aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c205
1 files changed, 84 insertions, 121 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b3c83c06f826..f18c2d8c7476 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
#include "posted_intr.h"
MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("KVM support for VMX (Intel VT-x) extensions");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
#ifdef MODULE
@@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
return 0;
}
- if (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+ if (kvm_host.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
return 0;
}
@@ -404,7 +405,7 @@ static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
* and VM-Exit.
*/
vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
- (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+ (kvm_host.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
@@ -1123,12 +1124,12 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
* atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
*/
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
- (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
+ (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ kvm_host.efer) & EFER_NX))) {
if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
- if (guest_efer != host_efer)
+ if (guest_efer != kvm_host.efer)
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
- guest_efer, host_efer, false);
+ guest_efer, kvm_host.efer, false);
else
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
return false;
@@ -1141,7 +1142,7 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
- guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
+ guest_efer |= kvm_host.efer & ignore_bits;
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].data = guest_efer;
vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i].mask = ~ignore_bits;
@@ -1411,6 +1412,38 @@ static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
}
#endif
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+ vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+ ple_window_grow,
+ ple_window_max);
+
+ if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+ vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+ trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+ vmx->ple_window, old);
+ }
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+ vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+ ple_window_shrink,
+ ple_window);
+
+ if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+ vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+ trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+ vmx->ple_window, old);
+ }
+}
+
void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
struct loaded_vmcs *buddy)
{
@@ -1486,6 +1519,9 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ if (vcpu->scheduled_out && !kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+
vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu, NULL);
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
@@ -2525,17 +2561,15 @@ static bool cpu_has_sgx(void)
*/
static bool cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug(void)
{
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
- switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
- case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP: /* AAK155 */
- case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM: /* AAP115 */
- case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE: /* AAT100 */
- case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
- case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX: /* BA97 */
- return true;
- default:
- break;
- }
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm) {
+ case INTEL_NEHALEM_EP: /* AAK155 */
+ case INTEL_NEHALEM: /* AAP115 */
+ case INTEL_WESTMERE: /* AAT100 */
+ case INTEL_WESTMERE_EP: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
+ case INTEL_NEHALEM_EX: /* BA97 */
+ return true;
+ default:
+ break;
}
return false;
@@ -2834,9 +2868,6 @@ int vmx_hardware_enable(void)
return r;
}
- if (enable_ept)
- ept_sync_global();
-
return 0;
}
@@ -4108,26 +4139,6 @@ void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
-bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- void *vapic_page;
- u32 vppr;
- int rvi;
-
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
- !nested_cpu_has_vid(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) ||
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.gfn))
- return false;
-
- rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
-
- vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
- vppr = *((u32 *)(vapic_page + APIC_PROCPRI));
-
- return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
-}
-
void vmx_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -4357,7 +4368,7 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
}
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
- vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+ vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
}
void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -5052,14 +5063,19 @@ int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
return !vmx_nmi_blocked(vcpu);
}
+bool __vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ return !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||
+ (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+ (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
+}
+
bool vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
return false;
- return !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||
- (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
- (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
+ return __vmx_interrupt_blocked(vcpu);
}
int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
@@ -5897,38 +5913,6 @@ int vmx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
-static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
-
- vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
- ple_window_grow,
- ple_window_max);
-
- if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
- trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
- vmx->ple_window, old);
- }
-}
-
-static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
-
- vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
- ple_window_shrink,
- ple_window);
-
- if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
- trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
- vmx->ple_window, old);
- }
-}
-
/*
* Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
* exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
@@ -6677,9 +6661,10 @@ static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
bool flush_l1d;
/*
- * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
- * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
- * VMEXIT handlers.
+ * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again if the vCPU
+ * is reloaded, i.e. if the vCPU is scheduled out or if KVM
+ * exits to userspace, or if KVM reaches one of the unsafe
+ * VMEXIT handlers, e.g. if KVM calls into the emulator.
*/
flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
@@ -7665,39 +7650,25 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
u8 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
- /* We wanted to honor guest CD/MTRR/PAT, but doing so could result in
- * memory aliases with conflicting memory types and sometimes MCEs.
- * We have to be careful as to what are honored and when.
- *
- * For MMIO, guest CD/MTRR are ignored. The EPT memory type is set to
- * UC. The effective memory type is UC or WC depending on guest PAT.
- * This was historically the source of MCEs and we want to be
- * conservative.
- *
- * When there is no need to deal with noncoherent DMA (e.g., no VT-d
- * or VT-d has snoop control), guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all ignored. The
- * EPT memory type is set to WB. The effective memory type is forced
- * WB.
- *
- * Otherwise, we trust guest. Guest CD/MTRR/PAT are all honored. The
- * EPT memory type is used to emulate guest CD/MTRR.
+ /*
+ * Force UC for host MMIO regions, as allowing the guest to access MMIO
+ * with cacheable accesses will result in Machine Checks.
*/
-
if (is_mmio)
return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
- if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
+ /*
+ * Force WB and ignore guest PAT if the VM does NOT have a non-coherent
+ * device attached and the CPU doesn't support self-snoop. Letting the
+ * guest control memory types on Intel CPUs without self-snoop may
+ * result in unexpected behavior, and so KVM's (historical) ABI is to
+ * trust the guest to behave only as a last resort.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP) &&
+ !kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm))
return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
- if (kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_CD)) {
- if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
- return MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
- else
- return (MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) |
- VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
- }
-
- return kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT;
+ return (MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT);
}
static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 new_ctl)
@@ -8179,12 +8150,6 @@ void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
#endif
-void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
-{
- if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
- shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
-}
-
void vmx_update_cpu_dirty_logging(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -8396,18 +8361,16 @@ static void __init vmx_setup_me_spte_mask(void)
u64 me_mask = 0;
/*
- * kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() returns shadow_phys_bits. Use
- * the former to avoid exposing shadow_phys_bits.
- *
* On pre-MKTME system, boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits equals to
- * shadow_phys_bits. On MKTME and/or TDX capable systems,
+ * kvm_host.maxphyaddr. On MKTME and/or TDX capable systems,
* boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits holds the actual physical address
- * w/o the KeyID bits, and shadow_phys_bits equals to MAXPHYADDR
- * reported by CPUID. Those bits between are KeyID bits.
+ * w/o the KeyID bits, and kvm_host.maxphyaddr equals to
+ * MAXPHYADDR reported by CPUID. Those bits between are KeyID bits.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits != kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits())
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits != kvm_host.maxphyaddr)
me_mask = rsvd_bits(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
- kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() - 1);
+ kvm_host.maxphyaddr - 1);
+
/*
* Unlike SME, host kernel doesn't support setting up any
* MKTME KeyID on Intel platforms. No memory encryption
@@ -8629,9 +8592,9 @@ static void __vmx_exit(void)
static void vmx_exit(void)
{
kvm_exit();
+ __vmx_exit();
kvm_x86_vendor_exit();
- __vmx_exit();
}
module_exit(vmx_exit);