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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/s390/kernel/uv.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/uv.c207
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 265fea37e030..fa62fa0e369f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_pin_shared);
*
* @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed
*/
-static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
+static int uv_destroy(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR,
@@ -131,28 +131,40 @@ static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
}
/*
- * The caller must already hold a reference to the page
+ * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio
*/
-int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
+int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio)
{
- struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
int rc;
- get_page(page);
- rc = uv_destroy_page(paddr);
+ /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
+ if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
+ return 0;
+
+ folio_get(folio);
+ rc = uv_destroy(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc)
- clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
- put_page(page);
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
+ folio_put(folio);
return rc;
}
/*
+ * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping.
+ */
+int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte)
+{
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+ return uv_destroy_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte)));
+}
+
+/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it
* accessible to the host for paging (export).
*
* @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be exported
*/
-int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+static int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_CONV_FROM_SEC_STOR,
@@ -166,22 +178,34 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
}
/*
- * The caller must already hold a reference to the page
+ * The caller must already hold a reference to the folio.
*/
-int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+static int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio)
{
- struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
int rc;
- get_page(page);
- rc = uv_convert_from_secure(paddr);
+ /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
+ if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
+ return 0;
+
+ folio_get(folio);
+ rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc)
- clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
- put_page(page);
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
+ folio_put(folio);
return rc;
}
/*
+ * The present PTE still indirectly holds a folio reference through the mapping.
+ */
+int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte)
+{
+ VM_WARN_ON(!pte_present(pte));
+ return uv_convert_from_secure_folio(pfn_folio(pte_pfn(pte)));
+}
+
+/*
* Calculate the expected ref_count for a folio that would otherwise have no
* further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in
* the kernel, but with some slight modifications. We know that a secure
@@ -267,6 +291,36 @@ static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_str
}
/*
+ * Drain LRU caches: the local one on first invocation and the ones of all
+ * CPUs on successive invocations. Returns "true" on the first invocation.
+ */
+static bool drain_lru(bool *drain_lru_called)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we have tried a local drain and the folio refcount
+ * still does not match our expected safe value, try with a
+ * system wide drain. This is needed if the pagevecs holding
+ * the page are on a different CPU.
+ */
+ if (*drain_lru_called) {
+ lru_add_drain_all();
+ /* We give up here, don't retry immediately. */
+ return false;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We are here if the folio refcount does not match the
+ * expected safe value. The main culprits are usually
+ * pagevecs. With lru_add_drain() we drain the pagevecs
+ * on the local CPU so that hopefully the refcount will
+ * reach the expected safe value.
+ */
+ lru_add_drain();
+ *drain_lru_called = true;
+ /* The caller should try again immediately */
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to make a page accessible to a guest.
* If it's brought in the first time, it will be cleared. If
* it has been exported before, it will be decrypted and integrity
@@ -275,7 +329,7 @@ static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_str
int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- bool local_drain = false;
+ bool drain_lru_called = false;
spinlock_t *ptelock;
unsigned long uaddr;
struct folio *folio;
@@ -308,52 +362,63 @@ again:
goto out;
if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) {
folio = page_folio(pte_page(*ptep));
- rc = -EINVAL;
- if (folio_test_large(folio))
- goto unlock;
rc = -EAGAIN;
- if (folio_trylock(folio)) {
+ if (folio_test_large(folio)) {
+ rc = -E2BIG;
+ } else if (folio_trylock(folio)) {
if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
uv_convert_from_secure(PFN_PHYS(folio_pfn(folio)));
rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb);
folio_unlock(folio);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Once we drop the PTL, the folio may get unmapped and
+ * freed immediately. We need a temporary reference.
+ */
+ if (rc == -EAGAIN || rc == -E2BIG)
+ folio_get(folio);
}
-unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
out:
mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
- if (rc == -EAGAIN) {
+ switch (rc) {
+ case -E2BIG:
+ folio_lock(folio);
+ rc = split_folio(folio);
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
+
+ switch (rc) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Splitting succeeded, try again immediately. */
+ goto again;
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ /* Additional folio references. */
+ if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called))
+ goto again;
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ case -EBUSY:
+ /* Unexpected race. */
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -ENXIO;
+ case -EAGAIN:
/*
* If we are here because the UVC returned busy or partial
* completion, this is just a useless check, but it is safe.
*/
folio_wait_writeback(folio);
- } else if (rc == -EBUSY) {
- /*
- * If we have tried a local drain and the folio refcount
- * still does not match our expected safe value, try with a
- * system wide drain. This is needed if the pagevecs holding
- * the page are on a different CPU.
- */
- if (local_drain) {
- lru_add_drain_all();
- /* We give up here, and let the caller try again */
- return -EAGAIN;
- }
- /*
- * We are here if the folio refcount does not match the
- * expected safe value. The main culprits are usually
- * pagevecs. With lru_add_drain() we drain the pagevecs
- * on the local CPU so that hopefully the refcount will
- * reach the expected safe value.
- */
- lru_add_drain();
- local_drain = true;
- /* And now we try again immediately after draining */
- goto again;
- } else if (rc == -ENXIO) {
+ folio_put(folio);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ case -EBUSY:
+ /* Additional folio references. */
+ if (drain_lru(&drain_lru_called))
+ goto again;
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ case -ENXIO:
if (gmap_fault(gmap, gaddr, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
return -EFAULT;
return -EAGAIN;
@@ -388,6 +453,7 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long uaddr;
+ struct folio *folio;
struct page *page;
int rc;
@@ -411,7 +477,8 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
goto out;
- rc = uv_destroy_owned_page(page_to_phys(page));
+ folio = page_folio(page);
+ rc = uv_destroy_folio(folio);
/*
* Fault handlers can race; it is possible that two CPUs will fault
* on the same secure page. One CPU can destroy the page, reboot,
@@ -422,8 +489,8 @@ int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
* we instead try to export the page.
*/
if (rc)
- rc = uv_convert_owned_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
- put_page(page);
+ rc = uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio);
+ folio_put(folio);
out:
mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
return rc;
@@ -431,47 +498,51 @@ out:
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page);
/*
- * To be called with the page locked or with an extra reference! This will
- * prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the page concurrently. Having 2
- * parallel make_page_accessible is fine, as the UV calls will become a
- * no-op if the page is already exported.
+ * To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will
+ * prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the folio concurrently. Having 2
+ * parallel arch_make_folio_accessible is fine, as the UV calls will become a
+ * no-op if the folio is already exported.
*/
-int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page)
+int arch_make_folio_accessible(struct folio *folio)
{
int rc = 0;
- /* Hugepage cannot be protected, so nothing to do */
- if (PageHuge(page))
+ /* See gmap_make_secure(): large folios cannot be secure */
+ if (unlikely(folio_test_large(folio)))
return 0;
/*
- * PG_arch_1 is used in 3 places:
- * 1. for kernel page tables during early boot
- * 2. for storage keys of huge pages and KVM
- * 3. As an indication that this page might be secure. This can
+ * PG_arch_1 is used in 2 places:
+ * 1. for storage keys of hugetlb folios and KVM
+ * 2. As an indication that this small folio might be secure. This can
* overindicate, e.g. we set the bit before calling
* convert_to_secure.
- * As secure pages are never huge, all 3 variants can co-exists.
+ * As secure pages are never large folios, both variants can co-exists.
*/
- if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags))
+ if (!test_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags))
return 0;
- rc = uv_pin_shared(page_to_phys(page));
+ rc = uv_pin_shared(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc) {
- clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
return 0;
}
- rc = uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+ rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
if (!rc) {
- clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags);
return 0;
}
return rc;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_page_accessible);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_folio_accessible);
+int arch_make_page_accessible(struct page *page)
+{
+ return arch_make_folio_accessible(page_folio(page));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_make_page_accessible);
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)