch).
2. More gradual ramp up in reclaim aggression doesn't result in
premature OOMs.
To test this, I wrote a script that slowly increments the number of
pages held by stress(1)'s --vm-keep mode until a production system
entered severe overall memory contention. This script runs in a highly
protected slice taking up the majority of available system memory.
Watching vmstat revealed that page scanning continued essentially
nominally between test and control, without causing forward reclaim
progress to become arrested.
[0]: https://facebookmicrosites.github.io/cgroup2/docs/overview.html#case-study-the-fbtax2-project
[[email protected]: reflow block comments to fit in 80 cols]
[[email protected]: handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The "mode" and "level" variables are enums and in this context GCC will
treat them as unsigned ints so the error handling is never triggered.
I also removed the bogus initializer because it isn't required any more
and it's sort of confusing.
[[email protected]: reduce implicit and explicit typecasting]
[[email protected]: fix return value, add comment, per Matthew]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190925110449.GO3264@mwanda
Fixes: 3cadfa2b9497 ("mm/vmpressure.c: convert to use match_string() helper")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Enrico Weigelt <[email protected]>
Cc: Kate Stewart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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On architectures like s390, arch_free_page() could mark the page unused
(set_page_unused()) and any access later would trigger a kernel panic.
Fix it by moving arch_free_page() after all possible accessing calls.
Hardware name: IBM 2964 N96 400 (z/VM 6.4.0)
Krnl PSW : 0404e00180000000 0000000026c2b96e (__free_pages_ok+0x34e/0x5d8)
R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
Krnl GPRS: 0000000088d43af7 0000000000484000 000000000000007c 000000000000000f
000003d080012100 000003d080013fc0 0000000000000000 0000000000100000
00000000275cca48 0000000000000100 0000000000000008 000003d080010000
00000000000001d0 000003d000000000 0000000026c2b78a 000000002717fdb0
Krnl Code: 0000000026c2b95c: ec1100b30659 risbgn %r1,%r1,0,179,6
0000000026c2b962: e32014000036 pfd 2,1024(%r1)
#0000000026c2b968: d7ff10001000 xc 0(256,%r1),0(%r1)
>0000000026c2b96e: 41101100 la %r1,256(%r1)
0000000026c2b972: a737fff8 brctg %r3,26c2b962
0000000026c2b976: d7ff10001000 xc 0(256,%r1),0(%r1)
0000000026c2b97c: e31003400004 lg %r1,832
0000000026c2b982: ebff1430016a asi 5168(%r1),-1
Call Trace:
__free_pages_ok+0x16a/0x5d8)
memblock_free_all+0x206/0x290
mem_init+0x58/0x120
start_kernel+0x2b0/0x570
startup_continue+0x6a/0xc0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Last Breaking-Event-Address:
__free_pages_ok+0x372/0x5d8
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
00: HCPGIR450W CP entered; disabled wait PSW 00020001 80000000 00000000 26A2379C
In the past, only kernel_poison_pages() would trigger this but it needs
"page_poison=on" kernel cmdline, and I suspect nobody tested that on
s390. Recently, kernel_init_free_pages() (commit 6471384af2a6 ("mm:
security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options"))
was added and could trigger this as well.
[[email protected]: add comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 8823b1dbc05f ("mm/page_poison.c: enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option")
Fixes: 6471384af2a6 ("mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [5.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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There's a really hard to reproduce race in z3fold between z3fold_free()
and z3fold_reclaim_page(). z3fold_reclaim_page() can claim the page
after z3fold_free() has checked if the page was claimed and
z3fold_free() will then schedule this page for compaction which may in
turn lead to random page faults (since that page would have been
reclaimed by then).
Fix that by claiming page in the beginning of z3fold_free() and not
forgetting to clear the claim in the end.
[[email protected]: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190928113456.152742cf@bigdell
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Wool <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Markus Linnala <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Streetman <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Henry Burns <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: Markus Linnala <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Partially revert 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe
limits") because the patch is causing a regression to any workload which
needs to override the auto-tuning of the limit provided by kernel.
set_max_threads is implementing a boot time guesstimate to provide a
sensible limit of the concurrently running threads so that runaways will
not deplete all the memory. This is a good thing in general but there
are workloads which might need to increase this limit for an application
to run (reportedly WebSpher MQ is affected) and that is simply not
possible after the mentioned change. It is also very dubious to
override an admin decision by an estimation that doesn't have any direct
relation to correctness of the kernel operation.
Fix this by dropping set_max_threads from sysctl_max_threads so any
value is accepted as long as it fits into MAX_THREADS which is important
to check because allowing more threads could break internal robust futex
restriction. While at it, do not use MIN_THREADS as the lower boundary
because it is also only a heuristic for automatic estimation and admin
might have a good reason to stop new threads to be created even when
below this limit.
This became more severe when we switched x86 from 4k to 8k kernel
stacks. Starting since 6538b8ea886e ("x86_64: expand kernel stack to
16K") (3.16) we use THREAD_SIZE_ORDER = 2 and that halved the auto-tuned
value.
In the particular case
3.12
kernel.threads-max = 515561
4.4
kernel.threads-max = 200000
Neither of the two values is really insane on 32GB machine.
I am not sure we want/need to tune the max_thread value further. If
anything the tuning should be removed altogether if proven not useful in
general. But we definitely need a way to override this auto-tuning.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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disabled
In kdump kernel, memcg usually is disabled with 'cgroup_disable=memory'
for saving memory. Now kdump kernel will always panic when dump vmcore
to local disk:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ab8
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 598 Comm: makedumpfile Not tainted 5.3.0+ #26
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 10/02/2018
RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath+0x38/0x140
Call Trace:
__set_page_dirty+0x52/0xc0
iomap_set_page_dirty+0x50/0x90
iomap_write_end+0x6e/0x270
iomap_write_actor+0xce/0x170
iomap_apply+0xba/0x11e
iomap_file_buffered_write+0x62/0x90
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0xca/0x320 [xfs]
new_sync_write+0x12d/0x1d0
vfs_write+0xa5/0x1a0
ksys_write+0x59/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x59/0x1e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
And this will corrupt the 1st kernel too with 'cgroup_disable=memory'.
Via the trace and with debugging, it is pointing to commit 97b27821b485
("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing") which introduced
this regression. Disabling memcg causes the null pointer dereference at
uninitialized data in function mem_cgroup_track_foreign_dirty_slowpath().
Fix it by returning directly if memcg is disabled, but not trying to
record the foreign writebacks with dirty pages.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190924141928.GD31919@MiWiFi-R3L-srv
Fixes: 97b27821b485 ("writeback, memcg: Implement foreign dirty flushing")
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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We get two warnings when build kernel W=1:
mm/shuffle.c:36:12: warning: no previous prototype for `shuffle_show' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
mm/sparse.c:220:6: warning: no previous prototype for `subsection_mask_set' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
Make the functions static to fix this.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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finish_writeback_work() reads @done->waitq after decrementing
@done->cnt. However, once @done->cnt reaches zero, @done may be freed
(from stack) at any moment and @done->waitq can contain something
unrelated by the time finish_writeback_work() tries to read it. This
led to the following crash.
"BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000002"
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 40 PID: 555153 Comm: kworker/u98:50 Kdump: loaded Not tainted
...
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1)
RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x30
Code: 48 89 d8 5b c3 e8 50 db 6b ff eb f4 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 53 9c 5b fa 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 05 48 89 d8 5b c3 89 c6 e8 fe ca 6b ff eb f2 66 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc90049b27d98 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff889fff407600 R11: ffff88ba9395d740 R12: 000000000000e300
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bfdfa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 0000000002409005 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
__wake_up_common_lock+0x63/0xc0
wb_workfn+0xd2/0x3e0
process_one_work+0x1f5/0x3f0
worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
kthread+0x111/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Fix it by reading and caching @done->waitq before decrementing
@done->cnt.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 5b9cce4c7eb069 ("writeback: Generalize and expose wb_completion")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [5.2+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
SECTION_SIZE and SECTION_MASK macros are not getting used anymore. But
they do conflict with existing definitions on arm64 platform causing
following warning during build. Lets drop these unused macros.
mm/memremap.c:16: warning: "SECTION_MASK" redefined
#define SECTION_MASK ~((1UL << PA_SECTION_SHIFT) - 1)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h:79: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define SECTION_MASK (~(SECTION_SIZE-1))
mm/memremap.c:17: warning: "SECTION_SIZE" redefined
#define SECTION_SIZE (1UL << PA_SECTION_SHIFT)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h:78: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define SECTION_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << SECTION_SHIFT)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Cc: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the
calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption
enabled. From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled,
despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned.
This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the
command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping"
message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to
/proc/sysrq-trigger:
| sysrq: Trigger a crash
| Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148
| show_stack+0x14/0x20
| dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4
| panic+0x140/0x32c
| sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20
| __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190
| write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88
| proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8
| __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
| vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8
| ksys_write+0x64/0xf0
| __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168
| el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78
| el0_svc+0x8/0xc
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0002,24002004
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]---
| Ping 2!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 2!
The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n,
otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'.
Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xogium <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Feng Tang <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
ocfs2_info_scan_inode_alloc()
In ocfs2_info_scan_inode_alloc(), there is an if statement on line 283
to check whether inode_alloc is NULL:
if (inode_alloc)
When inode_alloc is NULL, it is used on line 287:
ocfs2_inode_lock(inode_alloc, &bh, 0);
ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested(inode, ...)
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, inode_alloc is checked on line 286.
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
In ocfs2_write_end_nolock(), there are an if statement on lines 1976,
2047 and 2058, to check whether handle is NULL:
if (handle)
When handle is NULL, it is used on line 2045:
ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, handle is checked before calling
ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans().
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
In ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry(), there is an if statement on line 2136 to
check whether loc->xl_entry is NULL:
if (loc->xl_entry)
When loc->xl_entry is NULL, it is used on line 2158:
ocfs2_xa_add_entry(loc, name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_hash = cpu_to_le32(name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_offset = cpu_to_le16(loc->xl_size);
and line 2164:
ocfs2_xa_add_namevalue(loc, xi);
loc->xl_entry->xe_value_size = cpu_to_le64(xi->xi_value_len);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_len = xi->xi_name_len;
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur.
To fix these bugs, if loc-xl_entry is NULL, ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()
abnormally returns with -EINVAL.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
[[email protected]: remove now-unused ocfs2_xa_add_entry()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
Unused portion of a part-written fs-block-sized block is not set to zero
in unaligned append direct write.This can lead to serious data
inconsistencies.
Ocfs2 manage disk with cluster size(for example, 1M), part-written in
one cluster will change the cluster state from UN-WRITTEN to WRITTEN,
VFS(function dio_zero_block) doesn't do the cleaning because bh's state
is not set to NEW in function ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block when we write a
WRITTEN cluster. For example, the cluster size is 1M, file size is 8k
and we direct write from 14k to 15k, then 12k~14k and 15k~16k will
contain dirty data.
We have to deal with two cases:
1.The starting position of direct write is outside the file.
2.The starting position of direct write is located in the file.
We need set bh's state to NEW in the first case. In the second case, we
need mapped twice because bh's state of area out file should be set to
NEW while area in file not.
[[email protected]: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jia Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.
This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.
There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.
Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.
Reported-by: James Dingwall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
|
|
For the kernel space, all ebreak instructions are determined at compile
time because the kernel space debugging module is currently unsupported.
Hence, it should be treated as a bug if an ebreak instruction which does
not belong to BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN or BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG is executed in
kernel space. For the userspace, debugging module or user problem may
intentionally insert an ebreak instruction to trigger a SIGTRAP signal.
To approach the above two situations, the do_trap_break() will direct
the BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE ebreak exception issued in kernel space to die()
and will send a SIGTRAP to the trapped process only when the ebreak is
in userspace.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: fixed checkpatch issue]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
|
|
On RISC-V, when the kernel runs code on behalf of a user thread, and the
kernel executes a WARN() or WARN_ON(), the user thread will be sent
a bogus SIGTRAP. Fix the RISC-V kernel code to not send a SIGTRAP when
a WARN()/WARN_ON() is executed.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: fixed subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
|
|
When the CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG is disabled by disabling CONFIG_BUG, if a
kernel thread is trapped by BUG(), the whole system will be in the
loop that infinitely handles the ebreak exception instead of entering the
die function. To fix this problem, the do_trap_break() will always call
the die() to deal with the break exception as the type of break is
BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
|
|
In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
|
Since dropping the set-to-gtt-domain in commit a679f58d0510 ("drm/i915:
Flush pages on acquisition"), we no longer mark the contents as dirty on
a write fault. This has the issue of us then not marking the pages as
dirty on releasing the buffer, which means the contents are not written
out to the swap device (should we ever pick that buffer as a victim).
Notably, this is visible in the dumb buffer interface used for cursors.
Having updated the cursor contents via mmap, and swapped away, if the
shrinker should evict the old cursor, upon next reuse, the cursor would
be invisible.
E.g. echo 80 > /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq ; echo f > /proc/sysrq-trigger
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111541
Fixes: a679f58d0510 ("drm/i915: Flush pages on acquisition")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Auld <[email protected]>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 5028851cdfdf78dc22eacbc44a0ab0b3f599ee4a)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
|
|
Force bonded requests to run on distinct engines so that they cannot be
shuffled onto the same engine where timeslicing will reverse the order.
A bonded request will often wait on a semaphore signaled by its master,
creating an implicit dependency -- if we ignore that implicit dependency
and allow the bonded request to run on the same engine and before its
master, we will cause a GPU hang. [Whether it will hang the GPU is
debatable, we should keep on timeslicing and each timeslice should be
"accidentally" counted as forward progress, in which case it should run
but at one-half to one-third speed.]
We can prevent this inversion by restricting which engines we allow
ourselves to jump to upon preemption, i.e. baking in the arrangement
established at first execution. (We should also consider capturing the
implicit dependency using i915_sched_add_dependency(), but first we need
to think about the constraints that requires on the execution/retirement
ordering.)
Fixes: 8ee36e048c98 ("drm/i915/execlists: Minimalistic timeslicing")
References: ee1136908e9b ("drm/i915/execlists: Virtual engine bonding")
Testcase: igt/gem_exec_balancer/bonded-slice
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit e2144503bf3b22275dd33cef2880e1cb5fb200c5)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
|
|
The officially validated plane width limit is 4k on skl+, however
we already had people using 5k displays before we started to enforce
the limit. Also it seems Windows allows 5k resolutions as well
(though not sure if they do it with one plane or two).
According to hw folks 5k should work with the possible
exception of the following features:
- Ytile (already limited to 4k)
- FP16 (already limited to 4k)
- render compression (already limited to 4k)
- KVMR sprite and cursor (don't care)
- horizontal panning (need to verify this)
- pipe and plane scaling (need to verify this)
So apart from last two items on that list we are already
fine. We should really verify what happens with those last
two items but I don't have a 5k display on hand atm so it'll
have to wait.
In the meantime let's just bump the limit back up to 5k since
several users have already been using it without apparent issues.
At least we'll be no worse off than we were prior to lowering
the limits.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Leho Kraav <[email protected]>
Fixes: 372b9ffb5799 ("drm/i915: Fix skl+ max plane width")
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111501
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bed34ef544f9ab37ab349c04cf4142282c4dcf5d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
|
|
When using virtual engines, the rq->engine is not stable until we hold
the engine->active.lock (as the virtual engine may be exchanged with the
sibling). Since commit 22b7a426bbe1 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy")
we may retire a request concurrently with resubmitting it to HW, we need
to be extra careful to verify we are holding the correct lock for the
request's active list. This is similar to the issue we saw with
rescheduling the virtual requests, see sched_lock_engine().
Or else:
<4> [876.736126] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff8883f931a1f8), but was dead000000000100. (prev=ffff888361ffa610).
<4> [876.736136] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736137] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915]
<4> [876.736154] CPU: 2 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G U 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1
<4> [876.736156] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019
<4> [876.736157] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736159] Code: c3 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 20 33 0e 82 48 89 c2 e8 4a 4a bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 c1 4c 89 c6 48 c7 c7 70 33 0e 82 e8 33 4a bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c0 33 0e 82 e8
<4> [876.736160] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018bd30 EFLAGS: 00010082
<4> [876.736162] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000104
<4> [876.736163] RDX: 0000000080000104 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
<4> [876.736164] RBP: ffffc9000018bd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736165] R10: 00000000aed95de3 R11: 000000007fe927eb R12: ffff888361ffca10
<4> [876.736166] R13: ffff888361ffa610 R14: ffff888361ffc880 R15: ffff8883f931a1f8
<4> [876.736168] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4> [876.736169] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4> [876.736170] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
<4> [876.736171] PKRU: 55555554
<4> [876.736172] Call Trace:
<4> [876.736226] __i915_request_submit+0x152/0x370 [i915]
<4> [876.736263] __execlists_submission_tasklet+0x6da/0x1f50 [i915]
<4> [876.736293] ? execlists_submission_tasklet+0x29/0x50 [i915]
<4> [876.736321] execlists_submission_tasklet+0x34/0x50 [i915]
<4> [876.736325] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x47/0xb0
<4> [876.736328] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x4ae
<4> [876.736332] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x23/0x280
<4> [876.736334] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x6b/0x280
<4> [876.736336] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50
<4> [876.736338] smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d3/0x280
<4> [876.736341] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
<4> [876.736343] kthread+0x119/0x130
<4> [876.736345] ? kthread_park+0xa0/0xa0
<4> [876.736347] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [876.736353] irq event stamp: 2290145
<4> [876.736356] hardirqs last enabled at (2290144): [<ffffffff8123cde8>] __slab_free+0x3e8/0x500
<4> [876.736358] hardirqs last disabled at (2290145): [<ffffffff819cfb4d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd/0x50
<4> [876.736360] softirqs last enabled at (2290114): [<ffffffff81c0033e>] __do_softirq+0x33e/0x4ae
<4> [876.736361] softirqs last disabled at (2290119): [<ffffffff810b815b>] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50
<4> [876.736363] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736364] ---[ end trace 3e58d6c7356c65bf ]---
<4> [876.736406] ------------[ cut here ]------------
<4> [876.736415] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff888361ffca10, but was ffff88840ac2c730
<4> [876.736421] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5490 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90
<4> [876.736422] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915]
<4> [876.736433] CPU: 2 PID: 5490 Comm: i915_selftest Tainted: G U W 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1
<4> [876.736435] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019
<4> [876.736436] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90
<4> [876.736438] Code: 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 30 34 0e 82 e8 ae 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 68 34 0e 82 e8 97 49 bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 c7 c7 a8 34 0e 82 e8 86 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3
<4> [876.736439] RSP: 0018:ffffc900003ef758 EFLAGS: 00010086
<4> [876.736440] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000002
<4> [876.736442] RDX: 0000000080000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
<4> [876.736443] RBP: ffffc900003ef780 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736444] R10: 000000001418e4b7 R11: 000000007f0ea93b R12: ffff888361ffcab8
<4> [876.736445] R13: ffff88843b6d0000 R14: 000000000000217c R15: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736447] FS: 00007f4e6f255240(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4> [876.736448] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4> [876.736449] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
<4> [876.736450] PKRU: 55555554
<4> [876.736451] Call Trace:
<4> [876.736488] i915_request_retire+0x224/0x8e0 [i915]
<4> [876.736521] i915_request_create+0x4b/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [876.736550] nop_virtual_engine+0x230/0x4d0 [i915]
Fixes: 22b7a426bbe1 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy")
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111695
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Auld <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 37fa0de3c137d5f54f7e64f53495c9d501d42a4d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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A few times in CI, we have detected a GPU hang on our Haswell GT2
systems with the characteristic IPEHR of 0x780c0000. When the PSMI w/a
was first introducted, it was applied to all Haswell, but later on we
found an erratum that supposedly restricted the issue to GT1 and so
constrained it only be applied on GT1. That may have been a mistake...
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111692
Fixes: 167bc759e823 ("drm/i915: Restrict PSMI context load w/a to Haswell GT1")
References: 2c550183476d ("drm/i915: Disable PSMI sleep messages on all rings around context switches")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 56c05de6bd773b96deca379370965c49042b5fbf)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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While srcu may use an integer tag, it does not exclude potential error
codes and so may overlap with our own use of -EINTR. Use a separate
outparam to store the tag, and report the error code separately.
Fixes: 2caffbf11762 ("drm/i915: Revoke mmaps and prevent access to fence registers across reset")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit eebab60f224fcfd560957715d08c31564d8672ed)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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This allows userspace to use "legacy" mode for push constants, where
they are committed at 3DPRIMITIVE or flush time, rather than being
committed at 3DSTATE_BINDING_TABLE_POINTERS_XS time. Gen6-8 and Gen11
both use the "legacy" behavior - only Gen9 works in the "new" way.
Conflating push constants with binding tables is painful for userspace,
we would like to be able to avoid doing so.
Signed-off-by: Kenneth Graunke <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 0606259e3b3a1220a0f04a92a1654a3f674f47ee)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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As soon as we re-enable the various functions within the HW, they may go
off and read data via a GGTT offset. Hence, if we have not yet restored
the GGTT PTE before then, they may read and even *write* random locations
in memory.
Detected by DMAR faults during resume.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Cc: Martin Peres <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit cec5ca08e36fd18d2939b98055346b3b06f56c6c)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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As we may unwind incomplete requests (for preemption) prior to
processing the CSB and the schedule-out events, we may update rq->engine
(resetting it to point back to the parent virtual engine) prior to
calling execlists_schedule_out(), invalidating the assertion that the
request still points to the inflight engine. (The likelihood of this is
increased if the CSB interrupt processing is pushed to the ksoftirqd for
being too slow and direct submission overtakes it.)
Tvrtko summarised it as:
"So unwind from direct submission resets rq->engine and races with
process_csb from the tasklet which notices request has actually
completed."
Reported-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <[email protected]>
Fixes: df403069029d ("drm/i915/execlists: Lift process_csb() out of the irq-off spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vinay Belgaumkar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit d810583fc2fcf139cc766eb2303500b2d9cf064d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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Commit ac7c3e4ff401 ("compiler: enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING
forcibly") allows compiler to uninline functions marked as 'inline'.
In cace of cmpxchg this would cause to reference function
__cmpxchg_called_with_bad_pointer, which is a error case
for catching bugs and will not happen for correct code, if
__cmpxchg is inlined.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: s/__cmpxchd/__cmpxchg in subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: James Hogan <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
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scripts/nsdeps automatically generates a patch to add MODULE_IMPORT_NS
tags, and what is nicer, it sorts the lines alphabetically with the
'sort' command. However, the output from the 'sort' command depends on
locale.
For example, I got this:
$ { echo usbstorage; echo usb_storage; } | LANG=en_US.UTF-8 sort
usbstorage
usb_storage
$ { echo usbstorage; echo usb_storage; } | LANG=C sort
usb_storage
usbstorage
So, this means people might potentially send different patches.
This kind of issue was reported in the past, for example,
commit f55f2328bb28 ("kbuild: make sorting initramfs contents
independent of locale").
Adding 'LANG=C' is a conventional way of fixing when a deterministic
result is desirable.
I added 'LANG=C' very close to the 'sort' command since changing
locale affects the language of error messages etc. We should respect
users' choice as much as possible.
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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This script does not use bash-extension. I am guessing this hashbang
was copied from scripts/coccicheck, which really uses bash-extension.
/bin/sh is enough for this script.
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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Running 'make nsdeps' in a clean source tree fails as follows:
$ make -s clean; make -s defconfig; make nsdeps
[ snip ]
awk: fatal: cannot open file `init/modules.order' for reading (No such file or directory)
make: *** [Makefile;1307: modules.order] Error 2
make: *** Deleting file 'modules.order'
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
The cause of the error is 'make nsdeps' does not build modules at all.
Set KBUILD_MODULES to fix it.
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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The module namespace produces __strtab_ns_<sym> symbols to store
namespace strings, but it does not guarantee the name uniqueness.
This is a potential problem because we have exported symbols starting
with "ns_".
For example, kernel/capability.c exports the following symbols:
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
Assume a situation where those are converted as follows:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(ns_capable, some_namespace);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(capable, some_namespace);
The former expands to "__kstrtab_ns_capable" and "__kstrtab_ns_ns_capable",
and the latter to "__kstrtab_capable" and "__kstrtab_ns_capable".
Then, we have the duplicated "__kstrtab_ns_capable".
To ensure the uniqueness, rename "__kstrtab_ns_*" to "__kstrtabns_*".
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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Currently, external module builds produce tons of false-positives:
WARNING: module <mod> uses symbol <sym> from namespace <ns>, but does not import it.
Here, the <ns> part shows a random string.
When you build external modules, the symbol info of vmlinux and
in-kernel modules are read from $(objtree)/Module.symvers, but
read_dump() is buggy in multiple ways:
[1] When the modpost is run for vmlinux and in-kernel modules,
sym_extract_namespace() allocates memory for the namespace. On the
other hand, read_dump() does not, then sym->namespace will point to
somewhere in the line buffer of get_next_line(). The data in the
buffer will be replaced soon, and sym->namespace will end up with
pointing to unrelated data. As a result, check_exports() will show
random strings in the warning messages.
[2] When there is no namespace, sym_extract_namespace() returns NULL.
On the other hand, read_dump() sets namespace to an empty string "".
(but, it will be later replaced with unrelated data due to bug [1].)
The check_exports() shows a warning unless exp->namespace is NULL,
so every symbol read from read_dump() emits the warning, which is
mostly false positive.
To address [1], sym_add_exported() calls strdup() for s->namespace.
The namespace from sym_extract_namespace() must be freed to avoid
memory leak.
For [2], I changed the if-conditional in check_exports().
This commit also fixes sym_add_exported() to set s->namespace correctly
when the symbol is preloaded.
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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Currently, EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(_GPL) constructs the kernel symbol as
follows:
__ksymtab_SYMBOL.NAMESPACE
The sym_extract_namespace() in modpost allocates memory for the part
SYMBOL.NAMESPACE when '.' is contained. One problem is that the pointer
returned by strdup() is lost because the symbol name will be copied to
malloc'ed memory by alloc_symbol(). No one will keep track of the
pointer of strdup'ed memory.
sym->namespace still points to the NAMESPACE part. So, you can free it
with complicated code like this:
free(sym->namespace - strlen(sym->name) - 1);
It complicates memory free.
To fix it elegantly, I swapped the order of the symbol and the
namespace as follows:
__ksymtab_NAMESPACE.SYMBOL
then, simplified sym_extract_namespace() so that it allocates memory
only for the NAMESPACE part.
I prefer this order because it is intuitive and also matches to major
languages. For example, NAMESPACE::NAME in C++, MODULE.NAME in Python.
Reviewed-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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Commit:
ab43762ef010 ("perf: Allow normal events to output AUX data")
forgets to configure aux_output relation in the inherited groups, which
results in child PEBS events forever failing to schedule.
Fix this by setting up the AUX output link in the inheritance path.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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Now all scripts in scripts/coccinelle to be automatically called
by coccicheck. However new adding add_namespace.cocci does not
support report mode, which make coccicheck failed.
This add "virtual report" to make the coccicheck go ahead smoothly.
Fixes: eb8305aecb95 ("scripts: Coccinelle script for namespace dependencies.")
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matthias Maennich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
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kexec reboot fails randomly in UEFI based KVM guest. The firmware
just resets while calling efi_delete_dummy_variable(); Unfortunately
I don't know how to debug the firmware, it is also possible a potential
problem on real hardware as well although nobody reproduced it.
The intention of the efi_delete_dummy_variable is to trigger garbage collection
when entering virtual mode. But SetVirtualAddressMap can only run once
for each physical reboot, thus kexec_enter_virtual_mode() is not necessarily
a good place to clean a dummy object.
Drop the efi_delete_dummy_variable so that kexec reboot can work.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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The efi_rci2_sysfs_init() is not used outside of rci2-table.c so
make it static to silence the following Sparse warning:
drivers/firmware/efi/rci2-table.c:79:12: warning: symbol 'efi_rci2_sysfs_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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If __calc_tpm2_event_size() fails to parse an event it will return 0,
resulting tpm2_calc_event_log_size() returning -1. Currently there is
no check of this return value, and 'efi_tpm_final_log_size' can end up
being set to this negative value resulting in a crash like this one:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffbc8fc00866ad
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
Call Trace:
tpm_read_log_efi()
tpm_bios_log_setup()
tpm_chip_register()
tpm_tis_core_init.cold.9+0x28c/0x466
tpm_tis_plat_probe()
platform_drv_probe()
...
Also __calc_tpm2_event_size() returns a size of 0 when it fails
to parse an event, so update function documentation to reflect this.
The root cause of the issue that caused the failure of event parsing
in this case is resolved by Peter Jone's patchset dealing with large
event logs where crossing over a page boundary causes the page with
the event count to be unmapped.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: c46f3405692de ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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When there are no entries to put into the final event log, some machines
will return the template they would have populated anyway. In this case
the nr_events field is 0, but the rest of the log is just garbage.
This patch stops us from trying to iterate the table with
__calc_tpm2_event_size() when the number of events in the table is 0.
Tested-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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Some machines generate a lot of event log entries. When we're
iterating over them, the code removes the old mapping and adds a
new one, so once we cross the page boundary we're unmapping the page
with the count on it. Hilarity ensues.
This patch keeps the info from the header in local variables so we don't
need to access that page again or keep track of if it's mapped.
Tested-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 44038bc514a2 ("tpm: Abstract crypto agile event size calculations")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[ Minor edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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The kernel command line option efivar_ssdt= allows the name to be
specified of an EFI variable containing an ACPI SSDT table that should
be loaded into memory by the OS, and treated as if it was provided by
the firmware.
Currently, that code will always iterate over the EFI variables and
compare each name with the provided name, even if the command line
option wasn't set to begin with.
So bail early when no variable name was provided. This works around a
boot regression on the 2012 Mac Pro, as reported by Scott.
Tested-by: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.9+
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 475fb4e8b2f4 ("efi / ACPI: load SSTDs from EFI variables")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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The CPER parser assumes that the class code is big endian, but at least
on this edk2-derived Intel Purley platform it's little endian:
efi: EFI v2.50 by EDK II BIOS ID:PLYDCRB1.86B.0119.R05.1701181843
DMI: Intel Corporation PURLEY/PURLEY, BIOS PLYDCRB1.86B.0119.R05.1701181843 01/18/2017
{1}[Hardware Error]: device_id: 0000:5d:00.0
{1}[Hardware Error]: slot: 0
{1}[Hardware Error]: secondary_bus: 0x5e
{1}[Hardware Error]: vendor_id: 0x8086, device_id: 0x2030
{1}[Hardware Error]: class_code: 000406
^^^^^^ (should be 060400)
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jerry Snitselaar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Lyude Paul <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Cc: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Scott Talbert <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent
Pull perf/urgent fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
perf script:
Andi Kleen:
- Fix recovery from LBR/binary mismatch in the "brstackinsn" --field.
perf annotate:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Propagate errors so that meaningful messages can be presented to the
user in case of problems.
perf map:
Steve MacLean:
- Fix handling of maps partially overlapped, resolving symbols in the
ranges not replaced by new mmaps.
perf tests:
Ian Rogers:
- Use raise() instead of NULL derefs to avoid causing a SIGILL rather than a
SIGSEGV for optimized builds that turn NULL derefs into ud2 instructions.
perf LLVM:
Ian Rogers:
- Don't access out-of-scope array.
perf inject:
Steve MacLean:
- Fix JIT_CODE_MOVE filename, that was having a u64 truncaded into a 32-bit
snprintf format and also a missing ".so" suffix in another case.
libsubcmd:
Ian Rogers:
- Make _FORTIFY_SOURCE defines dependent on the feature, avoiding
false positives with with memory sanitizers such as LLVM's ASan.
Vendor specific events:
Intel:
Andi Kleen:
- Fix period for Intel fixed counters.
s390:
Thomas Richter (2):
- Fix some event details transaction for machine type 8561.
tools headers UAPI:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Sync headers with the kernel, catching new usbdevfs ioctls and
madvise behaviours to properly decode in 'perf trace' output.
Documentation:
Steve MacLean:
- Correct and clarify jitdump spec.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
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Sphinx is generating a build warning as the title underline
of this file is too short.
Signed-off-by: Adam Zerella <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
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