aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c362
1 files changed, 248 insertions, 114 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index cdc43b899f28..a834068a400e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
* - out of bounds or malformed jumps
* The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
* Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
- * analysis is limited to 32k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
+ * analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
* insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
* Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
*
@@ -481,6 +481,13 @@ static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
}
+static void mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
+ u32 regno)
+{
+ mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
+ reset_reg_range_values(regs, regno);
+}
+
enum reg_arg_type {
SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
@@ -532,6 +539,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
switch (type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
@@ -616,7 +624,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
}
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* have read misc data from the stack */
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
return 0;
}
}
@@ -627,7 +636,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
{
struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
- if (off < 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
+ if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
map->value_size, off, size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -635,6 +644,51 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
return 0;
}
+/* check read/write into an adjusted map element */
+static int check_map_access_adj(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ int off, int size)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
+ int err;
+
+ /* We adjusted the register to this map value, so we
+ * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
+ * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
+ * safe.
+ */
+ if (log_level)
+ print_verifier_state(state);
+ env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
+ /* The minimum value is only important with signed
+ * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
+ * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
+ * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
+ * will have a set floor within our range.
+ */
+ if (reg->min_value < 0) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off, size);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
+ regno);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
+ * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
+ */
+ if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
+ verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->max_value + off, size);
+}
+
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -647,6 +701,7 @@ static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
/* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
return false;
+ /* fallthrough */
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
@@ -710,38 +765,56 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
}
}
-static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size)
+static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off, int size)
{
- if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
- if (off % size != 0) {
- verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n",
- off, size);
- return -EACCES;
- } else {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
- /* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */
- return 0;
-
if (reg->id && size != 1) {
- verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n");
+ verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in packet access.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */
- if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
- (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) {
+ if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) {
verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n",
NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int size)
+{
+ if (size != 1) {
+ verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
+static int check_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off, int size)
+{
+ switch (reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_PACKET:
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 :
+ check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size);
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 :
+ check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size);
+ default:
+ if (off % size != 0) {
+ verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n",
+ off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
* if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
* if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
@@ -763,7 +836,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
if (size < 0)
return size;
- err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
+ err = check_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -775,47 +848,13 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
return -EACCES;
}
- /* If we adjusted the register to this map value at all then we
- * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
- * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
- * safe.
- */
- if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
- if (log_level)
- print_verifier_state(state);
- env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
- /* The minimum value is only important with signed
- * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
- * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
- * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
- * will have a set floor within our range.
- */
- if (reg->min_value < 0) {
- verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off,
- size);
- if (err) {
- verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
-
- /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
- * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
- */
- if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
- verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- off += reg->max_value;
- }
- err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
+ if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
+ err = check_map_access_adj(env, regno, off, size);
+ else
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
@@ -827,7 +866,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
}
err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, &reg_type);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
}
@@ -860,7 +900,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
}
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
} else {
verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
@@ -958,6 +999,25 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return 0;
}
+static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
+ int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
+ struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
+
+ switch (regs[regno].type) {
+ case PTR_TO_PACKET:
+ return check_packet_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ return check_map_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
+ return check_map_access_adj(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ default: /* const_imm|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
+ return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ }
+}
+
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
@@ -993,10 +1053,13 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
- arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
+ arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
expected_type = CONST_IMM;
- if (type != expected_type)
+ /* One exception. Allow UNKNOWN_VALUE registers when the
+ * boundaries are known and don't cause unsafe memory accesses
+ */
+ if (type != UNKNOWN_VALUE && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
@@ -1006,8 +1069,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK ||
- arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK) {
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
+ arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
* passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test
@@ -1015,9 +1078,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0)
/* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
- else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
+ else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
+ type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK;
+ meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
} else {
verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1063,9 +1127,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->value_size,
false, NULL);
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
- arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
- bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
+ arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
+ bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
* from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
@@ -1073,14 +1137,50 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (regno == 0) {
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
- verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
+ verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
- err = check_packet_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
- else
- err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
- zero_size_allowed, meta);
+
+ /* If the register is UNKNOWN_VALUE, the access check happens
+ * using its boundaries. Otherwise, just use its imm
+ */
+ if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
+ /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
+ * mode so that the program is required to
+ * initialize all the memory that the helper could
+ * just partially fill up.
+ */
+ meta = NULL;
+
+ if (reg->min_value < 0) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (reg->min_value == 0) {
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
+ zero_size_allowed,
+ meta);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
+ verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
+ reg->max_value,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ /* register is CONST_IMM */
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ }
}
return err;
@@ -1154,15 +1254,15 @@ static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
int count = 0;
- if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
@@ -1316,7 +1416,7 @@ static int check_packet_ptr_add(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
imm = insn->imm;
add_imm:
- if (imm <= 0) {
+ if (imm < 0) {
verbose("addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed\n");
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -1485,22 +1585,54 @@ static int evaluate_reg_imm_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+ u64 dst_imm = dst_reg->imm;
- /* dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM here, simulate execution of 'add'/'or'
- * insn. Don't care about overflow or negative values, just add them
+ /* dst_reg->type == CONST_IMM here. Simulate execution of insns
+ * containing ALU ops. Don't care about overflow or negative
+ * values, just add/sub/... them; registers are in u64.
*/
- if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
- dst_reg->imm += insn->imm;
- else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
- src_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
- dst_reg->imm += src_reg->imm;
- else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
- dst_reg->imm |= insn->imm;
- else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
- src_reg->type == CONST_IMM)
- dst_reg->imm |= src_reg->imm;
- else
+ if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm += insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm += src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_SUB && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm -= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_SUB && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm -= src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_MUL && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm *= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_MUL && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm *= src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm |= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_OR && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm |= src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_AND && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm &= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_AND && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm &= src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_RSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm >>= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_RSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm >>= src_reg->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_LSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ dst_imm <<= insn->imm;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_LSH && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X &&
+ src_reg->type == CONST_IMM) {
+ dst_imm <<= src_reg->imm;
+ } else {
mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dst_reg->imm = dst_imm;
+out:
return 0;
}
@@ -1811,6 +1943,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
* register as unknown.
*/
if (env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+ BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 && opcode == BPF_ADD &&
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ))
dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ;
@@ -1859,14 +1992,15 @@ static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (regs[i].type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
- regs[i].range = dst_reg->off;
+ /* keep the maximum range already checked */
+ regs[i].range = max(regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
- reg->range = dst_reg->off;
+ reg->range = max(reg->range, dst_reg->off);
}
}
@@ -1894,6 +2028,7 @@ static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
case BPF_JGT:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
false_reg->min_value = 0;
+ /* fallthrough */
case BPF_JSGT:
/* If this is false then we know the maximum val is val,
* otherwise we know the min val is val+1.
@@ -1904,6 +2039,7 @@ static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
case BPF_JGE:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
false_reg->min_value = 0;
+ /* fallthrough */
case BPF_JSGE:
/* If this is false then we know the maximum value is val - 1,
* otherwise we know the mimimum value is val.
@@ -1942,6 +2078,7 @@ static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
case BPF_JGT:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
true_reg->min_value = 0;
+ /* fallthrough */
case BPF_JSGT:
/*
* If this is false, then the val is <= the register, if it is
@@ -1953,6 +2090,7 @@ static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
case BPF_JGE:
/* Unsigned comparison, the minimum value is 0. */
true_reg->min_value = 0;
+ /* fallthrough */
case BPF_JSGE:
/* If this is false then constant < register, if it is true then
* the register < constant.
@@ -2144,14 +2282,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
return err;
if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
- /* generic move 64-bit immediate into a register,
- * only analyzer needs to collect the ld_imm value.
- */
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
- if (!env->analyzer_ops)
- return 0;
-
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_IMM;
regs[insn->dst_reg].imm = imm;
return 0;
@@ -2664,7 +2796,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
- verbose("BPF program is too large. Proccessed %d insn\n",
+ verbose("BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
insn_processed);
return -E2BIG;
}
@@ -2729,7 +2861,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (err)
return err;
- reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
insn_idx++;
@@ -3085,10 +3216,14 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
- if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
type = BPF_READ;
- else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
+ else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
type = BPF_WRITE;
else
@@ -3097,8 +3232,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (env->insn_aux_data[i].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
continue;
- cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg,
- insn->off, insn_buf, env->prog);
+ cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
verbose("bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
return -EINVAL;