diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 612 |
1 files changed, 207 insertions, 405 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9a5bdfc21314..79b4890e9936 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -136,17 +136,13 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); #endif -static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = - CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; - static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) { unsigned long checkreqprot; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) { - selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; if (checkreqprot) - pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is no longer supported.\n"); } return 1; } @@ -257,7 +253,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, might_sleep_if(may_sleep); - if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) && + if (selinux_initialized() && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; @@ -403,14 +399,12 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } @@ -421,14 +415,12 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); return rc; } @@ -511,7 +503,7 @@ static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb) fallback: /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */ - rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/", + rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sid); if (rc) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -615,7 +607,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { + if (!selinux_initialized()) { if (!opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security @@ -716,7 +708,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); + rc = security_fs_use(sb); if (rc) { pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); @@ -741,8 +733,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; - rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), + rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); @@ -881,7 +872,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) + if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; /* @@ -911,7 +902,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { - rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); + rc = security_fs_use(newsb); if (rc) goto out; } @@ -960,7 +951,7 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) if (!s) return -EINVAL; - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { + if (!selinux_initialized()) { pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -997,7 +988,7 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) WARN_ON(1); return -EINVAL; } - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n", s, rc); @@ -1014,8 +1005,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) u32 len; int rc; - rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, - &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) { bool has_comma = strchr(context, ','); @@ -1038,7 +1028,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) + if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { @@ -1292,7 +1282,7 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, path++; } } - rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, + rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); if (rc == -ENOENT) { /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */ @@ -1347,7 +1337,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } - rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid, def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; @@ -1454,7 +1444,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ - rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; @@ -1599,11 +1589,9 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, return -EINVAL; } - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) { - int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); + int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); if (rc2) return rc2; } @@ -1629,8 +1617,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, sid = cred_sid(cred); isec = selinux_inode(inode); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); } /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing @@ -1703,8 +1690,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, ad.u.file = file; if (sid != fsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, fsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); @@ -1747,7 +1733,7 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); - return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } @@ -1775,8 +1761,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) @@ -1787,13 +1772,11 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - newsid, sbsec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } @@ -1822,8 +1805,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1843,8 +1825,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, return 0; } - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); return rc; } @@ -1868,19 +1849,16 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, old_isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, old_isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1890,15 +1868,13 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, new_isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); if (rc) @@ -1918,8 +1894,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); + return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); } /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ @@ -1993,8 +1968,7 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); } @@ -2007,22 +1981,20 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, int rc; if (mysid != fromsid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, + rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); if (rc) return rc; } - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid, + return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL); } static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to), + return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to), SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, NULL); } @@ -2042,8 +2014,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, ad.u.path = file->f_path; if (sid != fsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, fsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); @@ -2061,8 +2032,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, return 0; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), &ad); } @@ -2073,26 +2043,24 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, + NULL); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, + NULL); } static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), + return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); } static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS, - PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), + SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -2100,8 +2068,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL); } @@ -2168,21 +2135,18 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) switch (type) { case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL); case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ /* Set level of messages printed to console */ case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, NULL); } /* All other syslog types */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL); } @@ -2249,8 +2213,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; @@ -2261,7 +2224,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ - rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, + rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; @@ -2312,7 +2275,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ - rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) @@ -2331,29 +2294,25 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file; if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) @@ -2365,8 +2324,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - ptsid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) @@ -2380,8 +2338,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; @@ -2473,8 +2430,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ @@ -2513,8 +2469,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); + rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); if (rc) { clear_itimer(); @@ -2841,7 +2796,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, if (xattr_name) *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX; - return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, + return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); } @@ -2895,7 +2850,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || + if (!selinux_initialized() || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -2903,7 +2858,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { - rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2923,7 +2878,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, struct inode_security_struct *isec; int rc; - if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))) + if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized())) return 0; isec = selinux_inode(inode); @@ -2947,7 +2902,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, } else { isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; rc = security_transition_sid( - &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + tsec->sid, tsec->sid, isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2962,8 +2917,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE; ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?"; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__CREATE, @@ -3035,8 +2989,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad); + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad); } static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, @@ -3049,8 +3002,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; - return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, + return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); } @@ -3085,8 +3037,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, @@ -3166,7 +3117,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) + if (!selinux_initialized()) return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb); @@ -3180,13 +3131,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ad.u.dentry = dentry; isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { @@ -3215,25 +3165,23 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return rc; } - rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, newsid, isec->sclass, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass, FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, + rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - newsid, + return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, @@ -3273,7 +3221,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { + if (!selinux_initialized()) { /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if @@ -3282,7 +3230,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } - rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" @@ -3326,7 +3274,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) + if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. @@ -3396,7 +3344,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr. */ - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) || + if (!selinux_initialized() || strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -3411,11 +3359,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) - error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, - isec->sid, &context, + error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, &size); else - error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, + error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); if (error) return error; @@ -3447,7 +3394,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3464,7 +3411,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t { const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); - if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) + if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) @@ -3540,7 +3487,7 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, return rc; } - rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, + rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL); kfree(context); if (rc) @@ -3555,14 +3502,14 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, q.name = kn->name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name); - rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; } - rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3602,7 +3549,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && - fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state)) + fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) /* No change since file_open check. */ return 0; @@ -3643,8 +3590,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; if (ssid != fsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - ssid, fsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); @@ -3656,8 +3602,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, return 0; isec = inode_security(inode); - rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state, - ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested, driver, xperm, &ad); out: return rc; @@ -3726,8 +3671,7 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared * private file mapping that will also be writable. * This has an additional check. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); if (rc) goto error; @@ -3757,15 +3701,15 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { u32 sid = current_sid(); - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); } return rc; } -static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, +static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, + unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -3780,37 +3724,29 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, return rc; } - if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) - prot = reqprot; - return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); - if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state)) - prot = reqprot; - if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); } else if (!vma->vm_file && ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { /* @@ -3902,8 +3838,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, else perm = signal_to_av(signum); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - fsec->fown_sid, sid, + return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } @@ -3929,7 +3864,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) * struct as its SID. */ fsec->isid = isec->sid; - fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state); + fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(); /* * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving @@ -3948,8 +3883,7 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, { u32 sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } /* @@ -3991,8 +3925,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, secid, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); @@ -4016,8 +3949,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, NULL); @@ -4034,8 +3966,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); } @@ -4049,8 +3980,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) /* init_module */ if (file == NULL) - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); /* finit_module */ @@ -4060,15 +3990,13 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) fsec = selinux_file(file); if (sid != fsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } @@ -4106,22 +4034,19 @@ static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } @@ -4137,22 +4062,19 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } @@ -4167,8 +4089,7 @@ static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcre av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), + return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); } @@ -4182,8 +4103,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL); return 0; @@ -4191,22 +4111,19 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL); } @@ -4224,8 +4141,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, secid = current_sid(); else secid = cred_sid(cred); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, @@ -4245,8 +4161,8 @@ static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) { u32 sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE, - USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE, + USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL); } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ @@ -4504,7 +4420,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; - err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, + err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { pr_warn( @@ -4533,7 +4449,7 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) - err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; @@ -4551,7 +4467,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, return 0; } - return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } @@ -4568,8 +4484,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = sk; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } @@ -4589,8 +4504,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, if (rc) return rc; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, @@ -4719,8 +4633,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in snum, &sid); if (err) goto out; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->sid, sid, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) @@ -4759,8 +4672,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in else ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->sid, sid, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; @@ -4858,8 +4770,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) return err; } @@ -4971,8 +4882,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) @@ -4980,7 +4890,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; - err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; @@ -5003,8 +4913,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, + return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); } @@ -5019,8 +4928,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) return err; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, if_sid, + err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); if (err) return err; @@ -5028,8 +4936,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) return err; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, node_sid, + return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); } @@ -5052,8 +4959,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, return err; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; @@ -5118,8 +5024,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); return err; } - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad); if (err) { selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0); @@ -5128,8 +5033,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) } if (secmark_active) { - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, &ad); if (err) return err; @@ -5155,7 +5059,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; - err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, + err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); if (err) return err; @@ -5312,8 +5216,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid, sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); if (err) @@ -5534,8 +5437,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); tsid = __tsec->sid; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, + return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); } @@ -5584,8 +5486,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } @@ -5593,8 +5494,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); } @@ -5622,13 +5522,11 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (err) return err; - err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, + err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); if (err) return err; @@ -5682,8 +5580,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (secmark_active) - if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, skb->secmark, + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) return NF_DROP; @@ -5763,8 +5660,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_DROP; if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) - if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->sid, skb->secmark, + if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); @@ -5889,8 +5785,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, return NF_DROP; if (secmark_active) - if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, skb->secmark, + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); @@ -5900,15 +5795,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid)) return NF_DROP; - if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, if_sid, + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) return NF_DROP; - if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - peer_sid, node_sid, + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); } @@ -5953,8 +5846,8 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); - if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) && - !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) + if (enforcing_enabled() && + !security_get_allow_unknown()) return rc; rc = 0; } else if (rc == -ENOENT) { @@ -5993,8 +5886,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) @@ -6020,8 +5912,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); } @@ -6036,8 +5927,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } @@ -6050,8 +5940,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) case IPC_INFO: case MSG_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case MSG_STAT: @@ -6091,7 +5980,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ - rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -6101,18 +5990,15 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can this process send the message */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad); if (!rc) /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, + rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); return rc; @@ -6134,12 +6020,10 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key; - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); if (!rc) - rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, msec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); return rc; } @@ -6157,8 +6041,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__CREATE, &ad); } @@ -6173,8 +6056,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } @@ -6188,8 +6070,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) case IPC_INFO: case SHM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case IPC_STAT: case SHM_STAT: @@ -6240,8 +6121,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__CREATE, &ad); } @@ -6256,8 +6136,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, + return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); } @@ -6271,8 +6150,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) case IPC_INFO: case SEM_INFO: /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL); case GETPID: case GETNCNT: @@ -6359,8 +6237,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (current != p) { - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - current_sid(), __tsec->sid, + error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto bad; @@ -6387,7 +6264,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!sid) return 0; - error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; @@ -6409,24 +6286,19 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL); else error = -EINVAL; @@ -6439,7 +6311,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) str[size-1] = 0; size--; } - error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, + error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { @@ -6463,9 +6335,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) return error; } - error = security_context_to_sid_force( - &selinux_state, - value, size, &sid); + error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, + &sid); } if (error) return error; @@ -6488,7 +6359,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) tsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { if (sid) { - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid, + error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; @@ -6503,15 +6374,13 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { - error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, sid); + error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; @@ -6520,8 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { - error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; @@ -6548,13 +6416,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, + return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { - return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, + return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); } @@ -6674,8 +6542,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) @@ -6685,7 +6552,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) unsigned len; int rc; - rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, + rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; @@ -6699,8 +6566,7 @@ static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); } #endif #endif @@ -6722,8 +6588,7 @@ static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val) ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val; ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sec->sid, sid, + return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY, INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad); } @@ -6737,7 +6602,7 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; - err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, + err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid); if (err) @@ -6747,8 +6612,7 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, ibendport.dev_name = dev_name; ibendport.port = port_num; ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sec->sid, sid, + return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } @@ -6781,13 +6645,11 @@ static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, switch (cmd) { case BPF_MAP_CREATE: - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); break; case BPF_PROG_LOAD: - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); break; default: @@ -6827,16 +6689,14 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; bpfsec = map->security; - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) return ret; @@ -6850,8 +6710,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = map->security; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } @@ -6861,8 +6720,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; bpfsec = prog->aux->security; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } @@ -6911,7 +6769,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) } #endif -struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), @@ -6936,7 +6794,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) else return -EINVAL; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, requested, NULL); } @@ -6967,7 +6825,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL); } @@ -6976,7 +6834,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL); } #endif @@ -6991,7 +6849,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) */ static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) { - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new), + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL); } @@ -7005,7 +6863,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void) { int sid = current_sid(); - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL); } @@ -7027,7 +6885,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, + return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad); } #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ @@ -7047,7 +6905,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs * when disabling SELinux at runtime. */ -static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), @@ -7334,11 +7192,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n"); memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); - enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); - if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE) - pr_err("SELinux: CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is non-zero. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n"); - checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot); - selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc); + enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot); + selinux_avc_init(); mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock); mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); @@ -7398,7 +7253,6 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { }; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) - static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { { .hook = selinux_ip_postroute, @@ -7473,56 +7327,4 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) return 0; } __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE -static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) -{ - pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); - - unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); -} -#endif - -#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE -#define selinux_nf_ip_exit() -#endif - #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE -int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) -{ - if (selinux_initialized(state)) { - /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (selinux_disabled(state)) { - /* Only do this once. */ - return -EINVAL; - } - - selinux_mark_disabled(state); - - pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); - - /* - * Unregister netfilter hooks. - * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking - * runtime disable. - */ - selinux_nf_ip_exit(); - - security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); - - /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ - avc_disable(); - - /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ - exit_sel_fs(); - - return 0; -} -#endif |