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path: root/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c202
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
index 8fbb6a2e0559..77010b76c150 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
@@ -65,6 +65,77 @@ static u64 __compute_hcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return hcr | (__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HCR_EL2) & ~NV_HCR_GUEST_EXCLUDE);
}
+static void __activate_cptr_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 cptr;
+
+ /*
+ * With VHE (HCR.E2H == 1), accesses to CPACR_EL1 are routed to
+ * CPTR_EL2. In general, CPACR_EL1 has the same layout as CPTR_EL2,
+ * except for some missing controls, such as TAM.
+ * In this case, CPTR_EL2.TAM has the same position with or without
+ * VHE (HCR.E2H == 1) which allows us to use here the CPTR_EL2.TAM
+ * shift value for trapping the AMU accesses.
+ */
+ u64 val = CPACR_ELx_TTA | CPTR_EL2_TAM;
+
+ if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
+ val |= CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
+ if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+ val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
+ } else {
+ __activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
+ }
+
+ if (!vcpu_has_nv(vcpu))
+ goto write;
+
+ /*
+ * The architecture is a bit crap (what a surprise): an EL2 guest
+ * writing to CPTR_EL2 via CPACR_EL1 can't set any of TCPAC or TTA,
+ * as they are RES0 in the guest's view. To work around it, trap the
+ * sucker using the very same bit it can't set...
+ */
+ if (vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu) && is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
+ val |= CPTR_EL2_TCPAC;
+
+ /*
+ * Layer the guest hypervisor's trap configuration on top of our own if
+ * we're in a nested context.
+ */
+ if (is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
+ goto write;
+
+ cptr = vcpu_sanitised_cptr_el2(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Pay attention, there's some interesting detail here.
+ *
+ * The CPTR_EL2.xEN fields are 2 bits wide, although there are only two
+ * meaningful trap states when HCR_EL2.TGE = 0 (running a nested guest):
+ *
+ * - CPTR_EL2.xEN = x0, traps are enabled
+ * - CPTR_EL2.xEN = x1, traps are disabled
+ *
+ * In other words, bit[0] determines if guest accesses trap or not. In
+ * the interest of simplicity, clear the entire field if the guest
+ * hypervisor has traps enabled to dispel any illusion of something more
+ * complicated taking place.
+ */
+ if (!(SYS_FIELD_GET(CPACR_ELx, FPEN, cptr) & BIT(0)))
+ val &= ~CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
+ if (!(SYS_FIELD_GET(CPACR_ELx, ZEN, cptr) & BIT(0)))
+ val &= ~CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
+
+ if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1, S2POE, IMP))
+ val |= cptr & CPACR_ELx_E0POE;
+
+ val |= cptr & CPTR_EL2_TCPAC;
+
+write:
+ write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
+}
+
static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 val;
@@ -91,30 +162,7 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
- val = read_sysreg(cpacr_el1);
- val |= CPACR_ELx_TTA;
- val &= ~(CPACR_ELx_ZEN | CPACR_ELx_SMEN);
-
- /*
- * With VHE (HCR.E2H == 1), accesses to CPACR_EL1 are routed to
- * CPTR_EL2. In general, CPACR_EL1 has the same layout as CPTR_EL2,
- * except for some missing controls, such as TAM.
- * In this case, CPTR_EL2.TAM has the same position with or without
- * VHE (HCR.E2H == 1) which allows us to use here the CPTR_EL2.TAM
- * shift value for trapping the AMU accesses.
- */
-
- val |= CPTR_EL2_TAM;
-
- if (guest_owns_fp_regs()) {
- if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
- val |= CPACR_ELx_ZEN;
- } else {
- val &= ~CPACR_ELx_FPEN;
- __activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
- }
-
- write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
+ __activate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el1);
}
@@ -266,10 +314,111 @@ static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
}
+static bool kvm_hyp_handle_tlbi_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ u32 instr;
+ u64 val;
+
+ /*
+ * Ideally, we would never trap on EL2 S1 TLB invalidations using
+ * the EL1 instructions when the guest's HCR_EL2.{E2H,TGE}=={1,1}.
+ * But "thanks" to FEAT_NV2, we don't trap writes to HCR_EL2,
+ * meaning that we can't track changes to the virtual TGE bit. So we
+ * have to leave HCR_EL2.TTLB set on the host. Oopsie...
+ *
+ * Try and handle these invalidation as quickly as possible, without
+ * fully exiting. Note that we don't need to consider any forwarding
+ * here, as having E2H+TGE set is the very definition of being
+ * InHost.
+ *
+ * For the lesser hypervisors out there that have failed to get on
+ * with the VHE program, we can also handle the nVHE style of EL2
+ * invalidation.
+ */
+ if (!(is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu)))
+ return false;
+
+ instr = esr_sys64_to_sysreg(kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
+ val = vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(vcpu));
+
+ if ((kvm_supported_tlbi_s1e1_op(vcpu, instr) &&
+ vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu) && vcpu_el2_tge_is_set(vcpu)) ||
+ kvm_supported_tlbi_s1e2_op (vcpu, instr))
+ ret = __kvm_tlbi_s1e2(NULL, val, instr);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return false;
+
+ __kvm_skip_instr(vcpu);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_hyp_handle_cpacr_el1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+{
+ u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
+ int rt;
+
+ if (!is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu) || esr_sys64_to_sysreg(esr) != SYS_CPACR_EL1)
+ return false;
+
+ rt = kvm_vcpu_sys_get_rt(vcpu);
+
+ if ((esr & ESR_ELx_SYS64_ISS_DIR_MASK) == ESR_ELx_SYS64_ISS_DIR_READ) {
+ vcpu_set_reg(vcpu, rt, __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, CPTR_EL2));
+ } else {
+ vcpu_write_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_get_reg(vcpu, rt), CPTR_EL2);
+ __activate_cptr_traps(vcpu);
+ }
+
+ __kvm_skip_instr(vcpu);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_hyp_handle_zcr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+{
+ u32 sysreg = esr_sys64_to_sysreg(kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu));
+
+ if (!vcpu_has_nv(vcpu))
+ return false;
+
+ if (sysreg != SYS_ZCR_EL2)
+ return false;
+
+ if (guest_owns_fp_regs())
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * ZCR_EL2 traps are handled in the slow path, with the expectation
+ * that the guest's FP context has already been loaded onto the CPU.
+ *
+ * Load the guest's FP context and unconditionally forward to the
+ * slow path for handling (i.e. return false).
+ */
+ kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(vcpu, exit_code);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
+{
+ if (kvm_hyp_handle_tlbi_el2(vcpu, exit_code))
+ return true;
+
+ if (kvm_hyp_handle_cpacr_el1(vcpu, exit_code))
+ return true;
+
+ if (kvm_hyp_handle_zcr_el2(vcpu, exit_code))
+ return true;
+
+ return kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg(vcpu, exit_code);
+}
+
static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32,
- [ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg,
+ [ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64] = kvm_hyp_handle_sysreg_vhe,
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVE] = kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd,
[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd,
[ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_iabt_low,
@@ -388,7 +537,7 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return ret;
}
-static void __hyp_call_panic(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par)
+static void __noreturn __hyp_call_panic(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par)
{
struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
@@ -413,7 +562,6 @@ void __noreturn hyp_panic(void)
u64 par = read_sysreg_par();
__hyp_call_panic(spsr, elr, par);
- unreachable();
}
asmlinkage void kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void)