diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 15 |
8 files changed, 79 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 510d85261132..da7c361f47e0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) u64 ia32_cap; if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) || - cpu_mitigations_off()) { + boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) || + cpu_mitigations_off()) { mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF; return; } @@ -538,6 +539,8 @@ out: pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); + else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN)) + pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n"); } static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void) @@ -2275,6 +2278,9 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN)) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n"); + if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF) return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]); @@ -2421,6 +2427,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return srbds_show_state(buf); case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA: + case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN: return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: @@ -2480,7 +2487,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char * ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN)) + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN); + else + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); } ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 64a73f415f03..3e508f239098 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1135,7 +1135,8 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6) #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7) #define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8) -#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(9) +#define NO_MMIO BIT(9) +#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(10) #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) @@ -1158,6 +1159,11 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL(VORTEX, 6, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION), /* Intel Family 6 */ + VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), @@ -1176,9 +1182,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously @@ -1193,18 +1199,18 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB), /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ - VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO), /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ - VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS), - VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), + VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO), {} }; @@ -1358,10 +1364,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability, * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may * not want the guest to enumerate the bug. + * + * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist, + * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits. */ - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) && - !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) { + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN); + } if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) { if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c index 24c1bb8eb196..8bdeae2fc309 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c @@ -344,8 +344,11 @@ static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, false); - if (IS_ERR(va_page)) + if (IS_ERR(va_page)) { + if (PTR_ERR(va_page) == -EBUSY) + vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; goto err_out_epc; + } if (va_page) list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c index 515e2a5f25bb..0aad028f04d4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c @@ -49,9 +49,13 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sgx_dirty_page_list); * Reset post-kexec EPC pages to the uninitialized state. The pages are removed * from the input list, and made available for the page allocator. SECS pages * prepending their children in the input list are left intact. + * + * Return 0 when sanitization was successful or kthread was stopped, and the + * number of unsanitized pages otherwise. */ -static void __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list) +static unsigned long __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list) { + unsigned long left_dirty = 0; struct sgx_epc_page *page; LIST_HEAD(dirty); int ret; @@ -59,7 +63,7 @@ static void __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list) /* dirty_page_list is thread-local, no need for a lock: */ while (!list_empty(dirty_page_list)) { if (kthread_should_stop()) - return; + return 0; page = list_first_entry(dirty_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list); @@ -92,12 +96,14 @@ static void __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list) } else { /* The page is not yet clean - move to the dirty list. */ list_move_tail(&page->list, &dirty); + left_dirty++; } cond_resched(); } list_splice(&dirty, dirty_page_list); + return left_dirty; } static bool sgx_reclaimer_age(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page) @@ -395,10 +401,7 @@ static int ksgxd(void *p) * required for SECS pages, whose child pages blocked EREMOVE. */ __sgx_sanitize_pages(&sgx_dirty_page_list); - __sgx_sanitize_pages(&sgx_dirty_page_list); - - /* sanity check: */ - WARN_ON(!list_empty(&sgx_dirty_page_list)); + WARN_ON(__sgx_sanitize_pages(&sgx_dirty_page_list)); while (!kthread_should_stop()) { if (try_to_freeze()) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c index e5dd6da78713..01833ebf5e8e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ int irq_init_percpu_irqstack(unsigned int cpu) return 0; } -#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT +#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTIRQ_ON_OWN_STACK void do_softirq_own_stack(void) { struct irq_stack *irqstk; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c index 74167dc5f55e..4c3c27b6aea3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void kprobe_emulate_jcc(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) match = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) >> X86_EFLAGS_SF_BIT) ^ ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_OF) >> X86_EFLAGS_OF_BIT); if (p->ainsn.jcc.type >= 0xe) - match = match && (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF); + match = match || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF); } __kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, (match && !invert) || (!match && invert)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 63dc626627a0..a428c62330d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -701,7 +701,13 @@ e_term: void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) + /* + * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so + * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has(). + * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data + * in the cc_platform_has() function. + */ + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return; /* @@ -717,7 +723,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) + /* + * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so + * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has(). + * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data + * in the cc_platform_has() function. + */ + if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return; /* Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the RMP table. */ @@ -2100,7 +2112,7 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp) return true; } -void __init snp_abort(void) +void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void) { sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c index 38185aedf7d1..0ea57da92940 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c @@ -93,22 +93,27 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip); static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip) { struct ftrace_ops *ops; - unsigned long caller; + unsigned long tramp_addr, offset; ops = ftrace_ops_trampoline(ip); if (!ops) return NULL; + /* Set tramp_addr to the start of the code copied by the trampoline */ if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) - caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_call; + tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_caller; else - caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_call; + tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_caller; + + /* Now place tramp_addr to the location within the trampoline ip is at */ + offset = ip - ops->trampoline; + tramp_addr += offset; /* Prevent unlikely recursion */ - if (ip == caller) + if (ip == tramp_addr) return NULL; - return orc_find(caller); + return orc_find(tramp_addr); } #else static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip) |