diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 191 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 190 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index fc77a2bd70ba..fb732296cd36 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -20,133 +20,6 @@ #include "asymmetric_keys.h" #include "x509_parser.h" -static bool use_builtin_keys; -static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; - -#ifndef MODULE -static struct { - struct asymmetric_key_id id; - unsigned char data[10]; -} cakey; - -static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) -{ - if (!str) /* default system keyring */ - return 1; - - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { - struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; - size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; - int ret; - - if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { - pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); - return 1; - } - - ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); - if (ret < 0) - pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); - else - ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ - } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { - use_builtin_keys = true; - } - - return 1; -} -__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); -#endif - -/** - * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. - * @keyring: The keys to search. - * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL. - * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL. - * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. - * - * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is - * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the - * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but - * the latter must also match. - */ -struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *id, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid, - bool partial) -{ - struct key *key; - key_ref_t ref; - const char *lookup; - char *req, *p; - int len; - - if (id) { - lookup = id->data; - len = id->len; - } else { - lookup = skid->data; - len = skid->len; - } - - /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ - p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - if (partial) { - *p++ = 'i'; - *p++ = 'd'; - } else { - *p++ = 'e'; - *p++ = 'x'; - } - *p++ = ':'; - p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len); - *p = 0; - - pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req); - - ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, req); - if (IS_ERR(ref)) - pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref)); - kfree(req); - - if (IS_ERR(ref)) { - switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) { - /* Hide some search errors */ - case -EACCES: - case -ENOTDIR: - case -EAGAIN: - return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - default: - return ERR_CAST(ref); - } - } - - key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref); - if (id && skid) { - const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); - if (!kids->id[1]) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n"); - goto reject; - } - if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n"); - goto reject; - } - } - - pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); - return key; - -reject: - key_put(key); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key); - /* * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature. @@ -277,49 +150,6 @@ not_self_signed: } /* - * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of - * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the - * new certificate as being trusted. - * - * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't - * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there - * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. - */ -static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, - struct key *trust_keyring) -{ - struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; - struct key *key; - int ret = 1; - - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) - return 1; - - if (!trust_keyring) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) - return -EPERM; - if (cert->unsupported_sig) - return -ENOPKG; - - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], - false); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - return PTR_ERR(key); - - if (!use_builtin_keys || - test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) { - ret = public_key_verify_signature( - key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig); - if (ret == -ENOPKG) - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - } - key_put(key); - return ret; -} - -/* * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. */ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) @@ -348,31 +178,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type = "X509"; - /* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate. - * - * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate - * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted - * location. So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this - * case. - * - * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a - * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) - - * in which case it will be marked trusted. - */ - if (cert->unsupported_sig || cert->self_signed) { + if (cert->unsupported_sig) { public_key_signature_free(cert->sig); cert->sig = NULL; } else { pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo); - - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring()); - if (ret) - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring()); - if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) - goto error_free_cert; - if (!ret) - prep->trusted = true; } /* Propose a description */ |