diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 135 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 55 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 24 |
7 files changed, 132 insertions, 145 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index f5e1e60c9095..6c2f1b76a0b6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu) cea_map_stack(NMI); cea_map_stack(DB); cea_map_stack(MCE); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) { + cea_map_stack(VC); + cea_map_stack(VC2); + } + } } #else static inline void percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c index e1664e9f969c..5cd2a88930a9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c @@ -4,46 +4,30 @@ #include <linux/sched/debug.h> #include <xen/xen.h> -#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h> #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/kdebug.h> -typedef bool (*ex_handler_t)(const struct exception_table_entry *, - struct pt_regs *, int, unsigned long, - unsigned long); - static inline unsigned long ex_fixup_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x) { return (unsigned long)&x->fixup + x->fixup; } -static inline ex_handler_t -ex_fixup_handler(const struct exception_table_entry *x) -{ - return (ex_handler_t)((unsigned long)&x->handler + x->handler); -} -__visible bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs) { regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default); -__visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) { - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); regs->ax = trapnr; - return true; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault); /* * Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state. We should never get @@ -55,65 +39,47 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault); * of vulnerability by restoring from the initial state (essentially, zeroing * out all the FPU registers) if we can't restore from the task's FPU state. */ -__visible bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs) { regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing FPU registers.", (void *)instruction_pointer(regs)); - __restore_fpregs_from_fpstate(&init_fpstate, xfeatures_mask_fpstate()); + fpu_reset_from_exception_fixup(); return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fprestore); -__visible bool ex_handler_uaccess(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_uaccess(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) { WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?"); - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); - return true; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_uaccess); -__visible bool ex_handler_copy(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_copy(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr) { WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?"); - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); - regs->ax = trapnr; - return true; + return ex_handler_fault(fixup, regs, trapnr); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_copy); -__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs) { if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip)) show_stack_regs(regs); /* Pretend that the read succeeded and returned 0. */ - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); regs->ax = 0; regs->dx = 0; - return true; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe); -__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs) { if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n", (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, @@ -121,45 +87,29 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup show_stack_regs(regs); /* Pretend that the write succeeded. */ - regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup); - return true; + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe); -__visible bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, - struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, - unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long fault_addr) +static bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs) { if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (__USER_DS)); asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (0)); - return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs, trapnr, error_code, fault_addr); + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs); -enum handler_type ex_get_fault_handler_type(unsigned long ip) +int ex_get_fixup_type(unsigned long ip) { - const struct exception_table_entry *e; - ex_handler_t handler; + const struct exception_table_entry *e = search_exception_tables(ip); - e = search_exception_tables(ip); - if (!e) - return EX_HANDLER_NONE; - handler = ex_fixup_handler(e); - if (handler == ex_handler_fault) - return EX_HANDLER_FAULT; - else if (handler == ex_handler_uaccess || handler == ex_handler_copy) - return EX_HANDLER_UACCESS; - else - return EX_HANDLER_OTHER; + return e ? e->type : EX_TYPE_NONE; } int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long fault_addr) { const struct exception_table_entry *e; - ex_handler_t handler; #ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS if (unlikely(SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) { @@ -179,8 +129,35 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, if (!e) return 0; - handler = ex_fixup_handler(e); - return handler(e, regs, trapnr, error_code, fault_addr); + switch (e->type) { + case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT: + case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE: + return ex_handler_default(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_FAULT: + case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE: + return ex_handler_fault(e, regs, trapnr); + case EX_TYPE_UACCESS: + return ex_handler_uaccess(e, regs, trapnr); + case EX_TYPE_COPY: + return ex_handler_copy(e, regs, trapnr); + case EX_TYPE_CLEAR_FS: + return ex_handler_clear_fs(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_FPU_RESTORE: + return ex_handler_fprestore(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_RDMSR: + return ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_WRMSR: + return ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_BPF: + return ex_handler_bpf(e, regs); + case EX_TYPE_RDMSR_IN_MCE: + ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, false); + break; + case EX_TYPE_WRMSR_IN_MCE: + ex_handler_msr_mce(regs, true); + break; + } + BUG(); } extern unsigned int early_recursion_flag; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 84a2c8c4af73..4bfed53e210e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* VMALLOC_START, ... */ #include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ #include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ +#include <asm/irq_stack.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h> @@ -631,6 +632,9 @@ static noinline void page_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) { +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK + struct stack_info info; +#endif unsigned long flags; int sig; @@ -649,9 +653,7 @@ page_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * that we're in vmalloc space to avoid this. */ if (is_vmalloc_addr((void *)address) && - (((unsigned long)current->stack - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) || - address - ((unsigned long)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE) < PAGE_SIZE)) { - unsigned long stack = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF) - sizeof(void *); + get_stack_guard_info((void *)address, &info)) { /* * We're likely to be running with very little stack space * left. It's plausible that we'd hit this condition but @@ -662,13 +664,11 @@ page_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * and then double-fault, though, because we're likely to * break the console driver and lose most of the stack dump. */ - asm volatile ("movq %[stack], %%rsp\n\t" - "call handle_stack_overflow\n\t" - "1: jmp 1b" - : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT - : "D" ("kernel stack overflow (page fault)"), - "S" (regs), "d" (address), - [stack] "rm" (stack)); + call_on_stack(__this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF) - sizeof(void*), + handle_stack_overflow, + ASM_CALL_ARG3, + , [arg1] "r" (regs), [arg2] "r" (address), [arg3] "r" (&info)); + unreachable(); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 60ade7dd71bd..026031b3b782 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h> -#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res) */ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return 0; switch (res->desc) { @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) */ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc) { - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) @@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr) memunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT /* * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory * that should be mapped decrypted. If the memory is not part of the @@ -555,7 +556,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, case E820_TYPE_NVS: case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE: /* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) break; fallthrough; @@ -693,7 +694,7 @@ static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr, bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long flags) { - if (!mem_encrypt_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return true; if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC) @@ -702,7 +703,7 @@ bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size, if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC) return false; - if (sme_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) || memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size)) return false; @@ -723,12 +724,12 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr, { bool encrypted_prot; - if (!mem_encrypt_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return prot; encrypted_prot = true; - if (sme_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) || memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size)) encrypted_prot = false; @@ -746,7 +747,6 @@ bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size) return arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(phys_addr, size, 0); } -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT /* Remap memory with encryption */ void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index ff08dc463634..23d54b810f08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> #include <linux/virtio_config.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> @@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) struct boot_params *boot_data; unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - if (!sme_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */ @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) struct boot_params *boot_data; unsigned long cmdline_paddr; - if (!sme_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true); @@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++) protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]); - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE; } @@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void) phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); unsigned long size; - if (!sev_active()) + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; /* @@ -360,42 +361,13 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) return early_set_memory_enc_dec(vaddr, size, true); } -/* - * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are - * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The - * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a - * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used. - * - * The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before - * paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV - * will access all memory as encrypted. So, when APs are being brought - * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV - * the trampoline area must be encrypted. - */ -bool sev_active(void) -{ - return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED; -} - -bool sme_active(void) -{ - return sme_me_mask && !sev_active(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active); - -/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */ -bool noinstr sev_es_active(void) -{ - return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED; -} - /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) { /* * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return true; /* @@ -403,7 +375,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the * encryption mask. */ - if (sme_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_limit); @@ -428,7 +400,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. */ - if (mem_encrypt_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages); if (r) { pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n"); @@ -444,7 +416,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:"); /* Secure Memory Encryption */ - if (sme_active()) { + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { /* * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV * features below. @@ -454,11 +426,11 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void) } /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ - if (sev_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) pr_cont(" SEV"); /* Encrypted Register State */ - if (sev_es_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); pr_cont("\n"); @@ -477,7 +449,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) * With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions, * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler. */ - if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active()) + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && + !cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(); @@ -485,6 +458,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void) { - return sev_active(); + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 470b20208430..3f0abb403340 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -27,9 +27,19 @@ #undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL #undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS +/* + * This code runs before CPU feature bits are set. By default, the + * pgtable_l5_enabled() function uses bit X86_FEATURE_LA57 to determine if + * 5-level paging is active, so that won't work here. USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 + * is provided to handle this situation and, instead, use a variable that + * has been set by the early boot code. + */ +#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 + #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -287,7 +297,13 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) unsigned long pgtable_area_len; unsigned long decrypted_base; - if (!sme_active()) + /* + * This is early code, use an open coded check for SME instead of + * using cc_platform_has(). This eliminates worries about removing + * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has() + * function. + */ + if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) return; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index ad8a5c586a35..934dc5b2df36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/libnvdimm.h> #include <linux/vmstat.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ #include <asm/proto.h> #include <asm/memtype.h> #include <asm/set_memory.h> +#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include "../mm_internal.h" @@ -1980,15 +1983,15 @@ int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages) __pgprot(_PAGE_GLOBAL), 0); } -static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) +/* + * __set_memory_enc_pgtable() is used for the hypervisors that get + * informed about "encryption" status via page tables. + */ +static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) { struct cpa_data cpa; int ret; - /* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */ - if (!mem_encrypt_active()) - return 0; - /* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */ if (WARN_ONCE(addr & ~PAGE_MASK, "misaligned address: %#lx\n", addr)) addr &= PAGE_MASK; @@ -2023,6 +2026,17 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) return ret; } +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) +{ + if (hv_is_isolation_supported()) + return hv_set_mem_host_visibility(addr, numpages, !enc); + + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) + return __set_memory_enc_pgtable(addr, numpages, enc); + + return 0; +} + int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, true); |