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path: root/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c14
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
index aa11d07793d4..ecc516d4ab1d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
* queue and asynchronously sending message via
* ice_sq_send_cmd() function
*/
-enum ice_status
+int
ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd)
{
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw,
* sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds
* the permissible number of messages to send.
*/
-static enum ice_status
+static int
ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id,
enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state,
bool *is_malvf)
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap)
* Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse
* the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
*/
-enum ice_status
+int
ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id,
bool *is_malvf)
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq;
enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state;
- enum ice_status status = 0;
+ int status = 0;
if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data)
return ICE_ERR_BAD_PTR;
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
* the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been
* detected in any previous mailbox iterations.
*/
-enum ice_status
+int
ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf)
{
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
* that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going
* through the overflow detection algorithm.
*/
-enum ice_status
+int
ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id)
{
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
* called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number
* of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device.
*/
-enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count)
+int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count)
{
struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;