diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/events/core.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 7c436d705fbd..5bfe8e3c6e44 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -6453,10 +6453,9 @@ perf_output_sample_ustack(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 dump_size, /* Data. */ sp = perf_user_stack_pointer(regs); - fs = get_fs(); - set_fs(USER_DS); + fs = force_uaccess_begin(); rem = __output_copy_user(handle, (void *) sp, dump_size); - set_fs(fs); + force_uaccess_end(fs); dyn_size = dump_size - rem; perf_output_skip(handle, rem); @@ -9644,6 +9643,24 @@ static int perf_event_set_bpf_handler(struct perf_event *event, u32 prog_fd) if (IS_ERR(prog)) return PTR_ERR(prog); + if (event->attr.precise_ip && + prog->call_get_stack && + (!(event->attr.sample_type & __PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN_EARLY) || + event->attr.exclude_callchain_kernel || + event->attr.exclude_callchain_user)) { + /* + * On perf_event with precise_ip, calling bpf_get_stack() + * may trigger unwinder warnings and occasional crashes. + * bpf_get_[stack|stackid] works around this issue by using + * callchain attached to perf_sample_data. If the + * perf_event does not full (kernel and user) callchain + * attached to perf_sample_data, do not allow attaching BPF + * program that calls bpf_get_[stack|stackid]. + */ + bpf_prog_put(prog); + return -EPROTO; + } + event->prog = prog; event->orig_overflow_handler = READ_ONCE(event->overflow_handler); WRITE_ONCE(event->overflow_handler, bpf_overflow_handler); @@ -11585,7 +11602,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, struct perf_event *group_leader = NULL, *output_event = NULL; struct perf_event *event, *sibling; struct perf_event_attr attr; - struct perf_event_context *ctx, *uninitialized_var(gctx); + struct perf_event_context *ctx, *gctx; struct file *event_file = NULL; struct fd group = {NULL, 0}; struct task_struct *task = NULL; @@ -11689,7 +11706,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_task; /* - * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. + * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to @@ -11697,7 +11714,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) goto err_cred; } |