diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 73 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 20 |
5 files changed, 55 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3c323ca213d4..c0d3b716d11f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); @@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos); void ima_init_policy(void); @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 984e861f6e33..c35ea613c9f8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ err_out: * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @prop: properties of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ err_out: * */ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data, allowed_algos); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 656c709b974f..884a3533f7af 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 06132cf47016..9b87556b03a7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file); struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, &allowed_algos); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK || @@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ out: static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; int ret; if (!file) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) { - ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT); if (ret) return ret; } if (prot & PROT_EXEC) - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); return 0; @@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; struct inode *inode; + struct lsm_prop prop; int result = 0; int action; - u32 secid; int pcr; /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ @@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, + current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL); @@ -541,16 +541,16 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), + &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; - security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + security_cred_getlsmprop(bprm->cred, &prop); + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } @@ -566,10 +566,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the @@ -788,9 +788,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0, + MAY_READ, func); } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) @@ -831,8 +831,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0; - u32 secid; + struct lsm_prop prop; if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -990,9 +990,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid); + security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop); action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(), - secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, + &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest) return -ENOENT; @@ -1062,19 +1062,16 @@ out: */ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) { - struct fd f; - if (!buf || !size) return; - f = fdget(kernel_fd); - if (!fd_file(f)) + CLASS(fd, f)(kernel_fd); + if (fd_empty(f)) return; process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_idmap(fd_file(f)), file_inode(fd_file(f)), buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, false, NULL, 0); - fdput(f); } /** @@ -1114,7 +1111,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS /** - * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*) requests * @kmod_name: kernel module name * * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe @@ -1128,7 +1125,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name * in order to load a kernel module with same name. * - * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*)" kernel modules, * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and * avoid the verification loop. * @@ -1136,7 +1133,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data); */ static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,", 17) == 0) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 09da8e639239..dbfd554b4624 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *func_data) { int i; @@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; - u32 osid; + struct lsm_prop prop = { }; if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) { if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -649,15 +649,15 @@ retry: case LSM_OBJ_USER: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: - security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, + security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &prop); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE) @@ -737,8 +737,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos) { @@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask, func_data)) continue; |