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The caller of shadow_context_status_change may disable irqs. So it is not
safe to use spin_unlock_bh in such context. Let's switch to irqsave version
for safety.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4504 at kernel/softirq.c:161 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x60
[ 168.797710] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 7040/0Y7WYT, BIOS 1.2.8 01/26/2016
[ 168.797712] task: ffff8c693d22db80 task.stack: ffffb51b482bc000
[ 168.797718] RIP: 0010:__local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x60
[ 168.797721] RSP: 0018:ffffb51b482bfa10 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 168.797724] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: ffff8c6900278000 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
[ 168.797726] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000200 RDI: ffffffffc06a0330
[ 168.797728] RBP: ffffb51b482bfa10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8c690027cb90
[ 168.797730] R10: ffffb51b482bfa40 R11: 00000004072f0001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 168.797732] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8c690027ca9c R15: 0000000000000000
[ 168.797735] FS: 00007ff187c56700(0000) GS:ffff8c6959d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 168.797738] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 168.797740] CR2: 0000562bc0c3991f CR3: 0000000430614006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 168.797742] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 168.797744] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 168.797745] Call Trace:
[ 168.797755] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1e/0x20
[ 168.797826] shadow_context_status_change+0x120/0x1e0 [i915]
[ 168.797831] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x70
[ 168.797834] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x20
[ 168.797896] execlists_cancel_port_requests+0x4f/0x80 [i915]
[ 168.797956] reset_common_ring+0x30/0x100 [i915]
[ 168.798007] i915_gem_reset_engine+0x114/0x330 [i915]
[ 168.798060] ? i915_gem_retire_requests+0x75/0x180 [i915]
[ 168.798111] i915_gem_reset+0x3e/0xb0 [i915]
[ 168.798149] i915_reset+0x10b/0x1c0 [i915]
[ 168.798187] i915_reset_device+0x209/0x220 [i915]
[ 168.798225] ? gen8_gt_irq_ack+0x170/0x170 [i915]
[ 168.798229] ? __queue_work+0x430/0x430
[ 168.798270] i915_handle_error+0x285/0x420 [i915]
[ 168.798275] ? mntput+0x24/0x40
[ 168.798281] ? terminate_walk+0x8e/0xf0
[ 168.798328] i915_wedged_set+0x84/0xc0 [i915]
[ 168.798333] simple_attr_write+0xab/0xc0
[ 168.798337] full_proxy_write+0x54/0x90
[ 168.798343] __vfs_write+0x37/0x170
[ 168.798349] ? common_file_perm+0x4c/0x100
[ 168.798355] ? apparmor_file_permission+0x1a/0x20
[ 168.798361] ? security_file_permission+0x3b/0xc0
[ 168.798365] vfs_write+0xb8/0x1b0
[ 168.798370] SyS_write+0x55/0xc0
[ 168.798376] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xa9
Fixes: 0e86cc9 ("drm/i915/gvt: implement per-vm mmio switching optimization")
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]>
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The alternative intel_backlight_device_register() definition apparently
never got used, but I have now run into a case of i915 being compiled
without CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE, resulting in a number of
identical warnings:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_drv.h:1739:12: error: 'intel_backlight_device_register' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
This marks the function as 'inline', which was surely the original
intention here.
Fixes: 1ebaa0b9c2d4 ("drm/i915: Move backlight registration to connector registration")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 2de2d0b063b08becb2c67a2c338c44e37bdcffee)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
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As both the hotplug event and fbdev configuration run asynchronously, it
is possible for them to run concurrently. If configuration fails, we were
freeing the fbdev causing a use-after-free in the hotplug event.
<7>[ 3069.935211] [drm:intel_fb_initial_config [i915]] Not using firmware configuration
<7>[ 3069.935225] [drm:drm_setup_crtcs] looking for cmdline mode on connector 77
<7>[ 3069.935229] [drm:drm_setup_crtcs] looking for preferred mode on connector 77 0
<7>[ 3069.935233] [drm:drm_setup_crtcs] found mode 3200x1800
<7>[ 3069.935236] [drm:drm_setup_crtcs] picking CRTCs for 8192x8192 config
<7>[ 3069.935253] [drm:drm_setup_crtcs] desired mode 3200x1800 set on crtc 43 (0,0)
<7>[ 3069.935323] [drm:intelfb_create [i915]] no BIOS fb, allocating a new one
<4>[ 3069.967737] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
<0>[ 3069.977453] ---------------------------------
<4>[ 3069.977457] Modules linked in: i915(+) vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm r8169 mei_me mii prime_numbers mei i2c_hid pinctrl_geminilake pinctrl_intel [last unloaded: i915]
<4>[ 3069.977492] CPU: 1 PID: 15414 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G U 4.14.0-CI-CI_DRM_3388+ #1
<4>[ 3069.977497] Hardware name: Intel Corp. Geminilake/GLK RVP1 DDR4 (05), BIOS GELKRVPA.X64.0062.B30.1708222146 08/22/2017
<4>[ 3069.977508] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute
<4>[ 3069.977512] task: ffff880177734e40 task.stack: ffffc90001fe4000
<4>[ 3069.977519] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x1b60
<4>[ 3069.977523] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001fe7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010002
<4>[ 3069.977526] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: 0000000000000282 RCX: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 3069.977530] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff880170d4efd0
<4>[ 3069.977534] RBP: ffffc90001fe7c70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 3069.977538] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff81899609 R12: ffff880170d4efd0
<4>[ 3069.977542] R13: ffff880177734e40 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
<4>[ 3069.977547] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88017fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4>[ 3069.977551] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4>[ 3069.977555] CR2: 00007f7e8b7bcf04 CR3: 0000000003e0f000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
<4>[ 3069.977559] Call Trace:
<4>[ 3069.977565] ? mark_held_locks+0x64/0x90
<4>[ 3069.977571] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
<4>[ 3069.977575] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
<4>[ 3069.977579] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xde/0x1c0
<4>[ 3069.977583] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2f/0x50
<4>[ 3069.977588] ? finish_task_switch+0xa5/0x210
<4>[ 3069.977592] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x200
<4>[ 3069.977596] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x200
<4>[ 3069.977600] ? __mutex_lock+0x5e9/0x9b0
<4>[ 3069.977604] _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40
<4>[ 3069.977608] ? __mutex_lock+0x5e9/0x9b0
<4>[ 3069.977612] __mutex_lock+0x5e9/0x9b0
<4>[ 3069.977616] ? drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.19+0x16/0xa0
<4>[ 3069.977621] ? drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.19+0x16/0xa0
<4>[ 3069.977625] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.19+0x16/0xa0
<4>[ 3069.977630] output_poll_execute+0x8d/0x180
<4>[ 3069.977635] process_one_work+0x22e/0x660
<4>[ 3069.977640] worker_thread+0x48/0x3a0
<4>[ 3069.977644] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
<4>[ 3069.977649] kthread+0x102/0x140
<4>[ 3069.977653] ? process_one_work+0x660/0x660
<4>[ 3069.977657] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x40/0x40
<4>[ 3069.977662] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x40
<4>[ 3069.977666] Code: 8d 62 f8 c3 49 81 3c 24 e0 fa 3c 82 41 be 00 00 00 00 45 0f 45 f0 83 fe 01 77 86 89 f0 49 8b 44 c4 08 48 85 c0 0f 84 76 ff ff ff <f0> ff 80 38 01 00 00 8b 1d 62 f9 e8 01 45 8b 85 b8 08 00 00 85
<1>[ 3069.977707] RIP: __lock_acquire+0x109/0x1b60 RSP: ffffc90001fe7bb0
<4>[ 3069.977712] ---[ end trace 4ad012eb3af62df7 ]---
In order to keep the dev_priv->ifbdev alive after failure, we have to
avoid the free and leave it empty until we unload the module (which is
less than ideal, but a necessary evil for simplicity). Then we can use
intel_fbdev_sync() to serialise the hotplug event with the configuration.
The serialisation between the two was removed in commit 934458c2c95d
("Revert "drm/i915: Fix races on fbdev""), but the use after free is much
older, commit 366e39b4d2c5 ("drm/i915: Tear down fbdev if initialization
fails")
Fixes: 366e39b4d2c5 ("drm/i915: Tear down fbdev if initialization fails")
Fixes: 934458c2c95d ("Revert "drm/i915: Fix races on fbdev"")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit ad88d7fc6c032ddfb32b8d496a070ab71de3a64f)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
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The hardware always writes one or two bytes in the index portion of
an indexed transfer. Make sure the message we send as the index
doesn't have a zero length.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Daniel Kurtz <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
Fixes: 56f9eac05489 ("drm/i915/intel_i2c: use INDEX cycles for i2c read transactions")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bb9e0d4bca50f429152e74a459160b41f3d60fb2)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
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We can only specify the one slave address to indexed reads/writes.
Make sure the messages we check are destined to the same slave
address before deciding to do an indexed transfer.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Daniel Kurtz <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc: Sean Paul <[email protected]>
Fixes: 56f9eac05489 ("drm/i915/intel_i2c: use INDEX cycles for i2c read transactions")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit c4deb62d7821672265b87952bcd1c808f3bf3e8f)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
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Power values in the 100s of watt range can easily blow past
32bit math limits when processing everything in microwatts.
Use 64bit math instead to avoid these issues on common 32bit ARM
BMC platforms.
Fixes: 442aba78728e ("hwmon: PMBus device driver")
Signed-off-by: Robert Lippert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
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This just changes the file to report them as zero, although maybe even
that could be removed. I checked, and at least procps doesn't actually
seem to parse the 'stack' file at all.
And since the file doesn't necessarily even exist (it requires
CONFIG_STACKTRACE), possibly other tools don't really use it either.
That said, in case somebody parses it with tools, just having that zero
there should keep such tools happy.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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The apparmor_audit_data struct ordering got messed up during a merge
conflict, resulting in the signal integer and peer pointer being in
a union instead of a struct.
For most of the 4.13 and 4.14 life cycle, this was hidden by
commit 651e28c5537a ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket
mediation") which fixed the apparmor_audit_data struct when its data
was added. When that commit was reverted in -rc7 the signal audit bug
was exposed, and unfortunately it never showed up in any of the
testing until after 4.14 was released. Shaun Khan, Zephaniah
E. Loss-Cutler-Hull filed nearly simultaneous bug reports (with
different oopes, the smaller of which is included below).
Full credit goes to Tetsuo Handa for jumping on this as well and
noticing the audit data struct problem and reporting it.
[ 76.178568] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178579] IP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178581] PGD 1a640a067 P4D 1a640a067 PUD 0
[ 76.178586] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 76.178589] Modules linked in: fuse rfcomm bnep usblp uvcvideo btusb
btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ip6table_filter ip6_tables
xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack
iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables intel_rapl joydev wmi_bmof serio_raw
iwldvm iwlwifi shpchp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass autofs4 algif_skcipher
nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel
[ 76.178620] CPU: 0 PID: 10675 Comm: pidgin Not tainted
4.14.0-f1-dirty #135
[ 76.178623] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook Folio
9470m/18DF, BIOS 68IBD Ver. F.62 10/22/2015
[ 76.178625] task: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 task.stack: ffffa09b02a4c000
[ 76.178628] RIP: 0010:audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0
[ 76.178631] RSP: 0018:ffffa09b02a4fc08 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 76.178634] RAX: ffffa09b02a4fd60 RBX: ffff9c7aee0741f8 RCX:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178636] RDX: ffffffffee012290 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI:
ffff9c7a9493d800
[ 76.178638] RBP: ffffa09b02a4fd40 R08: 000000000000004d R09:
ffffa09b02a4fc46
[ 76.178641] R10: ffffa09b02a4fcb8 R11: ffff9c7ab44f5072 R12:
ffffa09b02a4fd40
[ 76.178643] R13: ffffffff9e447be0 R14: ffff9c7a94c31dc0 R15:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178646] FS: 00007f8b11ba2a80(0000) GS:ffff9c7afea00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 76.178648] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 76.178650] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0 CR3: 00000003d5209002 CR4:
00000000001606f0
[ 76.178652] Call Trace:
[ 76.178660] common_lsm_audit+0x1da/0x780
[ 76.178665] ? d_absolute_path+0x60/0x90
[ 76.178669] ? aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178672] aa_check_perms+0xcd/0xe0
[ 76.178675] profile_signal_perm.part.0+0x90/0xa0
[ 76.178679] aa_may_signal+0x16e/0x1b0
[ 76.178686] apparmor_task_kill+0x51/0x120
[ 76.178690] security_task_kill+0x44/0x60
[ 76.178695] group_send_sig_info+0x25/0x60
[ 76.178699] kill_pid_info+0x36/0x60
[ 76.178703] SYSC_kill+0xdb/0x180
[ 76.178707] ? preempt_count_sub+0x92/0xd0
[ 76.178712] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0x13/0x30
[ 76.178716] ? task_work_run+0x6a/0x90
[ 76.178720] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x80/0xa0
[ 76.178723] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
[ 76.178727] RIP: 0033:0x7f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178729] RSP: 002b:00007fff19efd4d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000003e
[ 76.178732] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557f3e3c2050 RCX:
00007f8b0e58b767
[ 76.178735] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
000000000000263b
[ 76.178737] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557f3e3c2270 R09:
0000000000000001
[ 76.178739] R10: 000000000000022d R11: 0000000000000206 R12:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178741] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000557f3e3c13c0 R15:
0000000000000000
[ 76.178745] Code: 48 8b 55 18 48 89 df 41 b8 20 00 08 01 5b 5d 48 8b
42 10 48 8b 52 30 48 63 48 4c 48 8b 44 c8 48 31 c9 48 8b 70 38 e9 f4 fd
00 00 <48> 8b 14 d5 40 27 e5 9e 48 c7 c6 7d 07 19 9f 48 89 df e8 fd 35
[ 76.178794] RIP: audit_signal_cb+0x6c/0xe0 RSP: ffffa09b02a4fc08
[ 76.178796] CR2: ffffffff0eee3bc0
[ 76.178799] ---[ end trace 514af9529297f1a3 ]---
Fixes: cd1dbf76b23d ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Reported-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ivan Kozik <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christian Boltz <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
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Adding cloud filters could fail for a number of reasons,
unsupported filter fields for example, which fails during
validation of fields itself. This will not result in admin
command errors and converting the admin queue status to posix
error code using i40e_aq_rc_to_posix would result in incorrect
error values. If the failure was due to AQ error itself,
reporting that correctly is handled in the inner function.
Signed-off-by: Amritha Nambiar <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
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This is a follow on to commit b10effb92e27 ("fix buffer overrun while the
I219 is processing DMA transactions") to address David Laights concerns
about the use of "magic" numbers. So define masks as well as add
additional code comments to give a better understanding of what needs to
be done to avoid a buffer overrun.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Neftin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander H Duyck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dima Ruinskiy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raanan Avargil <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
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sizeof when applied to a pointer typed expression gives the size of
the pointer.
The proper fix in this particular case is to code sizeof(*vfres)
instead of sizeof(vfres).
This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A R Silva <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
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restart_grace() uses hardcoded init_net.
It can cause to "list_add double add" in following scenario:
1) nfsd and lockd was started in several net namespaces
2) nfsd in init_net was stopped (lockd was not stopped because
it have users from another net namespaces)
3) lockd got signal, called restart_grace() -> set_grace_period()
and enabled lock_manager in hardcoded init_net.
4) nfsd in init_net is started again,
its lockd_up() calls set_grace_period() and tries to add
lock_manager into init_net 2nd time.
Jeff Layton suggest:
"Make it safe to call locks_start_grace multiple times on the same
lock_manager. If it's already on the global grace_list, then don't try
to add it again. (But we don't intentionally add twice, so for now we
WARN about that case.)
With this change, we also need to ensure that the nfsd4 lock manager
initializes the list before we call locks_start_grace. While we're at
it, move the rest of the nfsd_net initialization into
nfs4_state_create_net. I see no reason to have it spread over two
functions like it is today."
Suggested patch was updated to generate warning in described situation.
Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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nlm_complain_hosts() walks through nlm_server_hosts hlist, which should
be protected by nlm_host_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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nfsd_inet[6]addr_event uses nn->nfsd_serv without taking nfsd_mutex,
which can be changed during execution of notifiers and crash the host.
Moreover if notifiers were enabled in one net namespace they are enabled
in all other net namespaces, from creation until destruction.
This patch allows notifiers to access nn->nfsd_serv only after the
pointer is correctly initialized and delays cleanup until notifiers are
no longer in use.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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lockd_inet[6]addr_event use nlmsvc_rqst without taken nlmsvc_mutex,
nlmsvc_rqst can be changed during execution of notifiers and crash the host.
Patch enables access to nlmsvc_rqst only when it was correctly initialized
and delays its cleanup until notifiers are no longer in use.
Note that nlmsvc_rqst can be temporally set to ERR_PTR, so the "if
(nlmsvc_rqst)" check in notifiers is insufficient on its own.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Make these const as they are only getting passed to the function
cache_create_net having the argument as const.
Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Make these const as they are only getting passed to the function
cache_create_net having the argument as const.
Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Make the struct cache_detail *tmpl argument of the function
cache_create_net as const as it is only getting passed to kmemup having
the argument as const void *.
Add const to the prototype too.
Signed-off-by: Bhumika Goyal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Prevent the use of the closed (invalid) special stateid by clients.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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From kernel 4.9, my two nfsv4 servers sometimes suffer from
"panic: unable to handle kernel page request"
in posix_unblock_lock() called from nfs4_laundromat().
These panics diseappear if we revert the commit "nfsd: add a LRU list
for blocked locks".
The cause appears to be a typo in nfs4_laundromat(), which is also
present in nfs4_state_shutdown_net().
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 7919d0a27f1e "nfsd: add a LRU list for blocked locks"
Cc: [email protected]
Reveiwed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Commit efda760fe95ea ("lockd: fix lockd shutdown race") is incorrect,
it removes lockd_manager and disarm grace_period_end for init_net only.
If nfsd was started from another net namespace lockd_up_net() calls
set_grace_period() that adds lockd_manager into per-netns list
and queues grace_period_end delayed work.
These action should be reverted in lockd_down_net().
Otherwise it can lead to double list_add on after restart nfsd in netns,
and to use-after-free if non-disarmed delayed work will be executed after netns destroy.
Fixes: efda760fe95e ("lockd: fix lockd shutdown race")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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The use of the st_mutex has been confusing the validator. Use the
proper nested notation so as to not produce warnings.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Publishing of net pointer is not safe,
use net->ns.inum as net ID in debug messages
[ 171.757678] lockd_up_net: per-net data created; net=f00001e7
[ 171.767188] NFSD: starting 90-second grace period (net f00001e7)
[ 300.653313] lockd: nuking all hosts in net f00001e7...
[ 300.653641] lockd: host garbage collection for net f00001e7
[ 300.653968] lockd: nlmsvc_mark_resources for net f00001e7
[ 300.711483] lockd_down_net: per-net data destroyed; net=f00001e7
[ 300.711847] lockd: nuking all hosts in net 0...
[ 300.711847] lockd: host garbage collection for net 0
[ 300.711848] lockd: nlmsvc_mark_resources for net 0
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Publishing of net pointer is not safe,
replace it in debug meesages by net->ns.inum
[ 119.989161] nfsd: initializing export module (net: f00001e7).
[ 171.767188] NFSD: starting 90-second grace period (net f00001e7)
[ 322.185240] nfsd: shutting down export module (net: f00001e7).
[ 322.186062] nfsd: export shutdown complete (net: f00001e7).
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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The various functions that call check_stateid_generation() in order
to compare a client-supplied stateid with the nfs4_stid state, usually
need to atomically check for closed state. Those that perform the
check after locking the st_mutex using nfsd4_lock_ol_stateid()
should now be OK, but we do want to fix up the others.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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After taking the stateid st_mutex, we want to know that the stateid
still represents valid state before performing any non-idempotent
actions.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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If we're looking up a new lock state, and the creation fails, then
we want to unhash it, just like we do for OPEN. However in order
to do so, we need to that no other LOCK requests can grab the
mutex until we have unhashed it (and marked it as closed).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Trivial cleanup to simplify following patch.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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In order to deal with lookup races, nfsd4_free_lock_stateid() needs
to be able to signal to other stateful functions that the lock stateid
is no longer valid. Right now, nfsd_lock() will check whether or not an
existing stateid is still hashed, but only in the "new lock" path.
To ensure the stateid invalidation is also recognised by the "existing lock"
path, and also by a second call to nfsd4_free_lock_stateid() itself, we can
change the type to NFS4_CLOSED_STID under the stp->st_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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If nfsd4_process_open2() is initialising a new stateid, and yet the
call to nfs4_get_vfs_file() fails for some reason, then we must
declare the stateid closed, and unhash it before dropping the mutex.
Right now, we unhash the stateid after dropping the mutex, and without
changing the stateid type, meaning that another OPEN could theoretically
look it up and attempt to use it.
Reported-by: Andrew W Elble <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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Open file stateids can linger on the nfs4_file list of stateids even
after they have been closed. In order to avoid reusing such a
stateid, and confusing the client, we need to recheck the
nfs4_stid's type after taking the mutex.
Otherwise, we risk reusing an old stateid that was already closed,
which will confuse clients that expect new stateids to conform to
RFC7530 Sections 9.1.4.2 and 16.2.5 or RFC5661 Sections 8.2.2 and 18.2.4.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
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This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.
The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.
Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.
The script to do this was:
# places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
# touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
# there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
# the list of MS_... constants
SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
ACTIVE NOUSER"
SED_PROG=
for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done
# we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
# with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')
for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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This avoids the MODPOST error:
ERROR: "devm_ioremap_resource" [drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.ko] undefined!
Signed-off-by: Thomas Meyer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Currently we make page table entries dirty all the time regardless of
access type and don't even consider if the mapping is write-protected.
The reasoning is that we don't really need dirty tracking on THP and
making the entry dirty upfront may save some time on first write to the
page.
Unfortunately, such approach may result in false-positive
can_follow_write_pmd() for huge zero page or read-only shmem file.
Let's only make page dirty only if we about to write to the page anyway
(as we do for small pages).
I've restructured the code to make entry dirty inside
maybe_p[mu]d_mkwrite(). It also takes into account if the vma is
write-protected.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Currently, we unconditionally make page table dirty in touch_pmd().
It may result in false-positive can_follow_write_pmd().
We may avoid the situation, if we would only make the page table entry
dirty if caller asks for write access -- FOLL_WRITE.
The patch also changes touch_pud() in the same way.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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KASAN revealed another access after delete in group.c. This time
it found that we read the header of a received message after the
buffer has been released.
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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v2:
* Replace busy wait with wait_event()/wake_up_all()
* Cannot garantee that at the time xennet_remove is called, the
xen_netback state will not be XenbusStateClosed, so added a
condition for that
* There's a small chance for the xen_netback state is
XenbusStateUnknown by the time the xen_netfront switches to Closed,
so added a condition for that.
When unloading module xen_netfront from guest, dmesg would output
warning messages like below:
[ 105.236836] xen:grant_table: WARNING: g.e. 0x903 still in use!
[ 105.236839] deferring g.e. 0x903 (pfn 0x35805)
This problem relies on netfront and netback being out of sync. By the time
netfront revokes the g.e.'s netback didn't have enough time to free all of
them, hence displaying the warnings on dmesg.
The trick here is to make netfront to wait until netback frees all the g.e.'s
and only then continue to cleanup for the module removal, and this is done by
manipulating both device states.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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A previous commit changed the locking around registration/cleanup,
but direct callers of blk_trace_remove() were missed. This means
that if we hit the error path in setup, we will deadlock on
attempting to re-acquire the queue trace mutex.
Fixes: 1f2cac107c59 ("blktrace: fix unlocked access to init/start-stop/teardown")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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Currently when an error occurs devinfo is still allocated but is
unused when the error exit paths break out of the for-loop. Fix
this by kfree'ing devinfo to avoid the leak.
Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1416590 ("Resource Leak")
Fixes: 4124c4eba402 ("i2c: allow attaching IRQ resources to i2c_board_info")
Fixes: 0daaf99d8424 ("i2c: copy device properties when using i2c_register_board_info()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
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On Apollo Lake devices the BIOS does not set up IRQ routing for the i801
SMBUS controller IRQ, so we end up with dev->irq set to IRQ_NOTCONNECTED.
Detect this and do not try to use the irq in this case silencing:
i801_smbus 0000:00:1f.1: Failed to allocate irq -2147483648: -107
Cc: [email protected]
BugLink: https://communities.intel.com/thread/114759
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
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As part of testing log recovery with dm_log_writes, Amir Goldstein
discovered an error in the deferred ops recovery that lead to corruption
of the filesystem metadata if a reflink+rmap filesystem happened to shut
down midway through a CoW remap:
"This is what happens [after failed log recovery]:
"Phase 1 - find and verify superblock...
"Phase 2 - using internal log
" - zero log...
" - scan filesystem freespace and inode maps...
" - found root inode chunk
"Phase 3 - for each AG...
" - scan (but don't clear) agi unlinked lists...
" - process known inodes and perform inode discovery...
" - agno = 0
"data fork in regular inode 134 claims CoW block 376
"correcting nextents for inode 134
"bad data fork in inode 134
"would have cleared inode 134"
Hou Tao dissected the log contents of exactly such a crash:
"According to the implementation of xfs_defer_finish(), these ops should
be completed in the following sequence:
"Have been done:
"(1) CUI: Oper (160)
"(2) BUI: Oper (161)
"(3) CUD: Oper (194), for CUI Oper (160)
"(4) RUI A: Oper (197), free rmap [0x155, 2, -9]
"Should be done:
"(5) BUD: for BUI Oper (161)
"(6) RUI B: add rmap [0x155, 2, 137]
"(7) RUD: for RUI A
"(8) RUD: for RUI B
"Actually be done by xlog_recover_process_intents()
"(5) BUD: for BUI Oper (161)
"(6) RUI B: add rmap [0x155, 2, 137]
"(7) RUD: for RUI B
"(8) RUD: for RUI A
"So the rmap entry [0x155, 2, -9] for COW should be freed firstly,
then a new rmap entry [0x155, 2, 137] will be added. However, as we can see
from the log record in post_mount.log (generated after umount) and the trace
print, the new rmap entry [0x155, 2, 137] are added firstly, then the rmap
entry [0x155, 2, -9] are freed."
When reconstructing the internal log state from the log items found on
disk, it's required that deferred ops replay in exactly the same order
that they would have had the filesystem not gone down. However,
replaying unfinished deferred ops can create /more/ deferred ops. These
new deferred ops are finished in the wrong order. This causes fs
corruption and replay crashes, so let's create a single defer_ops to
handle the subsequent ops created during replay, then use one single
transaction at the end of log recovery to ensure that everything is
replayed in the same order as they're supposed to be.
Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
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In xfs_ifree, we reset the data/attr forks to extents format without
bothering to free any inline data buffer that might still be around
after all the blocks have been truncated off the file. Prior to commit
43518812d2 ("xfs: remove support for inlining data/extents into the
inode fork") nobody noticed because the leftover inline data after
truncation was small enough to fit inside the inline buffer inside the
fork itself.
However, now that we've removed the inline buffer, we /always/ have to
free the inline data buffer or else we leak them like crazy. This test
was found by turning on kmemleak for generic/001 or generic/388.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulus/powerpc into kvm-master
PPC KVM fixes for 4.15
One commit here, that fixes a couple of bugs relating to the patch
series that enables HPT guests to run on a radix host on POWER9
systems. This patch series went upstream in the 4.15 merge window,
so no stable backport is required.
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KVM API says for the signal mask you set via KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK, that
"any unblocked signal received [...] will cause KVM_RUN to return with
-EINTR" and that "the signal will only be delivered if not blocked by
the original signal mask".
This, however, is only true, when the calling task has a signal handler
registered for a signal. If not, signal evaluation is short-circuited for
SIG_IGN and SIG_DFL, and the signal is either ignored without KVM_RUN
returning or the whole process is terminated.
Make KVM_SET_SIGNAL_MASK behave as advertised by utilizing logic similar
to that in do_sigtimedwait() to avoid short-circuiting of signals.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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Xfstests btrfs/146 revealed this corruption,
[ 58.138831] Buffer I/O error on dev dm-0, logical block 2621424, async page read
[ 58.151233] BTRFS error (device sdf): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 1, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0
[ 58.152403] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff88005e6775d8), but was ffffc9000189be88. (prev=ffffc9000189be88).
[ 58.153518] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 58.153892] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1287 at lib/list_debug.c:31 __list_add_valid+0x169/0x1f0
...
[ 58.157379] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x169/0x1f0
...
[ 58.161956] Call Trace:
[ 58.162264] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x5bd/0xfb0 [btrfs]
[ 58.163583] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x60/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 58.164003] btrfs_sync_file+0x4c2/0x6f0 [btrfs]
[ 58.164393] vfs_fsync_range+0x5f/0xd0
[ 58.164898] do_fsync+0x5a/0x90
[ 58.165170] SyS_fsync+0x10/0x20
[ 58.165395] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
...
It turns out that we could record btrfs_log_ctx:io_err in
log_one_extents when IO fails, but make log_one_extents() return '0'
instead of -EIO, so the IO error is not acknowledged by the callers,
i.e. btrfs_log_inode_parent(), which would remove btrfs_log_ctx:list
from list head 'root->log_ctxs'. Since btrfs_log_ctx is allocated
from stack memory, it'd get freed with a object alive on the
list. then a future list_add will throw the above warning.
This returns the correct error in the above case.
Jeff also reported this while testing against his fsync error
patch set[1].
[1]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg65308.html
"btrfs list corruption and soft lockups while testing writeback error handling"
Fixes: 8407f553268a4611f254 ("Btrfs: fix data corruption after fast fsync and writeback error")
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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Reported by syzkaller:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2939 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:3844 free_loaded_vmcs+0x77/0x80 [kvm_intel]
CPU: 5 PID: 2939 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.14.0+ #26
RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x77/0x80 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vmx_free_vcpu+0xda/0x130 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x192/0x290 [kvm]
kvm_put_kvm+0x262/0x560 [kvm]
kvm_vm_release+0x2c/0x30 [kvm]
__fput+0x190/0x370
task_work_run+0xa1/0xd0
do_exit+0x4d2/0x13e0
do_group_exit+0x89/0x140
get_signal+0x318/0xb80
do_signal+0x8c/0xb40
exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe4/0x140
syscall_return_slowpath+0x206/0x230
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x98/0x9a
The syzkaller testcase will execute VMXON/VMLAUCH instructions, so the
vmx->nested stuff is populated, it will also issue KVM_SMI ioctl. However,
the testcase is just a simple c program and not be lauched by something
like seabios which implements smi_handler. Commit 05cade71cf (KVM: nSVM:
fix SMI injection in guest mode) gets out of guest mode and set nested.vmxon
to false for the duration of SMM according to SDM 34.14.1 "leave VMX
operation" upon entering SMM. We can't alloc/free the vmx->nested stuff
each time when entering/exiting SMM since it will induce more overhead. So
the function vmx_pre_enter_smm() marks nested.vmxon false even if vmx->nested
stuff is still populated. What it expected is em_rsm() can mark nested.vmxon
to be true again. However, the smi_handler/rsm will not execute since there
is no something like seabios in this scenario. The function free_nested()
fails to free the vmx->nested stuff since the vmx->nested.vmxon is false
which results in the above warning.
This patch fixes it by also considering the no SMI handler case, luckily
vmx->nested.smm.vmxon is marked according to the value of vmx->nested.vmxon
in vmx_pre_enter_smm(), we can take advantage of it and free vmx->nested
stuff when L1 goes down.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Fixes: 05cade71cf (KVM: nSVM: fix SMI injection in guest mode)
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
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