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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c199
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c1222
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/audit.h7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h38
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c34
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c64
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c263
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c609
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h96
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c8
19 files changed, 1257 insertions, 1356 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8af7a690eb40..55f032f1fc2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -22,21 +22,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- int "NSA SELinux boot parameter default value"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
- range 0 1
- default 1
- help
- This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
- 'selinux', which allows SELinux to be disabled at boot. If this
- option is set to 0 (zero), the SELinux kernel parameter will
- default to 0, disabling SELinux at bootup. If this option is
- set to 1 (one), the SELinux kernel parameter will default to 1,
- enabling SELinux at bootup.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-
config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index c7161f8792b2..ccf950409384 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
- netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o exports.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o \
ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 635e5c1e3e48..8346a4f7c5d7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -130,75 +130,6 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
}
/**
- * avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form.
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @av: access vector
- */
-static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
-{
- const char **perms;
- int i, perm;
-
- if (av == 0) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " null");
- return;
- }
-
- BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
- perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " {");
- i = 0;
- perm = 1;
- while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
- if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
- av &= ~perm;
- }
- i++;
- perm <<= 1;
- }
-
- if (av)
- audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
-
- audit_log_format(ab, " }");
-}
-
-/**
- * avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- */
-static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
- u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
-{
- int rc;
- char *scontext;
- u32 scontext_len;
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
- if (rc)
- audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
- kfree(scontext);
- }
-
- BUG_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
- audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
-}
-
-/**
* avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
*
* Initialize the access vector cache.
@@ -735,11 +666,36 @@ out:
static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
- audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
- ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
- avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
- audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
+ struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+ u32 av = sad->audited;
+ const char **perms;
+ int i, perm;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+
+ if (av == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " null");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ perms = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].perms;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " {");
+ i = 0;
+ perm = 1;
+ while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+ if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
+ av &= ~perm;
+ }
+ i++;
+ perm <<= 1;
+ }
+
+ if (av)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " } for ");
}
/**
@@ -751,14 +707,47 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
- audit_log_format(ab, " ");
- avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->state,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
- ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
- if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
- ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+ struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
+ char *scontext;
+ u32 scontext_len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
+ else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (rc)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
+ else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name);
+
+ if (sad->denied)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);
+
+ /* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " srawcon=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
+ &scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " trawcon=%s", scontext);
+ kfree(scontext);
}
}
@@ -772,6 +761,9 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
struct selinux_audit_data sad;
+ if (WARN_ON(!tclass || tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
@@ -838,6 +830,7 @@ out:
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
* @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
+ * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
@@ -856,6 +849,22 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
struct hlist_head *head;
spinlock_t *lock;
+ /*
+ * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk,
+ * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry
+ * because we cannot safely audit the denial. Otherwise,
+ * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we
+ * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry
+ * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in
+ * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode.
+ *
+ * See the corresponding handling in slow_avc_audit(), and the
+ * logic in selinux_inode_permission for the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag,
+ * which is transliterated into AVC_NONBLOCKING.
+ */
+ if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING)
+ return 0;
+
node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
if (!node) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1050,7 +1059,8 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
int rc = 0, rc2;
xp_node = &local_xp_node;
- BUG_ON(!requested);
+ if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+ return -EACCES;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1115,7 +1125,7 @@ decision:
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
- * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
+ * @flags: AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0
* @avd: access vector decisions
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -1140,7 +1150,8 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
- BUG_ON(!requested);
+ if (WARN_ON(!requested))
+ return -EACCES;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1191,24 +1202,6 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
return rc;
}
-int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
- u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- int flags)
-{
- struct av_decision avd;
- int rc, rc2;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
- &avd);
-
- rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
- auditdata, flags);
- if (rc2)
- return rc2;
- return rc;
-}
-
u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
{
return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e75dd94e2d2b..000000000000
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
- *
- * Author: James Morris <[email protected]>
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <[email protected]>
- * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <[email protected]>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-
-#include "security.h"
-
-bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
-{
- return selinux_enabled;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7ce683259357..2f82a54f8703 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/syslog.h>
@@ -88,6 +87,7 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -120,9 +120,8 @@ __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
#endif
+int selinux_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
-int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-
static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
@@ -131,8 +130,6 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
return 1;
}
__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
-#else
-int selinux_enabled = 1;
#endif
static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
@@ -148,9 +145,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
-static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
-
/**
* selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
*
@@ -213,12 +207,8 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tsec)
- panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
-
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- cred->security = tsec;
}
/*
@@ -228,7 +218,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
return tsec->sid;
}
@@ -249,13 +239,9 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
@@ -263,7 +249,6 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
isec->task_sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
- inode->i_security = isec;
return 0;
}
@@ -280,7 +265,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
struct dentry *dentry,
bool may_sleep)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
@@ -301,7 +286,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
{
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
@@ -311,7 +296,7 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
/*
@@ -320,14 +305,14 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, boo
static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
{
__inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- return inode->i_security;
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
/*
@@ -338,22 +323,17 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
__inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
- return inode->i_security;
-}
-
-static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
- kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
+ return selinux_inode(inode);
}
static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ if (!isec)
+ return;
+ sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -369,42 +349,19 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
list_del_init(&isec->list);
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
}
-
- /*
- * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
- * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
- * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
- * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
- * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
- * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
- * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
- */
- call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
}
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
u32 sid = current_sid();
- fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!fsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
fsec->sid = sid;
fsec->fown_sid = sid;
- file->f_security = fsec;
return 0;
}
-static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
- file->f_security = NULL;
- kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
-}
-
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -432,6 +389,20 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
kfree(sbsec);
}
+struct selinux_mnt_opts {
+ const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
+};
+
+static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
+{
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+ kfree(opts->fscontext);
+ kfree(opts->context);
+ kfree(opts->rootcontext);
+ kfree(opts->defcontext);
+ kfree(opts);
+}
+
static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
{
return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
@@ -443,20 +414,42 @@ enum {
Opt_fscontext = 2,
Opt_defcontext = 3,
Opt_rootcontext = 4,
- Opt_labelsupport = 5,
- Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
+ Opt_seclabel = 5,
};
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
-
-static const match_table_t tokens = {
- {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
- {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
- {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
- {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
- {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
- {Opt_error, NULL},
+#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
+static struct {
+ const char *name;
+ int len;
+ int opt;
+ bool has_arg;
+} tokens[] = {
+ A(context, true),
+ A(fscontext, true),
+ A(defcontext, true),
+ A(rootcontext, true),
+ A(seclabel, false),
};
+#undef A
+
+static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
+ size_t len = tokens[i].len;
+ if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
+ continue;
+ if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
+ if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
+ continue;
+ *arg = s + len + 1;
+ } else if (len != l)
+ continue;
+ return tokens[i].opt;
+ }
+ return Opt_error;
+}
#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
@@ -464,7 +457,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -483,7 +476,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
const struct cred *cred)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
@@ -497,16 +490,10 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-
- return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
- sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
- /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
+ return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
@@ -516,6 +503,34 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
}
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
+ * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
+
+ switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
+ return 1;
+
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
+ return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
+
+ /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
@@ -570,10 +585,9 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
populates itself. */
spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
-next_inode:
- if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+ while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
- list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
+ list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
struct inode_security_struct, list);
struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
list_del_init(&isec->list);
@@ -585,112 +599,12 @@ next_inode:
iput(inode);
}
spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
- goto next_inode;
}
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
out:
return rc;
}
-/*
- * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
- * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
- * mount options, or whatever.
- */
-static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
-{
- int rc = 0, i;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- char *context = NULL;
- u32 len;
- char tmp;
-
- security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
-
- if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (!selinux_state.initialized)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
-
- tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
- /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
- for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
- if (tmp & 0x01)
- opts->num_mnt_opts++;
- tmp >>= 1;
- }
- /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
- if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
- opts->num_mnt_opts++;
-
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free;
- }
-
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free;
- }
-
- i = 0;
- if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
- &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
- sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
- &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
- &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
- struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
- &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
- opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
- }
-
- BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
-
- return 0;
-
-out_free:
- security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
- return rc;
-}
-
static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
{
@@ -711,31 +625,39 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
return 0;
}
+static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
+ sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
* labeling information.
*/
static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+ void *mnt_opts,
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc = 0, i;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
- char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
- int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
- int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+ int rc = 0;
mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
- if (!num_opts) {
+ if (!opts) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
server is ready to handle calls. */
@@ -765,7 +687,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
* will be used for both mounts)
*/
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
- && (num_opts == 0))
+ && !opts)
goto out;
root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
@@ -775,68 +697,48 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
* also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
* than once with different security options.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
- u32 sid;
-
- if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
- continue;
- rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
- mount_options[i], &sid,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (rc) {
- pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
- goto out;
- }
- switch (flags[i]) {
- case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
- fscontext_sid = sid;
-
+ if (opts) {
+ if (opts->fscontext) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
fscontext_sid))
goto out_double_mount;
-
sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
- break;
- case CONTEXT_MNT:
- context_sid = sid;
-
+ }
+ if (opts->context) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
context_sid))
goto out_double_mount;
-
sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
- break;
- case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
- rootcontext_sid = sid;
-
+ }
+ if (opts->rootcontext) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
rootcontext_sid))
goto out_double_mount;
-
sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
-
- break;
- case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
- defcontext_sid = sid;
-
+ }
+ if (opts->defcontext) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
defcontext_sid))
goto out_double_mount;
-
sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
-
- break;
- default:
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
}
}
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
- if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
goto out_double_mount;
rc = 0;
goto out;
@@ -969,7 +871,8 @@ out:
out_double_mount:
rc = -EINVAL;
pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
- "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
+ "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
goto out;
}
@@ -1081,218 +984,145 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
{
- char *p;
- char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
- char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
- int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
- opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
-
- /* Standard string-based options. */
- while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
- int token;
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
-
- if (!*p)
- continue;
-
- token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
-
- switch (token) {
- case Opt_context:
- if (context || defcontext) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
- goto out_err;
- }
- context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
- if (!context) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_err;
- }
- break;
-
- case Opt_fscontext:
- if (fscontext) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
- goto out_err;
- }
- fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
- if (!fscontext) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_err;
- }
- break;
-
- case Opt_rootcontext:
- if (rootcontext) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
- goto out_err;
- }
- rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
- if (!rootcontext) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_err;
- }
- break;
-
- case Opt_defcontext:
- if (context || defcontext) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
- goto out_err;
- }
- defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
- if (!defcontext) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_err;
- }
- break;
- case Opt_labelsupport:
- break;
- default:
- rc = -EINVAL;
- pr_warn("SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
- goto out_err;
-
- }
- }
-
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts)
- goto out_err;
-
- opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
- goto out_err;
+ if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
+ return 0;
- if (fscontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (context) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
- }
- if (rootcontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
+ if (!opts) {
+ opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *mnt_opts = opts;
}
- if (defcontext) {
- opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
- opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_context:
+ if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
+ goto Einval;
+ opts->context = s;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fscontext:
+ if (opts->fscontext)
+ goto Einval;
+ opts->fscontext = s;
+ break;
+ case Opt_rootcontext:
+ if (opts->rootcontext)
+ goto Einval;
+ opts->rootcontext = s;
+ break;
+ case Opt_defcontext:
+ if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
+ goto Einval;
+ opts->defcontext = s;
+ break;
}
-
- opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
return 0;
-
-out_err:
- security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
- kfree(context);
- kfree(defcontext);
- kfree(fscontext);
- kfree(rootcontext);
- return rc;
+Einval:
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-/*
- * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
- */
-static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- char *options = data;
- struct security_mnt_opts opts;
-
- security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
-
- if (!data)
- goto out;
- BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
+static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
+ void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ int token = Opt_error;
+ int rc, i;
- rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
- if (rc)
- goto out_err;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
+ if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
+ token = tokens[i].opt;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
-out:
- rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+ if (token == Opt_error)
+ return -EINVAL;
-out_err:
- security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+ if (token != Opt_seclabel)
+ val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ kfree(val);
+ if (*mnt_opts) {
+ selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+ *mnt_opts = NULL;
+ }
+ }
return rc;
}
-static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
{
- int i;
- char *prefix;
-
- for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
- char *has_comma;
+ char *context = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
- if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
- has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
- else
- has_comma = NULL;
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
+ &context, &len);
+ if (!rc) {
+ bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
- switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
- case CONTEXT_MNT:
- prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
- break;
- case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
- prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
- break;
- case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
- prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
- break;
- case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
- prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
- break;
- case SBLABEL_MNT:
- seq_putc(m, ',');
- seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
- continue;
- default:
- BUG();
- return;
- };
- /* we need a comma before each option */
- seq_putc(m, ',');
- seq_puts(m, prefix);
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
- seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
+ seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
}
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
int rc;
- rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
- if (rc) {
- /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
- if (rc == -EINVAL)
- rc = 0;
- return rc;
- }
-
- selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return 0;
- security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+ if (!selinux_state.initialized)
+ return 0;
- return rc;
+ if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
+ struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
+ rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
@@ -1522,7 +1352,7 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
{
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -1769,7 +1599,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit, bool initns)
+ int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
@@ -1796,7 +1626,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
- if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+ if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
if (rc2)
@@ -1822,7 +1652,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return 0;
sid = cred_sid(cred);
- isec = inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
@@ -1888,7 +1718,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct file *file,
u32 av)
{
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1954,7 +1784,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
@@ -1976,7 +1806,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()), dir,
&dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2232,7 +2062,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
struct file *file)
{
u32 sid = task_sid(to);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2316,9 +2146,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
- int cap, int audit)
+ int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
- return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
}
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -2392,7 +2222,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
+ CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2483,8 +2313,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->called_set_creds)
return 0;
- old_tsec = current_security();
- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
isec = inode_security(inode);
/* Default to the current task SID. */
@@ -2648,7 +2478,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
int rc, i;
- new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
+ new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
return;
@@ -2691,7 +2521,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct itimerval itimer;
u32 osid, sid;
int rc, i;
@@ -2747,195 +2577,129 @@ static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
superblock_free_security(sb);
}
-static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
-{
- if (plen > olen)
- return 0;
-
- return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
+static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
{
- return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
-}
+ bool open_quote = false;
+ int len;
+ char c;
-static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
-{
- if (!*first) {
- **to = ',';
- *to += 1;
- } else
- *first = 0;
- memcpy(*to, from, len);
- *to += len;
-}
-
-static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
- int len)
-{
- int current_size = 0;
-
- if (!*first) {
- **to = '|';
- *to += 1;
- } else
- *first = 0;
-
- while (current_size < len) {
- if (*from != '"') {
- **to = *from;
- *to += 1;
- }
- from += 1;
- current_size += 1;
+ for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
+ if (c == '"')
+ open_quote = !open_quote;
+ if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
+ break;
}
+ return len;
}
-static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
+static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
{
- int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
- char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
- char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
- int open_quote = 0;
+ char *from = options;
+ char *to = options;
+ bool first = true;
- in_curr = orig;
- sec_curr = copy;
+ while (1) {
+ int len = opt_len(from);
+ int token, rc;
+ char *arg = NULL;
- nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!nosec) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- nosec_save = nosec;
- fnosec = fsec = 1;
- in_save = in_end = orig;
-
- do {
- if (*in_end == '"')
- open_quote = !open_quote;
- if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
- *in_end == '\0') {
- int len = in_end - in_curr;
+ token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
- if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
- take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
- else
- take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
+ if (token != Opt_error) {
+ char *p, *q;
- in_curr = in_end + 1;
+ /* strip quotes */
+ if (arg) {
+ for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
+ char c = *p;
+ if (c != '"')
+ *q++ = c;
+ }
+ arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
+ }
+ rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ kfree(arg);
+ if (*mnt_opts) {
+ selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+ *mnt_opts = NULL;
+ }
+ return rc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
+ from--;
+ len++;
+ }
+ if (to != from)
+ memmove(to, from, len);
+ to += len;
+ first = false;
}
- } while (*in_end++);
-
- strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
- free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
-out:
- return rc;
+ if (!from[len])
+ break;
+ from += len + 1;
+ }
+ *to = '\0';
+ return 0;
}
-static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{
- int rc, i, *flags;
- struct security_mnt_opts opts;
- char *secdata, **mount_options;
+ struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ u32 sid;
+ int rc;
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
return 0;
- if (!data)
- return 0;
-
- if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ if (!opts)
return 0;
- security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
- secdata = alloc_secdata();
- if (!secdata)
- return -ENOMEM;
- rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free_secdata;
-
- rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free_secdata;
-
- mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
- flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
-
- for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
- u32 sid;
-
- if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
- continue;
- rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
- mount_options[i], &sid,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (rc) {
- pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
- "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
- mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
- goto out_free_opts;
- }
- rc = -EINVAL;
- switch (flags[i]) {
- case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
- if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
- goto out_bad_option;
- break;
- case CONTEXT_MNT:
- if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
- goto out_bad_option;
- break;
- case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
- struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
- root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
-
- if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
- goto out_bad_option;
- break;
- }
- case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
- if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
- goto out_bad_option;
- break;
- default:
- goto out_free_opts;
- }
+ if (opts->fscontext) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
}
+ if (opts->context) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ if (opts->rootcontext) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ if (opts->defcontext) {
+ rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ }
+ return 0;
- rc = 0;
-out_free_opts:
- security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
-out_free_secdata:
- free_secdata(secdata);
- return rc;
out_bad_option:
pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
"during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
sb->s_type->name);
- goto out_free_opts;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
- int rc;
-
- rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
- if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
- return 0;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
@@ -2994,7 +2758,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
u32 newsid;
int rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3014,14 +2778,14 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
int rc;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
tsec->create_sid = newsid;
return 0;
}
@@ -3031,7 +2795,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 newsid, clen;
int rc;
@@ -3041,7 +2805,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3050,7 +2814,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -3139,9 +2903,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
if (IS_ERR(isec))
return PTR_ERR(isec);
- return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
- rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
}
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
@@ -3150,7 +2913,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
int rc;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
@@ -3196,7 +2959,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return PTR_ERR(isec);
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
- sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+ sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+ (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0,
+ &avd);
audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
&denied);
@@ -3245,11 +3010,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
+ unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
- if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
+ if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
return false;
- if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
+ if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
return false;
return true;
}
@@ -3455,12 +3220,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
u32 newsid;
int rc;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
if (!value || !size)
return -EACCES;
@@ -3503,7 +3272,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- tsec = new_creds->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
tsec->create_sid = sid;
@@ -3544,7 +3313,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3566,11 +3335,6 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
return file_alloc_security(file);
}
-static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
- file_free_security(file);
-}
-
/*
* Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
* operation to an inode.
@@ -3579,7 +3343,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
u32 requested, u16 cmd)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
@@ -3649,7 +3413,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
+ CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -3831,7 +3595,7 @@ static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
}
@@ -3846,7 +3610,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
if (!signum)
perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
@@ -3870,7 +3634,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
@@ -3904,52 +3668,15 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
}
/*
- * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
- */
-static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
- tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- cred->security = tsec;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-
- /*
- * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
- * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
- */
- BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
- cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
- kfree(tsec);
-}
-
-/*
* prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*/
static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
- old_tsec = old->security;
-
- tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
- if (!tsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- new->security = tsec;
+ *tsec = *old_tsec;
return 0;
}
@@ -3958,8 +3685,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
@@ -3975,7 +3702,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
*/
static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
@@ -4000,7 +3727,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
@@ -4046,7 +3773,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;
- fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec = selinux_file(file);
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
@@ -4212,7 +3939,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
u32 sid = task_sid(p);
spin_lock(&isec->lock);
@@ -4549,7 +4276,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
u32 newsid;
u16 secclass;
int rc;
@@ -4569,7 +4296,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
@@ -5318,6 +5045,9 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
addr_buf = address;
while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+ if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
addr = addr_buf;
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
@@ -5447,7 +5177,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 tsid;
- __tsec = current_security();
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
tsid = __tsec->sid;
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -5922,51 +5652,22 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
-static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
- u16 sclass)
+static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-
- isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!isec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
isec->sclass = sclass;
isec->sid = current_sid();
- perm->security = isec;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
-{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
- perm->security = NULL;
- kfree(isec);
}
static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
- msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!msec)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- msg->security = msec;
return 0;
}
-static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
-
- msg->security = NULL;
- kfree(msec);
-}
-
static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 perms)
{
@@ -5974,7 +5675,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
@@ -5988,11 +5689,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
}
-static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- msg_msg_free_security(msg);
-}
-
/* message queue security operations */
static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
{
@@ -6001,11 +5697,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(msq, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -6013,16 +5706,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(msq);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
-{
- ipc_free_security(msq);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
@@ -6031,7 +5715,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = msq->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -6080,8 +5764,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
/*
* First time through, need to assign label to the message
@@ -6128,8 +5812,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
- isec = msq->security;
- msec = msg->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
+ msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
@@ -6152,11 +5836,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(shp, SECCLASS_SHM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6164,16 +5845,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
SHM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(shp);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
-{
- ipc_free_security(shp);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
@@ -6182,7 +5854,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = shp->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
@@ -6249,11 +5921,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(sma, SECCLASS_SEM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
+ ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6261,16 +5930,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
SEM__CREATE, &ad);
- if (rc) {
- ipc_free_security(sma);
- return rc;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
-{
- ipc_free_security(sma);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
@@ -6279,7 +5939,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = current_sid();
- isec = sma->security;
+ isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
@@ -6365,7 +6025,7 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
*secid = isec->sid;
}
@@ -6384,7 +6044,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
unsigned len;
rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+ __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
if (current != p) {
error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -6507,7 +6167,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = new->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(new);
if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
@@ -6591,7 +6251,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
@@ -6603,7 +6263,10 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
*/
static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+ ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
+ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
}
/*
@@ -6636,7 +6299,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
if (!ksec)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsec = cred->security;
+ tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
else
@@ -6899,6 +6562,14 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
}
#endif
+struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
+ .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+ .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6923,7 +6594,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
@@ -6932,7 +6604,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
@@ -6967,7 +6639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
@@ -6981,8 +6652,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
@@ -7010,24 +6679,20 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
@@ -7138,16 +6803,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
- if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
- selinux_enabled = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!selinux_enabled) {
- pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
- return 0;
- }
-
pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
@@ -7161,12 +6816,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
- sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
- sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
- file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
- sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
avtab_cache_init();
@@ -7193,7 +6842,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
{
- superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+ selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
void selinux_complete_init(void)
@@ -7209,6 +6858,9 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void)
all processes and objects when they are created. */
DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
.name = "selinux",
+ .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+ .enabled = &selinux_enabled,
+ .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
.init = selinux_init,
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..682e2b5de2a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -1,9 +1,6 @@
/*
* SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
*
- * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
- * is released under below copyrights:
- *
* Author: James Morris <[email protected]>
*
* Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
@@ -46,13 +43,11 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
*
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index ef899bcfd2cb..7be0e1e90e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
+#define AVC_NONBLOCKING 4 /* non blocking */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
@@ -152,11 +153,6 @@ int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
-int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
- u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
- int flags);
int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index cc5e26b0161b..231262d8eac9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
@@ -56,10 +58,7 @@ enum label_initialized {
struct inode_security_struct {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
- union {
- struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
- struct rcu_head rcu; /* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
- };
+ struct list_head list; /* list of inode_security_struct */
u32 task_sid; /* SID of creating task */
u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
u16 sclass; /* security class of this object */
@@ -158,4 +157,35 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
};
+extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;
+static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
+}
+
+static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
+static inline struct inode_security_struct *selinux_inode(
+ const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!inode->i_security))
+ return NULL;
+ return inode->i_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
+}
+
+static inline struct msg_security_struct *selinux_msg_msg(
+ const struct msg_msg *msg_msg)
+{
+ return msg_msg->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg;
+}
+
+static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
+ const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
+{
+ return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 23e762d529fa..f68fb25b5702 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ enum {
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
-extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+extern const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
/*
* type_datum properties
@@ -255,6 +255,9 @@ int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+
int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 74b951f55608..9cec81209617 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_NEWSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { RTM_NEWCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_DELCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { RTM_GETCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
@@ -158,7 +161,11 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
switch (sclass) {
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
- /* RTM_MAX always point to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3 */
+ /* RTM_MAX always points to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3.
+ * If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+ * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+ * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+ */
BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCHAIN + 3));
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
@@ -170,6 +177,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
break;
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET:
+ /* If the BUILD_BUG_ON() below fails you must update the
+ * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings
+ * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro!
+ */
BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRM_MSG_MAX != XFRM_MSG_MAPPING);
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_xfrm_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_xfrm_perms));
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f3a5a138a096..145ee62f205a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
goto out;
}
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
if (ret) {
@@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
}
inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
- isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec = selinux_inode(inode);
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 2fe459df3c85..5e05f5b902d7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -245,9 +245,13 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
char *rangep[2];
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
- if ((def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc) || (*scontext) == '\0')
- return 0;
- return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * With no MLS, only return -EINVAL if there is a MLS field
+ * and it did not come from an xattr.
+ */
+ if (oldc && def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -436,16 +440,17 @@ int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
/*
* Convert the MLS fields in the security context
- * structure `c' from the values specified in the
- * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp'.
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
+ * storing the resulting context in `newc'.
*/
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
struct policydb *newp,
- struct context *c)
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc)
{
struct level_datum *levdatum;
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
- struct ebitmap bitmap;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
int l, i;
@@ -455,28 +460,25 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
levdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_levels.table,
sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
- c->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+ oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1));
if (!levdatum)
return -EINVAL;
- c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+ newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
- ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
- ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
+ node, i) {
int rc;
catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
if (!catdatum)
return -EINVAL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
-
- cond_resched();
}
- ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
- c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 67093647576d..7954b1e60b64 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
struct policydb *newp,
- struct context *context);
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc);
int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
struct context *scontext,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f4eadd3f7350..c1c31e33657a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -732,7 +732,8 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
kfree(key);
if (datum) {
levdatum = datum;
- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
kfree(levdatum->level);
}
kfree(datum);
@@ -909,13 +910,21 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
if (!c->context[0].user) {
pr_err("SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
c->u.name);
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (c->sid[0] == SECSID_NULL || c->sid[0] > SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: Initial SID %s out of range.\n",
+ c->u.name);
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
- rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
+ rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
c->u.name);
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
}
@@ -2108,6 +2117,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
{
int i, j, rc;
u32 nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
__le32 buf[3];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
u32 nodebuf[8];
@@ -2217,21 +2227,30 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
goto out;
break;
}
- case OCON_IBPKEY:
- rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ case OCON_IBPKEY: {
+ u32 pkey_lo, pkey_hi;
+
+ rc = next_entry(prefixbuf, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* we need to have subnet_prefix in CPU order */
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(*((__be64 *)nodebuf));
+ pkey_lo = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ pkey_hi = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- if (nodebuf[2] > 0xffff ||
- nodebuf[3] > 0xffff) {
+ if (pkey_lo > U16_MAX || pkey_hi > U16_MAX) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[2]);
- c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[3]);
+ c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = pkey_lo;
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = pkey_hi;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
p,
@@ -2239,7 +2258,10 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
- case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+ }
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT: {
+ u32 port;
+
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -2249,12 +2271,13 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
if (rc)
goto out;
- if (buf[1] > 0xff || buf[1] == 0) {
+ port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (port > U8_MAX || port == 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- c->u.ibendport.port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.ibendport.port = port;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
p,
@@ -2262,7 +2285,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
- }
+ } /* end case */
+ } /* end switch */
}
}
rc = 0;
@@ -3105,6 +3129,7 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
{
unsigned int i, j, rc;
size_t nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
__le32 buf[3];
u32 nodebuf[8];
struct ocontext *c;
@@ -3192,12 +3217,17 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
return rc;
break;
case OCON_IBPKEY:
- *((__be64 *)nodebuf) = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+ /* subnet_prefix is in CPU order */
+ prefixbuf[0] = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
- nodebuf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
- nodebuf[3] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+ rc = put_entry(prefixbuf, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 12e414394530..1269e2be3c2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
@@ -71,7 +70,7 @@
#include "audit.h"
/* Policy capability names */
-char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
+const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
"network_peer_controls",
"open_perms",
"extended_socket_class",
@@ -776,7 +775,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
if (!user)
tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
@@ -876,7 +875,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
rc = -EINVAL;
old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
@@ -1034,7 +1033,7 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
goto allow;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
@@ -1123,7 +1122,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
goto allow;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
@@ -1177,7 +1176,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
goto allow;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
@@ -1281,7 +1280,8 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 sid, char **scontext,
- u32 *scontext_len, int force)
+ u32 *scontext_len, int force,
+ int only_invalid)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
struct sidtab *sidtab;
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
}
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
if (force)
context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
else
@@ -1326,8 +1326,14 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
- rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
- scontext_len);
+ if (only_invalid && !context->len) {
+ scontext = NULL;
+ scontext_len = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+ }
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
out:
@@ -1349,14 +1355,34 @@ int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
- scontext_len, 0);
+ scontext_len, 0, 0);
}
int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
- scontext_len, 1);
+ scontext_len, 1, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it
+ * is invalid.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the
+ * context is invalid in the current policy. Set @scontext to point to
+ * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to
+ * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid).
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 1);
}
/*
@@ -1483,7 +1509,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
}
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
&context, def_sid);
if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
@@ -1668,7 +1694,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
}
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
@@ -1880,19 +1906,6 @@ int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
out_sid, false);
}
-/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
-static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
- struct context *context,
- void *arg)
-{
- struct sidtab *s = arg;
-
- if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
- return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
- else
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
struct selinux_state *state,
struct context *context)
@@ -1920,101 +1933,84 @@ struct convert_context_args {
/*
* Convert the values in the security context
- * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified
* in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
- * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
- * context is valid under the new policy.
+ * in the policy `p->newp', storing the new context
+ * in `newc'. Verify that the context is valid
+ * under the new policy.
*/
-static int convert_context(u32 key,
- struct context *c,
- void *p)
+static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p)
{
struct convert_context_args *args;
- struct context oldc;
struct ocontext *oc;
- struct mls_range *range;
struct role_datum *role;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
char *s;
u32 len;
- int rc = 0;
-
- if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
- goto out;
+ int rc;
args = p;
- if (c->str) {
- struct context ctx;
-
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (oldc->str) {
+ s = kstrdup(oldc->str, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
- &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
- kfree(s);
- if (!rc) {
- pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
- c->str);
- /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
- kfree(c->str);
- memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
- goto out;
- } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ newc, SECSID_NULL);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
/* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
- rc = 0;
- goto out;
- } else {
+ context_init(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = oldc->len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kfree(s);
+ if (rc) {
/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
- c->str, -rc);
- goto out;
+ oldc->str, -rc);
+ return rc;
}
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ oldc->str);
+ return 0;
}
- rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ context_init(newc);
/* Convert the user. */
rc = -EINVAL;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
- sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1));
if (!usrdatum)
goto bad;
- c->user = usrdatum->value;
+ newc->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Convert the role. */
rc = -EINVAL;
role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
- sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1));
if (!role)
goto bad;
- c->role = role->value;
+ newc->role = role->value;
/* Convert the type. */
rc = -EINVAL;
typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
- sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1));
if (!typdatum)
goto bad;
- c->type = typdatum->value;
+ newc->type = typdatum->value;
/* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
- rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
- /*
- * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
- * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
- * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
- */
- mls_context_destroy(c);
} else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
/*
* Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
@@ -2032,38 +2028,30 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
" the initial SIDs list\n");
goto bad;
}
- range = &oc->context[0].range;
- rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
+ rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
- if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
- rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
- &oldc);
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state, oldc);
if (rc)
goto bad;
}
- context_destroy(&oldc);
-
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
bad:
/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
- rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len);
if (rc)
return rc;
- context_destroy(&oldc);
- context_destroy(c);
- c->str = s;
- c->len = len;
+ context_destroy(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = len;
pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
- c->str);
- rc = 0;
- goto out;
+ newc->str);
+ return 0;
}
static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
@@ -2103,11 +2091,11 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *oldsidtab, *newsidtab;
struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
- struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
struct selinux_map newmap;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params convert_params;
struct convert_context_args args;
u32 seqno;
int rc = 0;
@@ -2121,27 +2109,37 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+ newsidtab = kmalloc(sizeof(*newsidtab), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newsidtab) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (!state->initialized) {
rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(newsidtab);
goto out;
+ }
policydb->len = len;
rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
&state->ss->map);
if (rc) {
+ kfree(newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(policydb);
goto out;
}
- rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, newsidtab);
if (rc) {
+ kfree(newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(policydb);
goto out;
}
+ state->ss->sidtab = newsidtab;
security_load_policycaps(state);
state->initialized = 1;
seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
@@ -2154,13 +2152,11 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
goto out;
}
-#if 0
- sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
-#endif
-
rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(newsidtab);
goto out;
+ }
newpolicydb->len = len;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
@@ -2169,10 +2165,11 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
- rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, newsidtab);
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
+ kfree(newsidtab);
goto out;
}
@@ -2186,12 +2183,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
goto err;
}
- /* Clone the SID table. */
- sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
-
- rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
- if (rc)
- goto err;
+ oldsidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
/*
* Convert the internal representations of contexts
@@ -2200,7 +2192,12 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
args.state = state;
args.oldp = policydb;
args.newp = newpolicydb;
- rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+ convert_params.func = convert_context;
+ convert_params.args = &args;
+ convert_params.target = newsidtab;
+
+ rc = sidtab_convert(oldsidtab, &convert_params);
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
" representation of contexts in the new SID"
@@ -2210,12 +2207,11 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
- sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
- sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+ state->ss->sidtab = newsidtab;
security_load_policycaps(state);
oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
@@ -2225,7 +2221,8 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
- sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+ sidtab_destroy(oldsidtab);
+ kfree(oldsidtab);
kfree(oldmapping);
avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
@@ -2239,7 +2236,8 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
err:
kfree(newmap.mapping);
- sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+ sidtab_destroy(newsidtab);
+ kfree(newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
out:
@@ -2276,7 +2274,7 @@ int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
while (c) {
@@ -2322,7 +2320,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
while (c) {
@@ -2368,7 +2366,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
while (c) {
@@ -2414,7 +2412,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
while (c) {
@@ -2479,7 +2477,7 @@ int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
switch (domain) {
case AF_INET: {
@@ -2579,7 +2577,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
context_init(&usercon);
@@ -2681,7 +2679,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 *sid)
{
struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
int len;
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
@@ -2767,7 +2765,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
while (c) {
@@ -2973,7 +2971,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
{
struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
struct context *context1;
struct context *context2;
struct context newcon;
@@ -3064,7 +3062,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 *peer_sid)
{
struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
int rc;
struct context *nlbl_ctx;
struct context *xfrm_ctx;
@@ -3404,8 +3402,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
@@ -3425,7 +3422,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
goto out;
}
- ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid);
if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
sid);
@@ -3588,7 +3585,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
u32 *sid)
{
struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
- struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
int rc;
struct context *ctx;
struct context ctx_new;
@@ -3666,7 +3663,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
rc = -ENOENT;
- ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+ ctx = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 24c7bdcc8075..9a36de860368 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct selinux_map {
};
struct selinux_ss {
- struct sidtab sidtab;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
struct policydb policydb;
rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
u32 latest_granting;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index fd75a12fa8fc..e63a90ff2728 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -2,108 +2,164 @@
/*
* Implementation of the SID table type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
+#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include "flask.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "sidtab.h"
-#define SIDTAB_HASH(sid) \
-(sid & SIDTAB_HASH_MASK)
-
int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
{
- int i;
-
- s->htable = kmalloc_array(SIDTAB_SIZE, sizeof(*s->htable), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!s->htable)
- return -ENOMEM;
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++)
- s->htable[i] = NULL;
- s->nel = 0;
- s->next_sid = 1;
- s->shutdown = 0;
+ u32 i;
+
+ memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
+ atomic_set(&s->rcache[i], -1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ s->isids[i].set = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&s->count, 0);
+
+ s->convert = NULL;
+
spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
}
-int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
{
- int hvalue;
- struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
-
- if (!s)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
- prev = NULL;
- cur = s->htable[hvalue];
- while (cur && sid > cur->sid) {
- prev = cur;
- cur = cur->next;
- }
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry;
+ int rc;
- if (cur && sid == cur->sid)
- return -EEXIST;
+ if (sid == 0 || sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ return -EINVAL;
- newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!newnode)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ entry = &s->isids[sid - 1];
- newnode->sid = sid;
- if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
- kfree(newnode);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ rc = context_cpy(&entry->context, context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- if (prev) {
- newnode->next = prev->next;
- wmb();
- prev->next = newnode;
- } else {
- newnode->next = s->htable[hvalue];
- wmb();
- s->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+ entry->set = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
+{
+ u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+ u32 level = 0;
+
+ while (count > capacity) {
+ capacity <<= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ ++level;
}
+ return level;
+}
- s->nel++;
- if (sid >= s->next_sid)
- s->next_sid = sid + 1;
+static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
+{
+ u32 l;
+
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf) {
+ s->roots[0].ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l)
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner) {
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner->entries[0] = s->roots[l - 1];
+ }
return 0;
}
-static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
+static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)
{
- int hvalue;
- struct sidtab_node *cur;
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;
+ u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+
+ /* find the level of the subtree we need */
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(index + 1);
+ capacity_shift = level * SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
- if (!s)
+ /* allocate roots if needed */
+ if (alloc && sidtab_alloc_roots(s, level) != 0)
return NULL;
- hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
- cur = s->htable[hvalue];
- while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
- cur = cur->next;
-
- if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len)
- return &cur->context;
-
- if (!cur || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) {
- /* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */
- sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
- cur = s->htable[hvalue];
- while (cur && sid > cur->sid)
- cur = cur->next;
- if (!cur || sid != cur->sid)
+ /* lookup inside the subtree */
+ entry = &s->roots[level];
+ while (level != 0) {
+ capacity_shift -= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ --level;
+
+ entry = &entry->ptr_inner->entries[leaf_index >> capacity_shift];
+ leaf_index &= ((u32)1 << capacity_shift) - 1;
+
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
return NULL;
}
+ return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES].context;
+}
+
+static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
+{
+ u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+
+ if (index >= count)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* read entries after reading count */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
+}
+
+static struct context *sidtab_lookup_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].context : NULL;
+}
+
+static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
+{
+ struct context *context;
+
+ if (sid != 0) {
+ if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ context = sidtab_lookup(s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1));
+ else
+ context = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
+ if (context && (!context->len || force))
+ return context;
+ }
- return &cur->context;
+ return sidtab_lookup_initial(s, SECINITSID_UNLABELED);
}
struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
@@ -116,191 +172,324 @@ struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
}
-int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
- int (*apply) (u32 sid,
- struct context *context,
- void *args),
- void *args)
+static int sidtab_find_context(union sidtab_entry_inner entry,
+ u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
+ struct context *context, u32 *index)
{
- int i, rc = 0;
- struct sidtab_node *cur;
-
- if (!s)
- goto out;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = sidtab_find_context(node->entries[i],
+ pos, count, level - 1,
+ context, index);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return 0;
+ i++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
- cur = s->htable[i];
- while (cur) {
- rc = apply(cur->sid, &cur->context, args);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- cur = cur->next;
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ if (context_cmp(&node->entries[i].context, context)) {
+ *index = *pos;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ (*pos)++;
+ i++;
}
}
-out:
- return rc;
+ return -ENOENT;
}
-static void sidtab_update_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_node *n, int loc)
+static void sidtab_rcache_update(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, u32 pos)
{
- BUG_ON(loc >= SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN);
-
- while (loc > 0) {
- s->cache[loc] = s->cache[loc - 1];
- loc--;
+ while (pos > 0) {
+ atomic_set(&s->rcache[pos], atomic_read(&s->rcache[pos - 1]));
+ --pos;
}
- s->cache[0] = n;
+ atomic_set(&s->rcache[0], (int)index);
}
-static inline u32 sidtab_search_context(struct sidtab *s,
- struct context *context)
+static void sidtab_rcache_push(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
{
- int i;
- struct sidtab_node *cur;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
- cur = s->htable[i];
- while (cur) {
- if (context_cmp(&cur->context, context)) {
- sidtab_update_cache(s, cur, SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN - 1);
- return cur->sid;
- }
- cur = cur->next;
- }
- }
- return 0;
+ sidtab_rcache_update(s, index, SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE - 1);
}
-static inline u32 sidtab_search_cache(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
+static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+ u32 *index)
{
- int i;
- struct sidtab_node *node;
+ u32 i;
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++) {
- node = s->cache[i];
- if (unlikely(!node))
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++) {
+ int v = atomic_read(&s->rcache[i]);
+
+ if (v < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, (u32)v, 0), context)) {
+ sidtab_rcache_update(s, (u32)v, i);
+ *index = (u32)v;
return 0;
- if (context_cmp(&node->context, context)) {
- sidtab_update_cache(s, node, i);
- return node->sid;
}
}
- return 0;
+ return -ENOENT;
}
-int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
- struct context *context,
- u32 *out_sid)
+static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+ u32 *index)
{
- u32 sid;
- int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
+ u32 count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ u32 count_locked, level, pos;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+ struct context *dst, *dst_convert;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = sidtab_rcache_search(s, context, index);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
+
+ /* read entries after reading count */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ pos = 0;
+ rc = sidtab_find_context(s->roots[level], &pos, count, level,
+ context, index);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ sidtab_rcache_push(s, *index);
+ return 0;
+ }
- *out_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ /* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
- sid = sidtab_search_cache(s, context);
- if (!sid)
- sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
- if (!sid) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
- /* Rescan now that we hold the lock. */
- sid = sidtab_search_context(s, context);
- if (sid)
- goto unlock_out;
- /* No SID exists for the context. Allocate a new one. */
- if (s->next_sid == UINT_MAX || s->shutdown) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto unlock_out;
+ convert = s->convert;
+ count_locked = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(count_locked);
+
+ /* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */
+ while (count < count_locked) {
+ if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 0), context)) {
+ sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
+ *index = count;
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
- sid = s->next_sid++;
- if (context->len)
- pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
- context->str);
- ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
- if (ret)
- s->next_sid--;
-unlock_out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ ++count;
}
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ /* insert context into new entry */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
+ if (!dst)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = context_cpy(dst, context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /*
+ * if we are building a new sidtab, we need to convert the context
+ * and insert it there as well
+ */
+ if (convert) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(convert->target, count, 1);
+ if (!dst_convert) {
+ context_destroy(dst);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
- *out_sid = sid;
- return 0;
+ rc = convert->func(context, dst_convert, convert->args);
+ if (rc) {
+ context_destroy(dst);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
+ atomic_set(&convert->target->count, count + 1);
+ }
+
+ if (context->len)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+ context->str);
+
+ sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
+ *index = count;
+
+ /* write entries before writing new count */
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ atomic_set(&s->count, count + 1);
+
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
}
-void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)
{
- int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
- struct sidtab_node *cur;
-
- slots_used = 0;
- max_chain_len = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
- cur = h->htable[i];
- if (cur) {
- slots_used++;
- chain_len = 0;
- while (cur) {
- chain_len++;
- cur = cur->next;
- }
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry = &s->isids[i];
- if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
- max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ if (entry->set && context_cmp(context, &entry->context)) {
+ *sid = i + 1;
+ return 0;
}
}
- pr_debug("%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
- "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
- max_chain_len);
+ rc = sidtab_reverse_lookup(s, context, sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ *sid += SECINITSID_NUM + 1;
+ return 0;
}
-void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc,
+ u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert)
{
- int i;
- struct sidtab_node *cur, *temp;
-
- if (!s)
- return;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) {
- cur = s->htable[i];
- while (cur) {
- temp = cur;
- cur = cur->next;
- context_destroy(&temp->context);
- kfree(temp);
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner) {
+ edst->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&edst->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ &esrc->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ pos, count, level - 1,
+ convert);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ i++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf) {
+ edst->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = convert->func(&esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ &edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ convert->args);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ (*pos)++;
+ i++;
}
- s->htable[i] = NULL;
+ cond_resched();
}
- kfree(s->htable);
- s->htable = NULL;
- s->nel = 0;
- s->next_sid = 1;
+ return 0;
}
-void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src)
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
{
unsigned long flags;
- int i;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&src->lock, flags);
- dst->htable = src->htable;
- dst->nel = src->nel;
- dst->next_sid = src->next_sid;
- dst->shutdown = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN; i++)
- dst->cache[i] = NULL;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->lock, flags);
+ u32 count, level, pos;
+ int rc;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ /* concurrent policy loads are not allowed */
+ if (s->convert) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ count = (u32)atomic_read(&s->count);
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
+
+ /* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
+ * live convert)
+ */
+ rc = sidtab_do_lookup(params->target, count - 1, 1) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ if (rc) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
+ atomic_set(&params->target->count, count);
+
+ /* enable live convert of new entries */
+ s->convert = params;
+
+ /* we can safely do the rest of the conversion outside the lock */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ pr_info("SELinux: Converting %u SID table entries...\n", count);
+
+ /* convert all entries not covered by live convert */
+ pos = 0;
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&params->target->roots[level],
+ &s->roots[level], &pos, count, level, params);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* we need to keep the old table - disable live convert */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ }
+ return rc;
}
-void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s)
+static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
{
- unsigned long flags;
+ u32 i;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
- s->shutdown = 1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ if (level != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES; i++)
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(node->entries[i], level - 1);
+ kfree(node);
+ } else {
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES; i++)
+ context_destroy(&node->entries[i].context);
+ kfree(node);
+ }
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ u32 i, level;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ if (s->isids[i].set)
+ context_destroy(&s->isids[i].context);
+
+ level = SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL;
+ while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)
+ --level;
+
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index a1a1d2617b6f..bbd5c0d1f3bd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -1,56 +1,96 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
- * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
* of security context structures indexed by SID value.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+
#include "context.h"
-struct sidtab_node {
- u32 sid; /* security identifier */
- struct context context; /* security context structure */
- struct sidtab_node *next;
+struct sidtab_entry_leaf {
+ struct context context;
+};
+
+struct sidtab_node_inner;
+struct sidtab_node_leaf;
+
+union sidtab_entry_inner {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;
+};
+
+/* align node size to page boundary */
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT PAGE_SHIFT
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size) - 1) + 1))
+
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry_leaf))
+
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 31 /* limited to INT_MAX due to atomic_t range */
+#define SIDTAB_MAX (((u32)1 << SIDTAB_MAX_BITS) - 1)
+/* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
+ DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
+ SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+
+struct sidtab_node_leaf {
+ struct sidtab_entry_leaf entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
};
-#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS 7
-#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define SIDTAB_HASH_MASK (SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+struct sidtab_node_inner {
+ union sidtab_entry_inner entries[SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES];
+};
-#define SIDTAB_SIZE SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+struct sidtab_isid_entry {
+ int set;
+ struct context context;
+};
+
+struct sidtab_convert_params {
+ int (*func)(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *args);
+ void *args;
+ struct sidtab *target;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE 3
struct sidtab {
- struct sidtab_node **htable;
- unsigned int nel; /* number of elements */
- unsigned int next_sid; /* next SID to allocate */
- unsigned char shutdown;
-#define SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN 3
- struct sidtab_node *cache[SIDTAB_CACHE_LEN];
+ union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
+ atomic_t count;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
spinlock_t lock;
+
+ /* reverse lookup cache */
+ atomic_t rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
+
+ /* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
};
int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
-int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
-int sidtab_map(struct sidtab *s,
- int (*apply) (u32 sid,
- struct context *context,
- void *args),
- void *args);
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params);
-int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
- struct context *context,
- u32 *sid);
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
-void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag);
void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
-void sidtab_set(struct sidtab *dst, struct sidtab *src);
-void sidtab_shutdown(struct sidtab *s);
#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 91dc3783ed94..7c57cb7e4146 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int rc;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 str_len;
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
if (!ctx)
return 0;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 *sid, int ckall)
{
u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
- struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
if (sp) {
int i;
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad)
{
int i;
- struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+ struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
if (sp) {
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