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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c27
13 files changed, 71 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index c42827eb86cf..25f909362b7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -338,10 +338,15 @@ done:
static void __init_or_module optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
if (instr[0] != 0x90)
return;
+ local_irq_save(flags);
add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen);
+ sync_core();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
DUMP_BYTES(instr, a->instrlen, "%p: [%d:%d) optimized NOPs: ",
instr, a->instrlen - a->padlen, a->padlen);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 3ca3e46aa405..24e94ce454e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -336,6 +336,13 @@ static void __setup_APIC_LVTT(unsigned int clocks, int oneshot, int irqen)
apic_write(APIC_LVTT, lvtt_value);
if (lvtt_value & APIC_LVT_TIMER_TSCDEADLINE) {
+ /*
+ * See Intel SDM: TSC-Deadline Mode chapter. In xAPIC mode,
+ * writing to the APIC LVTT and TSC_DEADLINE MSR isn't serialized.
+ * According to Intel, MFENCE can do the serialization here.
+ */
+ asm volatile("mfence" : : : "memory");
+
printk_once(KERN_DEBUG "TSC deadline timer enabled\n");
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
index 38a76f826530..5c60bb162622 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
@@ -2522,6 +2522,7 @@ void __init setup_ioapic_dest(void)
int pin, ioapic, irq, irq_entry;
const struct cpumask *mask;
struct irq_data *idata;
+ struct irq_chip *chip;
if (skip_ioapic_setup == 1)
return;
@@ -2545,9 +2546,9 @@ void __init setup_ioapic_dest(void)
else
mask = apic->target_cpus();
- irq_set_affinity(irq, mask);
+ chip = irq_data_get_irq_chip(idata);
+ chip->irq_set_affinity(idata, mask, false);
}
-
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index 1bbd0fe2c806..836d11b92811 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -489,10 +489,8 @@ static int apic_set_affinity(struct irq_data *irq_data,
err = assign_irq_vector(irq, data, dest);
if (err) {
- struct irq_data *top = irq_get_irq_data(irq);
-
if (assign_irq_vector(irq, data,
- irq_data_get_affinity_mask(top)))
+ irq_data_get_affinity_mask(irq_data)))
pr_err("Failed to recover vector for irq %d\n", irq);
return err;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 07ce52c22ec8..de22ea7ff82f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@ void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
else
printk(KERN_CONT "%d86", c->x86);
- printk(KERN_CONT " (fam: %02x, model: %02x", c->x86, c->x86_model);
+ printk(KERN_CONT " (family: 0x%x, model: 0x%x", c->x86, c->x86_model);
if (c->x86_mask || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
- printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: %02x)\n", c->x86_mask);
+ printk(KERN_CONT ", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_mask);
else
printk(KERN_CONT ")\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
index cd9b6d0b10bf..3fefebfbdf4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c
@@ -2316,9 +2316,12 @@ static struct event_constraint *
intel_get_event_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, int idx,
struct perf_event *event)
{
- struct event_constraint *c1 = cpuc->event_constraint[idx];
+ struct event_constraint *c1 = NULL;
struct event_constraint *c2;
+ if (idx >= 0) /* fake does < 0 */
+ c1 = cpuc->event_constraint[idx];
+
/*
* first time only
* - static constraint: no change across incremental scheduling calls
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
index 54690e885759..d1c0f254afbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static void __bts_event_start(struct perf_event *event)
if (!buf || bts_buffer_is_full(buf, bts))
return;
+ event->hw.itrace_started = 1;
event->hw.state = 0;
if (!buf->snapshot)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
index c80cf6699678..38da8f29a9c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -68,11 +68,10 @@ static inline void *current_stack(void)
return (void *)(current_stack_pointer() & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
}
-static inline int
-execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc, int irq)
+static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc)
{
struct irq_stack *curstk, *irqstk;
- u32 *isp, *prev_esp, arg1, arg2;
+ u32 *isp, *prev_esp, arg1;
curstk = (struct irq_stack *) current_stack();
irqstk = __this_cpu_read(hardirq_stack);
@@ -98,8 +97,8 @@ execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc, int irq)
asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
"call *%%edi \n"
"movl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
- : "=a" (arg1), "=d" (arg2), "=b" (isp)
- : "0" (irq), "1" (desc), "2" (isp),
+ : "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp)
+ : "0" (desc), "1" (isp),
"D" (desc->handle_irq)
: "memory", "cc", "ecx");
return 1;
@@ -150,19 +149,15 @@ void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
bool handle_irq(struct irq_desc *desc, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- unsigned int irq;
- int overflow;
-
- overflow = check_stack_overflow();
+ int overflow = check_stack_overflow();
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc))
return false;
- irq = irq_desc_get_irq(desc);
- if (user_mode(regs) || !execute_on_irq_stack(overflow, desc, irq)) {
+ if (user_mode(regs) || !execute_on_irq_stack(overflow, desc)) {
if (unlikely(overflow))
print_stack_overflow();
- generic_handle_irq_desc(irq, desc);
+ generic_handle_irq_desc(desc);
}
return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
index ff16ccb918f2..c767cf2bc80a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -75,6 +75,6 @@ bool handle_irq(struct irq_desc *desc, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (unlikely(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(desc)))
return false;
- generic_handle_irq_desc(irq_desc_get_irq(desc), desc);
+ generic_handle_irq_desc(desc);
return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc0525f1c1..6acc9dd91f36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(int size)
if (alloc_size > PAGE_SIZE)
new_ldt->entries = vzalloc(alloc_size);
else
- new_ldt->entries = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ new_ldt->entries = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ldt->entries) {
kfree(new_ldt);
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void free_ldt_struct(struct ldt_struct *ldt)
if (ldt->size * LDT_ENTRY_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
vfree(ldt->entries);
else
- kfree(ldt->entries);
+ free_page((unsigned long)ldt->entries);
kfree(ldt);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index 84b8ef82a159..1b55de1267cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ void dma_generic_free_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *vaddr,
bool arch_dma_alloc_attrs(struct device **dev, gfp_t *gfp)
{
- *gfp = dma_alloc_coherent_gfp_flags(*dev, *gfp);
*gfp &= ~(__GFP_DMA | __GFP_HIGHMEM | __GFP_DMA32);
+ *gfp = dma_alloc_coherent_gfp_flags(*dev, *gfp);
if (!*dev)
*dev = &x86_dma_fallback_dev;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index c8d52cb4cb6e..c3f7602cd038 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/nmi.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
+#include <asm/geode.h>
unsigned int __read_mostly cpu_khz; /* TSC clocks / usec, not used here */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_khz);
@@ -1013,15 +1014,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mark_tsc_unstable);
static void __init check_system_tsc_reliable(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_MGEODE_LX
- /* RTSC counts during suspend */
+#if defined(CONFIG_MGEODEGX1) || defined(CONFIG_MGEODE_LX) || defined(CONFIG_X86_GENERIC)
+ if (is_geode_lx()) {
+ /* RTSC counts during suspend */
#define RTSC_SUSP 0x100
- unsigned long res_low, res_high;
+ unsigned long res_low, res_high;
- rdmsr_safe(MSR_GEODE_BUSCONT_CONF0, &res_low, &res_high);
- /* Geode_LX - the OLPC CPU has a very reliable TSC */
- if (res_low & RTSC_SUSP)
- tsc_clocksource_reliable = 1;
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_GEODE_BUSCONT_CONF0, &res_low, &res_high);
+ /* Geode_LX - the OLPC CPU has a very reliable TSC */
+ if (res_low & RTSC_SUSP)
+ tsc_clocksource_reliable = 1;
+ }
#endif
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE))
tsc_clocksource_reliable = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
index abd8b856bd2b..524619351961 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -232,6 +233,32 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus)
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
unsigned long err = 0;
+ err = security_mmap_addr(0);
+ if (err) {
+ /*
+ * vm86 cannot virtualize the address space, so vm86 users
+ * need to manage the low 1MB themselves using mmap. Given
+ * that BIOS places important data in the first page, vm86
+ * is essentially useless if mmap_min_addr != 0. DOSEMU,
+ * for example, won't even bother trying to use vm86 if it
+ * can't map a page at virtual address 0.
+ *
+ * To reduce the available kernel attack surface, simply
+ * disallow vm86(old) for users who cannot mmap at va 0.
+ *
+ * The implementation of security_mmap_addr will allow
+ * suitably privileged users to map va 0 even if
+ * vm.mmap_min_addr is set above 0, and we want this
+ * behavior for vm86 as well, as it ensures that legacy
+ * tools like vbetool will not fail just because of
+ * vm.mmap_min_addr.
+ */
+ pr_info_once("Denied a call to vm86(old) from %s[%d] (uid: %d). Set the vm.mmap_min_addr sysctl to 0 and/or adjust LSM mmap_min_addr policy to enable vm86 if you are using a vm86-based DOS emulator.\n",
+ current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+ from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
if (!vm86) {
if (!(vm86 = kzalloc(sizeof(*vm86), GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
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