diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 30 |
3 files changed, 45 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index d766b7d0ffd1..53baa95cb644 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr) + # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1766 + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION > 150006 config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS bool "Enable register zeroing on function exit" diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 20cffd32dc9e..6a68ec270822 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -71,6 +71,30 @@ struct ima_rule_opt_list { char *items[]; }; +/* + * These comparators are needed nowhere outside of ima so just define them here. + * This pattern should hopefully never be needed outside of ima. + */ +static inline bool vfsuid_gt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid, kuid_t kuid) +{ + return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid) > __kuid_val(kuid); +} + +static inline bool vfsgid_gt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid, kgid_t kgid) +{ + return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid) > __kgid_val(kgid); +} + +static inline bool vfsuid_lt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid, kuid_t kuid) +{ + return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid) < __kuid_val(kuid); +} + +static inline bool vfsgid_lt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid, kgid_t kgid) +{ + return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid) < __kgid_val(kgid); +} + struct ima_rule_entry { struct list_head list; int action; diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index de41621f4998..110a5ab2b46b 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -122,21 +122,11 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) } } -static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents) +static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); - /* - * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents - * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged - * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were - * no associated file struct. - */ - if (!contents) - file = NULL; - /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { @@ -192,9 +182,25 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, return 0; } +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available" + * argument here. + */ + return loadpin_check(file, id); +} + static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the + * state of "contents". + */ + return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |