diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/Kconfig | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/Makefile | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/Kconfig | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/Makefile | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/blake2s.c | 37 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/sha1.c (renamed from lib/sha1.c) | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/idr.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/iov_iter.c | 92 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/lockref.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/memneq.c | 176 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/mpi/mpi-add.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/mpi/mpi-mul.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/overflow_kunit.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/sbitmap.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/test_kasan.c | 10 |
17 files changed, 382 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index 6a843639814f..eaaad4d85bf2 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ config INDIRECT_IOMEM_FALLBACK source "lib/crypto/Kconfig" +config LIB_MEMNEQ + bool + config CRC_CCITT tristate "CRC-CCITT functions" help diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan index c4fe15d38b60..fd15230a703b 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan +++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan @@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ config UBSAN_SHIFT config UBSAN_DIV_ZERO bool "Perform checking for integer divide-by-zero" depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero) + # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1657 + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/56289 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG help This option enables -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero which checks for integer division by zero. This is effectively redundant with the @@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE bool "Perform checking for unreachable code" # objtool already handles unreachable checking and gets angry about # seeing UBSan instrumentation located in unreachable places. - depends on !(OBJTOOL && (STACK_VALIDATION || UNWINDER_ORC || X86_SMAP)) + depends on !(OBJTOOL && (STACK_VALIDATION || UNWINDER_ORC || HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION)) depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unreachable) help This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index ea54294d73bf..67482f5ec0e8 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ endif lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \ rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \ - idr.o extable.o sha1.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \ + idr.o extable.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \ flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \ is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \ earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o dec_and_lock.o \ @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DIMLIB) += dim/ obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o lib-$(CONFIG_CLZ_TAB) += clz_tab.o +lib-$(CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ) += memneq.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER) += strncpy_from_user.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER) += strnlen_user.o diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig index 9856e291f414..9ff549f63540 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519 tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library" depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n + select LIB_MEMNEQ help Enable the Curve25519 library interface. This interface may be fulfilled by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific @@ -120,6 +121,9 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305 select CRYPTO_ALGAPI +config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 + tristate + config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 tristate diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile index 26be2bbe09c5..919cbb2c220d 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/Makefile +++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ libpoly1305-y := poly1305-donna32.o libpoly1305-$(CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128) := poly1305-donna64.o libpoly1305-y += poly1305.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1) += libsha1.o +libsha1-y := sha1.o + obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o libsha256-y := sha256.o diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c index 409e4b728770..7d77dea15587 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ */ #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/string.h> /* @@ -587,5 +589,44 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void) } } + for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) { + enum { TEST_ALIGNMENT = 16 }; + u8 unaligned_block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE + TEST_ALIGNMENT - 1] + __aligned(TEST_ALIGNMENT); + u8 blocks[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 2]; + struct blake2s_state state1, state2; + + get_random_bytes(blocks, sizeof(blocks)); + get_random_bytes(&state, sizeof(state)); + +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC) && \ + defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S) + memcpy(&state1, &state, sizeof(state1)); + memcpy(&state2, &state, sizeof(state2)); + blake2s_compress(&state1, blocks, 2, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + blake2s_compress_generic(&state2, blocks, 2, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (memcmp(&state1, &state2, sizeof(state1))) { + pr_err("blake2s random compress self-test %d: FAIL\n", + i + 1); + success = false; + } +#endif + + memcpy(&state1, &state, sizeof(state1)); + blake2s_compress(&state1, blocks, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + for (l = 1; l < TEST_ALIGNMENT; ++l) { + memcpy(unaligned_block + l, blocks, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + memcpy(&state2, &state, sizeof(state2)); + blake2s_compress(&state2, unaligned_block + l, 1, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (memcmp(&state1, &state2, sizeof(state1))) { + pr_err("blake2s random compress align %d self-test %d: FAIL\n", + l, i + 1); + success = false; + } + } + } + return success; } diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c index c71c09621c09..98e688c6d891 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c +++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c @@ -16,16 +16,44 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/bug.h> +static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state) +{ + state->f[0] = -1; +} + void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen) { - __blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, false); + const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen; + + if (unlikely(!inlen)) + return; + if (inlen > fill) { + memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill); + blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + state->buflen = 0; + in += fill; + inlen -= fill; + } + if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) { + const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + blake2s_compress(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE); + in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1); + inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1); + } + memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen); + state->buflen += inlen; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update); void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out) { WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out); - __blake2s_final(state, out, false); + blake2s_set_lastblock(state); + memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0, + BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */ + blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen); + cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h)); + memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen); memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final); @@ -38,12 +66,7 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void) return 0; } -static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void) -{ -} - module_init(blake2s_mod_init); -module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>"); diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/crypto/sha1.c index 0494766fc574..1aebe7be9401 100644 --- a/lib/sha1.c +++ b/lib/crypto/sha1.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <crypto/sha1.h> @@ -135,3 +136,5 @@ void sha1_init(__u32 *buf) buf[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sha1_init); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/lib/idr.c b/lib/idr.c index f4ab4f4aa3c7..7ecdfdb5309e 100644 --- a/lib/idr.c +++ b/lib/idr.c @@ -491,7 +491,8 @@ void ida_free(struct ida *ida, unsigned int id) struct ida_bitmap *bitmap; unsigned long flags; - BUG_ON((int)id < 0); + if ((int)id < 0) + return; xas_lock_irqsave(&xas, flags); bitmap = xas_load(&xas); diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c index 0b64695ab632..507e732ef7cf 100644 --- a/lib/iov_iter.c +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c @@ -1268,6 +1268,98 @@ void iov_iter_discard(struct iov_iter *i, unsigned int direction, size_t count) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(iov_iter_discard); +static bool iov_iter_aligned_iovec(const struct iov_iter *i, unsigned addr_mask, + unsigned len_mask) +{ + size_t size = i->count; + size_t skip = i->iov_offset; + unsigned k; + + for (k = 0; k < i->nr_segs; k++, skip = 0) { + size_t len = i->iov[k].iov_len - skip; + + if (len > size) + len = size; + if (len & len_mask) + return false; + if ((unsigned long)(i->iov[k].iov_base + skip) & addr_mask) + return false; + + size -= len; + if (!size) + break; + } + return true; +} + +static bool iov_iter_aligned_bvec(const struct iov_iter *i, unsigned addr_mask, + unsigned len_mask) +{ + size_t size = i->count; + unsigned skip = i->iov_offset; + unsigned k; + + for (k = 0; k < i->nr_segs; k++, skip = 0) { + size_t len = i->bvec[k].bv_len - skip; + + if (len > size) + len = size; + if (len & len_mask) + return false; + if ((unsigned long)(i->bvec[k].bv_offset + skip) & addr_mask) + return false; + + size -= len; + if (!size) + break; + } + return true; +} + +/** + * iov_iter_is_aligned() - Check if the addresses and lengths of each segments + * are aligned to the parameters. + * + * @i: &struct iov_iter to restore + * @addr_mask: bit mask to check against the iov element's addresses + * @len_mask: bit mask to check against the iov element's lengths + * + * Return: false if any addresses or lengths intersect with the provided masks + */ +bool iov_iter_is_aligned(const struct iov_iter *i, unsigned addr_mask, + unsigned len_mask) +{ + if (likely(iter_is_iovec(i) || iov_iter_is_kvec(i))) + return iov_iter_aligned_iovec(i, addr_mask, len_mask); + + if (iov_iter_is_bvec(i)) + return iov_iter_aligned_bvec(i, addr_mask, len_mask); + + if (iov_iter_is_pipe(i)) { + unsigned int p_mask = i->pipe->ring_size - 1; + size_t size = i->count; + + if (size & len_mask) + return false; + if (size && allocated(&i->pipe->bufs[i->head & p_mask])) { + if (i->iov_offset & addr_mask) + return false; + } + + return true; + } + + if (iov_iter_is_xarray(i)) { + if (i->count & len_mask) + return false; + if ((i->xarray_start + i->iov_offset) & addr_mask) + return false; + } + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iov_iter_is_aligned); + static unsigned long iov_iter_alignment_iovec(const struct iov_iter *i) { unsigned long res = 0; diff --git a/lib/lockref.c b/lib/lockref.c index c6f0b183b937..45e93ece8ba0 100644 --- a/lib/lockref.c +++ b/lib/lockref.c @@ -111,31 +111,6 @@ int lockref_put_not_zero(struct lockref *lockref) EXPORT_SYMBOL(lockref_put_not_zero); /** - * lockref_get_or_lock - Increments count unless the count is 0 or dead - * @lockref: pointer to lockref structure - * Return: 1 if count updated successfully or 0 if count was zero - * and we got the lock instead. - */ -int lockref_get_or_lock(struct lockref *lockref) -{ - CMPXCHG_LOOP( - new.count++; - if (old.count <= 0) - break; - , - return 1; - ); - - spin_lock(&lockref->lock); - if (lockref->count <= 0) - return 0; - lockref->count++; - spin_unlock(&lockref->lock); - return 1; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(lockref_get_or_lock); - -/** * lockref_put_return - Decrement reference count if possible * @lockref: pointer to lockref structure * diff --git a/lib/memneq.c b/lib/memneq.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb11608b1ec1 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/memneq.c @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Constant-time equality testing of memory regions. + * + * Authors: + * + * James Yonan <james@openvpn.net> + * Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> + * + * This file is provided under a dual BSD/GPLv2 license. When using or + * redistributing this file, you may do so under either license. + * + * GPL LICENSE SUMMARY + * + * Copyright(c) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St - Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * The full GNU General Public License is included in this distribution + * in the file called LICENSE.GPL. + * + * BSD LICENSE + * + * Copyright(c) 2013 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * * Neither the name of OpenVPN Technologies nor the names of its + * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> + +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_CRYPTO_MEMNEQ + +/* Generic path for arbitrary size */ +static inline unsigned long +__crypto_memneq_generic(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size) +{ + unsigned long neq = 0; + +#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) + while (size >= sizeof(unsigned long)) { + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned long *)a) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned long *)b); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + a += sizeof(unsigned long); + b += sizeof(unsigned long); + size -= sizeof(unsigned long); + } +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ + while (size > 0) { + neq |= *(unsigned char *)a ^ *(unsigned char *)b; + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + a += 1; + b += 1; + size -= 1; + } + return neq; +} + +/* Loop-free fast-path for frequently used 16-byte size */ +static inline unsigned long __crypto_memneq_16(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + unsigned long neq = 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS + if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) { + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned long *)a) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned long *)b); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned long *)(a + 8)) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned long *)(b + 8)); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + } else if (sizeof(unsigned int) == 4) { + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned int *)a) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned int *)b); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(a + 4)) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(b + 4)); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(a + 8)) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(b + 8)); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(a + 12)) ^ + get_unaligned((unsigned int *)(b + 12)); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + } else +#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ + { + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+1) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+1); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+2) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+2); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+3) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+3); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+4) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+4); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+5) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+5); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+6) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+6); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+7) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+7); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+8) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+8); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+9) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+9); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+10) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+10); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+11) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+11); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+12) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+12); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+13) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+13); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+14) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+14); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + neq |= *(unsigned char *)(a+15) ^ *(unsigned char *)(b+15); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(neq); + } + + return neq; +} + +/* Compare two areas of memory without leaking timing information, + * and with special optimizations for common sizes. Users should + * not call this function directly, but should instead use + * crypto_memneq defined in crypto/algapi.h. + */ +noinline unsigned long __crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b, + size_t size) +{ + switch (size) { + case 16: + return __crypto_memneq_16(a, b); + default: + return __crypto_memneq_generic(a, b, size); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__crypto_memneq); + +#endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_CRYPTO_MEMNEQ */ diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c index 2cdae54c1bd0..9056fc5167fc 100644 --- a/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c +++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ void mpi_sub(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v) mpi_add(w, u, vv); mpi_free(vv); } - +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_sub); void mpi_addm(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v, MPI m) { diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-mul.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-mul.c index 8f5fa200f297..7f4eda8560dc 100644 --- a/lib/mpi/mpi-mul.c +++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-mul.c @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ void mpi_mul(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v) if (tmp_limb) mpi_free_limb_space(tmp_limb); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_mul); void mpi_mulm(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v, MPI m) { diff --git a/lib/overflow_kunit.c b/lib/overflow_kunit.c index 475f0c064bf6..7e3e43679b73 100644 --- a/lib/overflow_kunit.c +++ b/lib/overflow_kunit.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(u32) = { {-4U, 5U, 1U, -9U, -20U, true, false, true}, }; +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(u64) = { {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, false, false, false}, {1, 1, 2, 0, 1, false, false, false}, @@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(u64) = { false, true, false}, {-15ULL, 10ULL, -5ULL, -25ULL, -150ULL, false, false, true}, }; +#endif DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(s8) = { {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, false, false, false}, @@ -188,6 +190,8 @@ DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(s32) = { {S32_MIN, S32_MIN, 0, 0, 0, true, false, true}, {S32_MAX, S32_MAX, -2, 0, 1, true, false, true}, }; + +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(s64) = { {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, false, false, false}, @@ -216,6 +220,7 @@ DEFINE_TEST_ARRAY(s64) = { {-128, -1, -129, -127, 128, false, false, false}, {0, -S64_MAX, -S64_MAX, S64_MAX, 0, false, false, false}, }; +#endif #define check_one_op(t, fmt, op, sym, a, b, r, of) do { \ t _r; \ @@ -650,6 +655,7 @@ static struct kunit_case overflow_test_cases[] = { KUNIT_CASE(s16_overflow_test), KUNIT_CASE(u32_overflow_test), KUNIT_CASE(s32_overflow_test), +/* Clang 13 and earlier generate unwanted libcalls on 32-bit. */ #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 KUNIT_CASE(u64_overflow_test), KUNIT_CASE(s64_overflow_test), diff --git a/lib/sbitmap.c b/lib/sbitmap.c index ae4fd4de9ebe..29eb0484215a 100644 --- a/lib/sbitmap.c +++ b/lib/sbitmap.c @@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ unsigned long __sbitmap_queue_get_batch(struct sbitmap_queue *sbq, int nr_tags, sbitmap_deferred_clear(map); if (map->word == (1UL << (map_depth - 1)) - 1) - continue; + goto next; nr = find_first_zero_bit(&map->word, map_depth); if (nr + nr_tags <= map_depth) { @@ -539,6 +539,8 @@ unsigned long __sbitmap_queue_get_batch(struct sbitmap_queue *sbq, int nr_tags, get_mask = ((1UL << map_tags) - 1) << nr; do { val = READ_ONCE(map->word); + if ((val & ~get_mask) != val) + goto next; ret = atomic_long_cmpxchg(ptr, val, get_mask | val); } while (ret != val); get_mask = (get_mask & ~ret) >> nr; @@ -549,6 +551,7 @@ unsigned long __sbitmap_queue_get_batch(struct sbitmap_queue *sbq, int nr_tags, return get_mask; } } +next: /* Jump to next index. */ if (++index >= sb->map_nr) index = 0; diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c index c233b1a4e984..58c1b01ccfe2 100644 --- a/lib/test_kasan.c +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test) ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); /* * An unaligned access past the requested kmalloc size. * Only generic KASAN can precisely detect these. @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_left(struct kunit *test) ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr = *(ptr - 1)); kfree(ptr); } @@ -171,6 +173,7 @@ static void kmalloc_node_oob_right(struct kunit *test) ptr = kmalloc_node(size, GFP_KERNEL, 0); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[0] = ptr[size]); kfree(ptr); } @@ -191,6 +194,7 @@ static void kmalloc_pagealloc_oob_right(struct kunit *test) ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size + OOB_TAG_OFF] = 0); kfree(ptr); @@ -271,6 +275,7 @@ static void kmalloc_large_oob_right(struct kunit *test) ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ptr[size] = 0); kfree(ptr); } @@ -410,6 +415,8 @@ static void kmalloc_oob_16(struct kunit *test) ptr2 = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr2), GFP_KERNEL); KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr2); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr1); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr2); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *ptr1 = *ptr2); kfree(ptr1); kfree(ptr2); @@ -756,6 +763,8 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test) KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); real_size = ksize(ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); + /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */ ptr[size] = 'x'; @@ -778,6 +787,7 @@ static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test) KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr); kfree(ptr); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr)); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]); KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]); |